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THE BLACKEST PAGE IN MODERN HISTORY

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF POLAND AND THE NEAR EAST

SONGS FROM THE TRENCHES

THE NEW MAP OF ASIA

(1900—1919)

BY

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

AUTHOR OF "THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE," "THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA," ETC.

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

NEW YORK
THE CENTURY CO.
1919

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Published, September, 1919

EUROPEAN EMINENT DOMAIN IN ASIA
BRITISH
FRENCH
JAPANESE
RUSSIAN
RUSSIA
MONGOLIA
CHINA
INDIA
PERSIA
TIBET
CHINESE TURKESTAN
AFGHANISTAN
EASTERN SIBERIA
WESTERN SIBERIA
AMUR
MANCHURIA
KAMCHATKA
Sea of Okhotsk
Japan Sea
Yellow Sea
South China Sea
Bay of Bengal
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Red Sea
Persian Gulf
Gulf of Aden
Gulf of Siam
Arctic
Equator
PEKIN
BOMBAY
MADRAS
CEYLON
SIAM
BANGKOK
FORMOSA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
BORNEO
SUMATRA
DUTCH EAST INDIES
NEW GUINEA
JAPANESE EMPIRE
MUSCAT
KABUL
BOKHARA
KHIVA
BHUTAN
NEPAUL
HAINAN
ENGLISH MILES

To

RODMAN WANAMAKER

FOREWORD

This afternoon I saw two German delegates, followed by a long line of plenipotentiaries of the allied and associated powers, sign the Treaty of Versailles. The ceremony in the Hall of Mirrors, to which the world has been looking forward eagerly since the armistice of November 11, thrilled neither participants nor spectators. Cannon were booming to announce the end of the war and the birth of the League of Nations. But the war was not ended. The League of Nations was not born. The signers knew that the document over which they bent was not the chart of a durable world peace. That is why they were indifferent. Their apathy was communicated to us who looked on.

The futility of the Treaty of Versailles is due to three causes. In its first articles, it creates a league of nations, the possibility of the existence of which is taken away by the stipulations of the rest of the treaty. It attempts to settle a few of the moot questions in Europe and else-

where by the application of force, which means that the decisions arrived at can be maintained only by force and only so long as force continues to be applied. The treaty is silent altogether concerning questions that have been for more than a century as disturbing factors in provoking world wars as were Prussian militarism and the aspirations of Germany.

Since the framers of the Treaty of Versailles limited the changes of the *status quo* solely to territorial and economic matters where the change would be to the disadvantage of Germany, the vast continent of Asia, home of more than half the human race, was affected by but one provision of the treaty. Germany was compelled to renounce "in favor of Japan all her rights, titles and privileges" in the province of Shangtung. This amounted to a solemn affirmation of the doctrine of European eminent domain, extended now to include Japan among the privileged powers. And the reason for the inclusion of Japan was the same reason as for the exclusion of Germany!

"The New Map of Asia," planned several years ago to follow "The New Map of Europe" and "The New Map of Africa," has been writ-

ten during the Peace Conference, with the aim of presenting the principal facts and problems of Asiatic history since 1900 in so far as they are the result of or have been largely influenced by the maintenance and extension of European intervention. My work is incomplete. I have had to pick and choose here and there and to eliminate much of importance. But I trust that the interest of the reader will be aroused to go for fuller information and more competent criticism and discussion to the many excellent books that have been published in recent years on particular phases of contemporary Asiatic history.

To the authors of these books—their names would fill pages—and to the compilers of the "Annual Register," the "Statesmen's Year Book" and the "Japan Year Book," I wish to acknowledge my constant indebtedness. Above all, I have been helped by the Japanese, Chinese, Siamese, Indian, Greek, and Hedjazian plenipotentiaries, and by members of the Japanese, Chinese, Siamese, Persian, Russian, British, Palestinian, Zionist, Syrian, Armenian, Georgian, Korean, and Hellenic delegations. My colleagues of the Japanese press have been particularly kind and helpful. It is a pleasure to take this occasion also

of thanking Mr. T. H. McCarthy for his valuable aid in following certain threads of international diplomacy throughout the war, and my publishers and the editors of the *Century Magazine* and Mr. Rodman Wanamaker for the encouragement and the unique opportunity they have given me to make the studies upon which this book is based.

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS.

Paris, June 28, 1919.

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THE NEW MAP OF ASIA

"If it is true in America that people must be left to govern themselves irrespective of their capacity for the task, then it is also true in Europe, Asia and Africa. The world is not large enough to contain two moralities on a subject like this."

L. CURTIS: *The Problem of the Commonwealh.*

Il faut en tout pays, bourg, village, cité,
Plaine ou mont, proclamer la Sainte Vérité:
Que les peuples ont tous une même origine,
D'Amérique, d'Europe ou d'Afrique ou de Chine,
Tous n'ont qu'une patrie et la même pour tous,
La Terre qui nourrit le moindre d'entre nous.

MIRZA RIZA KHAN,
Persian Delegate to the Hague Convention, 1907.

THE NEW MAP OF ASIA

CHAPTER I

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE APPROACHES TO INDIA

DURING the nineteenth century was developed the British policy of becoming master of every approach to India by land and sea. If the policy was partly unconscious and instinctive, the result is as logical an evolution toward a goal as if every step had been thought out and planned beforehand. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, momentous decisions were taken to make effective and conclusive the work of a hundred years. The unsuccessful attempt of Germany to challenge Britain's world empire made possible the consecration of the British plans by the Conference of Paris. British possession of all the approaches to India is written into the compact of the society of nations.

None can understand the foreign policy of Great Britain, which has inspired military and diplomatic activities from the Napoleonic Wars to the present day, who does not interpret wars, diplomatic conflicts, treaties and alliances, territorial annexations, extensions of protectorates, with the fact of India constantly in mind.

It was for India that the British fought Napoleon in the Mediterranean, Egypt, and Syria. At the Congress of Vienna, Great Britain asked for nothing in Europe. Her reward was the confirmation of her conquest of Malta, the Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Ceylon. After 1815, Great Britain became champion of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in order to bar to any other power the land route to India. When Mohammed Ali, starting from Egypt, sent his armies to overthrow the Ottoman Empire, he found a British fleet and army in Syria, just as Napoleon had found them. Against the natural instinct of the British people, the Foreign Office consistently opposed the affranchisement of the Balkan States, and condoned the massacres of Christians by Moslems. The Crimean War was fought to protect Turkey, and if the treaty of San Stefano had not been re-

nounced, Lord Beaconsfield would have started another war with Russia in 1877. The British Government opposed the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez. But when the canal was an accomplished fact, control by the Suez Company was acquired. The British then did, themselves, what they would have fought any other European nation for trying to do. They made the first breach in the integrity of the Ottoman Empire by the Cyprus Convention and the occupation of Egypt. With Egypt safely in British hands, the Foreign Office did not hesitate to change its Balkan policy. The incorporation of eastern Rumelia in Bulgaria was supported in 1885. Eight years before, British statesmen would not have hesitated to plunge Europe into a bloody war to prevent the formation of a large Bulgaria.

The occupation of Egypt was to have been provisional. The British Government solemnly declared to the other powers that it had no intention of settling permanently on the Nile, and that it would evacuate Egypt "at an early moment." The occupation dragged on. There was always a good reason for not leaving. At the end of the nineteenth century, the British reconquered the Sudan to assure their position in

Egypt and the Red Sea, and fought the Boer War to prevent South Africa from passing out of their hands. The idea of the Cape-to-Cairo Railway—"all British"—was launched. By pushing up the Nile, the British came into contact with the French at Fashoda. If the French had thought it possible, or if they had had allies to help them, they would have declared war against Great Britain. Instead of fighting, the statesmen of the two countries came to an understanding on all colonial questions. This was not hard to accomplish, because the French had set their hearts on Morocco and did not claim any of the approaches to India. On May 8, 1904, an agreement was signed between Great Britain and France, settling their disputes throughout the world. The basis of the compromise was mutual disinterestedness in Egypt and Morocco. The principal factor which led Great Britain into the entente cordiale was a desire to get rid of French intrigue in Egypt. This was necessary to hold permanently the route to India by the Suez Canal.

The agreement with Russia, concluded three years later, was also dictated by the policy of guarding the approaches to India. Russia's pen-

etration into Persia, her arrival on the borders of Afghanistan, and her intrigues in Tibet were the factors which brought about the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907. But in order to understand the working out of British policy in regard to India, it is necessary to follow the development of British activity in putting safeguards around India by land and sea. British initiative was not crowned with success until the years immediately preceding the recent world war. The war with Germany interrupted—even threatened—the approaches to India. But it ended in assuring Great Britain control over all southern Asia from the Mediterranean to the Pacific.

To protect India by sea, the British decided to control the Arabian Sea on the west, the Gulf of Bengal on the east, and all the passages from the Indian Ocean to these waters. In the mind of the British Foreign Office, unquestioned supremacy of the seas meant the occupation of islands; and supremacy of the straits leading to the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Siam, the occupation of the mainlands bordering them. Later, the policy of control was extended to include the littoral of the Arabian Ocean and the Gulf of Siam. Then, it was evident that the littoral

could be made secure only by occupation of the hinterland! From London and Liverpool to Hongkong, the control of the sea could not be maintained by a fleet alone. The result? Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, Aden, Perim, the Sudan on the route to India from the west; Sokotra, the Seychelles, and other islands guarding the Arabian Sea; the Bahrein Islands dominating the Persian Gulf; Ceylon at the tip of India; the islands and mainland of the Gulf of Bengal; Singapore and the Malay Peninsula, and the northern side of Borneo on the route to India from the east.

On land, India is surrounded by Baluchistan; Afghanistan; the Russian provinces of Bokhara and Turkestan; the Chinese provinces of Sinkiang and Tibet; Nepal; Bhutan; and Burma. Since the Government of India annexed Baluchistan and Burma, Persia, the Sze-chuan and Yunnan provinces of China, French Indo-China, and Siam have had common boundaries with India.

The sovereignty of British India was extended over Baluchistan from 1875 to 1903, and over Burma from 1879 to 1909. Because Baluchistan

and Burma were on the sea-coast, the British were satisfied with nothing less than actual political control and effective military occupation. But once started, there is no limit to "safeguards." The appetite grows in eating. When the recent war broke out, Great Britain was ensconcing herself in southern Persia, not with the consent of the Persians, but by reason of an agreement with Russia. Afghanistan was forced to accept British control. In Egypt, not the consent of the Egyptians, but an agreement with France, gave Great Britain what she considered her "rights" on the Nile, and those rights were never satisfied until the head-waters of the Nile were reached.

As the control of southern Persia followed logically the incorporation of Baluchistan into India, expansion at the expense of Siam followed the absorption of Burma. In 1909, Great Britain achieved command of the coast of the Gulf of Bengal by wresting from Siam the tributary states of Kelantan, Trengganu, and Keda. To protect India on the land side, military occupation has followed the sending of punitive expeditions to punish tribesmen for raiding protected

states. New territories occupied became in turn protected, and so the process continued until the great mountain frontiers were reached.

On the confines of India only three independent states remain, Nepal, Bhutan, and Afghanistan. But these states are not independent in fact. They are bound hand and foot to the Government of India. There has been a British Resident in Nepal for a hundred years. The British are allowed to recruit freely for the Indian Army from among the splendid dominant race of Ghurkas, and the prime minister, who is all-powerful, holds the rank of Lieutenant-General in the British Army. The rulers of Afghanistan and Bhutan receive large subsidies on condition of "good behavior," which means doing always what the Government of India says and treating with the outside world only through the Government of India. Part of Bhutan was annexed to Bengal in 1864, and the country has received a British subsidy since 1865. In 1907, the dual control of clergy and laity, which had been in force ever since the British began to occupy India, was done away with in Bhutan. The difficulties in Tibet were a warning that could not be disregarded. A maharaja was elected,

and this gave the British the opportunity to get effective control of the country without conquering it. In consideration of doubling the subsidy, the Bhutan government surrendered control of foreign relations to the British in 1910, and allowed them to occupy two strong positions inside the Bhutan frontier. Judging from the history of the formation of British India, unless we are on the threshold of a radical change in international relations, one is safe in predicting that both Nepal and Bhutan will become integral parts of India in the near future.

The situation in regard to Afghanistan has been different. The treaty of 1893, which followed long and costly wars, gave the British predominance in Afghanistan. But Russia, in her Asiatic expansion, was not disposed to allow Afghanistan to become British without a struggle. Russian imperialism turned against British imperialism its own argument. If the British were alarmed at Russian intrigues in Afghanistan on account of the menace to India, the Russians were equally alarmed at British intrigues on account of the menace to Transcaucasia and Siberia. The Russians did not hesitate to stir up the Afghans and the frontier tribesmen of the north-

west territories against the British. After penetrating Mongolia, the Russians desired to extend their influence over Tibet—and, for exactly the same reason as the British, had been following out their own imperialistic policy. In the minds of British statesmen, Afghanistan and Tibet became the two shields of India. During the first decade of the twentieth century, these two countries, as well as Persia, became—to the Government of India and the British Foreign Office—"safeguards" which must be added to the British Empire. War with Russia was avoided because of the Convention of 1907. In the same decade Germany became a menace to India through the Bagdad Railway conception. Great Britain had determined to allow neither Russia nor Germany to reach the Persian Gulf. Having compounded colonial rivalries with France and Russia, she had no way of arriving at a diplomatic understanding with Germany. The Bagdad Railway question was decided on battlefields from Flanders to Mesopotamia.

CHAPTER II

THE TWO SHIELDS OF INDIA: AFGHANISTAN AND TIBET

AFGHANISTAN is a country of 250,000 square miles, between Persia and the tribes of the Indian northwestern frontier. On the south is Baluchistan, and on the north Bokhara and other Russian territories. The mountains of the north and east and center descend into valleys on the Persian and Baluchistan boundaries. Since the Russian penetration into central Asia, the British have considered the control of Afghanistan of vital importance; for if the Russians had been able to extend their influence over Afghanistan, they could not only have reached the Persian Gulf but also have threatened the Punjab by stirring up the tribesmen of Kafiristan, Waziristan, and Swat.

To include Afghanistan in their sphere of influence, the British did not hesitate to invade the country in 1839, 1842, 1878, and 1880. The mil-

itary operations were on a large scale and exceedingly costly. But after British influence had been thoroughly established in the Punjab and Baluchistan, the problem of threatening Afghanistan was not so difficult as in earlier days. The twentieth century opened, however, with Anglo-Russian rivalry greater than it had ever been before, and it was a common sentiment in British political circles that Great Britain's next great war would be against Russia and France. Russia was threatening British colonial supremacy in Asia, France in Africa. Some British imperialists were outspoken in their advocacy of an entente with Germany against the Franco-Russian menace. The conventions of 1904 and 1907 turned Great Britain from a potential ally for Germany (which was what Cecil Rhodes advocated) into a potential enemy.

After more than twenty years on the throne, Emir Abdul died in September, 1901. Between the two great rivals, Russia and Great Britain, he ruled with discernment and courage. The year before his death, although worried over rumors of Russian aggression, he had refused to fall into a trap laid for him by the Government of India. When the British suggested that Russian pene-

tration could be checked by railway and telegraph construction, undertaken by the British, he thought the remedy as bad as the evil. He allowed his autobiography to be published in November, 1900, in which there was frank criticism of the vacillating, though not disinterested, British policy. He asserted for Afghanistan the right to direct diplomatic relations with London and to an outlet to the ocean, with a port. It was his idea that he should be able to negotiate directly with London. He did not want Afghanistan to be exploited by India in the matter of trade relations. As an indication of his resentment of India's pretension to monopolize Afghan trade, he forbade the export of horses to India and the import of salt from India. Abdul was partisan of a triple alliance with Persia and Turkey, formed to resist attempts to encroach upon the sovereignty of Moslem countries and to exploit them. He maintained that the proper policy for Afghanistan was to be friendly with the least aggressive great power, and hostile to whatever power wished to pass through the country and interfere with its independence.

Although Abdul had no real love for England, he fully recognized the value of the British al-

liance, and was faithful to it. Under his despotic rule, Afghanistan had become united and prosperous, and a regular government, recognized by the tribesmen, had been established. Like Mohammed Ali of Egypt, Abdul was willing to encourage foreign trade and industries under foreign supervision, but not at the cost of loss of independence.

Abdul's successor was his eldest son, Habibullah Khan, a young man of thirty who spoke English and was friendly to the British. He had been well trained by his father and had already exercised authority as regent during Abdul's long absence in Turkestan. The new emir made himself popular with the army by raising the pay, and as he thought he had no competitors for the throne to fear, he issued a proclamation inviting the return of the exiles from India. On the first anniversary of his reign, he announced the intention to enforce his father's plan of compulsory military service.

In 1902, Russia suggested to Great Britain that it would be a great convenience if Russian and Afghan officials on the frontier were allowed to communicate directly for commercial purposes. Although the Russian Government said

that it still recognized the existing agreement by which Russia was excluded from direct diplomatic intercourse with Afghanistan, there was a campaign in the Russian press to urge that the agreement be canceled. Why should not Russia enjoy the same privileges as Great Britain in political and commercial intercourse?

Russia's chances of penetration into the markets and political life of Afghanistan were harmed by the oppressive policy pursued in Turkestan. Four thousand Turkomans and Jamshids emigrated to Herat and were received very cordially by the Afghans. The emir granted them a place for residence. At the end of 1904, however, the British were still worried over the pushing forward of the Russian railways toward the Afghanistan frontier. A mission was sent at the end of the year to Kabul to talk over with the emir a plan of action in case of Russian aggression. It was necessary, also, to make an agreement concerning the tribes on the northwestern frontier. With an eye to business, the mission was instructed to secure also greater facilities for trade between Afghanistan and India.

Sir Lewis Dane's mission was regarded as

distinctly encouraging. The emir consented to renew the treaty his father had made, to accept the arrears of the subsidy which he had steadfastly refused since his accession, and an increase of fifty per cent. of the subsidy. He said he would employ this money to strengthen the defenses of the country. On the evening before the departure of the mission, the emir invited Sir Lewis and other British officers to dinner, together with his courtiers. It was the first time that he or they had eaten with infidels. Nothing definite was secured in the way of new concessions, for Sir Lewis Dane did not want to go too far at the beginning. But it was in his mind to pave the way for the reorganization of the Afghan Army with British officers, and for railways to connect Afghanistan with British India so that British troops could be thrown into Afghanistan quickly in case of a Russian attack. Habibullah Khan had assured Sir Lewis that he would later announce his acceptance of the invitation of the viceroy to visit India.

During these first years of the new reign, the British had been able to render Afghanistan a great service in settling an old boundary dispute with Persia. The river Helmund had been

agreed upon as the boundary between Afghanistan and the Persian province of Seistan in 1872, but the river-bed had moved in thirty years considerably to the west. The Persians claimed the old bed as a boundary and protested against the action of the Afghans in erecting new dams. Colonel MacMahon was sent from Quetta in January, 1903, with a large expedition to map out a new boundary and to arbitrate the quarrel, which was threatening to become serious. After two years' work, both countries accepted Colonel MacMahon's arbitration in new delimitation of boundary line. The British officers and engineers had much opposition on the Persian side on account of Russian intrigue, but succeeded finally in impressing both Persians and Afghans with their sense of fairness and good will in the matter.

In the chapter on Persia, I explain the reasons for and the circumstances leading up to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. This composition of differences between the two great powers influenced the situation in Afghanistan as vitally as in Persia. The following are the provisions of the conventions in regard to Afghanistan:

1. Great Britain disclaims any intention of changing the political position of Afghanistan, and promises neither to take measures in Afghanistan nor to encourage Afghanistan to take measures to threaten Russia. Russia recognizes Afghanistan as outside her sphere of influence, and agrees to act in political relations with Afghanistan through Great Britain and to send no agents to Afghanistan.

2. Great Britain, adhering to the provisions of the Treaty of Kabul of March 21, 1905, undertakes not to annex or occupy any part of Afghanistan or to intervene in the internal administration of the country, with the reservation that the Emir fulfill engagements contracted by him in the Treaty.

3. Russian and Afghan officials in the frontier provinces, or appointed for that purpose on the frontier, may enter into direct relations in order to settle local questions of an unpolitical character.

4. Russia and Great Britain agree to recognize the principle of equality of treatment for commerce so that facilities secured for British and Anglo-Indians, commerce and merchants, shall apply equally to Russian commerce and merchants.

5. These arrangements are not to come into force until Great Britain has notified Russia of the Emir's assent to them.

The convention was a distinct political advantage to Great Britain, in that it made Afghanistan an inviolable buffer state for the protection of India. The fear of Russian aggression was removed. On the other hand, the advantages to Russia were both political and commercial. The

status quo of Afghanistan was maintained and Russia secured most-favored-nation treatment without having to apply force or to continue intrigues which might have a boomerang effect on her own protected states of Bokhara and Khiva.

The emir's reply to the Anglo-Russian Convention was not published, but there can be no doubt that its provisions were considered as satisfactory by him and his subjects. Aside from the stipulation that Afghanistan treat with outside nations through Great Britain, the sovereignty of the emir and the independence of the country were maintained. Equal opportunity for Russian and British commerce took away the greatest source of intrigue and political unrest. If Persia had been treated by the contracting powers in the same way as Afghanistan, much trouble in store for Great Britain in western Asia could have been avoided.

During the last decade of Habibullah Khan's reign the history of Afghanistan presented little of interest. The emir had to put down conspiracies against his life, and to face a storm of fanatical criticism on the part of his subjects when he attempted to introduce European customs and conveniences. He managed, however, to keep

his position, and to strengthen his authority in frontier regions. Roads were built and plans for railway construction made. Telephones were introduced. Caravan routes became safe. As the emir's subjects were still without education, political unrest was confined to palace conspiracies.

The greatest task of Habibullah Khan was to coöperate loyally and effectively with the British to put down feuds among frontier tribes, and to prevent raids into British territory. In 1910, the Indian and Afghan governments reached an agreement that outlaws should be removed to a distance of not less than fifty miles from the border. Except in the Khost Valley, the emir was able to carry out this agreement. The territories of the Indian northwest frontier will not be pacified until they are effectively occupied or until the sale of arms to the tribesmen has been made impossible. The mountainous character of the country and difficulties of communication make the task of policing an onerous and not wholly successful one.

If Great Britain and Russia had not been allies in the present war, the entry of Turkey into the war on Germany's side might have caused trouble for the British in Afghanistan. For-

tunately for British security in India, Russia held strongly northern Persia during the first three years of the war. And before the collapse of Russia, Great Britain was able to reëstablish the military situation in Mesopotamia and southern Persia. So the proclamation of the Holy War did not have in Afghanistan the effect confidently expected by Berlin. When the Viceroy of India notified Habibullah Khan of a state of war between Great Britain and Turkey, the emir expressed his regret and issued a strict neutrality proclamation. A mission sent by Emperor William at the end of 1915 to induce the Afghans to attack India failed. When the mission tried to return to Turkey in May, 1916, some of its members were captured by the Russians and British. Indian revolutionaries were found among them.

Since the Russian revolution Afghanistan has been exposed to anti-British intrigue much more than before. The Russians withdrew from Persia, and there was no barrier against Moslem and pan-Turanian agitators. The collapse of the Russian Empire brought freedom to the emirates north of Afghanistan. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 is no longer recognized by

the Russians. In fact, the Bolshevists declare that one of their aims is to help India recover her independence, and to destroy British imperialism in Asia. The future attitude of Afghanistan toward Great Britain depends largely upon what happens in India and in the native Asiatic states of the former Russian Empire. As far as the Afghans themselves were concerned, the British had no cause for anxiety until the beginning of 1919.

During the Peace Conference, the news arrived in Paris of the assassination of Habibullah Khan. As telegrams from Afghanistan are liberally "edited" in their passage through India and are always late and always meager, different interpretations of the assassination were possible. Some French and British writers feared a recrudescence of anti-foreign agitation, and saw the hand of the Bolshevists. Others attributed the assassination to a palace plot. British official circles declared that it had no international significance. Subsequent events proved that the assassination was directed against British influence in Afghanistan. Not only did the new emir declare his complete independence of Great Britain. He invaded India. Frontier tribes went over to

him. The British found themselves with another Afghan war on their hands. They did not hesitate to bring the Afghans to terms by adopting a policy of frightfulness so universally condemned when it was the Germans who used it. Aëroplanes dropped bombs on Kabul until the emir cried for peace.

Maintaining Afghanistan as a shield to India has been the work of eighty years. Aside from Russia, there was no complication internationally. The other shield to India, Tibet, was not a matter of concern until the twentieth century. British relations with Tibet have meant dealing with China as well as with Russia. The problem could not be disposed of by an agreement with Russia. Ever since Great Britain thought she had the matter arranged, Tibetan affairs have been singularly involved by the rise of the republican movement and by the civil wars in China.

Tibet, a frontier province of China with an area of nearly half a million square miles, has not yet been fully explored by Europeans. No census has been taken for nearly two hundred years: so it is impossible to estimate the population of this remote country, as little known as some parts of South America.

When the British extended their influence northward to the Himalayas and eastward to Burma, the question of trade relations with Tibet arose. The Government of India made treaties with China in 1890 and 1893 to regulate commercial relations with Tibet. But the Tibetans did not want to trade with the outside world. It was impossible to open up satisfactory communications with the fanatical inhabitants of this bleak mountainous region of central Asia. The Tibetan problem had come before the Indian Government several times, especially in the dealings with Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan. Intervention on the part of the British presented many difficulties. There was an unwillingness to offend China, and commercially the game did not seem to be worth the candle. Tibetan hostility to foreigners was a religious question. The head of the government was the dalai lama, who lived in a palace near Lhasa. The lama was at the same time the religious head of the nation, and his court was a monastery. The Tibetans allowed no foreigners to enter or even come near Lhasa. Chinese authority, represented by two ambans, was purely nominal. There were less

than five thousand Chinese troops in the country, divided into three garrisons.

As long as the Tibetans maintained their exclusiveness against all foreigners, the British were content to let well enough alone. But in 1900, the news was published of the visit of an envoy from the dalai lama to Petrograd with a letter and presents to the czar. It was the first time that the spiritual head of Tibet had sent a mission to a European sovereign. It leaked out that the initiative had not been taken by the dalai lama, but that the Russians had secretly sent envoys to the dalai lama some time before. British uneasiness was increased when a second Tibetan mission was received with great ceremony at Petrograd by the czar and czarina in July, 1901. An inspired note in the Russian press stated that the object of the mission was to obtain religious liberties for the Buddhist subjects of the czar! The mission was headed by a former Russian subject, a Buddhist from the Transbaikal Province. As Russia was at this time pursuing an aggressive policy in Mongolia as well as in Manchuria, this open departure from all precedent on the part of the dalai lama cre-

ated much uneasiness at Peking. London was no less worried. A new form of approach to the Indian frontier, and thus a new menace to India, was scented.

The British press began to recall the fact that the Tibetans had invaded Sikkim in 1886 and had not been driven out for two years. The inability to get results from the trade treaties of 1890 and 1893 was also mentioned. It was pointed out that the Chumbi Valley, like Bhutan and Sikkim, was geographically a part of India, and that former ideas of annexing it had been given up only out of deference to the feelings of China. But now that Tibet was in relations with Russia, British India had a right to ask that old-standing boundary questions be settled, and that trade relations be enforced. Great Britain, however, unlike Russia, would respect the sovereignty of China and treat through Peking.

In response to a suggestion from China that frontier and trade questions be discussed on the spot, Great Britain informed China in May, 1903, that the Viceroy of India would appoint commissioners to meet Chinese and Tibetan representatives at the nearest inhabited place on the Tibet side of the frontier.

Colonel Younghusband was appointed British commissioner. Taking with him the British political officer of Sikkim, he went to meet the Chinese and Tibetan envoys at Khamba Jong in July, 1903. This town was in Tibetan territory, north of Sikkim, on the other side of the great Himalayan passes. At the end of the year, the Chinese and Tibetan envoys had not yet arrived, but Colonel Younghusband was letting no grass grow under his feet. A British-Indian force of three thousand had been concentrated, and road-building was pushed in order to make feasible the invasion of Tibet. Nothing less than the forcible opening up of Tibet and the placing of a British Resident at Lhasa was contemplated by the Government of India. The policy was clear, as it had been in other cases. In order to prevent Tibet from falling under Russian influence, it was to be controlled by Great Britain without regard for the feelings of either the suzerain state or of the Tibetans themselves. If the Tibetans opposed Colonel Younghusband's mission—which was nothing less than a military expedition—they were to be shot down in their own country.

The London press began to speak of the neces-

sity of a clear understanding between Great Britain and Tibet. But there was agitation in Liberal circles about the methods the Indian Government proposed to employ, and questions were asked in parliament. The Russian ambassador in London warned Lord Lansdowne that Russia would view with apprehension an attempt to disturb the *status quo* in Tibet, and denied that Russia had designs upon Tibet. It was necessary for the Foreign Office to publish a Blue Book which covered the disputes and negotiations between India and Tibet and China from 1874 to 1904. The official despatches revealed the proposal of the Indian Government to send a military expedition to Lhasa, and establish a permanent Resident there, *before opening negotiations.* The home government had refused to sanction this proposal, but had yielded in principle to the invasion of Tibet. Colonel Younghusband was to be permitted to advance as far as Gyangtse, but was told not to use force unless the mission was attacked or communications threatened, and was instructed to withdraw as soon as negotiations were completed.

None who knew the feeling of the Tibetans doubted their strong disinclination to open up

their country to outsiders, and it seemed certain that the Younghusband mission would meet with opposition. The British military authorities had no illusions. The elaborate preparations and the size of the "guard" demonstrated that hostilities were expected. Early in 1904, Colonel Younghusband crossed the Tang Pass. When no envoys appeared, the advance on Gyangtse began.

The Tibetans were defeated in three engagements during ten days. Their weapons were ludicrously inadequate and their leadership inexperienced. The British killed six hundred, including the Tibetan general, in the first engagement, and took two hundred prisoners. But after the expedition had reached Gyangtse, the Tibetans persisted in the hopeless sacrifice. Colonel Younghusband sent a letter to the dalai lama, fixing June 25 as limit for a response and declaring that if no answer were received, the British would march on Lhasa. The letter was returned unopened. Colonel Younghusband received reinforcements and occupied Lhasa on August 3. The battles were really massacres, as the British lost only thirty-seven, while fifteen hundred Tibetans were killed in all.

The dalai lama fled to Mongolia, but the Tibetans were compelled to sign a treaty with Great Britain on September 7. The terms of the treaty were that Tibet should be opened up to trade; that British consent should be obtained before making territorial concessions to other foreign powers; that no other foreign power should intervene in Tibetan affairs or send representatives or agents into Tibet; and that no power should be granted commercial concessions without similar or equivalent concessions being given to the British. An indemnity of five hundred thousand pounds was imposed. The British were to continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity was paid and until trade marts had been open for three years.

As a strong feeling of protest arose in parliament, not only on account of the injustice to the Tibetans but for fear that permanent occupation of the Chumbi Valley might offend China, London reduced the indemnity to one third. In view of Russian and Japanese aggression in the Far East, the British legation at Peking was anxious not to have its influence impaired. The real object of the expedition was to show the Tibetans that Great Britain would not tolerate

Russian influence in any country bordering on India.

Not until April 27, 1906, were the British and Chinese able to come to an agreement regarding Tibet. China accepted the Younghusband treaty in a modified form. Great Britain promised not to annex Tibetan territory or interfere with the administration of the country, while China agreed to prevent intervention by any other power and to be responsible for the payment of the reduced indemnity.

The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 put an end to the conflict over Tibet. Both powers agreed to recognize Tibet as under the suzerainty of China, to respect its territorial integrity, to abstain from intervention in internal administration, to refrain from sending representatives to Lhasa, and to treat with Tibet only through China. Great Britain's "special interest" to maintain the present régime was recognized by Russia. But both powers bound themselves not to seek or obtain on their own account—or on behalf of their subjects—railway, road, telegraph, or mining concessions or other rights in Tibet, or to send even scientific missions into the country before 1911!

The mutual hands-off policy adopted by Great Britain and Russia in regard to Tibet, and the continued absence of the dalai lama from Lhasa, gave China the opportunity of establishing effective control over the country. The defeat of Russia by Japan had encouraged national movements throughout Asia. The year 1908 was notable for the birth among all Asiatic peoples of a new spirit whose influence was felt from Constantinople to Peking. China became as jealous of her territorial integrity as Turkey. The Chinese determined to make their suzerainty in Tibet a reality. The army was reorganized with Chinese officers, trade agents were sent to many places, and settlement by Chinese peasant farmers was encouraged. At the end of September, 1908, the dalai lama visited Peking. His desire to be recognized by China as the sovereign of Tibet was met by the answer that even his spiritual power depended upon China. A year later, when the dalai lama returned to Lhasa, he found the Chinese in effective military occupation. The Chinese amban had become the viceroy of a real Chinese province. When the dalai lama attempted to restore the old order of the days before the Younghusband expedition,

Chinese troops entered Lhasa and shot down the Tibetans who desired to aid their old ruler in reëstablishing his sovereignty. The dalai lama fled to India. An imperial edict was issued at Peking deposing him.

The revolution of 1912 led to a mutiny of the Chinese troops at Lhasa, whose pay and supplies had been cut off. When they looted the monasteries, the Tibetans were strong enough to expel them, and they had to leave Tibet by way of India. The dalai lama returned to Lhasa and was able to secure a decree from Peking giving back to him his old position with all its power and privileges.

When the Chinese Government prepared to reconquer the country, the British intervened at Peking and warned China that any attempt to make Tibet a Chinese province again would be strongly opposed. At the suggestion of the British, Chinese and Tibetan delegates met in India in 1913 to arrange for the relations between the two countries. The dalai lama cultivated friendly relations with the British in order to prevent the Chinese from returning to Tibet. At the outbreak of the war in 1914, the relations between China and Tibet were not yet clearly

established. It seems certain, however, that the dalai lama had been successful in availing himself of the influence of the Indian Government against a recrudescence of Chinese nationalistic aspirations. Telegrams from India announced that he had offered to contribute a Tibetan regiment to the war against Germany.

In the decade between the Younghusband expedition and the European war, trade relations with Tibet proved increasingly profitable to the British, in spite of the inaccessibility of the country and the great cost of transportation over the high Himalaya passes. During the first three years of the war, trade increased fifty per cent. over the figures of 1914. Most of Tibet's exports to India were raw wool, and imports from India, Manchester cotton piece goods.

Added to the advantage of lucrative trade, the British profited by the opening up of Tibet in making more secure the Indian frontiers north of Assam and northeast of Burma. At the beginning of the war, survey and exploration work was being carried on in order to establish natural boundary lines between India and China, administrative control had been extended over parts of the Burma frontier tribal area, and a new dis-

trict, Patas, had been peacefully established.

The participation of China in the world war on the side of the Entente did not bring to the enemies of Germany all the advantages that were expected. For China was in the midst of a political and social evolution that relegated the European conflict to the background. China was in the throes of civil war during the whole of 1918. Tibet did not escape being a battle-field. At the end of the year, it was reported that the Tibetans had freed their country from Chinese invaders. But one is permitted to wonder whether the war in Tibet was racial or politico-social. Has it been Tibetans against Chinese, or narrow traditions against new ideas? The latter seems the more probable. If the Chinese Republic emerges from the civil war a strong federal organism, imbued with the spirit of the twentieth century and destined to "Europeanize" China, Tibet, instead of being a shield to India, may become the point of contact of Japan and China with India in the movement to give Asia to the Asiatics.

CHAPTER III

INDIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

THE title of no people to rule over another is more questionable in its origin and in its development than that of the British to rule over the Indians. What fair-minded Englishman could read the history of the East India Company and continue to believe that his fellow-countrymen of the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century fought and worked in India from the burning desire to help the Indian races to a higher civilization? The builders of the British Empire in India had admirable qualities—qualities essential to the making of successful pirates and freebooters—resourcefulness, persistence, and military genius developed under extraordinarily difficult circumstances. Ruffians though they were, earlier British administrators were free from cant. They did not hesitate to admit that they were out for the loot, and that might made right. They did

not attempt to justify their actions. They did not speak of the blessings of the *pax britannica,* and they never got angry over the unwillingness of their victims to laud their efforts.

During the course of the nineteenth century, the British Government substituted itself for the East India Company, but did not change the old system. Directly administered territories were constantly added to the inheritance of the East India Company but did not change the old system. A host of British functionaries and a large British army were quartered on the country, and their salaries charged to Indian revenues. Indian troops were raised and trained to fight against other Indians to forge more deeply the bonds of economic and political serfdom. In 1876, Queen Victoria assumed the title of Empress of India. The British Crown is represented in India by a viceroy, who with the Secretary of State for India, a member of the British cabinet, has virtually unlimited power. The various parliamentary statutes under which India was governed were consolidated into the Government of India Act, passed in 1915 and amended in 1916. Slight changes, under pressure of Indian agitation, were suggested to par-

liament in 1918 that would give some Indians a small measure of self-government. The Indians are now demanding full self-government. This is one of the great questions confronting British statesmen in the period of reconstruction. But a strenuous effort is being made in London to prevent the League of Nations from having anything to do with India. The Indian question is considered as an internal British question.

How blind men are to the signs of the times! In the fifteen provinces of India under direct administrative control, and ruled by British law, live two hundred and fifty millions, mostly Aryans. The protected states of central India, whose rulers have managed to preserve their thrones and a semblance of independence, contain seventy millions. In all, the Government of India holds sway over one fifth of the inhabitants of the world, whose discontent with the present form of British rule grows rapidly every year. Unless a serious effort is made to administer India for the benefit of the Indians and give the Indians the opportunity of attaining self-government, it is hardly probable that the Society of Nations will be able to consider India as an internal British problem. India is the foyer for

political unrest throughout Asia, the repercussion of which is influencing profoundly the entire world. Interwoven with the course of events in India are the problems of Persia, Central Asia, Siberia, and China. Within the limits of India, seventy million Mohammedans proclaim their inability to remain indifferent to what is going on in the Mohammedan world. Did they not recently protest at Paris against the expulsion of the Sultan of Turkey from Constantinople?

The movement for self-government that swept across Asia in the first decade of the twentieth century was nowhere more enthusiastically and intelligently taken up than in India. The Indian people had real grievances against the British, social and economic as well as political. Socially, the handful of British military and civilian officials were becoming more and more arrogant in their attitude toward the natives. The gulf separating the British from the people of the country was widening. No Britisher tolerates assumption of social equality on the part of a native, even though ruler of a large state. A maharaja told me in 1916: "The limit of endurance has been reached. We cannot stand the British much longer." Economically, famines

are more and more frequent, and the British authorities seem to be less able to cope with them than formerly. Trade returns show that England is taking a hundred and fifty million dollars every year out of India with no commercial or material return. This has been going on so long that India has become the most impoverished country in the world. Politically, the agitation against absolute British rule has grown threatening in the past ten years, and at no time have the British been more alarmed than in the winter following the Entente triumph over Germany.

Contemporary books on Indian political and economic life are almost invariably polemical. The writer develops a brief pro or contra. The champion of British rule, however, confines himself to generalities and assertions unsupported by facts or figures. He tells you what would happen to India if the British loosened their control, and justifies repression of agitation for self-government on the ground that order must be maintained. I have read a great number of articles and several books on the British side. Not one of them contains statistics to point out benefits to the Indian population resulting from British rule. There is no disposition to study export

and import figures, agriculture, sanitation, development of educational facilities, and to compare the social and economic status of the Indian under native rule with that of the Indian under direct British rule. The reading of books like Captain Trotter's "History of India," published by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, and Lovat Fraser's "India under Curzon and After," causes one to realize the perverted or rather unawakened moral sense of intelligent and high-minded Englishmen, when it is a question of India. Some of the finest men I have ever known have served Great Britain in India in a military or civilian capacity. It never occurred to them to question their right to draw large salaries from a starving people against their will, to raid and shoot down frontier tribes, to flog and condemn to death Indians for acting precisely as they would have acted under similar circumstances. Inability to see any wrong in Great Britain's actions toward India is an inherited moral quirk of Britishers. The Britisher is sincere in his patriotism. He believes he is serving his country, if not humanity. But if he would analyze the motives behind British rule in India and his presence there, he could not escape the conclusion

that bearing the white man's burden means (1) selling goods in a market where others do not enjoy an equal opportunity; (2) preference in investment and concession privileges; (3) getting on the pay-roll.[1]

Reading books on India is like traveling in India. You visit big cities, you attend Durbars and military reviews. You are called upon to admire railway construction and irrigation and plague hospitals and governmental machinery. The histories are full of military expeditions and ceremonies and viceregal achievements. And the people at whose expense the show is mounted? One goes through hundreds of pages. The people are not mentioned except in case of an outbreak. Then the writer tells you of a successful punitive expedition or of a trial, ending in the condemnation of the agitators. The Nationalist leader, Mr. Lajpat Rai, expresses the Indian's point of view in a verse of four lines:

[1] If it be objected that orderly government is sufficient compensation to India for commercial exploitation, the ready reply is forthcoming that the administration is paid for separately in hard Indian cash; and far from being a philanthropic service, provides congenial and remunerative employment for a large number of Englishmen who could not have found the same opportunity elsewhere.—Richard Jebb: *Studies in Colonial Nationalism* (London, 1905), p. 322.

The toad beneath the harrow knows
Exactly where each tooth-point goes.
The butterfly upon the road
Preaches contentment to the toad.

Within the scope of this volume, it is impossible to discuss the problems of British rule in India. During the recent war, two books were written that put the problem of India before the world. Mr. H. M. Hyndman was not allowed by the British censor to publish his "Awakening of Asia" until after the armistice had been signed. Mr. Hyndman's ancestors served Great Britain in India. He has been a close student of and writer upon Indian affairs for more than forty years. "England's Debt to India" is a compilation of what Britishers, past and present, have said and written about the relations between Great Britain and India. Mr. Lajpat Rai has suffered personally at the hands of the British and is a bitter opponent of the present form of British rule. But his bias does not affect, of course, the value of the hundreds of textual quotations. Although more than two years have passed since Mr. Rai's book was published, I have looked in vain for a refutation or rectification of the facts it sets forth.

The Nationalist movement first became menacing in 1907. It has continued ever since, and has developed strong leaders. The methods of repression adopted by the British have had the disastrous effect of destroying the confidence of the Indians in the just administration of law, always the strongest hold of the British on subject races. It was not until prominent Indians had been arrested, imprisoned, and transported without trial or even accusation, that the Indians resorted to terrorism and bomb-throwing. Defiance of law and justice was fought with its own weapons. When political offenders were hanged in batches of ten, some without any evidence against them at all, the Nationalists resorted to assassination. When students were flogged without having been given a chance to defend themselves, because they were not told of what crime they were accused, Indian universities became centers of anti-British agitation. In 1910, the Press Act took away the freedom of the press. In 1911, the right of assembly was denied the Indians by the enactment of the Seditious Meetings Act. In 1913, the Criminal Law Amendment Act amended Indian law of conspiracy by making it penal to conspire to com-

mit an offense, even though the conspiracy was accompanied by no overt act in pursuance of its object. This gave the British authorities a legal cover, which they had before lacked, for arbitrary arrest. There is no Habeas Corpus Act in India. A John Hampden would be regarded as a Bolshevist or an anarchist, and treated as such.

On the eve of the great war, the British authorities had come to recognize that rigorous repression of criticism of the government was excellent propaganda for the Nationalist movement. None could close his eyes to the warning to the British Government in the unprecedented action of the Municipal Council of Bombay, which ordered the public markets closed for eight days as a protest against a sedition trial under the new repressive laws. Some degree of self-government, some participation in good posts on the pay-roll, had to be granted to the Indians. The most crying of economic injustices, the stifling of the Indian cotton industry for the benefit of English manufacturers, was attacked by Anglo-Indian officials, who admonished London against the folly of continuing this traditional barefaced exploitation in disregard of the growing agitation. A significant change had taken place. Na-

tionalism was no longer confined to editors and students. Merchants and landowners were being contaminated. Encouragement was coming even from princes whose personal fortunes were naturally on the side of the British.

At this moment the war broke out. As usual, India was called upon to aid England. Indian troops reached the battle-fields of France before Kitchener's volunteer army. Indians served at Gallipoli and in Egypt. The Mesopotamian Expedition was undertaken and financed by the Government of India. The Indian princes came to the front with munificent gifts and offers of service. Most important of all, the announcement was made that "the people of India" gave a "gift" of one hundred million pounds to the British Exchequer. The Indians had nothing whatever to do with the transaction, which the London "Nation" described as "merely a case of one official in India signaling to another in England." Said the "Nation":

> This is sheer dishonesty. India is not self-governing, and this particular action is not the action of a body justly claiming to represent the will or interests of the Indian people. The people of India have no voice in this or any other act of government, and, if they had, they

would be forced to think twice before contributing out of their dire poverty this huge sum to the resources of their wealthy rulers. Nor ought a poor subject people already burdened with large increases of war taxation to be compelled by its Government to make this gift.

Indian public opinion, however, accepted the enormous levy, as well as military service in the war against Germany. As in Egypt, the Nationalists who went over to the German side and worked for the victory of Germany were very few and of secondary importance. Men of position and intelligence among Egyptian and Indian Nationalists had no illusions about Germany. They were not fools enough to compromise the justice and the triumph of their cause by conspiring with a nation that was fighting for the very antithesis of Nationalist principles. On the other hand, from the first days of the war, British statesmen declared unequivocally that the war against Germany was not a war for territorial or commercial aggrandizement. The British people had drawn the sword solely for the defense of the principle of the right of nations to govern themselves. These declarations were accepted by the Indians as a solemn pledge on the part of the British, who bound themselves to the fulfill-

ment of these ideals by the very fact that they made Indians pay for the war and fight.

No British official denied the necessity of recognizing the obligation. In the dark days of the war, the British cabinet appreciated the loyalty and aid of India. There was a tendency to be liberal in the reforms proposed and the measure of self-government granted to the Indians. The inclination of the British Government to do the right thing was strengthened by two significant facts. Mohammedans and Hindus had arrived at an understanding to work together in pressing claims for self-government. In 1916, the British viceroy held a conference with Indian princes at Delhi. He was astonished—and not a little alarmed—to be confronted by Hindu rulers of every grade and sect sitting side by side with Mohammedan chieftains. And they chose as their spokesman one of the most enlightened princes of India, the Gaikwar of Baroda, whose relations with the British had been strained ever since the king's visit. The gaikwar was accused of lacking in deference to the Emperor of India.

Lord Chelmsford, Viceroy of India, and Mr. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, were

asked by the British Government to make a report on India, embodying proposals for administrative and legislative concessions that might safely be granted to the people of India after the war as a token of Great Britain's appreciation of India's participation in the war. But powerful influences combined to prevent any change in the system of government. Former Anglo-Indian officials, who were drawing comfortable pensions in England from India, and functionaries high up on the pay-roll were united in the determination to preserve undiminished the places and the power of British officials in India.

The proposals of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report would have been hailed with satisfaction by the small number of Indians interested a generation ago in the amelioration of political and economic conditions. But at the end of a great war, fought to establish the liberty of all races, and in the prosecution of which India had contributed blood and treasure, the attempt to preserve the autocratic central government and English officialdom graft could not be successful. It was too late. At a special congress, which met in Bombay at the end of August, 1918, held in conjunction with a meeting of the All-India Moslem

League at the same time and place, representative Indian patriots passed resolutions setting forth the *minimum* that Hindus and Moslems were willing to accept in the way of reforms and concessions. The second and third resolutions indicate the present temper of the Indian people:

RESOLUTION II: That this Congress re-affirms the principles of reform contained in the Resolutions relating to Self-Government adopted in the Indian National Congress and the All-India Moslem League held at Lucknow in December, 1916, and at Calcutta in December, 1917, and declares that nothing less than Self-Government within the Empire can satisfy the Indian people and, by enabling it to take its rightful place as a free and Self-Governing Nation in the British Commonwealth, strengthen the connexion between Great Britain and India.

RESOLUTION III: That this Congress declares that the people of India are fit for responsible Government, and repudiates the assumption to the contrary contained in the Report on Indian Constitutional reforms.

The Bombay Congress demanded the recognition by the British Parliament of the rights of the people of India as British citizens; equality before the law; right of open and lawful trial; free press; and that "corporal punishment shall not be inflicted upon any Indian subject of His Majesty save under conditions applying equally to all other British subjects." Hindus and Mos-

lems were unanimous in asking for the immediate institution of responsible government, as in other portions of the empire, and declared that the Montagu-Chelmsford Report contained "proposals as a whole disappointing and unsatisfactory."

The counter-proposals of the Indians stipulated the abolition of the Privy Council; an adequate Indian element in the Council of India; the choice of four fifths of the members of the Legislative Assembly by election; India's control of her own finances; the promise of Great Britain to establish full responsible government within fifteen years; the granting of at least twenty-five per cent. of commissions in the Indian Army to Indians, the proportion to be gradually increased, and the right to trial by peers and the Habeas Corpus Act for Indians. Not a single one of these demands was unreasonable. The Indians simply asked for rights in their own country that the British had won and deemed precious and indispensable in their country.

Hindus and Moslems were united, also, in asking that India be represented at the Peace Conference in the same manner as other portions of the British Empire, not by delegates chosen in

London but by genuine representatives of the Indian people.

Like the Egyptian and Irish questions, the Indian question was not courageously faced by the British Government at the time of the Peace Conference. Repression was attempted, and British officials tried to explain away Indian nationalism as a German scheme promoted by German gold, or as the work of Bolshevist agents. The result was a serious uprising in March, 1919.

If British public opinion refuses to listen to the cry of India and regards the agitation as insincere and instigated by Germans and Russians, a terrible awakening is in store for the British. The unrest in India in 1919 has far deeper causes —causes inherent in the history of the past century of exploitation, oppression, and failure to give India material compensation to justify alien rule. The average life of the Indian is twenty-three years; of the Englishman, forty years; of the New Zealander, sixty years. In 1850, the average earning of an Indian was four cents a day. This sum fell to three cents a day in 1882, and to one and a half cents a day in 1900. The majority of the population of India goes through life without ever having enough to eat. This

state of affairs did not exist before England started to drain India of her wealth. It exists in no other portion of the world's surface. It does not exist in neighboring equally densely populated countries that are not directly under British rule.

The Secretary of State for India, Mr. Montagu, in prefacing his proposals for reform, admitted the inconsistency of denying liberty to India. He said:

> Attention is repeatedly called to the fact that in Europe, Britain is fighting on the side of liberty, and it is urged that Britain cannot deny to the people of India that for which she is herself fighting in Europe, and in the fight for which she has been helped by India's blood and treasure.

CHAPTER IV

BRITISH ASIATIC COLONIES AND PROTECTORATES

FROM Cyprus to Wei-hai-wei, the British flag waves over islands and peninsulas and ports at every strategic point in the southern half of the continent of Asia. It requires only a glance at the map to see that the British have succeeded in establishing themselves in places where they control the paths of the sea. Without the strongest navy in the world, their hold on southern Asia would be precarious. Mistress of the sea, Great Britain fears no rival. She commands: Europeans and Asiatics and Americans alike must obey. The commercial advantage of this thorough Asiatic extension of British eminent domain is incalculable. Lucky are the manufacturers and merchants born Britons—if they desire to trade any here. In southern Asia the handicap in their favor is greater than elsewhere. And that is saying a great deal!

Starting with Asia Minor and ending with China, they have Cyprus, the Isthmus of Suez; Perim Island; Aden; the islands of Abd-el-Keru and Sokotra; the Kuria Muria Islands and Bay; the Bahrein Islands; Koweit; the southern coast of Persia; Afghanistan and Baluchistan; the peninsula of India; the Laccadive and the Maldive Islands; Chagos Archipelago; Ceylon; Burma; the Andaman and the Nicobar Islands; the Federated Malay States; Singapore; Sarawak, Brunei, and British North Borneo; Hongkong; and Wei-hai-wei.

Cyprus keeps guard over the eastern Mediterranean, Syria, and Egypt. Perim Island and Aden control the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb at the outlet of the Red Sea. The islands of Abd-el-Keru and Sokotra, off Cape Guardafui, are sentinels at the entrance of the Gulf of Aden. On the southeastern side of the Arabian peninsula, the Kuria Muria Islands and Bay make a precious coaling-station of a kind that the British were willing to fight to prevent France from obtaining. The Bahrein Islands dominate the Persian Gulf, with Koweit at the upper end of the gulf. Possession of the Laccadive and the Maldive Islands, the Chagos Archipelago, and Ceylon,

makes India secure. The Andaman and the Nicobar Islands watch over the western exit from Malacca Strait, while the Federated Malay States and Singapore give Great Britain control of Malacca Strait. Sarawak, Brunei, and British North Borneo are on the strategically important side of the Dutch island of Borneo. British North Borneo is close to the Sulu Archipelago and other islands of the Philippine group. Hongkong is the great port of southern China. Wei-hai-wei, near the end of the Shantung peninsula opposite Port Arthur, stands ready to dispute with Japan the control of the exit to the sea of the most important and populous portion of the Chinese Empire.

Including India and her dependencies (but excluding Afghanistan and the parts of Persia, Asiatic Russia, and the Ottoman Empire occupied since 1914), the British have gained possession of 2,100,000 square miles in Asia, with a population of 360,000,000. In these vast dominions live only 170,000 Europeans and Americans, of whom a third are not British subjects! If we do not count government officials and missionaries, the European residents of British possessions in Asia are few and far between.

BRITISH ASIATIC COLONIES

In the British Empire there are four forms of attachment to Great Britain: self-governing dominions, colonies, protectorates, and dependencies. The last of these terms is vague. Sometimes—and this is the case in several instances in Asia—a British dependency is a country over which administrative control has not been extended or which has not been formally recognized as a protectorate. It is simply within the British "sphere of influence." Other powers must keep out!

The Government of India is rapidly evolving into a self-governing dominion in the sense that its affairs, and in a large measure its policies, are not under the direct control of London. In fact, the Government of India is not infrequently in conflict with the British Foreign Office. But the autonomy does not extend to giving the people of the country a voice in the government. One might say that British India is an autocratic government in the hands of an official caste of foreigners, supported by native rulers. Outside of the Indian peninsula, Burma, the Andaman, and the Nicobar Islands and a portion of Baluchistan are provinces. The rest of Baluchistan is controlled by India, partly as a protectorate and

partly as dependencies. Aden (with Perim, Sokotra, and the Kuria Muria Islands) belongs to the Indian province of Bombay, while the Laccadive Islands are incorporated in the Madras Presidency. The Bahrein Islands, Koweit, Afghanistan, and Sikkim are protectorates of India.

Depending directly upon London are: *Colonies*—Ceylon (with the Maldive Islands), Cyprus, Hongkong, Wei-hai-wei and the Straits Settlements (with Christmas Island and the Cocos Islands); *Protectorates*—the Malay States (five of which are federated under one administration), British North Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak; *Dependencies*—Nepal, Bhutan, Tibet, and the Yangtse Valley of China.

British India is dealt with in another chapter. Here we shall try to give the salient features of British administration and the recent events in the territories controlled by Great Britain that do not depend upon the Government of India.

Ceylon, taken from the Dutch during the Napoleonic Wars, became a colony at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Dutch had never exercised any control over the interior. But the British were able to pacify the island in fif-

teen years, partly by conquest but mostly by aiding the native kings against rebels. For a hundred years the British have experienced remarkably little difficulty in the administration of Ceylon. Its population of four and a half millions is composed mostly of Sinhalese and Tamils, invaders from India who virtually exterminated the native tribes and brought with them the religions of India. On the tea estates are half a million Tamils, immigrants of recent years from southern India. The colony is one of the richest British possessions, and is self-supporting. Most of its shipping and trade are with India and Great Britain, and the larger portion of expenditures for garrisons is taken from local revenue. The British authorities have managed the finances of the colony admirably. Its public debt is small and accounted for in the construction of railways, roads, harbor works and other public utilities. Little has been done, however, for education. Although the European population is less than ten thousand, one fifth of the money for schools appropriated from public revenues is given to the foreign communities. Until after the outbreak of the recent war, the native population of Ceylon was uncontaminated by the po-

litical unrest prevailing in India. Serious riots broke out at Kandy in June, 1915, and spread to Colombo and other towns. Martial law had to be proclaimed in five provinces of the island. Since 1915, the British have had on their hands the problem of political agitation.

The island of Cyprus passed under British control by a secret convention signed at Constantinople in 1878. It was not ceded by the sultan. The British were allowed to administer Cyprus in return for an annual tribute and the promise of support in maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Five years later, however, the British installed themselves in Egypt. The status of Cyprus was like that of Egypt—a part of the Ottoman Empire, paying tribute—until Turkey joined the Central powers in the recent war. On November 5, 1914, Great Britain annexed Cyprus. Eighty per cent. of the three hundred thousand inhabitants are Greeks, who have for many years been agitating for the union of Cyprus with Greece. In 1915, the British Government offered to give the island to Greece in return for intervention in the war on the side of the Entente. King Constantine refused. But as Greece later came into the war, the

Greeks confidently expect that Cyprus will be ceded to them on the basis of the principle of nationalities.

Hongkong is an island at the mouth of the Canton River, the cession of which was wrung from China after the inglorious opium war of 1841. Twenty years later, the colony was increased by the seizure of the peninsula of Kaulung, opposite the island. Great Britain took advantage of the weakness of China after the war with Japan to quintuple the area of the colony by the lease of more than three hundred additional square miles of mainland. Half a million Chinese are now living under British rule in the Hongkong colony and leased territory. Since 1900, the British have worked feverishly to increase their political and economic influence on the mainland. In 1901, the Waglan lighthouse was taken over by the colonial government. In 1904, a large district of high land was set aside for exclusive European settlement. In 1905, British influence on the mainland was extended by lending money to the viceroy at Wu-chang to pay off the American concession-holders of the railway line. In 1906, the British opposed bitterly an effort of the Chinese at Canton to construct a

Chinese-owned railway to a point outside of the British colony. Since the rise of republican feeling in China, the British have had to deal with a growing agitation among the Chinese to recover possession of what the Chinese consider as one of their most important ports. When it was realized that the revolutionary movement had succeeded, there was an outburst of national feeling in Hongkong, and republican flags were flown from all the houses and carried in processions. The British suppressed with severity the attempted political demonstration, and passed a special law "for the preservation of peace." In July, 1912, there was an attempt to assassinate the new governor of the colony at the moment he landed. The assailant, who declared at his trial that he was actuated by no personal malice but by love of his country, was sentenced to imprisonment for life. The following month, the custom-houses were attacked and the police station in the Hongkong Extension. In December, 1912, when the British refused to accept Chinese coins on the tramways, the trams were boycotted. The British retaliated by threatening to levy an extra tax from the native population to provide compensation for the loss sustained through the boy-

cott. In recent years, the Chinese have been paralyzed by the civil war between North and South. There can be no doubt, however, that Young China will endeavor within the next generation to expel all foreign political influence from China. The aim of the Chinese is to get back their sovereignty.

The lease of Wei-hai-wei, like that of the extension in Hongkong, was secured by Great Britain at the time of the disgraceful scramble of 1898. Besides the port and the bay, it includes the island of Liu-kung, all the islands in the bay, and a depth of ten English miles along the entire coast of the bay. At the beginning of 1901, Wei-hai-wei was transferred from the War Office to the Colonial Office, and a commissioner appointed to administer the leased territory under the laws and ordinances of Hongkong. This action foreshadowed the announcement of the following year that the British Government had abandoned the idea of fortifying the port and keeping a large garrison there. The British looked with alarm upon the establishment of naval stations on the Chinese cost by rival European powers. For half a century, they alone had enjoyed this advantage with Hongkong, and British

diplomacy at Peking was being exercised to stiffen the backbone of the Chinese. Under these circumstances, fortifying Wei-hai-wei would have been illogical. Why should not the leased territories acquired by the powers remain unfortified? The British said they intended to use Wei-hai-wei as a sanatorium and vacation center. They would limit its naval use to an aëroplane base, and the bay would be used only for small-arm naval practice. After the Russo-Japanese War, the consent of China to transfer the rights of Russia in Port Arthur to Japan was considered to settle the status of Wei-hai-wei. For Wei-hai-wei had been leased to the British Government on the understanding that it would be returned to China when Russia returned Port Arthur. Since Japan was to remain in Port Arthur, the British would remain in Wei-hai-wei. The leased territory was made a colony, and the Chinese Government was summoned to recognize Wei-hai-wei as a foreign port on the same footing as Hongkong. The future of the port and the leased territory around it now depends upon how Japan acts in the Shangtung peninsula. If Japan intends to stay in Shangtung, the British may change their minds about the naval base. They

will certainly endeavor to extend their economic influence in the hinterland of the port, and arrive at an agreement with Japan to divide up Shangtung. Wei-hai-wei is an admirable sanatorium: its climate is unsurpassed in the Far East. But it also gives Great Britain a valuable strategic foothold in North China!

In the southeast corner of Asia, a long narrow peninsula extends for ten degrees beyond the continent. From its geographical position, the Malay Peninsula belongs to the East Indies, almost all of which have managed to remain under the Dutch flag. In this part of the world, the British, however, have been as tireless as elsewhere in a long and successful effort to control the passages of the sea. South from Burma along the western coast, the British have encroached upon Siam down to the neck of the peninsula. The southern portion of the peninsula is entirely in their possession. They control also the northern end of Borneo and the Borneo coast of the China Sea.

Singapore is an island at the tip of the Malay Peninsula. At the other entrance of the Malacca Straits is the island of Penang. In the China Sea off the coast of British North Borneo is the island of Labuan. The three islands are the

links which enable the cable from India to Hongkong to be wholly in British territory. Together with three enclaves—Province Wellesley, the Dindings, and Malacca—on the Malacca Strait side of the Malay Peninsula, they form what is known as the Straits Settlement Colony. They were detached from India and put directly under the Crown in 1867. In the first years of the twentieth century, Christmas Island, the Cocos Islands, and Labuan Island were annexed to the settlement of Singapore. The territories of the Straits Settlements were "detached" from the sultanates of the peninsula, which in turn were put under British protection. The Malays have either gradually left or have not increased lately in number in the colony. The largest part of the population consists of Chinese immigrants, although nearly a hundred thousand natives of India have immigrated to the colony during the past twenty years. The wealth of the Straits Settlements is in transit trade. Singapore has become the mart for the entire peninsula, and is the administrative capital of all the British possessions in this corner of Asia. The governor is High Commissioner of the Federated Malay States and

other protectorates, and Agent for North Borneo and Sarawak.

Since 1911, the population of the Straits Settlements has increased by a hundred thousand, principally by immigration. The revenue of the colony is one of the most striking examples of the financial advantage—in direct cash—to the British Crown of colonial possessions. In 1916, the profit from the colony was three and a half million dollars, in addition to grants made to Britain's war chest. It was at Penang that the German cruiser *Emden* appeared suddenly in October, 1914, and sank a Russian cruiser and a French destroyer. Singapore was the scene of a serious riot at the beginning of 1915. On February 15, nearly a thousand members of the Indian Fifth Light Infantry mutinied and killed some of their officers. For two days they were masters of the situation. Then French, Russian, and Japanese war-ships arrived and aided the white population in putting down the rebellion. Many of the mutineers escaped to the jungle. The authorities had them trailed down by Dyak headhunters. There were seventy deaths among the whites, including many civilians.

North of Singapore is the Sultanate of Johore, which is inhabited mostly by Chinese. In 1910, at the request of the sultan, it became a protectorate. Four sultanates north of Johore—Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang—combined in July, 1896, to form the Federated Malay States, under British protection. This was the triumph of twenty years of tireless effort on the part of British advisers. The sultanates had long been under British protection, but their number in the beginning was nearly twenty. By successive consolidation it became possible to form a confederation. Since they were put under a common government, the Federated Malay States have been endowed with an excellent railway system to the Province Wellesley and to Singapore. From Province Wellesley there is now a connection north to Bangkok. The area of the federated sultanates is twenty-seven thousand square miles, with a total population of about a million. Chinese and Malays are pretty evenly divided. A third of the Chinese, however, is floating mine population. Tin- and gold-mines make the protectorates wealthy, as there is an export duty on tin. The revenue of the states in 1916 showed a surplus of sixty per cent., eleven

million dollars resting in the coffers after all expenses were paid. Immigration from India is allowed and encouraged. Indians are now nearly twenty per cent. of the population. As in the case of most protectorate treaties, the "protected" are bound to furnish troops for the defense of the neighboring British colony when Great Britain is at war with any nation.

North of the Federated States, extending to the narrower portion of the peninsula, the British have added to their dominions at the expense of Siam. On March 10, 1909, Siam transferred her rights over the sultanates of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Trengganu. The population of a million consists almost entirely of Mohammedan Malays. The trade of these new protectorates, now chiefly with the Straits Settlements and India, is growing rapidly, stimulated by railway development.

In 1842, Sir James Brooke secured from the Sultan of Brunei a concession of the Lupar River valley and the gulf on the northwest coast of Borneo into which the river ran. By gradual extensions of the concession in 1851, 1885, and 1890, the Brooke family increased its holdings for four hundred miles to the northeast until little was

left of the Sultanate of Brunei. Sir James Brooke, interpreting his concessions as cessions, created an independent state and took the title of "raja." The interior boundary of the state, as it was begun and increased during the latter half of the nineteenth century, followed the range of mountains which formed a watershed. Navigable rivers, running west and north, give access to the interior. In 1888, Sarawak—as Sir James Brooke called his country—and what was left of the Sultanate of Brunei were placed under British protection. In 1912, Raja Brooke, son of the founder, outlined a scheme to form a council of former inhabitants of Sarawak to provide for the support of the government against possible European intrigue to impair the independence and integrity of the country. "Then," he said, "I can end my life in happiness and contentment." The Sarawak Government Agency and Advisory Council, instituted in London in November, 1912, with headquarters in London, is a link between Great Britain and Sarawak as well as a trustee of invested money and financial advisory body. The grandson of the founder succeeded to the title on May 17, 1917. Sarawak trades mostly with Singapore. There is no public debt and the

revenue appreciably exceeds expenditures. Large quantities of coal, petroleum, and gold give promise of greater prosperity still.

Part of British North Borneo was acquired by a grant from the Sultan of Sulu, whose archipelago extends almost to the coast of Borneo. But the greater portion came from the Sultan of Brunei, as in the case of Sarawak. The grants were for economic development and the territory was simply under the jurisdiction of the British North Borneo Company for the purposes of trade and exploitation of mineral and forest and agricultural wealth. In 1888, the British Government proclaimed a protectorate, and in 1898 rounded out the state by further annexations from Brunei. The protectorate, developed in an extensive way, has a great future.

Narrowed down by the successive encroachments by the British on each side, Brunei was compelled to accept British protection in 1888, and to sign a treaty granting the administration of the state to a British Resident in 1906. As an illustration of how the concession and protectorate theory works out under European practices, a comparative table of Sarawak, British North Borneo, and Brunei furnishes food for thought.

	Area	*Population*	*Revenue*
Sarawak	42,000 sq. m.	500,000	£180,000
Brit. North Borneo ...	31,106 sq. m.	210,000	250,000
Brunei	4,000 sq. m.	30,000	15,000

Sarawak and British North Borneo have no public debts. But Brunei owes £51,300. These certainly are interesting figures, especially when we consider that Brunei was virtually all this country (with the exception of a bit belonging to the Sultan of Sulu) before the grandfather of the present sultan started giving concessions. How we do groan under the white man's burden!

CHAPTER V

PARING DOWN SIAM

SHORTLY after the entry of Siam into the war against Germany, a member of the Siamese royal family brought me a manuscript to read. It was the graduation thesis he was offering at the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques. In it I found:

We hold to national independence above everything else, and will sacrifice everything to that. At no price do we wish to submit ourselves to the political domination or influence of a foreign Power. The Siamese have a developed national conscience, and are worthy to constitute a State. It is evident that if States do not wish reciprocally to recognize the independence of each other, international law will not be able to develop on a solid and durable basis. The natural tendency of this state of things is that certain Powers try to establish domination over weaker States in such a way as to arrogate to themselves the right to dictate the laws which these Powers esteem are necessary for the weaker States.

The excuse is a difference of civilization. But one cannot establish scientific criteria of classification. The criterion adopted and practiced must be that of force, and of physical force alone, without taking into consideration intellectual and moral elements. The error is

natural among the large States: for when a big fellow meets a little fellow, his quantitative superiority naturally leads him to the conclusion that he has a qualitative superiority.

When I asked the prince whether these words applied to Germany, and if the feeling expressed in them was the cause of Siam's decision to enter the war, he smiled the inscrutable smile of the Orient. Ten years at a famous English public school and Oxford, during the formative period of life, had not made his smile more easy to fathom than if he had just come from Bangkok. "Siam," he said, "does not know much about Germany. My country entered the war for a very simple reason. Like China, we followed the United States. We wanted to benefit by the application of the American principles for which, and for no others, President Wilson said the American people would fight. If you want to understand why we are asking for a voice at the Peace Conference, just study the history of Siam during the past twenty years."

As I did want to understand, I took the prince's advice.

On the eastern peninsula of southern Asia, Siam is the only country which has preserved its

independence against the encroachments of European eminent domain. Caught in a vise between British and French, what sovereignty they have managed to maintain the Siamese owe to the mutual jealousy of their neighbors. In the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, Siam, pared down to the narrowest possible limits, was left independent because French and British statesmen could not agree as to which should rule at Bangkok. France and Great Britain used the pretext of freeing Burmese, Cambodians, Annamites, and other races from Siamese suzerainty as a means of increasing their own colonial empires. During the last thirty years, Siam has been robbed of portions of her sea-coast as well as of the great valley of the Mekong, leading to China. For the preservation of her sovereignty within the present boundaries, Siam has had to fight hard and consent to the sacrifice of all her borderlands, even when yielding territory meant serious economic handicaps. The history of French and British diplomacy in Siam is a practical exposition of the working of European colonial policy in Asia. Never once have considerations of right and justice entered into the minds of the statesmen and diplomats, the generals and admirals,

who bullied Siam. The criterion adopted and practised has been that of force, of physical force alone.

Relations between Siam and France were most friendly until France began to penetrate into the hinterland of Indo-China. As effective administrative control was extended over the kingdoms of Cambodia, Annam, and Tonking, the French found forests and mineral wealth which they desired to exploit. Wherever Siamese sovereignty interfered with concessions the French planned to establish, the old historical claims of the three kingdoms they had conquered were revived and pushed to the extreme limit. Siam refused to consider France as the inheritor of these claims. A French fleet blockaded Bangkok, and Siam was compelled to sign a treaty under threat of bombardment. She accepted without discussion the French interpretation of frontiers with Indo-China. The Siamese would have resigned themselves to this injustice. But the French did not intend to let the occasion slip to get complete control of Siam.

Article VIII of the treaty of October 3, 1893, read: "The French Government reserves the right to establish Consuls where it deems the

presence of Consuls necessary for protecting the interests of its subjects (*ressortissants*)." Up to this time, France had maintained a consulate only at Bangkok. As foreigners in Siam enjoyed the privileges of a capitulatory régime, the consuls of the European powers at Bangkok exercised judicial authority over the citizens of their respective nations. The system of capitulatory institutions in Oriental countries had its origin in the differences in laws, customs, and religion, which necessitated special exceptions for foreigners in order that it might be possible for traders to settle in the country. The granting of capitulatory privileges was not disadvantageous to the non-European states: for the presence of foreigners brought the benefit of opening up trade with the outside world. But since France had become a colonial power in the Far East, she used the privileges accorded by the capitulations in a way contrary to their spirit.

The word *ressortissant* is a technical legal expression. France claimed as *ressortissants* not only the natives of the kingdoms she had conquered, but also Chinese immigrants into Siam, who were induced to enroll themselves at the consulate in order to have the benefit of French

protection. These Asiatics were not different from the Siamese in civilization. Putting them under French consular authority was against the *raison d'être* of the capitulations, and an abuse of good faith. Article VIII of the treaty of 1893 was used by the French to impair the sovereignty of Siam and to undermine Siamese authority in frontier districts coveted by France. Between 1893 and 1896, the number of *ressortissants* inscribed in the French consulates increased from two hundred to thirty thousand! French consuls had upon their books in 1896 twenty times as many Chinese as the British.

The intention of the French to make Siam a French protectorate became apparent. Siam questioned the right of the French consuls to afford protection to others than French citizens, arguing that no difference of race, religion, or civilization could be invoked to justify subtracting French protégés from the control of Siamese laws. France answered that Siam must be "Europeanized." The King of Siam appointed a commission to draw up a penal code. He reformed the magistrature, and established a law school at Bangkok. In her fight for existence, Siam turned to Great Britain for aid.

PARING DOWN SIAM

Although the British had long been planning to detach outlying territories from Siam, they did not look with favor upon similar French schemes of territorial aggrandizement. So it was intimated to the Siamese minister at London that the British were willing to revise the stipulations of their own capitulatory treaty. An Anglo-Siamese treaty was signed in 1899 limiting Great Britain's right of protection. Categories were established. Children of the fourth generation born in Siam and illegitimate children were deprived of capitulatory rights, even if their parents were British subjects. As to Asiatics born in British dominions or in territories of princes under the suzerainty of or allied to Great Britain, and to Asiatics naturalized in Great Britain, the capitulatory régime was not to extend beyond the second generation. Great Britain agreed also to inscribe no new protégés on her consular books in Siam. These concessions led M. Delcassé (who had begun to work for an entente cordiale with Great Britain) to consent to a revision of protégés on the same principles as had been agreed to by Great Britain and other powers. In 1902 he proposed to limit the French right of protection to Cambodians and other

bona-fide subjects, and to give orders that no more Chinese be inscribed. But the French press and Chamber of Deputies did not approve the Delcassé agreement. It was not ratified, and no change was made in the French system.

In the meantime, other complaints had been accumulating against France. Although the Siamese had loyally fulfilled the stipulations of the treaty of 1893, the French had not carried out their side of the bargain. In 1901 Siam demanded that France fulfil the promise to evacuate the port of Chentabun, and to allow Siam to resume jurisdiction in the neutral zone along the Mekong River and in the Angkor-Battambang district, which was an integral part of Siamese territory. The French, however, now demanded further concessions. They wanted to extend their jurisdiction across the Mekong, to have exclusive commercial privileges in the Mekong Valley, and to force Siam to employ Frenchmen in Siamese government service.

The Convention of Paris, drawn up on October 7, 1902, was an attempt to come to an understanding between Siam and France. M. Delcassé realized that the rapprochement with Great Britain necessitated abandoning the French

dream of a protectorate over Siam. He was willing to make modifications in the abuses of the capitulatory régime, and to let the Siamese have garrisons on the right bank of the Mekong. But Siam was to cede twenty thousand square kilometers of territory and to give French capital priority in all concessions in the Mekong Valley. The proposed treaty was a one-sided bargain in favor of France. All Siam would have gotten out of it was a renewal of the promise France had several times made to fulfil the obligations assumed by her in the earlier treaty of 1893. And yet the French Colonial Party would have none of it. In 1903, Siam again tried to get support from Great Britain against French aggression. This time she received scant encouragement. The British themselves were encroaching upon Siamese sovereignty from the west and the south, and had decided to use Siam as one of the pawns in their game to arrive at a colonial agreement with France.

The Anglo-French Convention of 1904, which settled moot questions all over the world, defined the attitude of France and Great Britain toward Siam. Siam was no more consulted in the matter than Egypt, Morocco, and the other countries

whose future was being decided upon. The two great colonial powers had exclusively in mind their own political and commercial interests. Great Britain recognized the right of France to extend her influence in the eastern provinces of Siam in return for French recognition of Great Britain's right to detach other Siamese territory in the neck of the peninsula.

Given a free hand by the British, M. Delcassé did not wait until the secret negotiations between London and Paris were completed. On February 13, 1904, the Siamese were forced to sign a treaty, whose terms were an acceptance of everything the French thought it possible to exact. Nearly eight thousand square miles of Siamese territory passed to France in the northeast and southeast, and the French seized the port of Krat. A more extended "neutral zone," *to be policed by Cambodians under French officers,* was mapped out, and a railway authorized, built by the French, in this "neutral zone"! In regard to the question of French protégés in Siam, the arrangement drafted in 1902 was accepted by France in a modified form, but France refused to allow Siamese officials to participate in the revision of the list of protégés. This treaty did not satisfy the Co-


CHINA
TONKING
Gulf of Tonking
HAINAN
BURMA
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ANNAM
SIAM
BANGKOK
CAMBODIA
KRAT
COCHIN CHINA
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CHINA
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lonial Party in France any more than the Convention of 1902. Although the French Nationalist press maintained that nothing short of annexation would satisfy "the legitimate aspirations of France," it soon became clear that the Anglo-French Convention did not admit the extension of French sovereignty over all of Siam. But the French went the limit. In 1907 France presented a revised treaty to Siam. No discussion was possible. Siam ceded "the neutral zone" of the treaty of 1904, and granted a "perpetual lease" of four ports in the upper Mekong Valley. In return for the loss of twelve thousand more square miles, Siam got back the port of Krat, and the consent of France to making Asiatic protégés justiciable to ordinary Siamese tribunals after a period of ten years.

The relations of Siam with Great Britain during the first decade of the twentieth century were hardly more to the advantage of Siam than those with France. British intervention saved Siam from annexation to France, and the British showed a spirit of justice and liberality in regard to the capitulations. But this attitude was not dictated by the interests of Siam. The British Government drove a hard bargain with the Si-

amese in return for the right of the Siamese to be masters in their own country. For a long time, the British had been quietly extending their sovereignty northward from Singapore over the tip of the Malay Peninsula, in order to secure undisputed control of the Straits of Malacca. British policy in regard to the Malay sultanates had been inspired in the beginning by fear of French ambitions. After the Anglo-French Convention of 1904, the British regarded the Siamese tributary states of Kelantan, Trengganu, Perlis, and Keda as theirs. Naturally, Siam did not have the same point of view! Superior force again came into play. To round out British possessions on the peninsula, and to complete British control of waterways leading from India to China, these four states were ceded by Siam to Great Britain on March 10, 1909. Another fifteen thousand square miles were lost, and Siam found herself with a narrow outlet to the sea only on the south. Siam's sole profit out of the transaction was a further limitation granted by Great Britain to the working of the capitulatory régime.

While Siam was being pared down, her government was making splendid efforts to prove that an Asiatic race is able to keep abreast with

the changed conditions of living demanded by Europeanization. At the moment France began to plot seriously to destroy the independence of Siam, large sums were being spent on public works in the interior, and the administration was being successfully reformed. On December 21, 1900, the king opened the railway from Bangkok to Korat, which had been ten years in building. It was the pioneer line of the government system, 165 miles long. In the construction, the government had to contend with a private British company which charged much larger sums than those agreed upon in the contract. A second line, from Bangkok to Petchaburi, seventy miles long, was opened for traffic in 1903. Despite the fact that these two lines cost twice as much as the estimates, they were built entirely from the state's current revenues. There was no increase of old taxes or imposition of new ones. Siam had no public debt. From 1896 to 1904 the income of the government was doubled, and after all railway construction had been paid for there was a large balance in the treasury. Although taxes on gambling farms provided nearly a sixth of the state's revenues, the farms were abolished. Finances were established upon a gold standard.

Since 1904, Siam has borrowed nearly fifty million dollars, of which fifteen millions have already been paid back. The money was spent entirely on works of public utility. Siam owns one thousand, two hundred miles of railways. Telegraph lines now extend almost everywhere, and there are two wireless stations, both owned and operated by the government. The telephone system of Bangkok has nearly a thousand subscribers. Government and local schools have been quadrupled in twenty years, and a university, with eight faculties, organized at Bangkok.

The Siamese have known how to profit by the advice and aid of Europeans and Americans, without surrendering the administration of the country, or sacrificing the interests of the state to concession-hunters. Agriculture is developing, and stock-raising is being encouraged by methods that would do credit to any European nation. Trade is flourishing, and increases yearly by leaps and bounds. The principal wealth of upper Siam is the teak forests, which the Siamese have not allowed to be ruined by unprincipled cutting. Exploitation is under the control of a British conservator, with an adequate staff of inspectors.

In 1903, an army reform bill introduced obligatory military service of two years, with the two following years in the reserve. Although French steel firms encouraged the development of the Siamese Army, and were anxious to make it efficient in artillery and small arms, the political influence of France opposed the modernization of the army. It was intimated to Siam that unless liberal exemptions were granted, France would be compelled to regard obligatory service as an unwarranted innovation to disturb the peace of the peninsula. But at the same moment, the French were raising armies on their home system in Indo-China.

Almost all the British shipping-interests at Bangkok were transferred to German control in 1899, and the new openings for investment of capital were being taken up by Germans and Danes. Within two years, the German flag overtook the British, and there was a considerable falling off of British mercantile interests. Before the Germans became competitors, the British had eighty per cent. of Siam's trade in their own hands. In the decade before the war Germany succeeded in getting a virtual monopoly of Siam's coastal and river trade, a predominant

place in her railways and banks, and increased her imports every year. The chief reason for German success in Siam, as in other countries in which Europeans do not like to live, was her ability to send there large numbers of resident agents and engineers, who were willing to cast in their fortunes with Siam.

Siam declared war against Germany and her allies on July 22, 1917, anticipating the action of China by several weeks. What China intended to do, however, had been clear for a long time. But there were no strong pro-German influences in Siam as in China. Notwithstanding their residence in the country and their effective aid in its development, the Germans had not been able to win either the respect or the affection of the Siamese. In 1914 the German residents of Siam began to take advantage of the neutral country in which they lived to intrigue against India, Indo-China, and Hongkong. They sent out news of the movement of ships, and fomented civil war in China. The Siamese resented abuse of hospitality as much as we did, and when they followed us into the war, they took the same measures against German citizens and German property and German shipping as we had done

in America. For the time being, German influence has been banished from Siam. If the Germans ever recover their position, it will be only after their government has been radically changed and they recast their ideas about the privileges and obligations of hospitality.

But it would be a fatal mistake for British and French to think that Siam has forgotten, or will ever forget, what she has suffered through their unscrupulous imperialism. The internal development and prosperity of Siam, during the very years in which the paring-down process took place, gives the lie to excuse for aggression, bullying, and robbery, always made by European statesmen and writers—that the nation mulcted or deprived of independence could not manage its own affairs and stood in the way of progress. Consequently, some one had to assume unselfishly the white man's burden. How those who groan under the white man's burden do protest against the responsibility thrust upon them, the responsibility they did not seek, but which, having undertaken, they must not—in the name of civilization and for the good of the exploited race—abandon![1]

[1] Since writing this chapter, I have received, through the

King Maha Chulalongkorn died in 1910, after fifteen years of constant but impotent protest against the successive attacks upon the integrity of Siam. He was succeeded by Maha Vajiravudh, a product of English public school and university. The present sovereign has the reputation of being Anglophile, and I have no doubt

kindness of the American adviser to the Siamese Government, a remarkably clear and able statement of Siam's case for the revision of obsolete treaties. The case for revision is under two heads. The first head demands the abolition of treaty provisions imposing extraterritoriality, because it involves the sovereignty of Siam, a free nation; because it makes the administration of impartial justice difficult if not impossible; because it puts obstacles in the way of maintenance of order, being a continual affront to Siam's dignity, and a fruitful source of irritation; because it is expensive, as it involves the mainteance of European judges and advisers; because it furnishes no incentive (rather the reverse) to the completion of the Siamese codes of laws, now in process; and because it is utterly unnecessary for the purpose of safeguarding aliens. The second head demands the abolition of treaty provisions imposing fiscal limitations, because they infringe the sovereign rights of Siam; because they have forced Siam to rely for a large proportion of her revenues upon opium and gambling monopolies, with all the evil consequences to the people which this involves; because they have imposed this vicious traffic in gambling and opium not only to the injury of Siam, but against the will of her people and in opposition to the government policy of doing away with gambling and the use of opium; and because other forms of taxation cannot be made to yield the necessary income.

In spite of the powerful — the unanswerable — character of the plea, the Treaty of Versailles imposed the renunciation of treaty privileges only upon Germany. The victorious powers evidently do not intend to give up advantages in Siam that they would never tolerate any country possessing in territories controlled by them.

that he is. But his pleasant personal feelings for a host of Englishmen, whom he knows to be square and "good sports," do not reconcile him to the impaired inheritance he received from his ancestors. Every Siamese, in spite of Occidental culture, is *thais*—the name the Siamese give themselves. There is no difference between high-born and commoner in intense passionate love for country.

French policy toward Siam has had the opposite effect to that which it was intended to have. The French thought they were extending their influence in the peninsula, and making a greater Indo-China. They could afford to trample upon Siam's feelings and ignore Siam's rights. But the Siamese were rendered bitter enemies instead of being cultivated as useful friends for the future. Extension of her colonial dominion at the expense of Siam will mean one day for France the necessity of getting out of Indo-China altogether. If she does not go without resistance, the Siamese will help in putting her out. It might have been otherwise.

As British methods have been different, the case of the British is a little different. And Siam owes much of her present prosperity to the

loyal and disinterested aid of Britishers. However, when the moment comes for Asiatic races to attempt to get rid of European eminent domain, the Siamese will be to all Europeans, friends and foes, what they have been during the past two years to the Germans. The criterion will be once more that of "force, and of physical force alone."

CHAPTER VI

FRANCE IN ASIA

DURING the two centuries of European world-wide exploration and settlement that followed Vasco da Gama and Columbus, France vied with Spain, Portugal, Holland, and England in colonial expansion. But what France gained in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was lost to England in the eighteenth. The treaties of 1713, 1748, and 1763 exacted renunciations on the part of France. The Napoleonic Wars completed the destruction of her colonial empire. The Congress of Vienna left to France only Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and a part of Guiana in America; Réunion Island off the coast of Africa; and small enclaves in India. After the final disposition of the Bourbons in 1830, France started to rebuild a colonial empire. The Monroe Doctrine denied to France reëntry into the New World. Under Louis Philippe and Na-

poleon III, a new beginning was made in Africa, Asia, and Oceania.

A hundred years after Napoleon, France holds a position in the colonial world second only to Great Britain. It has been almost entirely won since the Franco-Prussian War. The French colonial empire is the achievement of the Third Republic. One admits the privileged position throughout the world of the British at the time Germany and Italy attained political unity. But the bitter complaint of Germans and Italians of having been born without the possibility of peaceful acquisition of colonies is certainly not true when directed against France. The German Confederation could have asked for Algeria instead of Alsace-Lorraine. In the decade following the Treaty of Frankfort no other power would have opposed German colonial expansion in Africa and in the Far East. Bismarck did not believe in colonial acquisitions, and public sentiment in Germany was behind him. France was allowed to go ahead and stake out uncontested parts of the world's surface. Bismarck regarded the extra-European effort of the French as an excellent antidote against a policy of revenge. Not until the accession of Kaiser Wil-

helm II did the Germans think that their future was on the sea. Not until 1906, in fact, did public opinion in Germany support the theory that Germany must demand her "place in the sun."

In India, France possesses five separate colonies, with a total area of less than two hundred square miles and with about three hundred thousand inhabitants. Mahé, on the Malabar coast north of Calicut, is the only French colony on the western side of the Indian peninsula. Karikal, Pondicherry, and Yanaon, also enclaves in Madras, are on the Gulf of Bengal. Chandernagor is an inland town, north of Calcutta, in the delta of the river Ganges. Mahé, Yanaon, and Chandernagor are no more than trading-posts. Pondicherry and Karikal each has a slight hinterland with a railway. The administration of the colonies is centered at Pondicherry. They are represented together by one senator and one deputy in Paris. Pondicherry alone has direct steamship service with France. The interest of these footholds in India is sentimental, as in the case of the considerably larger Portuguese enclave of Goa. The French have never been favorable to proposals to cede these colonies to the Government of India against compensations else-

where. One realizes how much the remnants of the Bourbon colonial empire mean to France in reading the protests of the French press against the rumored negotiations to sell Martinque to the United States. The French are opposed to following the example of Denmark.

There has been much agitation in the French Indian colonies themselves over the reports that the French and British Foreign Offices were arranging a "transaction" in regard to the last French footholds in India. The inhabitants of Chandernagor sent to the Colonial Minister a cablegram on November 12, 1918, which read: "Congratulations victory, but there are rumors session Chandernagor. We protest with all our heart." This was followed up by a remarkable open letter to the Colonial Minister, which was given out for publication. The inhabitants of the French Indian colonies reminded the government of the sacrifices made by their volunteers in the war, declared that they had been accustomed to live as Frenchmen for hundreds of years, and that their plight would be terrible if their privileges as French citizens were taken from them. All the signers of the petition were Hindus, and they did not hesitate to point out the difference

between their lot and that of their fellow-countrymen under British rule. France gave them the right of voting, including representation in parliament, and local autonomy. The British, on the other hand, would treat them as a subject race without either political or social rights.

Indo-China is another story. In the southeastern corner of Asia, France secured footholds in Cochin-China and Cambodia during the reign of Napoleon III. After the humiliation of the war of 1870, the French turned their attention to building up a colonial empire on the easternmost peninsula of southern Asia. Starting from the southern point of the peninsula, Cochin-China, administrative control was extended over the eastern part of Cambodia. In 1884, Annam and Tonking, on the coast of the China Sea and Gulf of Tonking, were put under French protectorate. During the past thirty years, the hinterland has been gradually penetrated and occupied. Laos, inland between the coast protectorates and the Mekong River, was wrested from Siamese suzerainty by the treaty of 1893. Between 1893 and 1907 the French completed the occupation of Laos and Cambodia at the expense of Siam. If the Rhine is the natural boundary between France

and Germany, certainly by the same token could one consider the Mekong the natural boundary between Siam and the states of Indo-China. But the French claimed as Cambodian territory all the tributary waters of the Sang-Ke River, and forced Siam to accept this interpretation. They insisted upon their right to control the Mekong Valley. In the Luang Prabang district of Laos they pushed the boundary line considerably to the west of the river, just as they were doing in Cambodia.

The methods employed by the French in acquiring Laos, Cambodia west of the Mekong, and the control of the Mekong River have been described in the chapter on Siam. How the French extended their protectorate over Cambodia, Annam, and Tonking is the old story of European relations with backward races, and does not need to be retold. If European eminent domain is a right and if European civilization and commercial development are benefits to African and Asiatic countries which can be conferred in no other way than by political control, there is nothing to criticize in the way the French have created Indo-China. They have acted no better and no worse than Europeans engaged in assuming the white

man's burden elsewhere. Siam had to suffer because she belonged to the *Halbkulturvolk* category. Annamites, Tonkinese, and Cambodians could be legitimately considered as rebels by the invaders, when they resisted being subjected, because they belonged to the *Naturvolk* category. Have not the spread of civilization and economic prosperity and better health conditions compensated for loss of independence and being taken forcibly into tutelage?

If we waive questions of equity and principle, there is much to commend and admire in the organization and development of Indo-China. To an immense task colonial administrators have brought splendid energy, wide scientific knowledge, and better governing ability than has been shown in many of the French colonies and protectorates of Africa. Among the men who created Indo-China and gave years of their lives to its development, I have had the privilege of knowing personally several high officials. Men like Klobukowski, Sarrault, and Brenier had unbounded faith in the civilizing mission of France in the Far East, and devoted themselves to what they thought were the interests of the natives with the zeal and the self-abnegation of missionaries.

What the French have accomplished in the past forty years in Indo-China ranks high in the annals of European colonizing efforts.

The area of French Indo-China is a little more than 250,000 square miles. The population is 17,000,000, of whom less than 25,000 are Europeans. Indo-China was formed from the union of the colony of Cochin-China with the protectorates of Cambodia, Annam, and Tonking. In 1887, the protectorates were united in a customs union. Six years later, Laos was added, and in the first decade of the twentieth century, Cambodia was greatly increased by extensions on the right bank of the Mekong River. In 1900, Kwang-chau Wan, a territory and port leased to France by China two years before, was placed under the administrative control of Indo-China.

The tip of the peninsula, between the Gulf of Siam and the China Sea, is the colony of Cochin-China. Its capital, Saigon, is one of the world's large rice ports. Most of the land of the colony is the delta of the Mekong River, and produces over two million tons of rice annually. Vegetables, fruits, and cotton yield large crops. The country lends itself equally well to stock-raising

and forestry, and fishing is a thriving industry on the coast. The colony is in the healthy condition of exporting thirty per cent. more than it imports. Its local budget balances, and it contributes substantially to the general Indo-Chinese budget. About half the Europeans of Indo-China live in the colony, and they return a member to the Chamber of Deputies in Paris.

The protectorates of Cambodia, Annam, and Tonking are about equal in area. But Cambodia is not nearly so thickly populated as the other two protectorates. All three have hereditary kings, who govern nominally with councils of ministers. The kings have no authority and little influence, as the administration is in the hands of French residents-superior, backed by French native troops.

Cambodia lies between Cochin-China and Siam. The Mekong River runs through the middle of the protectorate, and is navigable up to Khone, on the Laos frontier. The colony has a stretch of sea-coast on the Gulf of Siam. But as there is no port, traffic is through Cochin-China. In the first decade of the twentieth century, Cambodia was substantially increased at the expense of Siam by the extension of the frontier toward Bang-

kok up to the headquarters of the river Sang-Ke and its tributaries.

Annam is a strip of coast, with a narrow hinterland, extending nine hundred miles along the China Sea and into the Gulf of Tonking. The northern part of the protectorate, south as far as the entrance of the Gulf of Tonking, has been put under the administrative government of Tonking by the French. Railroads run into Annam from Tonking on the north and from Cochin-China on the south. There is also a railway running north and south from Hue, the capital. But these railways do not as yet meet, so communication is by boat. The interior, in southern Annam, is very mountainous and inhabited by tribes of a different race. The Annamites stick to the coast. Although in population and area Annam is more than twice the size of Cochin-China, and although the local budget is nearly as large as that of the colony, exports from Annam in 1916 amounted to four and a half million francs against Cochin-China's two hundred and eleven million francs; imports amounted to less than six million francs against Cochin-China's one hundred and fifty-six million francs. Annam has many small industries, of which silk-production and silk-weaving

promise well. But the chief benefit of France from Annam up to the present time has been soldiers for her colonial army. The railways in Annam are the only ones of Indo-China that cost more to run than they bring in.

Tonking, which was until 1897 a tributary of Annam, presents quite a different picture. The protectorate is in the gulf of the same name, south of the Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Kwangsi. Its capital, Hanoi, some distance inland from Haiphong, has become a railway center and is the administrative capital of Indo-China. One of the most important railway projects in the Far East links up Haiphong, the port of Hanoi, with Yunnan, capital of the second largest province of China, and diverts the trade of millions of Chinese through Tonking. Another railway line from Hanoi has reached the frontier of Kwangsi. When it is continued to the upper valley of the Sikiang River, a portion of the transit trade of another Chinese province will be captured for Haiphong. Tonking, with hardly more population than Annam, has nearly fifteen times as valuable import and export trade.

Laos lies between Tonking and Annam and the Mekong River. Like Cambodia, it was

formerly under Siamese suzerainty, and the northern part under effective Siamese administrative control. But France forced the Siamese out between 1893 and 1907. The area of Laos is nearly a hundred thousand square miles, twice as large as any of the other protectorates. But its population is supposed to be less than seven hundred thousand. There are three protected states in Laos, the most important of which is the northern one, Luang Prabang, in a sharp bend of the Mekong River. South of Luang Prabang, French-protected territory forms a wedge into the heart of Siam. In the west the Mekong River is the boundary line with the Shan States of British Burma. In spite of its sparse population, Laos has great agricultural possibilities. But the natives are implacably hostile to the French. The value of the country to France lies in the gold-, tin-, and lead-mines and in the teak forests. Logs can be floated down the Mekong, of which the French have succeeded in gaining control from Siam. The administration expenses of Laos are charged to Cochin-China and the other three protectorates.

When the war broke out in Europe, the French had not yet pacified and extended administrative

control over Laos and the mountainous regions of Annam. In Cambodia, Tonking, and along the coast of Annam, however, French authority has been successfully established during the last two decades. Governors-General Doumer, Klobokowski, and Sarrault had a much freer hand than their predecessors. The centralization of the administration, and the designation of Hanoi as the capital of Indo-China, were wise decisions. As long as Saigon was the center of administration, the interests of the protectorates were subordinated to those of the colony of Cochin-China. In 1901, Governor-General Doumer put the credit of Indo-China behind railway construction. He introduced the principle of an Indo-Chinese government guarantee of the interest on railway loans, and in addition, set aside a stipulated sum annually for a railway sinking-fund. In this way, railways could be planned with other than purely commercial considerations in view. Railway extension could be encouraged in Tonking, and lines could be run south into Annam from Tonking and north into Annam from Cochin-China. Effective administrative control in Tonking and Annam followed the railways.

Another important advantage of pooling the interests of Cochin-China and the protectorates was in raising and maintaining military forces for service wherever needed. The military policy that had met with success in the African colonies was introduced into Indo-China. The French have taxed the protectorates to pay the expenses of French and native troops, and have used native troops to extend the colonial influence of France. This policy is justified by the argument that there is solidarity of interest between "the mother country" and the colonies and protectorates. What benefits France benefits the natives! For instance, it is to the advantage of Tonking that Annam be pacified, and to the advantage of Tonking and Annam that Cambodia west of the Mekong and Laos be taken from Siam. *Ergo,* France has the right to ask the Annamites and Tonkinese to give their lives and money to extend and fortify the rule of France over themselves and their neighbors. In the recent war, the French went further. They asserted the obligation of their African and Asiatic subjects to fight for France in France. As many troops as could be safely taken away from Indo-China were shipped to the battle-fields of

Europe. Following the example of the British, the French called for service in France native colonial troops whom they were afraid to leave in their own countries, sometimes replacing them by French troops!

It goes without saying that Cambodians, Annamites, and Tonkinese have never received the French in their countries with open arms. Why should they be more enthusiastic about French rule than the French would be enthusiastic about Asiatic rule? The French have a genius for raising native troops, and winning the affection and devotion of the Asiatics and Africans whom they have trained in arms. But this affection and devotion is strictly limited to the young troops who give it and to the officers upon whom it is bestowed. The natives do not hold the same attitude toward civilian officials. This is partly because the rank and file of French functionaries is markedly inferior to that of Britishers holding similar posts in the colonies. The best of British blood and intellect goes into colonial civil service: almost never does a Frenchman of similar class enter colonial service at the bottom of the ladder. For a Frenchman, a colonial position is a makeshift or a punishment, unless the

post is an exceptionally good one which puts him in the public eye or gives him political influence at home: for an Englishman, colonial service is an honorable career. The Frenchman outside of the army does not possess the Britisher's amazing (to Americans, at least!) ability to live contentedly away from home. The impossibility of getting the right sort of officials has made French administration in Indo-China, in spite of certain promising results, costly and sadly lacking in efficiency. French engineers and business men and traders in Indo-China complain of the civil administration more than the natives: for they, too, suffer by it. The severest criticism I have heard of the way the protectorates of Indo-China are run and of lack of consideration in treating the natives has been from French travelers. French officials do not know the language of the people with whom they are dealing, have little sympathy with the natives or interest in the future of the protectorates, and seem to be bearing the white man's burden for the salary they get out of it.

The Annamites and Tonkinese demand self-government. They oppose the arbitrary system of taxation, and the closed-door tariff policy of

France, both of which are exploitation. They resent doing military service in Laos, and paying for the administration of Laos, for the benefit of French mining and lumber industries. Since the victory of Japan over Russia, the French have had to contend with "sedition" in Tonking and Annam. In 1908, revolutionary movements necessitated increasing the French garrisons by eight thousand men. After considerable fighting in 1910, the French deported some of the leading "rebels" to Guiana. There were conspiracies against the French in 1911 and 1913. A bomb thrown, at Hanoi in April, 1913, caused the death of two French majors and other Europeans. The existence of a conspiracy to overthrow the French Government was revealed at the trial.

One of the most severe indictments against French rule in Indo-China is the lack of educational facilities accorded to the natives. Indo-China has an outstanding debt of three hundred and fifty million francs, and forty million francs a year is taken from the Tonking protectorate for military purposes alone. And yet, in spite of thirty-five years of French protectorate, the six million inhabitants of Tonking are offered school-

ing facilities for eight thousand pupils. In Cambodia there are less than four thousand pupils in the schools, and in Annam less than three thousand, five hundred. These figures speak for themselves. Their testimony is all the more eloquent when we consider that according to the last educational reports there were two hundred and thirty-two girls in the primary schools of Annam, whose population is over five millions!

It is only fair to point out, however, that the highest official in Indo-China has repeatedly called the atttention of the government to the necessity of granting larger political rights to the natives and of increasing educational facilities in the protectorates under his administration. M. Albert Sarrault secured long ago for Indo-Chinese the right of admission to French lycées and universities. He has encouraged students to go to France. It has been his ambition to develop schools along the lines of the Americans in the Philippines. Native demands for autonomy in local affairs have been recommended favorably by him. Against the virtually united opposition of French officialdom in Indo-China and consistently cold or lukewarm response from Paris, Governor-General Sarrault has advocated

the appointment of natives to all administrative posts except the highest. During the Peace Conference, M. Sarrault returned to France to urge upon the government a liberal policy in the Far East as the alternative to serious troubles that might lead to the loss of the colonies.

The destinies of Indo-China will be profoundly influenced by the participation of Japan, China, and Siam in the European war. If imperialism carries the day in the reconstruction of the world, Japan will succeed France in Indo-China, by force if not by amicable arrangement. If a genuine League of Nations is born of the Conference of Paris, France may be able to retain the colony of Cochin-China, and possibly southern Annam. Tonking and northern Annam will inevitably be drawn into political union with the Chinese Republic, or will demand and obtain independence. The question of Laos will then become one between Tonking and Siam, in which France will have little, if any, say.

CHAPTER VII

PORTUGUESE AND DUTCH IN ASIA

THE discovery and colonization of extra-European territories began with Spain and Portugal, and there was a time when the Pope could divide the world overseas between these two Latin states without a protest from other European countries. South and Central America remained to Spain and Portugal until their own colonists revolted. The republics formed were saved from European imperialism by the Monroe Doctrine. In Africa, Spain and Portugal would have been eliminated at the end of the nineteenth century if the great powers had been able to agree upon the division of the spoils. In Asia, Spain disappeared through the destruction of her sea power by the Americans under Admiral Dewey. Most of her possessions were taken by the United States. The other islands were sold to Germany.

Portugal lost her Ceylon settlements to Holland in the middle of the seventeenth century, who in turn was put out by Great Britain at the end of the eighteenth century. But the Portuguese have retained insignificant footholds in Asia. On the west coast of India are the enclaves of Goa and Damao; in the Arabian Sea, the little island of Dio; in the Malay Archipelago, the eastern portion of the island of Timor, with a strip called Ambeno on the neighboring island of Pulo Cambing; and the island of Macao at the mouth of the Canton River in China. The total area of the Portuguese colonies is less than a thousand square miles, with a population of about a million. Goa, the seat of an archbishopric, is an interesting witness of past glory, but does not pay expenses. The other colonies barely make their way. Great Britain has never gobbled them up because she has not needed them and they have not been a menace to her mastery of southern Asia. For two hundred years, Portugal has never been in antagonism with British policy nor allied to one of Britain's enemies.

Holland in Asia presents a different problem. The Dutch East Indies—consisting of Java, Sumatra, portions of Borneo, and other islands and

archipelagos—are rich colonies in strategic positions in the Indian Ocean. Their area is nearly seven hundred and fifty thousand square miles, and a population of fifty millions—largely Mohammedan—makes Holland a Mohammedan colonial power of great importance.

Great Britain's colonial empire has received several accessions at the expense of Holland. The Dutch attempt to challenge British sea power during the reign of Charles II ended inconclusively. At the Peace of Breda in 1667, the British confirmed Holland's possession of Surinam (Dutch Guiana) in exchange for the cession of New York. But after the Napoleonic wars, the British insisted upon a foothold on the continent of South America as well as upon control of the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon. Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo were detached from Surinam and formed into British Guiana. The Dutch were compelled to resign themselves to the loss of Cape Colony and the foreign settlements in Ceylon, which had been seized by the Presidency of Madras twenty years before. The Convention of London, signed on August 13, 1814, and incorporated in the arrangements of Vienna, guaranteed to Holland, however, her

East Indies and the island of Curaçao in the West Indies. This was the last exchange of European sovereignty in the New World. A few years later, the Monroe Doctrine forbade further extension of European eminent domain in the two Americas.

The Convention of London has often been criticized by British writers. But aside from the sense of justice which prompted the conquerors of Napoleon to recognize that the Dutch alliance with France had been a case of *force majeure,* atoned for by the aid given at Waterloo, sound policy dictated leaving Holland with rich colonies. The advantage to Great Britain of giving back to Holland the East Indies may not have been apparent at the time. Probably it was not thought of at all. But in more than one international crisis, the fear of losing her colonies has acted as a deterrent to anti-British tendencies of Dutch foreign policy. The Dutch had to be guarded in the expression of their sentiments at the time of the Boer War. In the recent European war, joining forces with Germany would have proved as great a risk to Holland as taking sides against Germany. And in the East Indies, the Dutch were far less pro-German than in

Holland. Their neutrality was much more "benevolent" toward the Entente.

In extent and population, the Dutch East Indies are by far the most important island group of colonies of Asia—of the entire world, in fact. They are nearly seven times as large and seven times as populous as our Philippine-Sulu group, which lies to the north of the Dutch East Indies. With the exception of the northern side of Borneo, which is British, and the eastern end of Timor, which is Portuguese, the Dutch are in undisputed possession of all the islands between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean from the Strait of Malacca to New Guinea. Sumatra forms one side of the Strait of Malacca, and the Riau-Lingga Archipelago controls Singapore. Sumatra, the Dutch portions of Borneo, and the Molucca Islands are larger singly than our entire Philippines. Outside of Java, none of the islands has been completely pacified or organized administratively throughout. Java and Madura (a small island close to the north coast of Java) are a crown colony. The rest of the Dutch East Indies form outposts and will absorb all of Holland's colonizing energy and capital for generations. Consequently, estimates of the population

of the "outposts" are largely conjectural, as in the case of some of the Philippines. While Java has only one fifteenth of the area of the Dutch East Indies, her population is probably three quarters of the total. There are four cities in Java of over one hundred thousand population, and railways extend throughout the island. The Dutch authorities have done excellent work in extending schools for elementary education in the outposts as well as in Java, and have accomplished much during the past half-century in encouraging agriculture through small holdings. In 1914, forced labor was abolished. The Dutch maintain the open-door policy toward all.

But being mistress of a superb colonial dominion has not been a bed of roses for Holland. Native tribes, especially in Sumatra, have had to be continually pacified. Petty colonial wars, inglorious and inconclusive, demand continuous expenditure and loss of life. Socialists and Liberals have seized upon insurrections in the East Indies as a means of embarrassing the government. From 1902 to 1909, the Achinese in the northern end of Sumatra were in rebellion. After three years of fighting, the Dutch Government was attacked in parliament by members of

the majority as well as by Socialists. A thousand women and children were killed in the fighting in Achin during the spring of 1904. Members of parliament said that the Dutch were behaving like Huns and Tartars in the Achin expedition, massacring women and children in order to exploit mines and petroleum wells. Mynheer Kuiper attempted to reply to the accusations of cruelty. He said that he deplored the death of so many women and children, but that the Dutch army was under the obligation of making war *à outrance.* The Dutch Socialists then declared that it would be advisable to sell a large part of the colonial possessions of Holland to put an end to the disgrace on the escutcheon of a chivalrous nation. If colonial policy necessitated such military expeditions, it would be best to do away with colonies. Another interesting argument advanced against the retention of the East Indies was that it would be wise to sell the islands before the great powers seized them!

In 1905, there was bloody fighting in Sumatra, Borneo, and the Celebes, which continued until 1907. In the latter year, during the debates at The Hague on the Indian budget, members of various parties again raised the question of cruelty

to the non-combatant population of the Sultanate of Achin. The Colonial Minister insisted that the charges had been refuted by official reports, but promised that the Governor-General would go to Achin to investigate. These discussions in parliament led to a reform in colonial administration. In 1909, Queen Wilhelmina promised in a speech from the throne further reforms, and said that a new royal commission would be sent to the East Indies with unlimited power to consider and report upon revisions. She pointed out that much had been accomplished in Java as well as in the outposts. Administrative control had been extended; the power of petty native tyrants was being broken; Dutch officials had been appointed to protect the populace; hundreds of miles of new roads had been made and many new markets opened; and the authority of the government was stronger than ever before in the places where rebellions had occurred. The most important step in improving conditions in Sumatra was the termination of the agreement made a century ago with the states in the west of the island. These states had been allowed to sell their products at prices fixed by them, and were free from taxation. This system would no longer work.

Most of the chiefs saw the advantage of administrative control in developing their trade, although it meant taxation, and were submitting without protest.

In 1913, the Commission on the Defense of the East Indies declared that it was necessary to build a fleet to protect Holland's colonies. The program proposed was: nine dreadnoughts, six torpedo cruisers, eight destroyers, forty-four torpedo boats, and twenty-two submarines. The creation of the new navy was already under way when Germany precipitated the European war.

In view of the precarious position of the Dutch East Indies, which Holland cannot hope to defend by her own means, no country is more interested in the formation of a League of Nations to guarantee the present colonial *status quo*. If Holland is free from the anxiety and the burden of defense, the Dutch East Indies have a bright future. There is an annual deficit to face in the administration of the East Indies which has doubled in the three years 1916–1918. But if we have world peace and a strict prohibition of the sale of arms and ammunition to natives by international agreement, there are brilliant prospects for Holland in her Asiatic colonies. Coffee,

tea, cocoa, tobacco, tin, coal, and mineral oil will bring large profits—if the government does not have to spend in armaments more than it earns in trade.

CHAPTER VIII

THE UNITED STATES IN THE PHILIPPINES

IN the last two years of the nineteenth century, Spain disappeared as an Asiatic colonial power. Her place in the Pacific was taken by Germany and the United States. The cession of Guam, the largest and southernmost island of the Mariana archipelago, to the United States in December, 1898, was followed by Germany's purchase of the rest of the archipelago and the rights of Spain in the Caroline and Pelew Islands. By the treaty of April 11, 1899, Spain ceded the Philippine archipelago to the United States in consideration of a payment of twenty million dollars. The United States had already begun her career as a Pacific power by the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands in August, 1898. The territorial readjustment in the Pacific was completed in February, 1900, when Great Britain, Germany, and the United States signed

a tripartite agreement for the division of the Samoan Islands between the latter two powers.

Hawaii was made a territory almost immediately and granted limited self-government and representation in Congress. The Samoan Islands continued to be governed in much the same way as before. There has never been dissatisfaction with the American administration. Guam was constituted, and has remained ever since, a naval station closed to foreign vessels of war and commerce and administered by an American naval officer. Guam has no history. Its fourteen thousand inhabitants have become rapidly Americanized through compulsory elementary education.

From the beginning, our occupation of the Philippine Islands was entirely different from the extension of American sovereignty over Samoa, Hawaii, and Guam. The transfer from the Spanish to the American flag was not made with the consent of the inhabitants. Before the United States attacked Spain in the Philippines, the larger islands had already revolted against the Spanish and were fighting for independence. The rebel juntas in Asiatic ports claimed to have had a definite understanding with American

agents about the significance and purpose of American intervention. They believed that the enemies of Spain were going to intervene to help the Filipinos in their struggle for liberty. The Americans were coming, and had asserted that they were coming, to oust the Spanish and not to instal themselves in the place of the Spanish. The revolutionaries of Manila claimed to have the same understanding as the juntas of the meaning of American intervention. The rebels welcomed the Americans, and it was not until they thought they had been fooled that they turned their arms against the United States.

The bitter opposition in the United States to the acquisition of the Philippine Islands was unfortunately capitalized by the Democratic Party as the leading issue of the presidential campaign of 1900. The Democrats did not have the confidence of the country. Their candidate, who had been defeated four years before on the issue of free coinage of silver, was suspected by business men of espousing the cause of the Filipinos as a cloak for his financial vagaries. Many convinced opponents of the Administration's Philippine policy were afraid to vote the Democratic ticket. This had much to do with the second de-

feat of Mr. Bryan. The United States had become a colonial power by accident. Official and popular sanction was given to the acquisition of the Philippines for reasons other than the merits of the question. The general sentiment about departing from national traditions was not changed.

Although the Philippine archipelago contains three thousand islands and islets, considerably more than half of the total area is in Luzon and Mindanao. The Filipinos, approximately nine millions at the time of the American occupation, are mostly of Malay origin. The greater part were long ago converted to Christianity by Spanish friars who spread the Spanish language. Native dialects are as numerous as the tribes. In the interior of the large islands, and in some of the remoter ones, there are still pagans and savages. In the south, nearly a million Moros and some of the Sulus are Mohammedans. The Spanish administration of the archipelago did not attract Chinese, Japanese, and Hindus. Shortly after the American occupation, the Exclusion Act was applied to the Philippines. Consequently, there has been no "Asiatic problem."

At the time American sovereignty over the

Philippines was proclaimed, a promise was made to establish civil government as soon as possible. But the revolutionaries contended that before Admiral Dewey sailed into Manila Bay, the success of the movement against Spain was assured. They asserted the right to independence. Fighting began as soon as the American Army attempted to extend its authority throughout the islands. The Filipinos were encouraged by influential Americans to assert their rights, and in America the pacification policy met with bitter opposition which never died down.

The first Philippine Commission of five members, with William H. Taft as Governor-General, was instructed to study the problem of establishing civil government everywhere in the islands as soon as opposition to American occupation was overcome. On September 1, 1900, the commission assumed authority. A civil service was established and a million dollars appropriated out of customs revenues for public highways and bridges.

At the end of 1900, General MacArthur's report demonstrated the difficulties before the American Army. The Filipinos had an active junta at Hongkong and their leaders organized

a wide-spread guerilla warfare in the islands. The insurgents would appear and disappear at convenience. One day they would be soldiers and the next peaceful citizens within the American lines. In ten months, from November, 1899, to September, 1900, military stations were increased from 53 to 413, and the Americans had lost over a thousand killed and wounded. General MacArthur believed that it would be difficult to introduce a republican government and concluded that "for many years to come the necessity of a large American military and naval force is too apparent to admit of discussion." It was necessary for Mr. Taft and his associates to leave full executive authority in the hands of General MacArthur. In 1901, progress in ending the revolution was slow. The capture of Aguinaldo in March did not lead to a collapse in the revolutionary movement. However, on July 4, President McKinley proclaimed the establishment of civil government, and Judge Taft assumed executive control at Manila. Provincial governors were placed in the largest islands. The power which Congress gave to the President of the United States was delegated to the governor-general and his associates of the commission.

Courts were established, road-building pushed, and a thousand school-teachers brought from the United States. But the United States had to keep fifty thousand men under arms in desultory guerilla warfare.

For two years longer the rebellion continued. In 1903, Lieutenant-General Miles, ranking officer of the American Army, after his return from an inspection trip, issued a report in which American officers were charged with cruelty toward the natives. There was much agitation throughout the country. Although an investigation showed that the charges of General Miles were not substantiated, sympathy for the Filipinos increased. At heart, the American people were antagonistic to imperialism. Discussions in Congress over Philippine bills showed how difficult it was to adjust the government of an alien people against their consent to the spirit of the American Constitution, in which there was no provision for the administration of colonies. President Roosevelt proclaimed amnesty to political prisoners, and supported actively the provisions of the Philippine Bill to abolish military governorship and courts martial, and to provide for the creation of a Philippine Assembly "two years

after complete peace in the islands." The bill provided for the transfer of legislative power from the Philippine Commission to a Philippine Legislature. But the Philippine Commission was to constitute the upper house of the legislature, and Congress reserved the right to approve or annul laws passed by the Philippine Government! The members of the Philippine Commission were to be the Governor-General, the Vice-Governor, and the Secretaries of Finance, Public Instruction, and the interior.

After his election, in a message to Congress in December, 1904, President Roosevelt declared that the Filipinos were "utterly incapable of existing in independence at all or of building up a civilization of their own." According to the President, "our chief reason for continuing to hold the Philippines must be that we ought in good faith to try to do our share of the world's work. The Filipinos do not need independence at all, but do need good laws, good public servants, and the industrial development that can come only if the investment of American and foreign capital in the islands is favored in all legitimate ways."

President Roosevelt was a believer in the the-

ory of the white man's burden. The United States had not sought colonial possessions. But the American people could not refuse the responsibility thrust upon them. One might disagree with the radical departure from American traditions and maintain that the principles of the Declaration of Independence applied with equal force to other nations than ourselves. At least, it was not the rôle of the descendants of Washington and his followers to consider and treat as rebels any people who were ready to give their lives for the right to govern themselves. Mr. Roosevelt, however, had the cōurage of his convictions and could not be accused of insincerity or inconsistency. The course of action he adopted in the Isthmus of Panama and his attitude later toward the Egyptian Nationalists demonstrated his belief in the *Uebermensch* doctrine, which is the inspiration of whatever idealism may be advanced as a justification of imperialism.

Aside from the fundamental question of self-government, three problems confronted the Americans. Among the Moslems of the Philippines existed the institution of slavery. Throughout the islands, the Spanish friars held

THE
STEPPING STONES
FROM
ASIA TO AUSTRALIA
UNITED STATES
BRITISH
NETHERLANDS
JAPANESE
ENGLISH MILES
Yellow Sea
JAPAN
CHINA
LUCHU ISLANDS (TO JAPAN)
FORMOSA (TO JAPAN)
PESCADORES (TO JAPAN)
BATAN Is.
BABUYAN Is.
LUZON
PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS (TO UNITED STATES)
PALAWAN
MINDORO
MINDANAO
PALAU Is. (TO JAPAN)
JAP. I. TO JAPAN
FRENCH INDO CHINA
South China Sea
Sulu Sea
SULU Is.
TALAUD Is.
EQUATOR
Celebes Sea
Molucca Passage
Jilolo Passage
NATUNA Is.
BORNEO
SINGAPORE
Rhio-Lingo Archipelago
Macassar Strait
Banda Sea
BANKA
BILLITON Is.
Java Sea
SUMATRA
SUNDA STR.
MADURA
SUMBAWA
FLORES
TIMOR
WETTER
PORTUGAL
MELVILLE I.
Arafura Sea
NEW GUINEA

large portions of the land. The Philippines had lost their free-trade facilities with Spain and naturally expected to have American markets opened to their produce on the same terms.

The slavery question has confronted Occidental states whenever they have attempted to bring Moslem countries under their legislation. In the development of Africa, Great Britain and France had been attempting for years to solve this problem by expedients. On the one hand, the polity they introduced was incompatible with the existence of slavery; on the other hand, the attempt to abolish slavery meant confiscation of property and complicated the extension of effective administrative control. It was enough for the natives to accept an alien government without at the same time seeing their customs radically changed and their vital economic interests attacked. But there was no hesitation on the part of the American authorities. When Major-General Wood was appointed governor of the Sulu Archipelago, he issued a proclamation abolishing slavery. This intensified the resistance of the Moros to American rule, and necessitated punitive expeditions on a much larger scale than if the local customs of the people, including tacit acceptance

of the institution of salvery, had been respected.

In 1902, Governor-General Taft went to Rome to discuss directly with the Pope the problem of the lands of the friars. He insisted upon the point that the expulsion of the friars was a political and economic question and not a religious question. From the moment of American occupation, the Roman Catholic Church had been invited to play a leading part in the constitution of the new government. Only Washington felt that it was necessary to have the religious administration of the Catholic Church in the Philippines in the hands of the American hierarchy. When the friars saw that it would be impossible for them to remain in their old position in the Philippines, they decided to sell out their lands to the American Government. They tried to drive a sharp bargain, but finally consented to receive compensation to the amount of seven and one fourth million dollars—less than half the sum originally demanded. Getting rid of the friars was essential to the pacification of the Philippines and the establishment of American institutions. When the American Government gained control of the extensive friar lands, the Philippine Commission announced that the lands

would be sold to native tenants under methods similar to the Irish Land Act.

The adjustment of trade relations with the United States proved to be the most serious problem of all. Unless there was reciprocity between the Philippines and the United States, it would be impossible to maintain that America had no intention to exploit the Philippines. American trade interests were unanimous in demanding of Congress free entry for American products into the Philippines. But they were equally unanimous in combating any special measure or modification of the existing tariffs on imports in favor of the Philippines. As the Philippines were large producers of tobacco and sugar, these interests made their lobby influence felt at Washington from the moment Philippine trade relations came up for action.

The Supreme Court, called upon to pass on the tariff question, decided that free trade must prevail between the Philippines and the United States until Congress made a special and definite provision. Since Hawaii was regarded as a part of the United States, the Filipinos, although annexed against their will, certainly had the right to believe that they would receive the same treat-

ment as the Hawaiians. But the first Philippine Tariff Law, passed on March 8, 1902, gave to Philippine imports only twenty-five per cent. reduction from the Dingley rates, and the Philippines were not allowed to place an export duty on articles for use and consumption in the United States! Duties and taxes were to be kept in a separate fund to be used for the government and benefit of the islands: but this did not answer the objection that we were assuming "the white man's burden" with the intention of making it profitable to ourselves. At the end of 1902, the import duties in the Philippines were reduced to one fourth of the Dingley rates. Free trade was fought by the sugar and tobacco people. Although Roosevelt recommended in his December, 1905, message that the tariff be entirely removed except on sugar and tobacco, no relief was granted the Filipinos until 1910, when the provisions of the Payne Tariff Law established free trade, but limited the amounts of sugar, rice, and tobacco that could be imported. This limitation was not removed until after President Wilson's first election. There was also, as long as the Republicans controlled Congress, a duty rebate on hemp shipped to the United States.

None can doubt the material benefits to the Filipinos of American rule during the first fifteen years of our occupation of the islands. But it is equally a fact that we held the people under a system of government contrary to the spirit and letter of American institutions. The violation of the dominating principle of our own Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal" and of our belief that "taxation without representation" is inadmissible, was defended by the familiar pleas which uphold the doctrine of European eminent domain. President Roosevelt, who had said in 1904 that the Filipinos were "utterly incapable of existing in independence at all, or of building up a civilization of their own," announced two years later that constantly increasing measures of liberty were being accorded to the Filipinos, and that in the spring of 1907, "if conditions warranted," their capacity for self-government would be tested by summoning the first legislative assembly. On July 20, 1907, election of delegates to the assembly was held. But suffrage was limited. There was a property qualification—a principle Americans had always refused to admit for themselves. Less than a hundred thousand votes were cast.

The repercussion of the Nationalist feeling that swept Asia in 1910 caused uprisings in several islands. Our troops were compelled to take the field again. The Democratic Party went before the country in the election of 1912 with a plank promising independence to the Filipinos at an early date. Congressman Jones of Virginia introduced a bill granting the Filipinos a provisional government from July 4, 1913, and complete independence after eight years. The bill was accompanied by a joint resolution requesting the President to negotiate a treaty with other world powers to neutralize the Philippines and guarantee their independence by international agreement. An eminent American, who had been an official of our government in the Philippine Islands for some years, wrote at the time: "The Filipino people believe that the platform of the Democratic Party promised them their independence at an early date. Rightly or wrongly, they have thus interpreted the declarations of the leaders of that party made publicly and privately. They are not sufficiently practiced in self-government to draw any distinction between promises and platform promises."

But not until August 29, 1916, did the Con-

gress of the United States provide an autonomous form of government for the islands, with both branches of the legislative body elective. By the terms of the present Organic Act, there are six executive departments whose secretaries are appointed by the governor-general with the consent of the Philippine Senate. Only the Secretary of the Department of Public Instruction is an American. Since the passage of this act, local municipal government has been instituted in nearly nine hundred towns.

The glory of the American occupation of the Philippines is the public-school system that has been organized in twenty years. There are nearly five thousand schools with an enrolment of nearly seven hundred thousand students, served by more than twelve thousand teachers. English is taught in every school. To these imposing totals can be added twenty-five hundred university students and twenty-six thousand pupils in two hundred private schools. To realize what the Americans have succeeded in doing in the Philippines, one has only to contrast their work in education with that of the French in Indo-China and the Dutch in the East Indies, the two neighboring colonial dominions. In Egypt,

a richer country with larger revenue and about the same population, the British Ministry of Education has under its direct management schools for thirty thousand pupils. In the elementary vernacular schools of Egypt, the total enrolment is about two hundred and fifty thousand! Illiteracy in Egypt is ninety-four per cent. after nearly forty years of British occupation. This is one of the principal accusations of the Egyptians against British rule. Material benefits are given the natives in colonies administered by European powers. But nowhere in Africa or Asia, outside of the Philippines, can one see an honest effort being made to help the people toward a higher civilization through education.

The complaint is rightly made by defenders of the European colonial system that the results of educating the natives have been unsatisfactory. For political agitators who lead the movement for self-government are, without exception, the product of the schools. If only we could have text-books for Asiatics without mention of the Magna Charta, John Hampden, the fate of Charles I and the Star Chamber, and the American and French revolutions!

The inevitable result of our efforts at educa-

tion in the Philippines is the determination of the Filipinos to run their own affairs. It is fortunate that the United States went to the Peace Congress with the Organic Act of 1916 in active and effective operation. The American Government and the American people do not oppose the demands of the Filipinos for independence. During the Peace Conference, a delegation of representative Filipinos visited Washington to ask for independence. They received encouragement from officials and newspapers alike. The sentiment of the American people was well expressed by Secretary of War Baker when he told the Filipino delegation that "Americans love liberty too greatly to deny it to others."

CHAPTER IX

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

AFTER the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji in 1774, European historians prophesied the speedy disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The Turks had shot their last bolt and were powerless to resist the progress of Austria in the Balkans and of Russia around the Black Sea. They were saved by the European cataclysm at the end of the eighteenth century. If the Allies who triumphed over Napoleon had been able to come to an agreement concerning the division of the Ottoman Empire, modern history would have been changed. But the statesmen gathered at Vienna had no world vision. They saw only the interests of the nations they represented, and acted accordingly. Napoleon's expedition to Egypt and Syria was a warning to the British. To prevent India from becoming a goal for other powers, the British laid down the doctrine of the

integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The maintenance of this doctrine was the keynote of British policy in the Near East during the nineteenth century. It was reaffirmed at Paris in 1856 and at Berlin in 1878. The Crimean War was fought to maintain it. Had not France in 1840 and Russia in 1833 and 1877 acquiesced in it, Great Britain would have fought two other wars. Every time Christians of the Ottoman Empire tried to liberate themselves from Mohammedan oppression, their efforts met with the disapproval of a majority of the great powers.

Three considerations influenced other European statesmen to adhere to the British policy when their own particular interests did not prompt them to try to disregard it. In the post-Vienna period, many agreed with Metternich that the realization of national aspirations in the Balkans would encourage democracy throughout Europe. Nationalist movements in Europe threatened the *status quo* of Vienna, which must be maintained at all costs. In the second place, each great power feared that a diminution of Ottoman territory, in whatever form it was made, would mean the extension of influence of a rival power over the territories detached. Thirdly,

each power hoped through concessions and loans to extend its influence in the moribund empire to the exclusion of other powers.

The record of European diplomacy in the Near East from 1815 to 1919 has no redeeming feature. From the Congress of Vienna to the Conference of Paris it did not change. Heartlessness and selfishness were its characteristics. The interests of the races of the Ottoman Empire, Moslem and Christian alike, were consistently sacrificed to fancied interests of the powers. Never once did European statesmen, assembled to solve Near Eastern problems, make a decision actuated by a desire to protect or to help the races whose fate was in their hands.

It is an error to believe that there has been a change of heart in the twentieth century. Before the outbreak of the Balkan War, on October 8, 1912, the six great powers notified the Balkan States that: "(1) The Powers condemn energetically every measure capable of leading to rupture of peace; (2) supporting themselves on Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, the Powers will take in hand, in the interest of the populations, the realization of the reforms in the administration of European Turkey, on the understanding

that these reforms will not diminish the sovereignty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire; (3) if, in spite of this note, war does break out between the Balkan States and the Ottoman Empire, they will not admit, at the end of the conflict, any modification of the territorial *status quo* in European Turkey." During the recent war, the Entente powers made secret treaties to divide up the Ottoman Empire into "spheres of influence" without regard for the aspirations and interests of its inhabitants. At the Conference of Paris in 1919, as at Berlin in 1878, the representatives of the races of the Ottoman Empire were not allowed to take part in the deliberations to decide their destinies.

The hostility of the European powers to any effort, from within or from without, to detach territory from the Ottoman Empire proved in the long run unsuccessful. But this policy made more difficult the task of races aspiring to freedom and resulted in untold suffering to every element in the Ottoman Empire. The nations of Europe, too, have reaped in blood and tears a terrible harvest from the callous intrigues of their statesmen, which they did not control. The in-

tegrity of the Ottoman Empire was not maintained in the nineteenth century. In two wars, Russia took territory from Turkey at the eastern end of the Black Sea. Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, and Bulgaria, by their own efforts, became free and increased their territories until the Turks were virtually driven from Europe. The war of 1914 brought about the crisis in the Near East that more than a century of diplomacy and wars had averted.

In spite of powerful aid constantly rendered by the European powers, the Turks were unable to preserve their empire. Decay had gone too far before they awoke to the peril. But in the decade preceding the world war, they made an effort to prevent disintegration.

The Young Turk movement, launched by Midhat Pasha and other reformers at the beginning of the reign of Abdul Hamid, met with momentary success. Yielding to popular agitation, the new sovereign promulgated a constitution. But as the interference of Great Britain to save the Turks from the consequences of their defeat by Russia removed the fear of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Abdul Hamid was able to revoke the constitution and to rule as a despot

during thirty years. The Young Turk movement gathered irresistible force again when the Turks realized that the integrity of the empire was once more threatened. An intellectual element among the Mohammedans of Turkey believed sincerely in the necessity of a constitutional régime, made possible by the coöperation of the Christian subject races. The older statesmen and high military and civilian officials were won over to the resuscitation of the constitution, however, only when the Young Turk conspirators convinced them that the abolition of despotism was essential to prevent the disintegration of the empire. It is important to emphasize this fact, which explains the meaning of the revolution of 1908, the ease with which it was effected, and its almost immediate perversion into an instrument of forcible assimilation of non-Turkish elements, Moslem as well as Christian.

The history of the years preceding the revolution of 1908 is exceedingly complicated. As it bears principally upon the situation in European Turkey, it does not come within the province of this volume.[1] It is enough to say that the two

[1] For details of racial rivalry in Macedonia and an account of events in European Turkey up to the revolution of 1908, see "The New Map of Europe," pp. 151–168.

European powers most interested in the Balkans, Austria-Hungary and Russia, agreed in the autumn of 1903 to propose to the other powers a program of reforms in Macedonia. The other powers accepted "the program of Mürszteg," as it was called from the place where Emperor Franz Josef and Czar Nicholas had met to draw it up. An international gendarmery in Macedonia was imposed upon Turkey. The neighboring states, who had been carrying on an intensely bitter racial propaganda in Macedonia, gave this proposal of the powers a chance. They withdrew their bands of *comitadjis*. But there was bad faith all around, as has been the experience in every attempted international effort to compose imperialistic ambitions. When the Balkan States saw that the great powers were not sincere in carrying out the Mürszteg program, proved by an utter unwillingness to keep Turkey up to her side of the bargain, they resumed their propaganda in Macedonia. Russia, checkmated by Japan in the Far East, renewed her intrigues in the Balkans. Austria-Hungary followed suit. This was the situation when the Young Turks tried to save the Ottoman Empire in Europe by an immediate and radical change in the government.

The moment was propitious. The Russian disaster in the Far East was felt throughout Asia. The success of Japan instilled a great hope into other Orientals, who resented the humiliation of European overlordship and the unfairness of European exploitation. The doctrine of European eminent domain had been imposed and sustained by force. Did not Asiatics now demonstrate a superiority over Europeans not only in fighting but also in organizing ability? Russia, overwhelmingly conquered on sea, was expelled from her proudest fortress and held at bay in Manchuria. Japan emerged from the conflict an equal of European powers. If Japanese could defy Europe and get the better of Europeans, why not Egyptians, Turks, Persians, Indians, and Chinese? For three years, Young Turk propagandists worked silently but feverishly throughout the Ottoman Empire, concentrating their efforts upon army officers. I have it from the lips of the leaders themselves that this was the burden of their argument: "Our country is going straight to disaster under Abdul Hamid. If we force him to revive the constitution and give us all a share in the government, we can regenerate the army and the civil administration of the empire. Then,

having accomplished ourselves the reforms on the ground of the lack of which the powers interfere in our internal affairs and the Balkan States push their irredentist movements, we can free ourselves from European tutelage and thwart the ambitions of the Balkan States. Masters in our own country and with a powerful army, we shall be courted instead of bullied by the great powers: for we shall hold the balance of power between the rival groups."

On Friday, July 3, 1908, a Turkish officer in western Macedonia wrote to his brother-in-law:

> I must, with the help of God, start out in an hour. Therefore, I enclose my wishes and depend upon you to carry them out carefully and without delay in case I fall. Words are superfluous. You know the causes of my action. I prefer death to an ignoble existence. That is why I am going to death at the head of two hundred of my soldiers who have consented to the sacrifice of their lives and who are armed with Mauser rifles. I confide to God my wife. For the rest, either death or the safety of the country.

The letter of Major Ahmed Niazi deserves to be recorded. For the journey it mentions made a new epoch in history. The two hundred Albanians who followed their leader to what they believed was certain death fired shots that were

heard around the world just as clearly as those at Lexington. Niazi Bey did not die. His handful of Albanians increased to thousands, most of whom were Anatolian Turks. The general to whom Abdul Hamid telegraphed to "capture at any cost Niazi and the officers and soldiers accompanying him" (as the telegram from Yildiz read) was shot by one of his own men. All the Turkish divisions in Macedonia went over to the revolution. Niazi Bey entered Monastir without fighting and captured Marshal Osman Pasha, commander of the Third Army.

Abdul Hamid spent a fortnight telegraphing to every part of his dominions orders for troops to proceed to Macedonia to put down the rebellion. The answers were identical. The most faithful servants of the sultan told him that the movement for the constitution was universal in the army. Because none was found to fight the revolutionaries, the revolution was bloodless. Abdul Hamid had to yield. The constitution of 1876 was resuscitated. On July 25, 1908, the world was electrified by the news that Turkey had become overnight a constitutional monarchy.

It is an open question whether there were chances of success for the constitutional régime.

Some writers have maintained that the Young Turks were never given a fair opportunity, that the odds against them were increased from the beginning by the ill will of the great powers, by the refusal of the Balkan States to accept an Ottoman constitutional solution of the Macedonian question, and by the disloyalty of non-Turkish elements within the empire. There is a large measure of truth in the first two charges: the third has little foundation.

Russia and Austria-Hungary were actuated by powerful reasons in their uncompromising hostility to the new régime. Ruling over composite empires, built upon the destruction of the liberties of subject races, Nicholas and Franz Josef feared the internal political repercussion of the revolution, if it succeeded, upon their own peoples. A strong and united Turkey would have ended their dreams of reaching Constantinople and Saloniki. Italy had long been planning to seize the province of Tripoli and to inherit other choice morsels of the Ottoman Empire. The hopes of Germany to control economically—and eventually politically—Asia Minor and Mesopotamia would be dispelled if a sense of common nationality were born throughout the Ottoman

Empire. The British Foreign Office was dismayed. If the regeneration came to anything, Great Britain would be forced to return Egypt and Cyprus: it would create trouble in India and other possessions if the Moslem Turks, either by assimilating or coöperating with other elements, demonstrated the ability of self-government. France was troubled for similar reasons. She thought of the influence of Young Turkey upon her North African empire, and realized that success in the experiment of constitutional government in the Ottoman Empire would put an end to her precious privilege as the protector of Near Eastern Christians. The subjects of the European powers, who lived in the Ottoman Empire under the capitulations, could not be expected to rejoice over the prospect of giving up such advantages as exemption from taxation. Greece counted upon possessing some day Crete and the Ægean islands. All the Balkan States wanted to own Macedonia and Thrace. If the European press hailed with satisfaction the birth of a new democracy at Constantinople, it was not the same with the European chancelleries. No power interfered when Austria-Hungary announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and when

Italy attacked Turkey without declaration of war to seize Tripoli.

Admirers of the Young Turks have condoned their cruelties against Armenians, Greeks, Albanians, and Arabs on the grounds that these races refused to work with the founders of the new régime in the regeneration of the empire. They represent the Young Turks as extending the olive branch to the other elements, asking the other elements to join in the movement that was to bring liberty and equality and fraternity, and then finding themselves betrayed by those for whose benefit the constitution had been reëstablished. This fantastic distortion of fact was sent out to Europe by members of the diplomatic set in Constantinople, European officials in the service of Turkey, Levantines of European origin, and American missionaries whose hysterical admiration for the Young Turks robbed them of their faculties of observation and judgment. To the joy and comfort and benefit of the German propaganda, unrepentant Turcophiles (like the French Academician, Pierre Loti) kept up this refrain throughout the recent war and peace negotiations.

I had the privilege of living in the Ottoman Empire during the first five years of the constitu-

tional régime. In the initial year especially, I traveled far and wide and came into contact with the leaders of non-Turkish elements. The proclamation of the constitution was received with joy by all. I bear testimony to the earnest hope of all that better days were dawning for Turkey. None refused coöperation. The most intelligent and influential felt that the best solution of the Near Eastern question was the establishment of a genuine constitutional government in the Ottoman Empire, where races were hopelessly mingled. Among Ottoman subjects, there was solidarity of economic interests, and long years of exceedingly bitter experience had taught that European encouragement to separatist aspirations was invariably inspired by some economic or political ambition of a great power. Greece of ante-Venizelos days was not a magnet for Ottoman Greeks. Arabs preferred the Turks to one another. Even the Armenians, who had suffered most in massacre and oppression, were willing to let bygones be bygones.

Another reason frequently given for the failure of the Young Turks is the incompatibility of the Mohammedan theory of government with democratic institutions. Believers in the perma-

nent subjection of Islamic countries to European control use the sad story of the constitutional régime in Turkey to illustrate their contention that independence—or even self-government—cannot be granted with any chance of success to Mohammedan lands and would mean the sacrifice of non-Mohammedan elements. This argument against allowing Africans and Asiatics to work out their destinies as Europeans have done cannot be avoided or ignored by critics of European eminent domain and sympathizers with the aspirations of Asiatic races to govern themselves. It must be proved that the Young Turkish movement was not an Islamic movement and that its leaders were not under the influence of religious fanaticism or religious solidarity.

Not until the time of Abdul Hamid did Turkish foreign policy attempt to create a pan-Islamic movement. Religious fanaticism has never been a characteristic of the Turk. The history of the Ottoman Empire is less marred by religious intolerance and by massacres due to religious hatred than the history of European states from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century. Formed by conquest of Christian and Moslem races alike, the Ottoman Empire developed into an enormous po-

litical organism with one race dominating others. The conquering sultans meted out exactly the same treatment to all the vanquished, irrespective of religion. If the choice of conversion to Mohammedanism was offered to Christians, and sometimes forcibly imposed upon them, it was as a means of assimilation. To those who resisted successfully the temptation of bettering their material condition by throwing in their fortunes with the conquering race, a large measure of autonomy was granted. Severe persecution and massacre of Christian elements began only when the Balkan States became free and started irredentist propagandas, when Russia conquered part of Armenia and coveted the rest, when French and English intervention in Syria and Egypt threatened the disintegration of the empire. The animosity against Christian subject races was born of the suspicion that they were planning with outsiders to detach from the empire the regions in which they lived.

I knew personally most of the Young Turk leaders. Never did I have the feeling that a single one of them was a religious fanatic in the way that an Arab is. The Young Turks were far from being religious bigots. Some of them were of

Jewish origin; the majority were Freemasons of the European variety, i.e., free thinkers and opposed to the interference of an ecclestiastical organization in politics. If, in their foreign policy, they did not abandon the pan-Islamic intrigues of Abdul Hamid, it was because experience had taught that European statesmen were credulous and ignorant enough concerning Islam to be frightened by this bugaboo. But within the empire the Young Turks did not make Mohammedan solidarity a cardinal point in their policy. The Committee of Union and Progress never spared an enemy because he was a Mohammedan. The hostility of the Young Turks against and their oppression of Moslem Albanians and Moslem Arabs was as uncompromising and as bitter as their attitude toward Christians of these and other races. The proof of the lack of religious solidarity among the Mohammedans of the Ottoman Empire during the past decade is in the fact that the two serious rebellions against Constantinople, which undermined Young Turk authority, were engineered by Mohammedan leaders. The Albanian revolts of 1911 and 1912 aided materially in the easy victory of the Balkan States over Turkey. The defection of the Sherif of

Mecca and the Arabs of Mesopotamia and the Hedjaz, most orthodox of Mohammedans, was the decisive factor in the final collapse of the empire.

In "The New Map of Europe," I told the story of the Young Turk régime from 1908 to 1914, with special chapters about Crete, the war between Italy and Turkey, and the war between the Balkan States and Turkey. The Treaty of Lausanne (October, 1912) and the Treaty of London (May, 1913) deprived the Ottoman Empire of her last province in Africa, the islands of the Ægean Sea, and Turkey in Europe except Constantinople and a portion of Thrace. The Young Turks took advantage of the falling out between the Balkan States to win back almost all the ceded districts of Thrace. What a series of disasters in five years! Turkey had been the loser in many a previous war. But never had the losses been so great as during this brief period in which the Young Turks had hoped, by radical reforms, to save their country. Tripoli, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Albania, Epirus, Macedonia, Crete—it was to preserve these conquests of their fathers, and to demand the return of Cyprus and Egypt, that Young Turk visionaries

had conspired against Abdul Hamid, had worked for years at the constant risk of their lives, and had shown the admirable energy and military qualities that crushed the counter-revolution and deposed Abdul Hamid in April, 1909.

I have tried to show that lack of coöperation and disloyalty of non-Turkish elements within the empire were not to be blamed for the failure of the Young Turks to regenerate the empire, and that their weakness could not be attributed to religious fanaticism. Two causes, one beyond their control and the other due to themselves, had most to do with the inability of the Young Turks to save the empire.

The odds were against the Young Turks in organizing the new régime and in introducing a parliamentary system. The Young Turks were the victims of Hamidian despotism in just the same way as the Russian revolutionaries were victims of czarist despotism. Neither in Turkey nor in Russia were the leaders of the constitutional movement capable of carrying on the administration of the country. They had lived all their lives in exile or in prison, and were inexperienced. They were incapable of running the intricate machinery of government. Faced

with the dilemma of anarchy in administration or of coming to an arrangement with the officials of the corrupt autocratic régime, who neither understood nor sympathized with their ideals, the Young Turks decided to retain the Hamidian functionaries. They were compelled to call to the post of grand vizir and to the majority of cabinet positions Elder Statesmen who had served Abdul Hamid. Old Turks became Young Turks in name—but in name only! In the first year of the constitution, when Abdul Hamid made his unsuccessful *coup d'état* to get rid of the Young Turks, the leaders of the revolution realized the danger of leaving power in the hands of the old officials. In the army, generals and superior officers were under constant supervision, and could be kept from conspiring against the constitution. But civilian administrators could not be easily controlled.

The Committee of Union and Progress, as the Young Turk revolutionary organization was called, instead of assuming power as a governing party, responsible to parliament and the people, remained aloof from executive and legislative functions. The committee had its agents in the cabinet and most of its members were deputies.

But it was as an outside organization, wholly irresponsible, that the leaders of the committee attempted to dictate governmental policies. The despotism of a small group, which kept carefully in the background, was substituted for the absolutism of Yildiz Kiosk. The committee brooked no opposition to its will. Grand vizirs and cabinet ministers who refused to take orders were deposed or assassinated. The committee dictated also to parliament.

It is unnecessary to trace the parliamentary history of Turkey during the three years of grace before wars with foreign countries broke out. No party of opposition arose strong enough to hold in check the Committee of Union and Progress, which became more arrogant and suspicious and headstrong as the difficulties confronting Turkey at home and abroad increased. The situation was not the result of deliberate intention on the part of the Young Turk leaders to sacrifice the new régime they had called into being to their vanity and appetite for political domination. The Young Turk leaders were no more self-seeking than politicians of other countries whose names are held in honor for having accomplished great things. The Young Turks

were victims of the attempt to establish democratic institutions in a country where the ruling class was not converted to constitutional principles and where the masses had the vaguest, if any, conception of Young Turk ideals. Uneducated and divided up into racial and religious groups, most of the inhabitants of Turkey were unable to appreciate the differences and the benefits of a constitutional over an absolute régime. The Young Turks were not supported by the masses. Nor were they under the control of public opinion. How, then, could they be the prophets and the servants of their country?

The error of the Young Turks in their plan of regeneration for Turkey was their belief in the possibility of instilling in Ottoman subjects the consciousness of Ottoman nationality through Turkicization. If the Turkish element had been the most numerous, the most virile, the most intelligent and most cultivated of the elements in the Ottoman Empire, it would have been logical to try to build up a national life upon the Turkish foundation. The Young Turks were careful students of the history of nationalist movements in Europe, and of the development of democracy in Occidental countries. They had at their

tongues' end the shibboleths of revolutionary language. Inspired by the Convention, the Tugenbund, the Risorgimento, they started out to use classic methods. But, alas, there was no analogy between the problem of unifying Turkey and the examples of the unification of France and Germany and Italy. Nor could there be a pan-Turanian movement on the pan-Slavic model. The Romanoff method could not be followed because the Turks were not numerically preponderant. A strong and regenerated Ottoman Empire could not be constructed after the Hapsburg plan because the Turks were incapable of imposing their will upon other elements through superior education, energy, and industry.

The Young Turks refused to see the fact that they had been the dominant element in the Ottoman Empire solely because of the despotic form of government. There were two classes of Turks: peasants, mostly in Anatolia, a sturdy stock with admirable characteristics, but depleted by the wars of the nineteenth century and by the burden of obligatory military service from which Christians were free; and the ruling class—land owners, higher functionaries, and army officers—parasitical and indolent, prosperous only because

of a privileged position which a constitutional régime would ruin. The Turks had ruled for five hundred years by the brains of others, and non-Turks were as frequent in high civil and military posts as Scotchmen in the British Empire. In military affairs, Albanians, Kurds, and Circassians, proud of their race, reached the top more quickly and more numerously than Turks. In religious, educational, and administrative affairs, every second official was an Albanian or Arab or Christian.

Under the old conception of the Ottoman Empire, which held up to 1908, there was no distinction between Moslems of various races in the army and in the civil administration. Europeans regarded all Ottoman officials as Turks, just as the Turks regarded all Europeans (except Greeks and Italians and Balkan races) as one race. From the standpoint of the administration, there was no discrimination. Even Christians could attain very high posts. Easy-going tolerance was the spirit of the old régime. There were, of course, injustice, bribery, inefficiency, but not racial antagonism. For centuries, parts of the Ottoman Empire had defied every attempt of the Constantinople government to extend ef-

fective administrative control, with its consequences of taxation and conscription. Montenegro, Albania, large portions of Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, and Arabia were included within the Ottoman Empire, as far as the outside world knew, and were on the map that way. But the Turks had never dared to disturb the inhabitants of these regions, who were content to let the great world think they were Ottoman subjects so long as the Turks did not try to treat them as such. There were even Christian Armenian communities of this same virtually independent character.

The Young Turk proposition was this: now that we have the constitution, the old loose system is abolished, and every one, throughout the empire, must accept the responsibilities of citizenship, i.e., recognize the authority of Constantinople and conform to common laws for the empire. With amazing disregard of consequences, the Young Turks started in to throw overboard the expedients and connivances that had kept the empire afloat. They were logical in attempting to carry out their proposition—relentlessly logical! Albanian and Arabic autonomies and local privileges no longer existed, they said. The Young Turks asked for taxes and called to the

colors soldiers in regions the most powerful of Ottoman sultans had prudently kept out of. When the people refused, armies were sent to enforce the authority of Constantinople, which had never been acknowledged before. Immediately they had on their hands rebellions in Albania, the Hauran, Mesopotamia, and Arabia. Large sums were spent and thousands of lives sacrificed to no avail. The Albanian rebellion, in fact, so weakened the Turkish armies in Macedonia that the victory of Balkan arms was foreseen by close observers of the situation in European Turkey.

Bulgaria declared her complete independence and Crete annexed herself to Greece because of the Young Turk thesis that Bulgarians and Cretans were still Ottoman subjects. When the Young Turks raised questions of prerogatives and sovereignty that had long been allowed to lie dormant, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Italy seized Tripoli. The statement that Great Britain and France allowed these two acts of international brigandage to pass without official protest because Germany bullied and they showed the limit of forbearance to preserve the peace of Europe, is absurd. One marvels at that naïvety and ignorance of diplomacy shown

by serious writers who reiterated this statement during the recent war. The explanation of the failure of the British and French chancelleries to back Young Turk protests is very simple. If the British had protested against the action of Austria-Hungary or had refused to accept the new status for Bosnia-Herzegovina, they would have put themselves in a hole about Egypt. Similarly, the title of France to Tunis was such that there was nothing to be said officially about the way Italy went after Tripoli.

Abdul Hamid, fully as much as the sultans who preceded him, knew that every great power without exception could be bribed by political or economic concessions to its own interests, and that the Europeans with whom he negotiated had the same standards of international morality as himself. At the same time, he realized that the European powers had physical force with their moral weakness. He made use of the latter and never provoked to the breaking point the former. In dealing with internal affairs, Abdul Hamid and his functionaries were as much realists as in dealing with Europe. They did not fool themselves. They knew what they could and what they could not do.

The centralization and Turkicization policy of the Young Turks was considered as one and the same thing, and pressed feverishly from the moment the constitution was declared. Turkish was to be the language of the entire empire, taught in schools, used in legal documents and courts and administrative affairs, and spoken exclusively in parliament. Every one was to serve in the army and pay taxes.

But if the Young Turks were clear on the question of responsibilities and obligations, as a result of the constitution, they had a very confused notion of the other side of the shield. The constitution, while imposing obligations, assured privileges. If the different elements of the empire were to pay taxes and accept military service in proportion to population, they had a right to deputies in the parliament and representation in the cabinet in the same proportion. This the young Turks would not tolerate. The elections to the first parliament gave them an overwhelming majority of deputies, which did not represent the will or numerical distribution of the races of the Ottoman Empire. One cabinet post—and a minor one—was offered to the Christians. Albanians and Arabs were ignored unless they

joined the Committee of Union and Progress and consented to a program against their racial instincts and interests. The second election had the same disheartening result. The Young Turks could have gotten away with this travesty of constitutionalism had they really been the predominant element and had they had a large number of leaders with brains and energy and experience. As the Young Turks enjoyed none of these essentials to the parliamentary and administrative hegemony of a dominant minority, they lost out all along the line. Even the European powers, who woke up to the danger for the peace of Europe of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire during the war with Italy, could not save them.

The powers had not yet adjusted their Near Eastern policies to the new situation created by the victory of the Balkan States, when the European war broke out. Turkey could not remain neutral. The Young Turks chose to enter the war on the side of the Central powers. Had the Central empires won the war, the Ottoman Empire might have remained for a time what it was in 1914. But the price of territorial integrity would have been economic and political subserv-

iency to Germany. And the Turks, as the dominant element of the empire, would have disappeared probably more completely by the victory of their alliance than by its defeat.

CHAPTER X

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE WORLD WAR

WHEN war broke out between the European powers in the summer of 1914, a settlement had not yet been definitely reached of the problems that arose from the disastrous wars of the Ottoman Empire with Italy and the Balkan States. The Turks had been dispossessed of the islands of the Ægean Sea and of most of European Turkey. They had taken advantage of Bulgaria's weakness at the end of the second Balkan War to reoccupy Adrianople. A frontier line, unsatisfactory to both Bulgaria and Turkey, had been drawn just to the north and west of the city. Dedeagatch, the nearest port to the Dardanelles on the European coast of the Ægean, was on the Bulgarian side. But the railway to this port from the interior of Bulgaria ran through the outskirts of Adrianople. Bulgaria and Turkey were negotiating to find a solu-

tion that would leave Adrianople Turkish and the railway Bulgarian. The frontiers and political status of Albania were in doubt. No apportionment of the share of the Ottoman public debt to be borne by the Balkan States had been decided upon. While the Treaty of Ouchy, signed in October, 1912, stipulated the return of the Dodecanese to Turkey after the retirement of the Turkish army from Tripoli, Italy remained in possession of the islands. She did not seem disposed to give them up, and took refuge in the fact that Greece disputed them with Turkey. The basis of the claim of Greece was that the Dodecanese logically fell to her with the other islands of the Ægean. She had been prevented from occupying them during her war against Turkey only because Italy was holding them.

In July, 1914, the crisis between Greece and Turkey arrived at an acute stage. Aside from the question of the Dodecanese, Greece felt that it was her duty to make the Sublime Porte promise to stop the persecution of Ottoman Greeks in Asia Minor, who were being dispossessed along the coast by Mohammedan *mouhadjirs* (refugees from the lost provinces of European Turkey). War seemed imminent. Conscious of their in-

feriority on sea in the previous war, the Turks had ordered two battle-ships—both dreadnoughts of the latest type—from a British firm. The money for these ships had been raised by house-to-house collections throughout the empire, and every peasant had contributed his mite. Greece forestalled the menace of this increase of the Ottoman Navy by purchasing two cruisers from the United States. To try to find a peaceful solution of the difficulties, a meeting was arranged at Brussels between Premier Venizelos of Greece and Grand Vizir Said Halim Pasha of Turkey. M. Venizelos was on his way to Belgium when Austria-Hungary delivered the fateful ultimatum to Serbia. The grand vizir, foreseeing (or knowing?) what was going to happen, did not leave Constantinople.

The day before Great Britain declared war on Germany, the Sublime Porte was notified that the British Admiralty would be compelled to take over the two battle-ships building in an English shipyard. Turkey was assured that immediate and full financial compensation would be given and that, in return for Turkish neutrality, the British promised to make no change in the status of Egypt. The blunder of retaining the battle-ships

was stupendous in its consequences. When one considers the anxiety throughout Turkey over the intentions of Greece and the marvelous way in which the entire nation had been interested in these two battle-ships (there were more than two million contributions of less than ten cents), it will readily be seen how this decision played into the hands of Germany.

Two German war-vessels, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau,* succeeded in eluding the net spread for them in the Mediterranean and passed into the Dardanelles on the evening of August 10, 1914. The next day, news despatches from Constantinople stated that Turkey had bought these ships. The grand vizir explained that Turkey could not afford to neglect the opportunity to compensate herself in this way for the requisitioning of the battle-ships building in England. To bargain with Greece on the question of the islands, naval power was indispensable. The representatives of the Entente powers protested to the Sublime Porte against the transfer of the German ships to the Ottoman flag. It was not necessary, they said, for Turkey to fear Greece or Italy or themselves. They were ready, in exchange for a strict neutrality, to defend the independence and

the integrity of Turkey against any enemies that might wish to use the European conflict as an occasion to attack her.

The answer of the Sublime Porte was unexpected and disconcerting. On August 20, Djemal Pasha, Minister of Marine, called on Sir Louis Mallet, the British ambassador. As the price of neutrality, Djemal Pasha proposed the immediate abolition of the capitulations; the delivery of the two Turkish dreadnoughts retained by Great Britain; renunciation of future interference in the internal affairs of Turkey; the restoration of western Thrace to Turkey if Bulgaria joined the Central powers; and the handing back of the Ægean Islands occupied by Greece and Italy. So anxious were the Entente ambassadors to prevent what they saw was coming that they went the limit to conciliate Turkey. They agreed to accept the transfer of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* if the German officers and crews were repatriated and facilities accorded for the passage of merchant vessels through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. They promised to give a joint guarantee in writing to respect the independence and integrity of Turkey, with the precise stipulation that "no conditions in the terms of peace at the

end of the war shall prejudice this independence and integrity." In addition, they declared that Great Britain, France, and Russia were willing to renounce the capitulatory privilege of extra-territorial jurisdiction as soon as a modern scheme of judicial administration was in working order throughout the empire.

But on September 9, the Sublime Porte notified the powers that the capitulations would be abolished on October 1. Even the German and Austro-Hungarian ambassadors joined in refusing to accept this unilateral denunciation of treaty obligations. Identical notes were sent pointing out that the capitulations could be abolished only by mutual consent of the contracting parties. In the meantime, trains of German sailors and officers and reservists were arriving. The Germanophile party in the cabinet, although in the minority, was gaining in popular favor. On September 21, the British ambassador, in a last vain effort, went to the sultan with a personal message from King George, regretting the retention of the battle-ships and begging the sultan not to break bonds of friendship that had endured more than a century.

Five weeks passed of tireless diplomatic ac-

tivity. The sultan, the heir apparent and the grand vizir were prodigal in their assurances of friendly intentions. Djavid Bey, Minister of Finance, declared that there was no cause for alarm. But on October 29, Bedouins raided the Sinai Peninsula and three Turkish torpedo boats bombarded Odessa and Theodosia. The next day, the Russian ambassador informed his British and French colleagues that he had received instructions to demand his passports. With great misgivings and not before they had made a final effort at reconciliation did Sir Louis Mallet and Monsieur Bompard take the inevitable step. The war party in the Ottoman cabinet committed Turkey irrevocably by publishing an official communiqué, which stated that the first acts of hostility in the Black Sea came from the Russian side.

When Turkey joined Germany and Austria-Hungary, the conflict between rival European powers became a world war. The participation of Japan had a limited objective. The intervention of Turkey opened up tremendous possibilities for both groups of belligerents. It is a mistake to attribute the action of Turkey to the influence of a few men in the pay of Germany.

France and Great Britain had as many and as powerful friends in the Ottoman cabinet and in other high positions as Germany. Among the rank and file of the Turks, the British and French were more loved and less feared than the Germans. But since the birth of the Young Turk régime, British and French diplomacy had shown very little sympathy with the efforts to regenerate and modernize Turkey. Both powers feared pan-Islamism. They were hostile to the development of constitutionalism in a Mohammedan country and resented the expression of opinions and the development of aspirations on the part of Young Turk leaders which would penetrate into and contaminate their own African subject races. The chief influence, however, in Turkey's choice of the Central Powers instead of the Entente was the fact that Russia stood on the other side. Every Turk knew that the victory of Russia in the war would be a menace to the Ottoman Empire. Russia had worked for centuries to destroy Turkey. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Great Britain abandoned her traditional policy of antagonism to Russia. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and the way it was being carried out convinced the Turks that the

British Government had become their enemy. Similarly, by the Anglo-French Convention of 1904, France and Great Britain entered into a conspiracy to rob the Turks of their title to Egypt. Much leaked out in Turkey about a secret treaty between France and Italy in which France had consented long beforehand to Italy's aggression against Turkey. No Turk was naïve enough to believe that Germany's feeling for and intentions toward the Ottoman Empire were better than those of the other powers. But the Turks felt rightly that in the evolution of European colonial politics, German interest in the twentieth century was what British interests had been in the nineteenth century in regard to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. For the sake of a clear title to Egypt and the advantage of strengthening her position in Southern Asia, Great Britain was willing to sell Turkey out to Russia. In the last analysis, the entrance of Turkey into the world war was determined by the instinct of self-preservation. It was to be the final act in the struggle between Muscovite and Osmanli that had been going on for hundreds of years and that was to end in the breaking up of both empires. Turkey

and Germany had the common interest to destroy the Romanoff empire.

The evolution of nationalism in Turkey under the constitutional régime was taken seriously by only one of the European ambassadors at Constantinople. Baron Marschall von Bieberstein realized in May, 1909, that Turkey would not remain neutral in the next European war. Symptoms to which others were blind did not escape his notice. After the Young Turks proved they were in earnest and in control of the army by the way they forced the abdication of Abdul Hamid, Young Turkey was worth cultivating. When the war with Russia came, the geographical position alone of Turkey would be a precious aid in shutting off Russia from the outside world. Add an Allied army, strong enough to penetrate the Caucasus and Persia, and the game was won. The German ambassador picked out three men as friends for his country. Mahmoud Shevket Pasha could be filled with the military future of Turkey.[1] Enver Bey, who had already spent a

[1] Mahmoud Shevket Pasha declared in parliament, in the spring of 1911, that "the million bayonets of Turkey would decide the fortunes of Europe." See my "New Map of Europe" (American Ed.), p. 252.

winter as military attaché at Berlin, could be sent back to Germany with the idea of studying still further Germany's sources of superiority over the other great powers "in the next war." Talaat Bey, a politician, could be helped up to high posts. When Italy attacked Tripoli, von Bieberstein did not allow himself to be confounded. He encouraged Enver Bey to go to Tripoli, where he would become an implacable enemy of the British. He showed Mahmoud Shevket and others the proofs of France's understanding with Italy. Von Bieberstein went to London at the time the empire in Europe was crumbling. He left among his large circle of Turkish friends the firm conviction that the disasters of 1912 could be retrieved by reforming the army through submitting to German leadership.

When the Balkan States were united against Turkey, scarcely more than a month's campaign led to the complete military collapse of the Turks. Three Turkish armies were besieged in Adrianople, the Gallipoli Peninsula, and Constantinople. The rest of Turkey in Europe was in the power of Bulgarians, Serbians, Greeks, and Montenegrins. An armistice was declared, but the determination of the Turks to hold Adrianople neces-

sitated a resumption of the war. Nazim Pasha was assassinated, and the grand vizir, Kiamil Pasha, deposed. Enver (now raised from Bey to Pasha), who had luckily for himself not returned from Triopli in time to have his share in the odium of the defeats in Thrace and Macedonia, managed the *coup d'état*. Mahmoud Shevket Pasha became Grand Vizir as well as Minister of War. The fortune of arms could not be changed. The Turks had to sign in the end a peace renouncing most of the European provinces and the islands of the Ægean Sea. Mahmoud Shevket was assassinated in June, 1913. Prince Said Halim, a member of the Egyptian khedival family, became Grand Vizir, Enver Minister of War, and Talaat Minister of the Interior. These were the men in power when Turkey joined Germany more than a year later: and they remained in power throughout the years of bitter convulsion in Europe and western Asia.

The seed sown by Ambassador Marschall von Bieberstein bore fruit. The German military mission, which started its work in 1909, was greatly increased in the autumn of 1913, and large powers were conferred upon its new head, General Liman von Sanders. The presence of

a German at Constantinople, in effective control of the Turkish Army and forts, caused a formal protest from Russia. But von Sanders and his associates, despite the inertia and jealousy that has to be contended with by Westerners who try to reform Easterners, succeeded in instituting admirable discipline and organization in the Turkish Army and in resisting the political pressure of the diplomats to oust them. Turkey was more ready to lend effective aid to the Central empires than was supposed. She had a quarter of a million under arms, and her mobilization had begun in midsummer. Partially trained men and recruits increased the army by half a million. Left to themselves—especially after the disastrous wars they had just been through—the Turks could have accomplished little in the field. But Germany and Austria-Hungary were able to contribute officers for line regiments, staff officers, artillerymen, and engineers. A short war, however, was a *sine qua non* to the efficiency of Turkish coöperation. For although the population of the empire was still over twenty millions, heavy losses from disease had been suffered in the Balkan War; the valuable Albanian element was lost; most of the Arabs could not be recruited; and the

Turks were afraid to incorporate in large numbers the Christian elements. It was evident that Turkey could not find new recruits. Losses in battle and from disease, therefore, could not be made good.

Turkey was risking everything. She had two chances of success: stirring up Egypt, and winning aid from the Tartars of central Asia by defeating the Russians in the Caucasus. These were the two points—at opposite ends of the empire—where offensive operations were possible, if begun immediately. In Mesopotamia, the Turks knew they would have to remain on the defensive. Some troops had to be kept along the Ægean coast of Asia Minor: for the Greeks could not be trusted. Constantinople also had to be protected against the Greeks and the Bulgarians. It was not known which side Greece and Bulgaria would take. Both were bitter enemies of Turkey. Both wanted to see the Turks disappear from their last foothold in Europe. But it was certain that the attitude of the Balkan States, and their intervention in the war, would be dictated by reasons other than hostility to Turkey. In the first year of the war, it was not the menace of her neighbors, but the attempt of the Entente

powers to force the Dardanelles and capture Constantinople, that immobilized important Turkish forces in the Gallipoli Peninsula and around Constantinople. The failure of the British at Gallipoli was only partial. In fact, it is doubtful whether we should consider the expedition as a failure and the sacrifices unjustified. For the menace to Constantinople lasted long enough to cause the miscarriage of the offensive projects of the Germans and Turks against the Caucasus and Egypt. In spite of the long neutrality of Greece and the entry of Bulgaria on the side of the Central powers, all danger of Turkey being a decisive military factor in the war could be discounted by the Entente powers before the British finally decided to evacuate Gallipoli.

Two attempts were made to cross the Suez Canal and invade Egypt. Owing to lack of sufficient forces and to absence of means of transportation, they failed miserably... In the Isthmus of Suez and in Mesopotamia, the Turks wore themselves out before the summer of 1916. Once the British had organized their railway communications and water supply across the Isthmus of Suez, the Turks were unable to defend Jerusalem and bar the road to Syria. In Mesopotamia, the

British occupied Bassorah at the very beginning of the war. The Turks scored the success of Kut-el-Amara only because of the rashness of the British in pushing north too fast and not making secure their lines of communication as they advanced. In conquering Mesopotamia, the problem of the British was rather to assure the neutrality and gain the coöperation of the Arabs than to face and break down a formidable resistance of the Turks. The recognition of the independence of the Hedjaz and the alliance with the Sherif of Mecca hastened the disappearance of Ottoman authority in the Arabic-speaking portions of the empire.

The policy followed by the British in Mesopotamia and Arabia was dictated by political considerations. The Germans had hoped to use the alliance with Turkey as a means of arousing the Islamic world. They induced the sultan, in his capacity of calif, to declare the jihad (holy war). The essential thing was to prevent the Mohammedans of Asia and Africa from making common cause with Turkey. As long as the Turks could be kept on the defensive, there would be no danger from pan-Islamism. Knowledge of this fact is the reason for the equanimity with which

friends of the Entente powers viewed the meager military results of the first two years of campaigning in the Near East.

In the northeastern corner of the empire, the Turks were handicapped by not having control of the Black Sea. There was no railway from western Asia Minor to the frontier of the Caucasus. After preliminary vicissitudes in Armenia and the Azerbaijan province of Persia, the Russians succeeded in gaining definite control of Tabriz and in capturing Erzerum, the great Turkish fortress that opened the path of invasion into Asia Minor. The news of the fall of Erzerum came as a timely antidote to the announcement of the withdrawal from Gallipoli.

The Germans did everything in their power to make Turkey an effective military factor in the war. After the intervention of Bulgaria, they were able to assist their Ottoman ally in a material way. Money and materials of all sorts flowed into Turkey. Large numbers of officers and engineers were loaned for staff and artillery work and for pushing the construction of the Bagdad Railway. The intervention of Turkey was precious to Germany in bottling up southern Russia and in compelling the Entente powers to keep

large numbers of troops in the Caucasus, Persia, Mesopotamia, and Egypt. The Gallipoli expedition and the operations in Egypt and Mesopotamia required the use of an enormous amount of tonnage, which seriously embarrassed, if it did not cripple, the Entente. But the Germans knew full well, after the failure to arouse Egypt and to penetrate into the Caucasus, that Turkey was doomed and German influence lost in the Near East unless decisive victories could be won on the western front. It was only a question of time when Turkey, like Germany herself, would succumb to the blockade and to exhaustion. This explains Verdun.

The Petrograd revolution, in March, 1917, enabled Germany and her allies to postpone the evil day and to regroup forces for one more supreme effort to crush the French and British armies in France. Nowhere did the collapse of Russia militarily and the breaking up of Russia politically help Germany more than in her relations with Turkey. The conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk put new heart into the Turks and opened up to them the perspective of a glorious future. They were content to let Mesopotamia and Arabia go: for those regions had never been

assimilated by the Turks and had been a source of constant weakness to the empire. The goal of the Young Turks was to link up their empire with the regions from which they had come. Once they became again masters of the Caucasus, they would be in touch with their fellow-Turanians of central Asia. Because the Armenians were in the path to the Caspian Sea, the Young Turks tried to exterminate them. The Turk has no affinity with the Arab save religion. But have not the British and the French the affinity of religion with the Germans? With the Tartars, the Turks have blood and language and ideals of civilization in common. It is easy to understand why, to the Turk *pur sang,* Russia has always been the great enemy.

In the spring and summer of 1918, when General Allenby was preparing for the decisive campaign in Palestine, and when the Germans made and failed in their final effort on the western front, the Turks seemed to have one thought—the recapture of the Caucasus. Their effort was concentrated between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, and they were marching from success to success, easily won, when the politico-military structure that had lasted four years collapsed in

four weeks. Rather than suffer invasion, Bulgaria sued for an armistice. Turkey read the handwriting on the wall. So did Austria-Hungary and Germany.

The Ottoman Empire could have been wiped oft the map—completely and without further effusion of blood—before the end of 1918. But who would inherit? Russia was no longer there. The shades of San Stefano began to stalk, all the same.

CHAPTER XI

PALESTINE AND THE ZIONISTS

TEN years of Young Turk rule accomplished what a century of European diplomatic effort, resulting several times in wars, tried desperately to prevent. The Ottoman Empire is in dissolution. The last footholds in Africa were lost by the Italian occupation of Tripoli (1911) and the proclamation of a British protectorate over Egypt (1914). The European provinces, except Thrace, were liberated by the Balkan States (1912). In the recent war, Mesopotamia and Palestine were conquered by the British and Arabia cast off the Turkish yoke.

At the beginning of the eleventh year of "the Constitution," while the Turks enjoyed illusory successes through reoccupying Armenia and penetrating into the Caucasus, by a series of brilliant military operations General Allenby's army passed into Syria after annihilating two Turkish

armies and capturing their artillery and means of transport.

The portions of the Ottoman Empire inhabited in majority by non-Turkish elements will not again be placed under the Turkish sultan's rule. The civilized world will not tolerate another Treaty of Vienna, Paris, or Berlin. The futile and disastrous results of old-fashioned diplomacy, which sacrificed races subject to the Turks for what was deemed the general good of Europe, have been demonstrated.

Among the Near Eastern problems, the establishment of a Zionist state in Palestine was not allowed to remain until the end of the war for discussion and settlement.

On November 2, 1917, in a letter to Lord Rothschild, immediate publication of which was authorized, Foreign Secretary Balfour made the following "declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations" on the part of the British cabinet:

His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish com-

munities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

The declaration was guarded and non-committal. In fact, the reservation concerning "the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine" kept the declaration in line with the ideals for which the nations banded against Germany were fighting. If the British Government's "sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations" did not mean prejudice either to civil or to religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, no harm or peril could possibly come of it. As opposed to 100,000 in the Jewish communities, there are 630,000 in the non-Jewish communities, of whom 550,000 form a solid Arabic-speaking Moslem block in racial and religious sympathy with the neighboring Arabs of Syria, Mesopotamia, Arabia, and Egypt. The Jews could therefore never become a menace to the majority.

But the Zionists did not interpret the declaration of the British Government according to its clear wording. From the day of its publication, they looked upon the letter of Mr. Balfour to Lord Rothschild as official British sanction to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine by

means of wholesale immigration and buying up of the land. They considered it as a recognition of Jewish nationality in the sense of separate political and civil status for the Jew from the international point of view. The Zionist interpretation of "sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations" is faithfully expressed in the first editorial comment of the London "Jewish Chronicle," which said:

> In place of being a wanderer in every clime, there is to be a home for the Jew in his ancient land. The day of his exile is to be ended. . . . The invitation to us is to enter into the family of nations of the Earth endowed with the franchise of Nationhood, to become emancipated, not as individuals or sectionally, but as a whole people.

"Unser Leute" ("our people") is not the jargon translation of *"B'nai B'rith"* ("Sons of the Covenant"), and yet to thoughtful and earnest Jews—not necessarily to devout Jews alone—the first expression is synonymous with the second. It requires neither rabbinical education nor religious conviction for the Jew to think of "the race apart" as "the chosen race." Instinct born of tradition and fostered by social conditions too unfortunately alike throughout the world has kept alive the phenomenon of consciousness of

separate race through religion, felt by Jews alone among all the elements that have formed the American nation, and felt more strongly than in America by the Jews of Occidental and central Europe.

In eastern Europe, where more than half the Jews in the world live, the feeling can hardly be called a phenomenon. For there race and religion are inextricably bound up together in determining a man's national and political status. The fact that in the Ottoman Empire and throughout the Mohammedan world a man derives his nationality from his religion makes the settlement of Near Eastern questions peculiarly perilous, even without Zionism to deal with.

Add Jewish aspirations, if loyally backed by newspaper and financial interests throughout the world, to indigenous Arab, Syrian, Egyptian, and Armenian aspirations, and we have a hopeless conflict of interests and ideals. Since the idea of a Zionist state in Palestine was brought before the Peace Conference, I have found opinions strongly pro and strongly contra among American Jews, mostly pro among British Jews and mostly contra among French Jews. Prominent Jews in the intellectual and business and com-

mercial world, whose names and statements appear in Zionist publications in favor of the Zionist interpretation of the Balfour letter, have assured me privately that they view the whole movement with the gravest misgivings. An American Jew, who has had unusual opportunities for studying the political and social and economic problems of the Ottoman Empire and who was a recent visitor to the Palestine colonies, said to me: "A Jewish state in Palestine is a chimera outside the realm of practical politics: so don't waste your time fighting windmills."

This keen and competent observer may be right about the chimera. But the attempt, the effort to establish a Jewish state in Palestine has certainly entered "the realm of practical politics." Events of the year 1918 proved that the British cabinet had an understanding with the Zionist leaders which most assuredly went far beyond the declaration of November 2, 1917.

By those who were watching closely the military and political situation in the Near East and who knew that Dr. Weizmann had secured the ear of Mr. Balfour, the diplomatic move at the end of 1917 was not unexpected. Nor have subsequent events in Palestine been unexpected.

Sudden "sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations" could have been born only of the knowledge that General Allenby was ready to capture Jerusalem, and that Dr. Weizmann, in return for Jewish support, was equally ready to enlist Zionism officially in the task of making Palestine virtually a British protectorate. Thus were Egypt and the Suez Canal to be covered. Thus was the Sherif of Mecca, recognized as "King of the Hedjaz" by the Entente powers, to be checked in his alarming ambition to refound a strong Arabic empire on the ruins of the former Ottoman Empire.

The British fought gloriously in France for over four years. Seven hundred thousand of the soldiers who, to defend France, came from every part of the world where the British flag waves, have been buried in France. Comradeship in arms, sealed by blood, has destroyed the traditional antagonism that had been kept alive through centuries by economic and colonial rivalry. One of the blessings of this war, and one of the solid guaranties of peace as well, would be a permanent friendship between the people of Great Britain and the people of France. Do the British realize that the policy pursued by

their government is a danger to Franco-British friendship? Certainly not; for they are ignorant of what is going on in Palestine, and even if they knew, would not see the danger. For they do not appreciate how the French feel about Palestine and Syria. Do the Jews who enthusiastically support Zionism understand the nature of the compact made by Weizmann with the consent of Sokalof? I am sure they do not. I was talking the other day to an American rabbi who is one of the most virile and zealous younger leaders of the Zionist movement—an idealist through and through. He seemed not to have studied Near Eastern history since the diaspora. He did not know that a small band of British imperialists, not content with determining to replace international by British control of the Suez Canal, planned, through using Zionism to prevent condominium with France and other nations in Palestine, to establish an all-rail British route from Haifa to Bassorah.

France was the pioneer among European nations in Egypt. Her sons established the cultural and economic foundations of present-day Egypt. France dug the Suez Canal. France signed in 1535 the first treaty with the Sublime

Porte to safeguard the lives and property of Christians in Turkey. For almost four centuries, the protection of Ottoman Christians and of the *Lieux Saints* (holy places) has been a precious prerogative of French foreign policy. Witness the treaties of 1569, 1589, 1604, 1637, 1740, and 1802. How easy it was during the nineteenth century to work up public opinion in France to fever heat over the question of France's unique position in Palestine and Syria is illustrated by the difficulties with England over Mehemet Ali in the reign of Louis Philippe; the Crimean War into which France entered primarily to prevent Russia from replacing her at Jerusalem; the expedition of 1860 to Damascus; Waddington's insistence at the Congress of Berlin that the clause *"les droits de la France sont expressément réservés,"* be added to the British draft of Paragraph 3 of Article 62; and when Italy tried to ignore the French protectorate in the Ottoman Empire, the appeal of France to the Vatican in 1880 which led to the encyclical *Aspera rerum conditio.* Only a few years before the outbreak of the recent war, France's guardianship of the Holy Land was recognized by Italy in the agreements of July 27, 1906, and January 13, 1907. In re-

lation to the Jews, also, France was the first nation to take measures for their protection and education in Palestine. France established the Mikweh Israel Agricultural School in 1870, subsidized the work of the Alliance Israelite Universelle at Jerusalem, assured by treaty the right of protecting North African Jews who had emigrated to Palestine, and has participated in the appointment of the Grand Rabbi of Jerusalem.

When the British army entered Damascus, the French fleet sailed into Beirut Harbor. If Asiatic Turkey is to be apportioned to the victors, whatever *modus vivendi* may be arranged for the time being, it is certain that Palestine must fall eventually under the protectorate of the power that controls Syria or the power that controls Egypt. Which power will get Palestine? Dr. Weizmann gave the answer of the International Zionist Commission in his memorable speech at Jerusalem in April, 1918. He stated categorically that "Zionists do not believe in the internationalization of Palestine or in any form of dual or multiple political control over Palestine, whose integrity must be protected by one just and fairly responsible guardian." The "one just and fairly responsible guardian," in Dr. Weizmann's opin-

ion, was already there; for, when speaking these words, he turned to General Sir Edmund Allenby.

The Grand Rabbi of France stated a few months ago that there are only a hundred thousand Zionists in the world outside of America; that most of the Zionists in France are of Russian or Rumanian origin; and that Jews of French birth, if interested at all in Zionism, were interested only out of sympathy with those who wanted to go to Palestine to escape persecution. "Zionism is not a pious desideratum on our part. What French Jews are interested in is liberty and equality in this country for all religions." But as a Frenchman and not as a Jew, the grand rabbi and all other prominent French Jews are exceedingly anxious that Zionism be not used to deprive France of her traditional past and her legitimate future place in the Near East. And French Jews fear that Zionism may revive anti-Semitism in France. French Catholics and French imperialists are determined that Palestine shall not be British. French Socialists, sensing future trouble, have repeatedly declared for territorial and political disinterestedness of *both* nations in Palestine.

In approaching the great problem of the world

peace that we hope our sacrifices will assure, we must face facts. When President Wilson made his speech of September 27, 1918, at the opening of the Fourth Liberty Loan, he said that this had become a war of peoples and that statesmen could no longer hope to make a peace that would be an "arrangement or compromise or adjustment of interests," and warned the leaders of the governments with which we are associated that "unity of purpose and of counsel are as imperatively necessary in this war as was unity of command on the battle-field; and with perfect unity of purpose and counsel will come assurance of complete victory. *It can be had in no other way.*" This "unity of purpose and of counsel" is sadly lacking between France and Great Britain at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. As long as Dr. Weizmann's words above quoted—"Zionists do not believe in any form of dual or multiple political control over Palestine"—represent Zionist opinion, and Zionists look to Great Britain to establish and guarantee a Jewish state in Palestine, the Entente powers cannot arrive at "unity of purpose and of counsel."

What happened in the Peace Conference at Paris during the early months of 1919 proved

clearly the difference of opinion between France and Great Britain as to the settlement of the Palestinian and Syrian questions. When the claims of the King of the Hedjaz were presented before the Council of Ten, it was discovered that the British had made a secret treaty with the Arabs, promising them Damascus! In the session devoted to Zionist aspirations in Palestine, after Dr. Weizmann had made his impassioned appeal, the French asked that M. Sylvain Lévy, professor at the College of France, be heard. Monsieur Lévy, recognized and honored as a leader by all his co-religionists in France, told President Wilson and the other members of the Council of Ten that he was not in sympathy with the Zionist movement. After an investigation on the spot since the British occupation of Jerusalem, Monsieur Lévy was persuaded that the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine was an impracticable and dangerous experiment. The same opinion was expressed by other eminent French Jews, such as Henri Bergson and Joseph Reinach.

Zionist aspirations, not only as interpreted and carried out by the present leaders of the Zionist movement but also in their very nature and essence—it is best to be frank about it—present

other dangers to the world peace than friction between France and Great Britain. In enumerating these dangers, I trust my readers will remember that I am not recording second-hand impressions and arguments. What I write here is the result of personal contact with the problems discussed.

First and foremost (for it affects the Jews themselves), *the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine would give birth to an alarming anti-Semitic movement throughout the Moslem world, resulting in boycotts and pogroms.*

The conception of a nation as a *millet* (religious community) is ingrained in Moslem races, and influences also races which have been subjected to or which have lived in intimate contact with Moslem civilization. In countries where Mohammedans have the political ascendency, non-Moslem *millets* are simply tolerated. They have no legal rights. Their security of life and property is based upon the granting of an *aman* (a safe-conduct) which is not permanent. It may be withdrawn at any moment. As long as non-Moslem *millets* do not aspire to political control or even to political equality, the non-Moslems are safe. For centuries, Christians and

Jews lived in perfect security in the Ottoman Empire and in other Mohammedan states. Massacres of Christians have occurred because of the withdrawal of the *qman*. So long as the Christians were content with their lot and did not try to become politically masters or equals through their own efforts or through demanding protection or aid from outside states, the *aman* was not withdrawn. I know that this statement will be indignantly denied by some, but it is made after years of study and observation. Starting with the massacre of the Greeks in Chios at the outbreak of the Greek rebellion nearly a hundred years ago, and examining the circumstances in which each massacre has taken place, we find that the underlying cause in every case is the refusal of Moslems to tolerate non-Moslem political rule or to grant equality to *raias* (non-Moslem subjects). I have lived in the Ottoman Empire, have traveled everywhere in perfect security, and know how it feels to have the *aman* suddenly withdrawn; for I was in the courtyard of the Adana government building when the massacre of 1909 broke out.

Massacres are not due to religious antipathy. Moslems do not declare the jihad (holy war)

simply to kill non-Moslems. It is their way of preventing the assertion of independence on the part of non-Moslems among them. Greeks and other Christians have not been harmed when Armenians were being killed. Armenians have not been harmed when Greeks were being killed. The Jews who had to emigrate from Spain several centuries ago were received hospitably by the Turks. There never has been a pogrom. And yet, in the Koran, the denunciation of Christians cannot be compared with the denunciation of Jews. Religiously speaking, Moslems bear far more hatred to Jews than Christians. It is always legally right for Moslems to kill non-Moslems. Only the *aman* stands between the non-Moslem and death. The Jews have enjoyed security in the Ottoman Empire and in Persia because there never has been up to now a reason to withdraw the *aman*.

Palestine contains two of the four holy places of orthodox Islam. Jerusalem is second only to Mecca. An attempt to turn the Mosque of Omar back into the Temple of Solomon would be more foolish and dangerous than to reconsecrate St. Sophia. Zionists answer that Zionism does not mean the restoration of Jewry in Jerusalem, and

that those who point out the inevitable conflict with Islam have not grasped the significance of the Zionist movement. But if Zionism is mystical and spiritual, why Palestine at all? And if the material return to Zion is practical, no previously announced good intentions are going to prevail against human nature. We have already had proof of this. Following in the trail of Sir Edmund Allenby's victorious army, the Zionist delegation first established headquarters at Tel Aviv near Jaffa. But within a few months, branch headquarters (the adjective and noun together form a paradox) were opened in Jerusalem, and Dr. Weizmann declared, "We return to this sacred country which our forefathers heroically defended to link up the glorious traditions of the past with the future."

In vain did Dr. Weizmann continue by stating that "this development will not, and must not, be detrimental to any of the great communities established in the country; on the contrary, it will be to their advantage." In vain did he express deep sympathy for and profound interest in "the struggle for freedom which the ancient Arab race is now waging against Turkey," and his belief that the scattered Arab forces were being

mented with the sympathies of the Entente and the freedom-loving powers. The mufti and other Moslem notables withdrew from the table. And ever since Dr. Weizmann's speech, there has been a constant cry of protest from Arabs, Christian as well as Moslem. So unanimous has been the protest that the French Government censor allowed to be printed in the Arab newspaper of Paris, "Al Moustaqbal" (number of August 30, 1918), a letter of a Palestinian Arab, written from Jerusalem on May 26, which in violent terms states that Moslems will never allow Jews to control Palestine. The sentiments of this letter are identical with those repeatedly expressed in "Al Kibla," official journal of the King of the Hedjaz, formerly Sherif of Mecca, whose aid has been decisive to the British in the Palestinian and Mesopotamian campaigns.[1]

Dr. Weizmann made strenuous efforts, sup-

[1] Writing a rejoinder to my article on "Zionism and the World Peace" (*Century*, January, 1919), Dr. Julius Friedlaender, of the Jewish Theological Seminary, New York, stated in the April *Century* that the Arabs of the Hedjaz were friendly to Zionism. Dr. Friedlaender asserts that he is much more familiar than I am with the Arab ideas concerning the Holy Land. I hesitate to take issue with a distinguished scholar, but Dr. Friedlaender's knowledge is a second-hand book knowledge of the dim past. The files of "Al Kibla" for 1918 speak for themselves. In March, 1919, the Emir Feisal, who was sent by the

ported by the British administration, to conciliate the Moslems and Christians of the Holy Land. Out of a great number invited, only three Arabs consented to talk with him. Despite his concessions—use of Arabic as official language, civil and administrative equality, prohibition of buying lands or flocks, limitation of Zionist agriculture to uncultivated government lands at Beersheba and Khan-Younes against the deposit of their value in money in an agricultural bank for the amelioration of the lot of the Arabic fellahin—he was told flatly no Judeo-Arabic agreement was possible *except between the elements already settled in Palestine.*

Under the influence of the dazzling victories of the autumn of 1918, the International Zionist Commission reported a "working agreement." But we must not be deceived by appearances. History proves the Mohammedan acceptance of the inevitable—cheerful and definite acceptance. But history proves also the unwisdom—no, more, the impossibility—of changing the political and social nature of a Mohammedan country by

king, his father, to represent the Hedjaz at the Peace Conference, said to me categorically, "Never will the Arabs give up their right to Palestine. It is our country."

forced European immigration. Colonists, products of another civilization, backed in agricultural and commercial competition with indigenous elements by large grants of money and protected by diplomacy behind which stood armies and battle-ships, have failed to take root or have been massacred. Zionists should study the failure of France in Tunis, the pitiful shipwreck of Italian ambitions in Tripoli, and the disastrous results of Greek attempts to increase colonization along the Sea of Marmora and the Ægean coast of Asia Minor. The resignation of Mohammedans is an article of faith; but their inability to accept political domination in their own country of non-Moslem elements is also an article of faith. Oil does not mix with water. It is a sad mistake to attribute the comparative failure of earlier Zionist attempts at colonization in Palestine to the corruption of the Turkish rule. Arabs are far more Mohammedan than are Turks. Their fanaticism is more to be feared.

If the Peace Conference finally decides to restore the Jews to Palestine, immigration into and development of the country can be assured only by the presence of a considerable army for an indefinite period. Not only the half million

Moslems living in Palestine but the millions in surrounding countries will have to be cowed into submission by the constant show and the occasional use of force.

But how can we reconcile such a policy in Palestine with the principles for the *world-wide* maintenance of which we have announced that we are fighting? Is the Peace Conference to give with one hand and take away with the other? We have made the issues of this conflict the triumph of right over force and the liberation of small nations from the yoke of the foreigner. Each race is to be consulted in regard to its own destinies. If we consult the Palestinian Arabs, Christian as well as Moslem, we shall find them *unanimous* in their desire, their determination, not to have Zionism foisted upon them. They comprise over eighty per cent. of the population of Palestine. Even in the Jewish minority there is a strong anti-Zionist element, for Jewry is no more united than are Christendom and Islam. The Sephardim, who understand the spirit of the Orient better than Occidental and Northern Jews and who are in large majority among the indigenous Palestine Jews, do not sympathize with the Zionist program.

We are fighting to break down racial and national barriers throughout the world. Americans hope that this war is going to bring together every element of the American nation in a common brotherhood. Native-born and immigrant, white and black, Protestant and Catholic and Jew, Aryan and Semite and Indian, have one allegiance—to the Government of the United States, for which all alike shed their blood on the battle-fields of France. This sacrifice was demanded by a government which does not make citizenship depend upon race or religion or color. The same responsibilities are exacted of all, the same privileges are extended to all.

Grand Rabbi Lévy of France struck the nail on the head when he said: "Zionism is not a pious desideratum on our part. What French Jews are interested in is liberty and equality in *this* country for all religions." The great majority of American-born Jews certainly have the same opinion. Not nationhood in an artificially created Zion, but complete unrestricted partnership in the political, economic, and social life of the United States of America is their goal. It must be the goal of all our foreign-born, also, Jew and Gentile alike. And do not American Jews

realize the glorious change, which can be made permanent if they act wisely, that has come over the situation of the Jew in Europe since 1914? When I was a boy living in the Jewish quarter of Philadelphia, Herzl, founder of Zionism, was worshiped by the immigrants from Poland and Russia because he proclaimed a gospel of emancipation. The immigrants soon realized that the emancipation had come with American citizenship and lost their fervor for the ideal of return to the Holy Land. As I write, I think of Russian and Polish Zionists whom I knew well in the old days and whom I have met again after a lapse of years. One of them, an officer in the American Expeditionary Force, laughed heartily when I told him the story of Lord Rothschild, who said he was for Zionism if he could be ambassador of the new state at London. "My sentiments! My sentiments exactly!" he exclaimed. This war has brought a complete change of the status of Jews in eastern and southeastern Europe. Who, then, will feel the need of returning to Zion?

If some Jews of Europe and America, however, follow the will-o'-the-wisp of Zionism and insist in the Peace Conference upon their separate

nationality, they may succeed in losing for themselves and for all others of their religion what they have to-day the golden opportunity of gaining. Anti-Semitism need not be reawakened in Russia; but the Russian peasants are susceptible of being worked upon by fanatics if told that the Jews have seized the Holy Land, which means more to Russians than to any other Christian people. Jews have been enfranchised in Rumania, but Rumanians will reconsider the decision if the concession is spurned by continued wholesale emigration of the Jewish element. The Polish question, most difficult of all, will become more delicate if the Jews maintain a state within a state by looking to Zion. French Jews are living to-day in the millennium. Who cannot foresee the change in French public opinion toward them if Zionism plays the game of another power? And are German and Austrian Jews going to be called upon to take sides with the enemies of the nation to which they owe allegiance?

Through the courtesy of the British Foreign Office, I have received a collection of books, pamphlets, and periodicals on the Zionist question which contain the case for Zionism in Palestine

in the most complete and strongest form. Since the Balfour declaration, when Zionism entered practical international politics, I have met Zionists as much as possible. Newspaper accounts of Zionist conventions and meetings and discussions of the Zionist movement have been coming to my desk for the last year. Neither in the spoken nor in the written word, I am sorry to say, is there an inclination to take into consideration what President Wilson pleaded for in his speech at the opening of the Fourth Liberty Loan:

> The impartial justice meted out must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned. No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis or any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all. . . . Shall there be a common standard of right and privilege for all peoples and nations or shall the strong do as they will and the weak suffer without redress?

The Jewish advocates of introducing hundreds of thousands of Jews into Palestine, immigrants backed by outside diplomatic and financial support and going for the purpose of setting up a theocratic government for the Jewish *nation,* forget or ignore the fact that Palestine is already in-

habited by a nation which has possessed the land for over a thousand years—a nation homogeneous in race as well as in religion, a nation with traditions more firmly centered, because of contact and ownership, with the *harams* of Jerusalem and Hebron than their own, a nation whose highly perfected language was preferred to Hebrew as a medium by the great Jewish writers, Saadia, Maimonides, and (for his prose) Jehuda ben Halévy. The Gentile advocates of restoring Palestine to the Jews either have never investigated the proposition from the point of view of the inhabitants of the country, or are actuated by the principle of political expediency denounced by President Wilson.

At the time of the Dardanelles Expedition, Syrian physicians educated in the American and French colleges of Beirut, when they learned the terrible need of medical care for British soldiers, volunteered their services. They received no answer. An Entente diplomat took up the case with the British authorities and urged that Syrians be used. "We do not want niggers looking after our men," was the answer. I should not tell this story, for the truth of which I can vouch, were it not that here may lie the reef which will wreck

the ship of a durable peace. Greeks, Armenians, Persians, Arabs, Syrians, and Egyptians are not "niggers," and the sooner we wake up to this truth the better for the whole Anglo-Saxon race. They are getting our education and our ideas. Given equal chance, their instincts are as gentlemanly as ours, their code of honor as high, and their intelligence as great. We can no longer get away with the "my man" and "here there" and "boy" fashion of addressing them. In the Near East, as in the Far East, arrogance, insolence, indifference to the political *and social* rights of "natives" *in their own countries* will have to go the way of ante-bellum diplomacy. If we do not change radically our attitude toward *all* Asiatic races, the recent war is nothing to what is coming, and in the twentieth century, too.

Assuming that Syrians and Arabs *are* "niggers," according to our principles in this war their rights are as sacred as ours. Dr. Weizmann assures them that their rights will be safeguarded. But they do not want this assurance from Dr. Weizmann, from the British Government, from the Entente nations, from the Peace Conference. They want to safeguard their own rights, freely and unhampered, like every other

nation. They challenge the authority of the British cabinet to dispose of Palestine. Palestine is theirs. They live in the country. They own the country. They have been indispensable in the military operation of freeing it from the Turks. They have been recognized as belligerents. No reasonable man can deny the justice of the unanimous demand of Moslem and Christian Palestinians of Arab race and language, who are over eighty per cent. of the present population, that the Zionist scheme be envisaged in regard to Palestine as we should look at it if our own countries were concerned. Can the Peace Conference say *ex cathedra:* "We have decided to sanction Zionist aspirations. You Palestinian Arabs must allow an indefinite number of Jews to come into your country, settle there and participate in the government. If you do not do so willingly, we shall occupy Palestine with a military force and treat you as rebels, as disturbers of the world's peace"?

We have an illustration as to what Mr. Balfour thinks about Zionist immigration *when it is a question of Britishers who would be affected.* Mr. Chamberlain, Foreign Secretary in the Balfour cabinet, conceived the idea of opening

eastern Africa to the Zionists. A commission was sent out from London in 1904 to study the question. The protest against the immigration of "Galician and other undesirable eastern and southeastern European Jews" on the part of a few hundred British colonists in an enormous country they had not yet themselves been able to cultivate, or even explore, prevented the commission from offering to the Zionists the only lands in the colony practicable for white settlement. Premier Balfour admitted the justice of their opposition when he saw that force would have to be used to make them yield; and the Zionist congress at Basel was offered inland, equatorial, undeveloped Uganda instead! Now that a similar protest against Zionist immigration comes from six hundred and thirty thousand Moslem and Christian inhabitants of a very small country, is the case different?

The argument of the Zionists that there is room for them, too, in Palestine is absurd. The world has never admitted such an argument to justify forcible immigration. It smacks of Prussianism pure and simple. The indigenous population of Palestine is not stationary and will increase without immigration under better political,

hygienic, and economic conditions. Who can deny the right—a right everywhere jealously guarded—of a race to wish to keep intact the soil and potential wealth of its own country for its own future generations? On the ground that there is room for others, the Peace Conference could with equal reason and justice insist upon the opening up of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and our own Pacific States to Asiatic immigration. But we Anglo-Saxons will have none of it. Are we going to force an Asiatic race to admit European immigrants against its will? Is this the meting out of "impartial justice that plays no favorites and knows no standard but equal rights"?

At the Peace Conference, the Japanese were quick to take advantage of the opening afforded them by President Wilson's pronouncements in regard to immigration and Zionism. During his short visit to the United States in midwinter, 1919, President Wilson said that he was in favor of Zionism, and that he had no doubt his colleagues in the Peace Conference held the same opinion as himself. But on the following day, he announced that the League of Nations would not necessitate the giving up by the Americans of

their undisputed right to regulate immigration into the United States!. When President Wilson returned to Paris, the Japanese delegates mildly suggested that supporting Zionism was inconsistent with maintaining the "undisputed right" of a people to regulate immigration into their country. They wanted to know if there was to be one measure for the American and European, and another for the Asiatic.

Zionists fall back upon their acceptance of the clause in the Balfour declaration to the effect that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." Zionism, say the Zionists, does not mean oppression of or conflict with the other communities. If conflict does arise, it will be the fault of others, and help will be asked from Dr. Weizmann's "one just and fairly responsible guardian" to defend the immigrants. But how can the setting up of a Jewish "national home" in Palestine fail to affect the civil and religious rights of the present inhabitants of the land? What other result can Zionism possibly have than to rob the Palestinian Arabs of their hope to evolve into a modern, self-governing state? The spirit of the twentieth

century is unalterably opposed to government by communities constituted on theocratic principles. The evolution of self-governing democracies has been possible only through unification and secularization. Utah is an illustration. Doing away with polygamy was simply the rallying-cry in the inevitable conflict with Mormonism. In Zionist congresses, delegates have frequently advocated making the United States "the promised land." But the answer always was that the ideals of Zionism could not be realized under the American system of civil government. At Paris, Mr. Lloyd George advocated Zionism—for Palestine. But years ago, when he was lawyer for the organization at the time of the East African proposal, he told his clients frankly that if Zion was to be estabished in a British colony, they would have to change their scheme of governing Zion.

When the whole world is moving toward democracy, we cannot ask the Arabs of Palestine to live under a polity emancipation from which is the corner-stone of our own liberties. The Zionist argues that the Arabs already live under that polity, and that precisely because there is no question of asking the inhabitants to change existing institutions, Palestine is the ideal country

for the erection of the Jewish "national home." This argument reveals a dangerous ignorance of existing institutions in Palestine. Commentators on the Koran have invariably represented the theocratic system of government as a *Mohammedan* theocracy. It is not against the law to tolerate non-Mohammedan *millets* as long as the Christian and Jewish sects do not aspire to political domination or do not interpret their autonomy as a right instead of as a free, and temporary, gift. In the Ottoman Empire, prerogatives of the *millets,* like the capitulations governing foreigners, originated in the inadaptability of Mohammedan law to meet the need of non-Moslems. The concessions were not wrung from the Turks by force. They were granted freely to avoid bother.

By establishing in the Near East a non-Mohammedan theocracy, on a present footing of equality and with the prospect of some day becoming the master, we should be doing more than bringing Judaism into conflict with Islam. We should be sanctioning the perpetuation of the very system of government that needs to be changed if the peoples of the Near East—and of all Asia, in fact—are to participate in our durable peace.

Our goal is the liberation of all races and the doing away with foreign control and exploitation of weaker peoples. To attain that goal, we must endeavor to show Mohammedan nations the path of political evolution we ourselves have followed, and to help them along the path. We must uphold in the Near East the antithesis of Zionist conceptions and ideals. Religion does not decide one's nationality. The state is a secular institution, created and supported by the people, serving and served by the people. "The people" comprise all who live within the limits of the state; they enjoy equal political rights; and these rights are not dependent upon and have no connection whatever with religious belief. A religious community, governed by rules and traditions of its own and not subject to the common laws made by all the people and applying to all alike, is inimical to the development of democracy. Occidental Europe and the United States have found out this truth. We cannot establish Zionism in Palestine after a war that has been fought "to make the world safe for democracy."

Other considerations of a political order dictated the decision of the British to abandon the Zionist program—in the sense it had been con-

templated—as the Peace Conference dragged on. The revolution in Egypt was a warning that could not be ignored. Emir Feisal avoided the Palestine question, under pressure from the British, when he presented the Arabic claims before the Council of Ten. But he became refractory the moment the British, yielding to the French, showed a tendency to weaken on their promise that Damascus should be his. Mr. Balfour called the attention of the Zionist leaders in Paris to the strict wording of the declaration of December, 1917, and said that the British would go no farther than that. An inspired press campaign began immediately to demonstrate that the Jewish leaders themselves were convinced of the impracticability of a Jewish state "at the present time." Shortly after President Wilson told the Zionist leaders that he would support their proposals, he received a protest signed by nearly three hundred leading American Jews, who sent representatives to Paris to combat Zionism.

When the Zionist movement arose and took root in Jewry, the whole world sympathized with the reasons for it given by Herzl. The political emancipation of the Jew in Russian and Austrian Poland, in Russia and in Rumania, has been a

plank in the platform of world-wide democracy. The Jews had a right to attempt to emancipate their downtrodden brethren in their own way and to use the age-old aspiration of Israel to revive hope and faith; but the most prominent of Zionists used to explain that the "return to Zion" did not mean return to Jerusalem in the material sense of the word. It was a mystical idea, like "Jerusalem the Golden" to Christians. The proof of this is in the fact that Zionist congresses have discussed seriously setting up Zion in other places than Palestine. Even recently, one of Dr. Weizmann's most ardent supporters said to me:

"Can I make you see the possession of Jerusalem means nothing to Zionists? The aim of Zionism is to revivify the religious faith of Jewry which our dispersion in the modern world threatens to extinguish. It is, from Alpha to Omega, a spiritual movement."

Why, then, does Zionism emphasize now the temporal aspect? Why Palestine? Why a distinct nationhood for the Jew? To preserve the Ghetto for those whose religion cannot thrive outside the Ghetto, are we going to risk putting the millions of Jews who live happily and usefully in their several countries back into the Ghetto?

Is it possible to recreate with success anachronistic political and religious conditions? Men have fought wars to turn back the hands of the clock. The wars have not prevented the progress of mankind. And how often has peace been disturbed because men failed to comprehend the universal Zion for all creeds in the words of a Palestinian Jew who said, "My kingdom is not of this world"!

CHAPTER XII

THE FUTURE OF THE OTTOMAN RACES

AMONG the many blank checks Germany was asked to sign in the Treaty of Versailles, none demanded more renunciation and was more far-reaching in its significance than Article 155. It read:

> Germany undertakes to recognize and accept all arrangements which the Allied and Associated Powers may make with Turkey and Bulgaria with reference to any rights, interests and privileges whatever which might be claimed by Germany or her nationals in Turkey and Bulgaria and which are not dealt with in the provisions of the present Treaty.

This stipulation is consistent with the determination to banish Germany from every portion of the world's surface outside of the German Empire and to impair her sovereignty in not inconsiderable portions inside the empire. It puts the future of the Near East into the hands of Great Britain and France and Italy. Japan has no interests in Turkey, and it cannot be expected

that the United States will pursue a more vigorous policy in regard to Turkey than in regard to China.

Representatives of the races liberated from or still subject to the Turks came to Paris with the idea that the Treaty of Versailles would establish a new order in the Near East. The speeches of Allied statesmen had encouraged them to believe in the settlement of their destiny in accordance with their wishes and interests. For had not the Entente powers frequently given as one of the principal objects of the war the liberation and independence of Ottoman subject races? Had they not claimed to be the defenders of small nationalities? They asserted that they were fighting for humanity and a durable peace and not for selfish national interests or commercial advantages or territorial aggrandizement. But when May 7, 1919, arrived and the treaty was presented to the Germans, the section concerning Turkey and Bulgaria could not be otherwise than vague. After six months of negotiations, the victors were as far from a decision about the future of the Ottoman races as they were when the Conference of Paris was convened. Never once, from the opening day of the congress to the

day the treaty was completed, were the representatives of Ottoman subject races consulted in more than a perfunctory way as to their claims and wishes. They were kept as completely in the dark as they had been at Berlin in 1878. Only one thing was clear—the intention of the leaders of the allied and associated powers to use the Ottoman subject races and their lands as pawns in a diplomatic game according to the old-fashioned nineteenth-century precedent.

It may be urged, however, that the disposition of the Ottoman Empire is provided for at the beginning of the treaty in the covenant of the League of Nations. Article 22 declares that "the well-being and development of peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world form a sacred trust of civilization," securities for the performance of which "should be embodied in this Covenant." The article goes on to read:

> The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

The characters of the Mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territories committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

The wording of this article contains several "jokers," which will enable it to be interpreted to suit the aspirations of imperialists who plan a further extension of European eminent domain. Witness: the phrase "advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility"; the statement that "the char-

acters of the Mandate must differ according to" several conditions, the last of which is "other similar circumstances"; the adjective "certain" before "communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire"; the qualification "until such time as they are able to stand alone"; "principal" before "consideration"; and the insertion of "if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League" in the next to the last paragraph. These "jokers" give the great powers the opportunity of coming to an understanding about the "territories" in accordance with their own ambitions and interests. If further proof is needed than the wording of Article 22 to show what the victors have in mind, the attitude of "principal Allied and Associated Powers" toward the problems of the Ottoman Empire during peace negotiations can be adduced.

During the months from January to May, 1919, Near Eastern problems came frequently before the Council of Ten and the Council of Four. Representatives of the Ottoman subject races were invited to present their claims. They were given a formal hearing. Then they heard no more from the Conference of Paris. There was no opportunity for full, heart-to-heart discussion.

They had no way of finding out whether their claims were approved or disapproved, or why. They were not asked to present modified programs, and it was not pointed out to them where their desiderata gave rise to difficulties or were deemed impracticable. The principal allied and associated powers made no effort to bring together the various elements of the Ottoman Empire in a common conference to reach an agreement of division of territory and to lay the foundations of an economic union. The representatives of every element in the empire, authorized to treat in the name of their people, were in Paris. The opportunity was unique.

But this was the nightmare of the statesmen who were feigning to establish justice and freedom for all races. They would tolerate no pan-Turkish conference: they would recognize no agreement among the elements of the Ottoman Empire to dispose of themselves. The reasons for the silence and unresponsiveness of Entente statesmen to the appeals of the Ottoman subject races soon became evident. Great Britain and France and Italy were bound by the secret treaty of April 26, 1915, and by later accords negotiated

in 1916 and 1917, to a cold-blooded policy of division of the spoils. The treaties and accords were made without consulting the peoples concerned and were inspired by selfish political and commercial interests. From the beginning of the Conference of Paris, the criterion adopted for the solution of problems was the reconciliation of the imperialistic ambitions of the victorious powers. Since there was no other thought in the minds of the statesmen than what would be advantageous to Great Britain or France or Italy, why waste time in reconciling the interests—much less in listening to the importunities—of Greeks, Armenians, Syrians, Palestinians, Kurds, and Arabs?

In the summer of 1919, the Near Eastern question was as insoluble and as dangerous to the peace of Europe as it had always been. With Germany and Austria eliminated and Russia temporarily out of the running, the three remaining powers had a wonderful opportunity to come to an understanding in regard to Turkey. But the three could no more agree than the six. Because of this tragic state of affairs, President Wilson was unable to guarantee that the United States

would consent to be a mandatory in the Near East and thus become involved in the madness of Old World imperialism.

The question of accepting a mandate, however, came before the American people. It was inevitable that the conception of a society of nations should carry with it responsibilities as well as privileges. The difficulty was for Europeans to understand why Americans regarded being invested with a mandate as a responsibility. In intimate conversations with prominent French and British statesmen, I have found that they considered the Wilsonian conception of attribution of mandates a harmless euphemism. Article 22 in their mind was simply an expedient to dispel opposition on the part of the radical elements in their own countries and the people who were to be the victims of exploitation. "After all," said one of them to me, "your President is a splendid politician and he knows just what to throw out to capture public opinion." Americans are curiously enough not cynical in questions of foreign policy. Not having borne the white man's burden, we think of colonies and protectorates as an altruistic proposition.

If there is to be a future of independence for

the races of the Ottoman Empire, the United States must have a hand in the reconstruction of the Near East. The European powers are without surplus capital to invest in the new states, and have no functionaries or officials for exportation at the present time. Certainly, they have neither money nor men for carrying on an altruistic work such as is implied in Article 22 of the peace treaty. If Great Britain and France and Italy go into Asia Minor, Syria, Arabia, and Mesopotamia, it will not be for helping the inhabitants of those countries to speedy self-government and independence. It will be for extending their colonial domains, for protecting existing interests, and developing new interests. We can put no faith in the solemn assurances of statesmen and in official statements of governments. Have we not before our eyes the example of Egypt, whose independence was guaranteed most formally by the British, and which the British bound themselves to evacuate within a short time?

Article 22 reads: "The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory." If this treaty provision is fulfilled, all the subject races (with the

exception of the Greeks, who naturally want to be united to Greece) will vote for the United States as mandatory. Their second choice is Great Britain. I am convinced that neither France nor Italy would have a majority anywhere. In regard to France, the reason for this is not enmity or dislike. In fact, French culture is more wide-spread in the Ottoman Empire than Anglo-Saxon. But the feeling is well-nigh universal that France, after the losses of this war, and especially with the tremendous new obligations she must assume in Alsace-Lorraine, Kamerun, and Togoland, will not possibly be able to send large amounts of capital and an adequate supply of first-class administrators, military officers, and engineers into the territories liberated from the Ottoman Empire. But is not Great Britain, after five years of war, in a somewhat similar position? What power other than the United States can perform the task of mandatory? With wounds to bind up and with tremendous existing obligations in Africa and Asia, which are being added to by the division of the German colonial empire, Great Britain and France are unable to become disinterested big brothers to the liberated Ottoman races.

The alternative to allowing the Ottoman Empire to be cut up into spheres for exploitation by Great Britain and France and Italy is the assumption of responsibility for the immediate future of the whole empire by the United States. For if America accepted a mandate for only one of the liberated races, our conception of administering the mandate would inevitably and immediately bring us into conflict with the other mandatories. This is a strong statement. I do not qualify it, however, for it represents a conviction based upon intimate knowledge of what is going on behind the scenes in Paris. By taking over the future of the Ottoman races, the United States would not only be assuming a duty of humanity to those races. She would also be aiding powerfully in preventing the disruption of the Entente Alliance and the failure of the society of nations. If the Foreign offices of Great Britain and France and Italy are allowed a free hand in carrying out cherished programs, we shall have oppression and unrest in western Asia, leading to uprisings and ending in war between those who are to-day allies.

In a separate chapter, I explain at length the problem of Zionism. Palestine is one of

many problems for which the solution slated violates the right of peoples to dispose of themselves and at the same time jeopardizes friendly relations between powers. I use Palestine as an illustration. Within the limits of this volume, it is impossible to deal similarly with the questions of Arabia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Kurdistan, Armenia, Turkey narrowed down to her ethnographical limits, the "unredeemed" Greeks, and Constantinople and the straits. Each of these questions is complex. Each involves the others. Each is bound up with special interests and colonial dreams of one or more great powers.

Prophecy is futile. The Byzantine proverb still holds good in regard to the region of the later Roman Empire: "Think out logically what ought to happen and what can reasonably be expected to happen, and then be sure that it will not happen." Kiamil Pasha, frequently Grand Vizir of Turkey, once said to me: "My friend, in writing about us, avoid speculation and statistics"! But the setting forth of certain facts is essential to a proper understanding of the problems and dangers before the world in connection with the future of the Ottoman dominions. Ante-bellum conditions and events of the war

should have influenced vitally the Near Eastern policy of the Entente powers. Unfortunately, nothing is changed. Whenever a problem of the Ottoman Empire came up at the Paris Conference, it was envisaged in the light of each power's particular traditional imperialism. The same influences that precipitated several wars in the nineteenth century were at work. Promises to liberate Arabs, Syrians, Armenians, and Greeks were war manœuvers and not intended seriously.[1] Not President Wilson's "fourteen points and subsequent discourses," as had been promised at the time of the armistice, but the Anglo-Franco-Russo-Italian treaty of April 26, 1915; the Anglo-French Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916; the

[1] Alternating the soft and loud pedal in the proclamation of ideals is strikingly illustrated by the experience of Poland during the war. The statesmen of both groups of belligerents acted in exactly the same way toward Polish aspirations, i.e., encouraged or discouraged them according to the exigencies of the moment. Before the revolution rendered Russia impotent, the Entente powers, allies of Russia, were bitterly hostile to the resuscitation of Poland, while the Central powers encouraged Poland's aspirations. When the advantage for the Central powers of sustaining Poland was over, they became Poland's enemies. On the other hand, the Entente powers, no longer having the fear of alienating Russia and needing an ally in the East to put in the place of Russia, declared their espousal of Poland's cause. In 1916, I was censored by the French military censorship for advocating Polish independence. In 1918, I was censored by the same people for advising moderation in the advocacy of Polish territorial claims!

Anglo-French promises to Italy at Saint Jean-de-Maurienne in 1916; the Anglo-Hedjaz treaty of 1917; and the Franco-Russian convention of February, 1917, were the bases of the Ottoman settlement in the minds of the Entente delegates and members of commissions. ..In discussing just settlements, Entente representatives disposed of arguments that such or such a measure was in the interests of the people concerned by a flat *non possumus.* The American experts on Near Eastern affairs were met constantly by the statement, "our treaty obligations come first, of course," and "our traditional policy demands this solution."

In brief, the actions of Entente fleets and armies in the Near East and the position of Entente statesmen at the Conference of Paris reveal the following policies. *British policy:* in lieu of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, now no longer possible, Great Britain must control the approaches to the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf, prevent any other European power from approaching Persia on the land side, inherit the Mesopotamian and Syrian portion of the Bagdad Railway, and substitute herself for Russia in central Asia, northern Persia, and the

Caucasus. *French policy:* to preserve French culture and commercial influence in the Near East, France must have Syria with a hinterland, and Cilicia, and must prevent Anglo-Saxondom from getting complete control of the Arabs and Armenians. France declares that she has been waiting since the Crusades for the political disruption of Islam at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. If she has to give up Palestine to the British, there must be compensation in upper Mesopotamia and Cilicia. *Italian policy:* since Great Britain and France exclude Italy from the eastern end of the Mediterranean, Italy must reestablish her medieval control of the Ægean Sea and the trade marts of western Asia Minor. This means permanent possession of Rhodes and the other islands of the Dodecanese, and a large slice of the mainland on the Mediterranean and Ægean coasts of Asia Minor.

British and French policies are irreconcilable, whatever the optimists of the Peace Conference may have said. To remain friends, it is not enough to desire to be friends or even to have certain common interests. Friendship between nations necessitates absence of causes of conflict. Symbols count for more than realities with the

French. The British do not realize this. The question of Syria is already poisoning Franco-British relations. Constantinople is becoming a bone of contention, too. British policy raises the question of unity of the Arabs. But if this movement once gains momentum, France will be threatened in Syria, and Great Britain herself in Palestine and Egypt. The French policy, if it succeeds, will deprive the Armenians of hope of recreating their national life. For without Cilicia, Armenia would be cut off from the Mediterranean. Italian policy can succeed only at the expense of the unity and well-being of the Greek nation. Acquiescence in the ambitions of Italy makes war between Greece and Italy inevitable, and will enable Germany to renew her political alliance with Italy.

The Entente powers were not blind to these dangers. Fearful of the disruption of the alliance before Germany was forced to sign the Treaty of Versailles, and unable to postpone indefinitely consideration of the future of the Ottoman Empire, the expedient of inviting "unofficially" a Turkish delegation to Paris was adopted in June, 1919. Headed by Damad Ferid Pasha, Grand Vizir, and other Turks who had not been

identified with the Committee of Union and Progress, the Turkish delegation reached Paris and was received by the Council of Ten on the very day the privilege of oral discussion was finally and irrevocably denied to the German delegation. The Turks made the classic plea of the necessity of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire for the peace of Europe. They maintained that they were in the majority at Constantinople and in most of Asia Minor, and that where there was not a Turkish racial majority, there was always a Moslem religious majority. The Turks demanded the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, with the exception of the Arabic-speaking portions. The Turkish delegation was a British inspiration. As the portions of the Ottoman Empire Great Britain claimed were not to be included in the proposed Turkish state, it was easy for the British to be generous. After all, the Turks had as much right to live as any one else, and the maintenance of Constantinople and Asia Minor as a political unity had four advantages: (1) it would eliminate the certain conflict between Italy and Greece; (2) it would settle the Armenian question in case of American refusal to accept a mandate, and would enable France to

take Cilicia in fee simple; (3) it would reserve for a future and friendly Russia the inheritance of Constantinople and the straits; (4) it would prevent agitators in the Mohammedan possessions of Great Britain and France from making capital of hostility to the calif. All four of these reasons appealed to French statesmen in the same way as to British statesmen. In a resuscitated Turkey, France would still be protector by treaty right of Christians, and Great Britain would preserve a privileged commercial position. In return for another chance to live, the Turks were ready to promise anything to the two Occidental powers. But where did Italy come in? And what was to become of the "unredeemed" Greeks and the Armenians? Italy had "rights" secured by her secret treaty of 1915 and subsequent negotiations. M. Venizelos, before the Moslems of India protested, had made the Entente leaders live up to their promises of days when they wanted and needed his help. In the Greek premier, whose authority and popularity at Paris were far beyond that of the spokesmen of other small nations, the "unredeemed" Greeks had a precious ally. The Armenians had no such advocate. Americans and a few Europeans sympa-

thized with the Armenians. But none had an interest in championing their cause. Zionist influence was strong enough to prevent the natives of Palestine from having a hearing. France laid down, as the *sine qua non* of her aid to the Syrians, their unqualified acceptance of a French protectorate. As for the Arabs, their claims were listened to only in so far as the claims did not conflict with British plans and interests.

The subject Ottoman races, with the exception of the Kurds and a certain portion of the Arabs, are not ignorant, untutored peoples, refractory to discipline and incapable of creating a national life in new political organisms. They recognize the justice of Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles, and the impracticability of starting out upon their new existence without a great deal of financial and military aid, and a certain measure of administrative aid, from "advanced nations." But in spite of the solution adopted by the Conference of Paris, they will be no more content than were the Balkan States after the Congress of Berlin. And they will defy the great powers at the earliest possible moment. Tutelage with no element of political and commercial exploitation they would gladly submit to. But I found in intimate con-

versation with the representatives of these different races that they have no faith in the sincerity of any European power. Their programs are identical: freedom from the Turkish yoke; aid from mandatories with no political string attached to it; international guaranties of early complete independence; membership on terms of equality with other states in the Society of Nations. The precedent has been set in the case of the Hedjaz. The others ask no more than is promised and in a large measure has already been granted to the Hedjaz.

On December 30, 1918, M. Venizelos exposed the claims of Greece before the Council of Ten. He declared that there were over eight million Greeks in the world, of whom nearly half still live outside the limits of the Kingdom of Greece. He estimated at 1,700,000 the Greek population of Asia Minor; 365,000 the Greeks of Constantinople and neighborhood; 100,000 the Greeks of the Dodecanese; and 235,000 the Greeks of Cyprus. M. Venizelos declared in regard to Constantinople that "the natural solution would be to give the vilayet to Greece, in establishing international guaranties for the liberty of the

straits." But he realized that if the society of nations were immediately established, there might be international reasons for creating an international state in Constantinople and the straits. Invoking the principle of nationalities, he asked that the Dodecanese be restored to Greece by Italy and Cyprus by Great Britain. In Asia Minor, M. Venizelos asked for all the vilayets bordering on the Ægean Sea, with a substantial hinterland. Smyrna, he said, was one of the oldest and most characteristically Hellenic of Greek cities. Although there were many thousands of Greeks in the interior of Asia Minor, in the Trebizond district on the Black Sea coast, and in Cilicia, Premier Venizelos told the Peace Conference that the Turks should be allowed to form a state in central Asia Minor, and that the Greeks, in order to make Armenia viable, were willing to sacrifice the Greek population of Trebizond and Cilicia to afford the Armenians outlets to the Black Sea and to the Mediterranean. The million Greeks in western Asia Minor are rightly called by M. Venizelos, "together with the population of the islands, the purest portion of the Hellenic race, which has best preserved

the ethnic type." M. Venizelos could have gone farther. None can deny the assertion that the Ottoman Greeks are intellectually the flower of Hellenism. For the very reason of their servitude, they have attained a higher degree of universal education and general Hellenic culture than the Greeks of the kingdom.

The Armenians claim the six vilayets of eastern Asia Minor, together with Cilicia, and are in accord with the Armenians of the former Russian Caucasus to form a united state stretching from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, from the Armenian Mountains on the border of Persia to the plains of Cilicia. As the Italians oppose Greek unification, the French oppose Armenian unification. Both nations have tried to denature the spirit and prove the impossibility of success of the Hellenic and Armenian national movements. But the efforts of imperialists at Paris were greatly embarrassed by the understanding between Greeks and Armenians. On February 25, 1919, the Greek and Armenian patriarchs of Constantinople signed, on behalf of their respective nations, a solemn agreement to sustain the territorial claims of each other. The end of the agreement read as follows:

If our nations had enjoyed liberty, they would have numbered dozens of millions. To-day they are reduced in Turkey to 2,500,000 Greeks and 1,500,000 Armenians. It is only a consequence of the most heinous crimes that a Mussulman majority exists in this or that locality; and to recognize such a majority would be to excuse, to sanction and to encourage the measures of extermination which the Turks have employed against us. We have always inhabited this country. We have irrigated its soil with our sweat and blood. . . . The Turk has been, and remains to this day, a terrible parasite living on our flesh. He has produced no work of civilization. He has not built a single city. He has everywhere sown death and ruin.

We demand that we be no longer compelled to live under a Turkish government, and we declare that we shall never submit to such a government, under whatever control it might be placed. We ask for restoration of our national domains. If all the Greek and Armenian populations cannot be included within the limits of our respective States, these populations should live under a Greek or an Armenian government, according to the necessities of the case.

We ask for a great Armenia, with a free and broad access to the Black Sea and to the Mediterranean, and we Greeks declare that we will be happy to see Cilicia integrally incorporated into the other six vilayets of Armenia and be permitted to develop freely.

We ask for the restoration to Greece of all of which she has been forcibly despoiled and which therefore rightly belongs to her, and we Armenians declare it to be our wish that Thrace, Constantinople, the vilayets of Aidin and Brusa, and the sanjaks of Ismidt (Nikomedia) and Bigha be integrally incorporated into Greece.

This agreement, presented at the Peace Conference with their own personal approval by Premier Venizelos and President Boghos Nubar Pasha of the Armenian national delegation, is contrary to the stipulations of the secret treaty by which Great Britain and France bought the intervention of Italy in the war. It embarrassed and angered the diplomats who threatened and tried to bully Greeks and Armenians. But from the standpoint of the races living in Turkey, it is a splendid step forward and is bound to have a radical influence upon the future of the Ottoman Empire. Subterranean influences destroyed the hopes of Greeks and Armenians at Paris. If both races continue to stick together, they will succeed in upsetting the diplomatic combinations of Paris just as the Balkan races upset the diplomatic combinations of Berlin. Owing to the depletion of their populations (the Greeks have lost seven hundred thousand and the Armenians one million by massacre, deportation, and starvation since 1914), Greek and Armenian claims undoubtedly comprised vast territories in which they were in minority, even with the patriarchal agreement to stand in with and support each other. But, as Premier Venizelos and Nubar

Pasha pointed out, the Moslem elements were by no means all Turkish, and little faith could be placed in the official figures. During five years of war, the Turks had suffered from losses in battle, from disease, and from famine. They were weak physically and ruined economically. With security and good government, Greeks and Armenians would compensate for their possible initial numerical inferiority by their higher standard of education and by the fact that they formed almost everywhere the small bourgeoisie.

The Christian races of Asia Minor cannot become factors of economic prosperity and political peace in the Near East unless they are freed from Turkish sovereignty. None who has lived in the Near East contests this statement. Advocates of the retention of Turkish sovereignty over Constantinople and the whole of Asia minor, now that it is possible to limit the Turkish state to ethnographical boundaries, are inspired by other reasons than the welfare and interests of the people of the Ottoman Empire, Moslem and Christian alike. On grounds of justice and practicability the claims of Greeks and Armenians may seem excessive. Disinterested experts hesitated to endorse the Greek and Armenian programs,

fearing that it was simply a question of turning the tables in religious and racial persecution and that the new states would be as weak and as much a menace to the world's peace as Turkey has been. But we must bear in mind the common interests of Greeks and Armenians to succeed in the experiment of recreating their national life. If the two races were at loggerheads, there would be no hope of success. As it is, Premier Venizelos realizes the importance of a strong Armenia in the East as a check against the Turks. If Greece were reconstituted in western Asia Minor without the Armenians on the other side of the Turks, there would be constant fear of an offensive return of the Turks against the cities of the Ægean coast. Similarly, the Armenians have every interest to see Greece installed in western Asia Minor. Less than a hundred years ago, independent Greece was created with three hundred thousand inhabitants, a good third of whom were Albanians. The great powers had no faith then or later in the viability of Greece. European statesmen were equally sure that each successive Balkan state born against their will could not live without their aid and protection. Whatever troubles the Bal-

kan States have had were due to the intrigues of the great powers. If the society of nations, as created by the Treaty of Versailles, is a real international instrument for helping the world to a better understanding and not a trust of imperialistic powers, greater Greece and Armenia will have a better chance of becoming strong and independent states than had the Balkan States. The difficulties seem enormous now: but the handicaps are not as great as those of Greece, Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria after the congresses of Paris and Berlin.

The Asiatic expansion of greater Greece involves the future frontiers of Turkey, the settlement of the status of Constantinople and the straits, and resistance to Italian imperialism. A different set of problems confronts Armenia. Her boundaries are matters of dispute not only with the Turks but with the races of the Russian Caucasus, the Persians, the Kurds, the Arabs, and the Syrians. The Moslem Tartars and the Christian Georgians of the Caucasus have shown no disposition to come to an understanding as to frontiers with the Armenian republic of the Caucasus. Persian and Armenian territorial claims conflict not only in the Caucasus but in

Kurdistan. The situation is further complicated by the English plan of creating independent Azerbaijan at the expense of both Armenia and Persia. French and British are rival claimants for important districts of Armenia on the Mesopotamian frontier. France refuses to recognize the right of Armenia to Cilicia. French intrigues prompted the Syrians to claim the whole of the Gulf of Alexandretta with the intention of depriving Armenia of a port on the Mediterranean. Against the pressure from all sides, and derived of any voice in the Conference of Paris, the Armenian national delegation had no means of defending Armenian interests. They put their whole faith in the United States.

While the powers were squabbling at Paris, Turks and Tartars continued to massacre Armenians, and the Armenian refugees in the Caucasus—precious remnant of the race—were allowed to die of starvation.

Beyond Asia Minor proper and Armenia lie the vast Arabic-speaking portions of Asiatic Turkey. During the war, the Arabs of the Hedjaz, under the Sherif of Mecca, rebelled against the Turks, and coöperated with the Entente powers. Before the end of the war, these regions were con-

quered from the Turks by the British. In 1916, Great Britain and France made an arrangement known as the Sykes-Picot agreement, settling their "spheres of influence" in the Arabic-speaking portions of the Ottoman Empire. More than a year later, the British Government gave official encouragement to Zionist aspirations to possess Palestine—under British protection, of course! France acquiesced in this. But France was not a party to a treaty between Great Britain and the Hedjaz, promising Damascus to Emir Feisal, son of the King of the Hedjaz (the former Sherif of Mecca). The Conference of Paris did not bring out all the promises made to the Arabs by the British. But there is no doubt that after the initial check of the Bagdad campaign, ending in the surrender of Kut-el-Amara, the British military authorities were prodigal in assurances of independence to the Arabic tribes of Mesopotamia. To protect Aden, similar promises were given to the tribes of the Yemen. These tribes had never acknowledged the political suzerainty of the Turks, and had always been virtually independent, paying no taxes to the Turks and furnishing no conscripts to the Ottoman Army. Turkish administrative authority in Mesopo-

tamia did not extend far from the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates. In Arabia, the Turks held only the ports and the sacred cities. They were never masters of the entire line of communication between Arabia and Syria, even after the Hedjaz railway was completed. The autonomous status of the Lebanon compelled the Turks to respect the virtual independence of a large portion of Syria. And in the Holy Land, where Christian and Jewish establishments were numerous and jealously protected by the European powers, the Turks scarcely regarded themselves as masters in their own house.

In discussing the future of Mesopotamia, Arabia, Syria, and Palestine, it is essential to take into consideration the slightness of the bonds that attached the Arabic-speaking portions of the Ottoman Empire to Constantinople. Undoubtedly, the former Arabic-speaking Ottoman subjects, Christian and Moslem equally, suffered inconvenience from Turkish maladministration before the war, and were greatly persecuted by the Turks during the war. But the victorious powers cannot expect Arabic-speaking Ottoman subjects to regard them as liberators. If justice is done to Armenian and Greek aspirations,

Armenians and "unredeemed" Greeks will bless the great war. But the Conference of Paris ran the risk of becoming the enslavers, rather than the liberators, of the other portions of the Ottoman Empire. Were Palestinians to submit to unrestricted Jewish immigration, meaning the eventual rule of aliens? Were the people of the Lebanon to lose their independence that had been preserved through centuries? Were Syrians to be compelled to choose between the less cultivated Hedjaz and French commercial exploitation? Were the Arabs of the Yemen and Mesopotamia to assume for the first time in their history the galling fetters of a centralized and Europeanized government, contrary to their instincts, their customs, and their desires?

The King of the Hedjaz interpreted the intimate sentiments of all Arabs when he said recently that he would prefer the granting of a mandate over his country to the Emir of Nejd to the protection of Great Britain or any other European power. The Arabs of the Yemen warned the Entente powers that after centuries of successful resistance to the Turks, it could not be expected that they would submit tamely to the rule of infidels.

Like the Turks whom they dispossessed, the British may be able to establish their authority along the river valleys of Mesopotamia, and on the Persian Gulf as far as the guns of their war-ships reach. The French may colonize the ports of Beirut and Tripoli and Alexandretta. But both Occidental powers will have their hands full if they try to make an India and an Algeria out of Mesopotamia and Syria. Three years ago, I wrote in discussing the relations of Europe and Islam that the Arabs wanted friends and not masters.[1] What was true during the war is all the more true after the war.

[1] See my "Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East," page 153.

CHAPTER XIII

THE ATTEMPT TO PARTITION PERSIA

DURING the first month of the Peace Conference, I sat with a group of distinguished Frenchmen around the green baize table in the judges' room of the Cour de Cassation. A Sorbonne professor, pleading for French support of the Armenian claims to independence, called Armenia "the outpost of European culture and civilization in Asia, our barrier against a new Asiatic invasion." The Persian minister to France took issue with this statement. His country lay to the east of Armenia and he was not disposed to admit the inferiority of Persian civilization and standards to those of Europe. Said Samad Khan: "Why do you think that the intellectual class in Persia is confined to those educated in Europe or along European lines? A good education can be had in Persia without knowing foreign languages or following the courses in foreign schools. By international

agreement, you made Russia your representative of European culture and civilization among us. But the rank and file of Persians are much less ignorant than the rank and file of Russians. Outside of big cities, there are no schools in Russia. There are schools everywhere in Persia. In purely Persian schools, we learn very profound things that it would be hard for any except the Orientalists among you to comprehend. Have you ever read the books of Professor Browne of Cambridge? The standard of intelligence and education of our village clergy does not fear comparison with the Russian popes."

"Not by international agreement, Excellency," remonstrated one of the Frenchmen. "The unfortunate situation of Persia before the war was solely the result of a dual agreement between Russia and Great Britain."

"Did not your greatest Christian saint blame himself all his life long for having stood by and held the clothes of those who stoned the first martyr?" answered the Persian minister. "All Europe, and especially France, consented to the martyrdom of Persia. You agreed to allow Russia—in fact, to make us accept Russia—as the personification of European ideals and po-

litical institutions. The British were the accomplices of the Russians in keeping us in economic slavery, in stifling our new-born democracy. The French sacrificed us, just as they sacrificed the Poles, to their Russian alliance. France will gain influence in Persia only by sustaining our demands for complete independence. And if we are to learn to trust and respect England, it will be when London has learned to reconstruct British diplomacy in our country along entirely new lines."

During the first two decades of the twentieth century, Persia was the victim of the struggle between European powers for the mastery of Asia. Her political independence and her economic prosperity were deliberately sacrificed for reasons that had nothing whatever to do with Persia herself. When the conflict of their imperialistic aspirations threatened to precipitate a war, Great Britain and Russia came to an understanding in Asia. Persia was called upon to pay the piper. No commentary is needed to drive home to the reader the heartlessness, the immorality, the hypocrisy, the brutality of the European powers in their relations with Asiatic races. One has only to set forth what took place in Per-

sia from 1900 to the end of the recent European war.

From 1900 to 1919 the railway mileage of Asia was quadrupled. Not a mile of railway was constructed in Persia. The marvelous increase in economic prosperity throughout Asia has been shared by every country except Persia. All over the world, nations have been engaged in harbor- and road-building, extension of popular education, improvement and consolidation of fiscal systems, working out and testing democratic institutions. Every effort made by the Persians along these lines was opposed and suppressed by Russia and Great Britain with the tacit consent of the other powers. What has been allowed to take place in Persia makes one wonder whether there is such a thing as an international conscience to give birth to and maintain a society of nations.

From the beginning of her expansion in Asia, Russia was accustomed to regard Persia as legitimate prey. Russian penetration southward on both sides of the Caspian Sea had been at the expense of Persia. The provinces of Transcaucasia, containing the world's richest oil-fields, were taken from Persia in wars. Most of the

Transcaspian Province, especially the portion of it across which runs the railway from the Caspian Sea to Central Asia, was wrested from Persia. Persia is one of the highways to the open sea of Russian dreams. It was natural, then, that Russian imperialism, when other outlets were temporarily or permanently blocked, should try to control Persia.

But Great Britain, on the other hand, was accustomed to regard Persia as within her "sphere of influence," for the simple reason that Persia was on one of the routes to India. In 1854 and 1877, Great Britain prevented Russia from reaching the Mediterranean through Turkey. Blocked at the Dardanelles, Muscovite ambitions turned to the Pacific Ocean and to the Persian Gulf. In the Far East, Great Britain stood behind Japan and prepared the way for Mukden and Port Arthur. The Persian Gulf had become British. Great Britain controlled Afghanistan. When Russian penetration into Central Asia brought about the building of great railways, the British began to fear that the Russian menace against India was not a myth. It was in Persia that the British Foreign Office and the Government of India felt that this menace must be met

So the twentieth century opened with Teheran the center of intense and tireless diplomatic intrigue. Using every tool they could get hold of and disregarding the rights and interests of the Persians, the British and the Russians fought in Persia each other's dream of dominating Asia.

In 1900, the Russians showed what use could be made of the newly completed Transcaspian Railway. On the branch that runs south from Merv to the Afghan frontier, twenty thousand men with siege trains, rails, and other construction material, were concentrated in the Kusht River valley, in the corner of the Transcaspian Province between the Khorasan province of Persia and the Herat province of Afghanistan. With this force as a threat against British and Persians alike, the Russians forced Persia to permit the Russian Loan Bank to issue a large loan whose interest and sinking-fund were guaranteed by Persian customs receipts. Should delay occur in payments, the Loan Bank would have the right to exercise control over custom-houses. The Persian Government agreed to make any future foreign loan for seventy-five years contingent upon the consent of the Loan Bank.

From the custom-house receipts mortgaged to this loan were excluded Fars and the gulf ports, a concession to British "rights" in South Persia. But as the loan was raised partly to pay off the Anglo-Persian loan of 1892 and as railway concessions went with the loan, the Government of India was greatly alarmed. The railway concession to Russia provided for a line from Julfa on the Perso-Transcaucasian frontier to Hamadan, with a branch line from Tabriz to Teheran. *The railway was to be finished in 1903!*

The extension of Russian influence was felt more strongly by the British in 1901, when Russian diplomacy interfered in the British intrigue to detach Koweit from Turkish suzerainty. Russia was bold enough to deny Britain's claim to paramount influence in the Persian Gulf. If Britain was to have Koweit, Russia must have as compensation Bender Abbas (in the Strait of Ormuz between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman). To emphasize the intention to contest British pretensions, Russia established in February, 1901, a line of steamers from Odessa to the Persian Gulf ports.

The greater part of the trade of northern Per-

sia was passing rapidly into Russian hands. Exports from Russia to Persia rose from four million to twenty million rubles in five years.

The widespread discontent in Persia over the terms of the loans and railway concessions was encouraged by British agents. The same hostility met the announcement of a further loan in 1902, one of the advantages of which was to enable Russia to establish branches of the Imperial Bank in Persian cities.

Feeling ran high in official circles in London when it was known that Russia had dared to send war-ships into the Persian Gulf, and that Russian consuls were endeavoring to purchase land in the islands and at Bender Abbas. Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, was ordered to visit the Persian Gulf with an imposing display of British naval power. The British experienced a humiliating rebuff at Bushire, where Lord Curzon waited in vain on his ship for a visit from the Persian governor. The governor refused to recognize Curzon's rank as superior to his own and would not make the first call. A Russian agent was prompting the governor. This led Lord Lansdowne to declare in the House of Lords that while Great Britain's claim to su-

premacy in the Persian Gulf was not based on treaties or international law, Great Britain would resist by all means in her power the attempt of any other nation to establish herself in the Persian Gulf. The old reason that held good from Gibraltar to Shanghai was given by Lord Lansdowne. Great Britain had the right to safeguard India and with this right went a virtual monopoly of trade in all the places where the right was exercised. During the nineteenth century, the British had been making treaties with petty chiefs, regarding some as independent and others as Indian feudatories.

The rigid determination to maintain control of the Persian Gulf had no exceptions. Germany was opposed at Koweit and Russia at Bender Abbas. France found Great Britain in her path when she sought a coaling-station in the Gulf of Oman. In 1904, the Sultan of Oman leased to France the port of Bender Jisseh. The British contended that the Sultan of Oman was an Indian feudatory and that he had received a subsidy in return for the promise to alienate no portions of his territory or to grant no concessions to any power without the consent of the Indian Government. When the sultan asserted his independ-

ence, the British said they would bombard Muscat if the concession to France were not immediately canceled. France acquiesced in the cancelation on condition that she receive at Muscat the same facilities for coaling as Great Britain enjoyed. The incident would have been serious but for the fact that the French and British had just gotten together in the agreement of 1904, and were ready to settle their differences by mutual concessions—always, however, without asking (and with no regard for the interests of) the particular native state that had given cause for the conflict between their own interests.

The defeat of Russia in the Far East had no direct influence upon the comparative position of Russia and Great Britain in Persia. The check in Manchuria led to the redoubling of efforts of Petrograd to open up a way to the sea through Persia. In spite of British protests and threats, a Russian consulate was established at Bender Abbas. Neither of the great powers was able to oust the other from Persia. But each was able to prevent the other from developing concessions or following up advantages. And as both powers refused to allow Persia to seek elsewhere for money and aid in develop-

ment, railways remained unbuilt and the country fell into anarchy.

When Shah Nasreddin was assassinated in 1896, he left a large private fortune and a fairly full public treasury. Ten years later, the death of Shah Muzaffereddin showed how well Russian diplomacy had been able to take advantage of a ruler's weakness. All the inheritance of Nasreddin was gone and his son had plunged Persia into debt. Much of the money loaned by Russia had been given to Muzaffereddin outright by the Russians, who knew exactly what they were doing. Unscrupulous European bankers and politicians acted in Persia as they had done in Turkey and Egypt, lending large sums to the sovereign with the deliberate intention of enslaving the country. The successive advances were made to one man over whose expenditures there was no public control. The enlightened elements of Persia protested and warned the bankers, whose methods were identical with those of a money shark getting into his toils some young prodigal. Would not the Persians be justified in repudiating the portions of these loans which went directly to the shah's private purse? It is true that a country autocratically ruled must

accept the responsibility for its ruler's acts. But in Western countries the law provides safeguards against money-lenders and recognizes the responsibility of the investor who lends to an irresponsible person or who acts like a confidence man.

A British commercial mission sent to study conditions in Persia in 1906 recommended an Anglo-Russian understanding as to "spheres of influence." It was obvious to business men in England and India that the policy of Russia blocking Great Britain and Great Britain blocking Russia was keeping the country in anarchy. Intrigues and counter-intrigues prevented either power from developing trade or concessions. The extension of Russian railways to the frontiers of Afghanistan and Persia and the rapid development of Russian influence in Mongolia and Tibet, had given London and Calcutta officials furiously to think. Germany, with her Bagdad Railway and her evident intention to enter the field for concessions and trade in Persia, made the British feel that a three-cornered fight would be more unprofitable even than the effort to keep Russia from getting anything. Would it not be wise to divide with Russia and keep Ger-

many out? Anglo-French relations were improving and Russia was the ally of France. Russia, on the other hand, was strongly advised by France to come to an agreement with Great Britain instead of settling rival claims by war. The result of the war with Japan and the warning of the revolution made Russian officialdom more tractable than it had been before the events of 1904 and 1905. Great Britain and Russia got together as Great Britain and France had done.

On September 24, 1907, the Anglo-Russian Convention for the partition of Persia was communicated to the ambassadors of the powers in Petrograd. In the preamble, Great Britain and Russia affirmed their intention of maintaining the independence and integrity of Persia and of allowing (*allow* is the expression used in the text!) equal facilities for trade to all nations. But the convention then states that, owing to geographical proximity to their own territories, Great Britain and Russia have "special interests" in certain parts of Persia. There are five points in the convention. The first establishes the Russian zone, the second the British zone, the third a neutral zone, the fourth the confirmation of the existing mortgages of Persian revenues, and the

fifth the mutual privilege "in event of irregularities" of instituting control over the revenues in the respective zones. A letter from Sir Edward Grey to the British ambassador at Petrograd, published simultaneously with the convention, stated that the Persian Gulf lay outside the scope of the convention, but that the Russian Government had agreed during the negotiations "not to deny the special interests of Great Britain in the Gulf."

The moral sense of European public opinion in regard to the treatment of non-European races had become so warped in the first decade of the twentieth century that the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 brought forth no protest. The Persians, being Asiatics, had no rights. It was quite within the province of British and Russian diplomatists to do what they saw fit in Persia, and to establish a new internal and international status for Persia without consulting either the wishes or the interests of the Persians. The only international law in Asia was the law of might. Because they could not oppose force to force, the Persians were compelled to submit to the indignity and iniquity of the Anglo-Russian Conven-

tion, and to suffer its disastrous political and economic consequences.

The Anglo-Russian conspiracy against the integrity and independence of Persia was conceived and put into action at the moment when Asia was experiencing her 1848. After the Russo-Japanese War, a wave of intense national feeling swept over Asia, and in every country there was a movement to establish democratic institutions and shake off foreign control. The two aims went together. They could not be divorced. In reading accounts of the nationalist movements in Egypt, Turkey, Persia, India, and China, one meets frequently the criticism that legitimate agitation for self-government and democratic institutions is marred by xenophobia. But is not this in the nature of every democratic movement? Europeans and Americans who criticize the form and methods of Asiatic and African political movements forget their own history. The Barons of Runnymede and the Boston Tea Party, Joan of Arc before Orléans and Henri IV before Paris, Andreas Hofer and the Tugenbund, although separated by centuries, were staged with the same *Leitmotiv,* tersely ex-

pressed in the rallying-cry of the Italian Risorgimento—*Fuori i stranieri!*

The accession of Mohammed Ali Mirza brought hopes of constitutional government to Persian liberals. The late shah had provided for a national council elected by all males between thirty and seventy who could read and write. The new shah signed his father's ordinance and convoked the national council at Teheran in the autumn of 1906. The council or parliament (*Mejliss*) was conceived as an advisory assembly and the constitution promulgated by Mohammed Ali was not intended to mean the surrender to the *Mejliss* of administrative control. It is impossible to relate here the story of the conflict between crown and parliament during the three years of Mohammed Ali's rule. Persia was in the throes of civil war. Nationalists and Royalists fought in Teheran and the provinces. In 1908, the shah bombarded the House of Parliament, dissolved the *Mejliss,* and established martial law in Teheran. Although he declared his intention of maintaining the constitution and ordering the election of a new *Mejliss,* Mohammed Ali proposed the substitution of an advisory council of forty, selected by him-

self. But the nationalist movement had become too strong to be stifled. The proclamation of a constitution at Constantinople in 1908 and the failure of Abdul Hamid's subsequent attempt to overthrow the constitution was a tremendous encouragement to the Persian nationalists. Abdul Hamid's deposition was a demonstration of the determination of an Oriental people to preserve the political liberties they had won, and foreshadowed the fall of Mohammed Ali. In the summer of 1909, less than three months after Abdul Hamid's deposition, the Persian Cossacks went over to the Nationalists. The shah was formally deposed by the *Mejliss,* and his son, Ahmed Mirza, declared successor to the throne. Mohammed Ali was expelled from Persian territory. Shah Ahmed, although only a little boy, opened in person a new *Mejliss* on November 15, 1909.

The opportunity had come for the civilized world to help Persia to constitutional government. Had the Persians been able to accept and utilize the loyal and disinterested aid of foreign advisers, Persia would have developed into happiness and prosperity. But Russia and Great Britain had no intention of allowing Persia to

become an orderly and self-supporting state, with a constitutional government. The success of political institutions in Persia would have caused trouble for the British in India and Egypt. Russia had taken advantage of the last year of the civil war to introduce troops into the Azerbaijan province. If Persia developed parliamentary government, Russia would have trouble in realizing her intention of settling down permanently in the region of Tabriz. The Russians had made the Convention of 1907 with their eyes open. Since the Persian Gulf was denied them, could not the Mediterranean be reached through Armenia and Cilicia? The possibility of realizing this ambition depended upon military and political control of northwestern Persia. At the very moment when nationalism seemed to have succeeded in establishing a constitutional régime, and when a new era was opening for Persia, Great Britain struck her blow. Not only was Russian occupation of Persian territory consented to by the British, but Persia was compelled to acquiesce in the British pretension of organizing police forces in southern Persia, to be commanded by British officers from the military forces of India.

After having thus installed themselves in their "zones," the two powers sent a joint note to the Persian Government, informing Persia that they would refuse to sanction loans from other powers, if these loans implied the granting of concessions to any other powers or their subjects "contrary to Russian or British political or strategic interests." As this was tantamount to a demand that Persia accept a Russo-British protectorate, the Persian Government refused. Petrograd and London then warned the other powers and international financial circles not to lend money to or seek concessions from Persia!

The Persians, in answer to the British complaint that the Persian Government was unable to preserve order along the trade routes of southern Persia, said that money was necessary to reorganize the gendarmery. For this purpose they wanted five hundred thousand pounds. The British and Russian governments would not lend the money. Moreover, they kept in their own hands revenues accruing to the government in the zones occupied by them, and prevented Persia from raising a loan either at Paris or Berlin. The manoeuver was clear. Disorders were to be fomented everywhere in Persia and the government

rendered powerless to take measures to restore peaceful conditions. This gave the Russians the pretext to send more troops into northern Persia, while the British informed the Persian Government that the state of anarchy in the south necessitated British intervention to police the southern trade route from Bushire to Shiras and Ispahan.

Some British writers have attempted to excuse the underhand and disloyal intrigues of their government, in conjunction with the Russian Government, by asserting that British officers and traders had been robbed and roughly handled—even assassinated—in Persia. There is no foundation for these assertions. Before British and Russians began to interfere in the internal affairs of Persia, animosity toward foreigners was unknown. Not a single case of molestation of either British or Russians can be cited. The open encroachments on Persian sovereignty led to the first attacks against foreigners in Persia. Tribesmen became unruly as a result of intrigues. They were provoked to lawlessness in order to give an excuse for intervention.

Let us be fair. What would the British say if the Germans tried to excuse the war of 1914

and the abominable crimes committed by them, on the ground that Germans were roughly treated by London mobs in May, 1915? Effects do not precede causes.

Having prepared the ground, the Russian and British governments arranged to carry out the terms of the agreement of 1907. The Russians occupied Tabriz, and appointed a military governor for the province of Azerbaijan. When the outcry in Persia against this violation of the independence of a sovereign state began to find its way into the press of western Europe, Russia instigated an attempt on the part of the ex-shah, who had been in exile at Odessa, to recover the throne. He was allowed to cross Russian territory with his followers, to land on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea, and organize an expedition against Teheran. The Russians took advantage of the renewal of civil war, started by themselves, to excuse the military occupation of Persian territory and to extend that occupation. Nationalist leaders, civilians and clergy and military, whose crime was an effort to protect the new régime against the reactionaries of the ex-shah and Russians alike, were hunted down by Russian Cossacks and hanged as outlaws. The

British landed troops at Persian Gulf ports and sent Indian regiments into the interior.

In the meantime, Persia was making a serious effort to reorganize a central government. Frenchmen were employed in the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior. Swedish officers were engaged to reorganize the gendarmery. To secure reorganization of finances, free from European political intrigue, Persia turned to America. An American mission to take complete charge of the finances of Persia was chosen by the Persian minister in Washington. Its head, Mr. W. Morgan Shuster, a former government official in the Philippines, had been recommended to Persia by the United States Government.

Mr. Shuster went to Persia with the idea that he had been enlisted in the service of an independent state to work for the interests of that state. He refused to recognize, as his employers had refused to recognize, the Anglo-Russian Convention. Under the name of Treasury Gendarmery, he organized a large force to collect taxes. As officers he chose Major Stokes and other Britishers who were believed at Petrograd to entertain strong anti-Russian sentiments—which

meant that they probably believed that Persia had the same right as any other nation to be mistress in her own house! In the face of remonstrances from the British embassy, Mr. Shuster sent detachments of the gendarmery under British officers into northern Persia to collect taxes within the "admitted" sphere of Russian influence. At Teheran, the *Mejliss* passed a decree confiscating the property of a brother of Mohammed Ali, who had joined the ex-shah in the attempt to recover the throne. But the Russian consular guard occupied the property, which the Russian embassy claimed to hold on the ground that it was mortgaged to Russian subjects. Mr. Shuster referred the Russian embassy to the courts, which were alone competent to decide a question of this kind. When the consular guard did not leave the property, Mr. Shuster ordered the Treasury Gendarmery to execute by force the decree of the *Mejliss*. Russia and Great Britain immediately demanded an apology from the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

This was not all. Mr. Shuster had dared to defy the partitioners of Persia. He was demonstrating reorganizing ability and energy that would certainly end in delivering Persia finan-

cially from the Anglo-Russian yoke. Russia sent an ultimatum to Persia, demanding the dismissal of Mr. Shuster; the promise to appoint thereafter foreign advisers only after consultation with the Russian and British ministers; and an indemnity to cover the cost of maintaining Russian troops in northern Persia. In spite of protests of fair-minded Liberals in the House of Commons Sir Edward Grey declared that the interests of Great Britain dictated the support of the first two demands of the Russian ultimatum. When a member asked, "How about the interests of Persia?" Sir Edward was silent. The *Mejliss* rejected the ultimatum. The occupation of Teheran by Russian troops and the final extinction of Persian independence was threatened. Yielding to the bullying of the two great powers, on December 24, 1911, the regent dissolved the *Mejliss* and dismissed Mr. Shuster.

The Shuster incident aroused a storm of controversy. Friends of Persia, who sympathized with the efforts of an unjustly treated people to maintain independence and national self-respect, were deeply disappointed in the failure of the American mission. Mr. Shuster was blamed for having uselessly kicked against the pricks.

Could he have accomplished more for Persia by adopting a less intractable attitude? The tendency was to answer the question affirmatively. Mr. Shuster's lectures and his book, "The Strangling of Persia," carried conviction as to the wrongs done to Persia, but left one undecided as to the wisdom of the course pursued by him. When it was seen that the Shuster incident was used by Russia and Great Britain to destroy the new-born parliamentary system and to compel the Persian Government to recognize, on February 18, 1912, the Anglo-Russian Convention, criticism of Mr. Shuster, *solely on the ground of the results of his actions,* was inevitable.

But with the perspective of years, the rôle of Mr. Shuster appears in a different light. Although the immediate results proved disastrous to Persia, were not the immorality and injustice of the Anglo-Russian Convention demonstrated? The courage and loyalty and straightforwardness of Mr. Shuster awakened the conscience of the world, and exposed the hypocrisy and unlovely greed lurking behind the altruistic cry of "assuming the white man's burden." Mr. Shuster became a national hero of the Persians. His defiance of Russian and British imperialism, far

from failing, gave birth to a wider and deeper national movement than had existed before. Russian and British diplomatists, in expelling Mr. Shuster from Persia, dug the grave of their own political and commercial hopes. A Russian who was in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Petrograd in 1911 told me eight years later that Mr. Shuster actually saved Persia from partition. The experience of Mr. Shuster in Persia is still talked about in Oriental bazaars from Cairo to Calcutta.

What Persia has lived through since the beginning of 1912 should bring a blush of shame to the brow of every European, and cause those who have given themselves without stint to the defeat of German imperialism in Europe to demand of their own governments a complete abandonment of the imperialism of all nations in Asia.

After Persia bowed to force and recognized the Anglo-Russian Convention, foreign markets were closed to her. Money had to be borrowed from Russia and Great Britain. The two "protecting" powers defeated every project of financial, military, and economic reform. Persia was forced to beg small sums at high interest. Banking operations were exclusively in the hands of

Russian and British banks in which customs receipts of the north and south had to be deposited. Persia, whose natural wealth was great and whose public debt was small, was reduced to a state of financial slavery, and in order to live from day to day had to sacrifice her rights and her independence. No railways were built, no open international trading was allowed, none of the great mineral wealth was developed to the profit of the Persian state or people.

Russian subjects did not pay taxes. Infringing upon the terms of the Treaty of Turcmantchaï, they acquired property at will and without restriction. This decreased the revenues of Persia and put Persians in a position of inferiority to Russian subjects, since the latter, exempt from taxation, competed with the Persians unfairly on Persian soil. The Russian and British legations, having got rid of the parliament and of foreign competitors, exercised constantly pressure upon the government to obtain concessions on conditions incompatible with the political and economic interests of the country. What Germany intended to do in Rumania after the Treaty of Bucharest, Russia and Great Britain had been doing for years in Persia. I remember an ed-

itorial in the "London Times" pillorying the Germans for planning to take economic advantage of helpless Rumania in the same way as had been —and was being—done by the British in Persia.

Russia tried to limit the military forces of Persia to a brigade of Cossacks, organized and commanded by Russian officers, using this force as a political instrument. It did not allow the Government Gendarmery to penetrate into the northern provinces. Similarly, in the south the British claimed that they could maintain order, and the British minister at Teheran told the Persian Government that there was no need for the National Gendarmery in the "British zone." It was thus that Persia found herself weakened and deprived of resources at the beginning of the war of 1914.

It is easy to understand the hatred of the Persians for the czarist government. Public opinion, especially after the entry of Turkey, demanded vengeance against Russia. The feeling was not nearly so strong against the British. But, naturally, there was little enthusiasm for a British victory. Russia and Great Britain were allies and their triumph in the war would only forge more firmly the fetters binding Persia.

However, the government had no confidence in the Turks and no love for the Germans. It was, after all, a European war. The Persian Government declared its neutrality and succeeded in keeping the people neutral.

The neutrality of Persia, although advantageous to Russia and Great Britain, was not respected by either of the powers. When the Persian Government asked the Russians to withdraw their troops from Persian territory in order that Persia might not become a field of battle between Russians and Turks, Russia not only refused but brought additional troops into Persia and used Persian territory as bases of military operations. The consuls and subjects of the Central powers were arrested and deported into the Caucasus. German commercial establishments were confiscated. The Turks penetrated into Azerbaijan under pretext of pursuing the Russians, who were menacing their eastern frontier. Expelled at first, the Russians returned in force. The whole province was devastated. Russians and Turks rivaled each other in barbarity toward the unhappy population of the most flourishing province of Persia. During this time, German agents were stirring up trou-

ble for their rivals, and the Turks sent agitators among the tribes of Arabistan. The British disembarked their troops in Persian Gulf ports, and another field of battle was created in the south and southwest.

In 1915, Hussein Raouf Bey invaded the west of Persia with a large Turkish force. He shot chiefs of tribes and burned Kerend. The tribe of the Sendjabis was massacred because it wished to remain neutral. Later, in 1918, what remained of this same tribe was destroyed by the British for the same reason!

Persia became a field of propaganda worked by agents of the two groups of belligerents. None respected the neutrality of any part of the country or the feelings of the inhabitants. Intrigues and raids and pitched battles increased from day to day. It was evidently impossible for Persia to do the logical thing, which would have been to declare war against both groups of belligerents. Protestations were ignored. The political faults of the Russians and the British caused them to be more hated than the others, and there is no doubt that in 1915 public opinion in Persia was against the Entente. At the end of 1915, Russian troops approached the capital, and the ambassador of

Turkey was arrested in the suburbs by Russian troops. The shah and the government wished to quit Teheran and were urged to do so by the German minister. At the last moment, assurances were given by the Russian and British legations that the Russian troops would not occupy the capital.

The situation in Persia had become intolerable. Seeing that Persia was suffering all the horrors of the war and stood alone without a friend, the Persian Government, conquering its repugnance and braving public opinion, thought that the only way of safety was to join Russia and Great Britain. A draft of treaty of alliance was handed to the ministers of Russia and Great Britain in December, 1915. They promised to refer the matter to their governments. The sole response was an ultimatum to Persia, dated August 1, 1916, demanding that the Russian and British armies be recognized in occupation of Persia; that contingents of troops be raised, commanded in the north by Russian officers and in the south by British officers; and that the financial control of Persia be handed over entirely to Great Britain and Russia. Already, in March, 1915, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 had been se-

cretly amplified by the two powers to do away with the neutral zone.

If Persia received no encouragement to enter into the Entente Alliance, she none the less protested fearlessly against violations of international law committed by Germany, and especially against the submarine warfare. Persian subjects had lost their lives on torpedoed vessels, including a member of the royal family who was on the *Sussex*. Persia also proclaimed her adherence to the principles and program of President Wilson at the time the United States entered the war.

The situation of Persia after the war would have been hopeless had it not been for the Russian revolution. The revolutionary government declared the abrogation of the Anglo-Russian Convention and Persia's right to complete independence. The Russian armies were withdrawn. The British followed close upon their heels and occupied all of Persia. At some places, as at Kazvin, they offered large sums to Russians to remain in their service. In 1918, the Turks came once more into Azerbaijan and fought in the province with the British until the armistice. During the Peace Conference, the British held

Persia and exercised a strict censorship on all communications. It has been their intention to fall heir to the political and economic privileges of Russia in Persia.

But the Persians have demanded at the Peace Conference, as outlined in a subsequent chapter, the cancelation of all treaties and concessions to which consent was given under compulsion, without the approval of and against the interests of the Persian nation. Did not Mr. Lloyd George state in the House of Commons shortly before the armistice of November, 1918, that no nation was obliged to honor a signature given under compulsion? The British premier was referring to the agreements between Rumania and the Central powers, which had been dictated to the former by the latter. But what he said holds equally in regard to all agreements made between Persia and Great Britain, which the latter forced the former to sign. Persia expects to abrogate all treaties and cancel all concessions with Russia and Great Britain, invoking the admitted reason for Rumania's similar action. We cannot have two moralities any longer—one for Europe and another for Asia. Consequently, Persia also expects Great Britain, when peace is ratified, to

evacuate Persian territory without conditions and regard Persia hereafter as an absolutely independent nation. If the society of nations succeeds, all of Persia's expectations will be automatically realized, and Persia, once more mistress of her destinies, will maintain the open door for the trade and welcome the coöperation of all nations.

Should the society of nations plan be not applied to Asia as to Europe and America, Persia and other Asiatic nations will make a more formidable effort than heretofore to rid themselves of foreign masters, whoever they may be and by whatever means. We may expect combinations between Asiatic states and races, political and religious; combinations between Asiatic states and separate European powers; agitation against Europeans and revolts. There will be no peace until Asiatics have the same rights in their own countries as Europeans have in theirs.

CHAPTER XIV

PERSIA BEFORE THE PEACE CONFERENCE

ONLY one independent state of Asia was not invited to take part in the Peace Conference. On the ground that Persia had been neutral during the war, Persia was not included by the allied and associated powers. The irony of this decision is apparent when one remembers that neither the Entente powers nor the enemies of Persia had respected her neutrality. Russian and British armies fought their foes on Persian territory just as if they had a right to. Up to the very end of the war, and after the armistice, the British sent armies through Persia to Mesopotamia and the Caucasus. Persia suffered all the horrors of war—invasion, destruction of cities and countryside, loss of life among the civilian population, famine and economic paralysis—without the glory or the advantages of belligerency. In 1915, desiring to choose the

lesser of two evils, Persia offered to join the Entente Alliance. Her proposal was ignored. Russia and Great Britain did not want to have the Persians bring up the notorious agreement of 1907 at the peace table!

Like many others not invited, the Persians sent a delegation to Paris and demanded to be admitted and to be heard. Headed by Aligholi Khan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Persian delegation presented to the conference in February a remarkable memorandum which set forth with irrefutable logic the reasons for the admission of Persia. Aligholi Khan described graphically the sufferings of Persia due to the constant violation of her neutrality by both groups of belligerents, and reminded the victorious powers that as far back as 1915 Persia had been willing to join the Entente. Persia, therefore, refused to believe that the conference would regard her as a neutral state. The neutrals had not suffered from being the theater of fighting during years. In fact, Persia had contributed more to the war and had suffered more from the war than many so-called belligerents represented in the Paris Conference.

The Persian Government received no answer

to Aligholi Khan's memorandum. Unofficial assurances of sympathy were given to the Persian delegation by several statesmen of the big powers. That was as far as the attempt of the Persians to get an official hearing went. In March, the Persian delegation, not discouraged by the lack of success of the first memorandum, presented formally to the Peace Conference the claims of Persia. Even if the conference persisted in refusing to receive Persia into its membership, the case of Persia was none the less put before every delegate in Paris.

The document drawn up by Aligholi Khan and his associates is entitled: "Claims of Persia before the Conference of the Preliminaries of Peace at Paris." Persia asked territorial restoration and reparations, following the line of the states in the conference and based upon the same arguments. But the unique portion of the Persian memorandum was the courageous and unreserved denunciation of Anglo-Russian policy before and during the war, of which Persia was the helpless victim. This exposition of "claims concerning political, juridical and economic independence" reads like the memorandum of China. With the memorandum of China, it

is an unanswerable indictment of the sordid commercial imperialism of the European powers in Asia.

The territorial demands of Persia, accompanied by a map, are extremely interesting. All the territories to which Persia laid claim had seen their former sovereignty disappear during the war, and were before the Peace Conference for the attribution of a new sovereignty. Persia, therefore, was wholly within her rights in presenting her claims. The merit of the claims is a different proposition.

The Persians explained that they were asking no annexations but only restitutions of provinces wrested from them by Russia and Turkey in the wars of aggression carried on during the nineteenth century by those two states.

The first restitution demanded was that of the Transcaspian Province, described in the Persian memorandum as "part of Persia," "one of the centers of Persian nationality," and the birthplace of "a great number of illustrious Persians—poets, men of letters, savants, philosophers." It was pointed out that the Persian language is widely diffused in the Transcaspian Province, that the inhabitants of the region are largely Per-

sian and that the Turkomans belong to the same tribes which live in the Astrabad province on the Persian side of the old frontier. After the Russian revolution, the Turkomans of the Transcaspian Province appealed to Persia for aid against the Bolshevists. In the Persian Transcaspian demands, all the territory up to the river Oxus (Amu Daria) was included. This meant that Persia claimed the khanate of Khiva.

Between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, the penetration of the Russians south of the Caucasus had resulted in the nineteenth century in territorial acquisitions at the expense of Persia as well as Turkey. The eastern half of Transcaucasia was part of the Persian Empire up to the treaty of 1828. What Persia has claimed from Russia includes the famous Baku oil-fields, Elisavetpol and Erivan. These demands come into direct conflict with the territorial aspirations of the Georgians and the Armenians. The Armenians, in fact, have set up an independent government at Erivan.

On the side of Turkey, Persian claims come again into conflict with Armenia by the demand for Kurdistan. In Kurdistan the Persians included the lake region of Van, Bitlis and Mouch;

the Kharput region of the upper Euphrates, and the upper valley of the Tigris from Diarbekir to south of Mosul. It was advanced that the Kurds are "a people Persian in race and language, professing Islamism." The region of Suleymanieh was taken from Persia by Turkey in 1847. The rest of Turkish Kurdistan, said the Persians, "is bound to Persia for ethnic, geographical, religious, and other reasons and should naturally be joined to that country, more especially because the religious chiefs and notable Kurds have declared themselves desirous to be reunited to Persia."

The last point in Persia's territorial claims affects the holy cities of the Shiite Mohammedan sect. Kerbela and Nedjef are west of the Euphrates on the edge of the Arabian Desert. Samara and Kazmein are on the Tigris River north of Bagdad in the heart of Mesopotamia. The great spiritual leaders of Persia reside in the Shiite cities. Commerce and industry is largely in Persian hands, and as these cities are centers of Persian pilgrimage, their prosperity and activity are dependent upon Persian money. Persia, therefore, has a more vital interest than any other nation in the future of Mesopotamia and

wanted a say in whatever arrangements were made by the Peace Conference for Mesopotamia.

In their territorial demands, the Persians laid especial emphasis upon the words "restoration" and "restitution," and spoke of the provinces claimed being "reunited to the mother country." This is the phraseology of all irredentist claims before the Peace Conference. And Persian irredentism, like all other irredentisms, meets equally strong counter-irredentist aspirations on the part of other nations and races. For instance, in the Transcaspian Province, the Emir of Khiva claimed exactly the same territory on the same ground, i.e., that it was taken away from Khiva by Russia! In Transcaucasia and in northern Kurdistan, Georgians and Armenians told the Peace Conference that Russian, Turkish, and Persian claims were all based on the same ground—the right of conquest. The Kurds of Turkey had a delegation at the Peace Conference which said nothing at all about wanting to be "reunited" to Persia!

The Persian claims for reparation are divided into three categories: losses from the acts of Russia; losses from the acts of Turkey; responsibili-

ties of Germany. Because they knew that it would be useless and would prejudice their case, the Persians made no claim to reparation for losses from the acts of Great Britain. The damages caused to Persia by Russian violation of neutrality and by Russian massacres of Persian subjects at Baku were outlined in detail. Turkey was responsible for invading Persia, as Russia and Great Britain had done, and for forcibly enrolling Persian subjects in the Ottoman Army during the war. The responsibilities of Germany were engaged toward Persia for "clandestine and subversive conduct of her agents who constantly created difficulties for the Government and disturbed the country," and for the death of Persian subjects on the *Lusitania* and the *Sussex*. The Persian Government suggested to the Peace Conference that a portion at least of the Russian reparations could be recovered by Persia from canceling Persia's debts to Russia, canceling the concessions obtained by the Russian Government and subjects, and seizing the property of the Russian state in Persia. From Turkey and Germany, Persia requested her share in the general indemnities.

To assert her political, juridical, and economic

independence, which had been so shamefully violated by Russia and Great Britain, Persia presented ten specific claims to the Peace Conference:

(1) That the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 be considered as void, as regards the signatory powers, as regards Persia, and as regards all and any powers which might have adhered to it or recognized in part or in whole the situation created by it;

(2) That the Anglo-Russian note of 1910, prohibiting the granting of concessions of a political and strategical nature to foreigners, be declared null and void;

(3) That the Anglo-Russian ultimatum of 1911, compelling Persia to bind herself not to take into her service foreigners without the previous consent of Russia and England, be declared null and void;

(4) That the foreign powers renounce the right, or rather pretension, to extend protection in Persia to Persian subjects;

(5) That the foreign powers abstain from intervening, in any way and for any reason, in the internal affairs of Persia;

(6) That foreigners be placed on the same footing with Persians in all matters affecting the payment of taxes;

(7) That the armed forces of foreign powers and their consular guards be withdrawn from Persian territory;

(8) That the treaties made between Persia and foreign countries be revised, to the end that all clauses infringing upon or limiting the political, juridical, and economic independence of Persia be eliminated;

(9) That the concessions acquired by foreigners be so revised that they contain hereafter no stipulations which prejudice the economic interests of Persia;

(10) That the right of Persia to frame freely and revise her customs tariff without the dictation or interference of the foreign powers be recognized, and that all bans against the free transit of goods to Persia be removed.

Speaking before the Royal Geographical Society on the day Germany signed the armistice, Lieutenant-Colonel Napier, British Military Attaché in Persia, foreshadowed the preponderant rôle of Great Britain in the renaissance of Per-

sia. He said that the agreement of 1907 could be regarded as terminated, and that this meant that Great Britain resumed her liberty of action and intended to direct the destinies of Persia. From the British point of view, the control of Persia by Great Britain was essential. The tranquillity and prosperity of Persia would now affect Great Britain's new acquisition, Mesopotamia, as well as India and Afghanistan. And then did not the Caucasian petroleum deposits continue across the Persian frontier into Persia's western mountainous region?

During the war, Colonel Napier was responsible for much of the misery in Persia, resulting from the violation of Persian neutrality. Acting as if the Persians had no rights whatever, Colonel Napier carried out over six thousand kilometers of military raids. If the British believe that Persian resentment against having their country made a battle-field was confined to Russian, Turkish, and German invaders and did not include equally the British, they have made a sad miscalculation. Colonel Napier's speech reveals the curious mentality of the British officer who has spent most of his life in Asia. Men of his type think of Asiatic states and Asiatic races

as created for the greater glory of the British Empire. The agreement of 1907 had been a drawback to the extension of British influence throughout Persia. It never occurred to Colonel Napier that the agreement was an iniquitous document which delivered a proud race to exploitation and bullying by foreigners. He rejoiced over the termination of the agreement because now Great Britain would have a free hand in Persia!

The ten claims presented by Persia to the Peace Conference are intended to make impossible the realization of hopes like those expressed by Colonel Napier. In declaring the agreement of 1907 null and void, in asking for the revision of all treaties with foreign powers and all concessions granted to foreign companies, Persia proposes to be master in her own house. Petroleum deposits in Persia give Great Britain no right to dictate the foreign and domestic political and economic policy of Persia. Nor does British political control extended over Mesopotamia mean that Great Britain should assume control also over Persia.

The Persians pointed out in Paris that the society of nations would be simply a hypocritical

cloak to conceal political and commercial imperialism unless all nations, great and small, enjoyed equal rights and privileges from membership in it. The ten claims presented by the Persians are the *sine qua non* of any nation's independent existence. No discussion or reservation concerning any one of them is permissible. The termination of the agreement of 1907 does not mean a free hand for Great Britain in Persia. It means a free hand for Persia in Persia.

CHAPTER XV

RUSSIAN EXPANSION ACROSS ASIA

"PAPA," said my eldest daughter, her eyes wide with enthusiasm, "I have found out how to make a big snowball, the kind of snowball that gets so large you have to ask other kids to help you roll it." "Found out? Was there anything to find out about making a snowball? Did n't you just make it?" "Oh, no;" she explained. "But I know now. You must n't try to bring the snow to the ball. You have to start in one place and keep rolling all around—and that 's the way your snowball gets big!"

The Russian Empire is like Christine's snowball. Moscow was the starting-point. The dominions of the Romanoffs in Europe and Asia have grown by expansion in every direction from Moscow. The land over which the Russian flag waved in 1914 was all contiguous territory. In seeking outlets to the sea, the Russians made no jumps. They added neighboring countries and

subjected neighboring races until they were masters of the largest continuous land areas in the world. Checked in one direction, they took up the process of snowball-rolling in another. Disaster in battle came always on the fringe of the empire. Tannenberg would have been like Poltawa and Mukden had not the revolution of March, 1917, occurred. Since then, the integrity of the Russian Empire has been in jeopardy, not because of outside enemies but because of abandonment of traditions of foreign policy. The Peace Conference dealt with Finland, the Baltic Provinces, Lithuania, Poland, Ukrainia, Georgia, and Armenia. But the greater part of the Russian Empire was in Asia. And the disappearance of the Romanoffs affects vitally the future of every Asiatic country. Although few seemed to be aware of it at the time, Japan's war on Russia was a challenge to the doctrine of European eminent domain. The Russian revolution of 1917 has turned out to be the renunciation of that doctrine on the part of Russia. To grasp the potentialities of the new situation created by the events of Petrograd and Moscow, we must review the expansion of Russia in Asia.

Russia in Asia has a population of only twenty-

five millions. But its area is considerably over six million square miles—more than a third of the continent of Asia, including the islands. Without the map before us, it is impossible to have an idea of the problems that arise from the readjustment of ownership in Asiatic Russia. Russian territory is contiguous to Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, China, and Japan, and separated only by a narrow strip of Afghanistan from India. Alaska also is very close at hand.

Russian Asiatic territories comprised Siberia, Transcaucasia, the Steppes, and Turkestan.

Siberia stretches across the northern part of the continent from the Ural Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. The political separation between Asia and Europe does not follow the line of the Ural Mountains, as the European governments of Perm and Orenburg include territory east of the mountains. In western Siberia, the governments of Tobolsk and Yeniseisk run from the Arctic Ocean south to the Steppes and Mongolia. Wedged in between them is the government of Tomsk. In eastern Siberia is the enormous province of Yakutsk bordering the Arctic Ocean and very sparsely inhabited. Between Yakutsk and Mongolia and Manchuria lie the govern-

ment of Irkutsk and the provinces of Transbaikalia and Amur. The province of Kamchatka is the northeastern tip of Asia, ending in Cape Chukotskoi, which is near the American islands of Saint Lawrence and Saint Matthew in Behring Straits. The peninsula from which Kamchatka takes its name extends southward to the Japanese Kurile Islands and helps to enclose the Sea of Okhotsk. Along the Sea of Okhotsk and the Japan Sea, running for more than a thousand miles, is the Maritime Province. In the Sea of Okhotsk, separated from the mainland by the Gulf of Tartary, lies the long narrow island of Saghalien, half of which was ceded to Japan by the Treaty of Portsmouth. Vladivostok is in the extreme south of the Maritime Province, just north of the Korean frontier and across the sea from the largest island of Japan. Before the Russo-Japanese War, the Russians had extended administrative control over the portion of Manchuria through which they were building their railway to Port Arthur on the Yellow Sea, thus commanding the route from Tokio to Peking.

The Trans-Siberian Railway runs through all the governments and provinces of Siberia ex-

cept Yakutsk and Kamchatka. From Irkutsk to Vladivostok it skirts Mongolia and Manchuria. A much shorter section, used as the main line, runs across Manchuria from Transbaikalia to Vladivostok by way of Kharbin. Kharbin is the junction point for the branch which runs south to Peking. From Mukden, on the Kharbin-Peking section, branches run south and east to Port Arthur and into Korea.

Western Siberia comprises the governments of Tobolsk and Tomsk; eastern Siberia, the governments of Yeniseisk and Irkutsk, and the provinces of Yakutsk, Kamchatka, and Transbaikalia. Amur, the Maritime Province, and Saghalien form a third administration. The area of Siberia is a little less than five million square miles. Before the building of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the population was about one per square mile. Out of five million inhabitants, considerably less than a million were indigenous. And three fourths of the population, virtually all Russians, were to be found in the two governments nearest European Russia. Only eight per cent. of the population lived in towns. Half of the four million Russians were agricultural immigrants and their children, who had settled in

Siberia during the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

The Trans-Siberian Railway, built between 1895 and 1903, caused the population of Siberia to double in fifteen years. From 1897 to the outbreak of the war, nearly three million Russian immigrants followed the railway into Tobolsk and Tomsk, and several hundred thousand settled east and west of Irkutsk. In the Maritime Province, the population tripled. Vladivostok jumped from thirty thousand to one hundred and twenty thousand. But the immigration into eastern Siberia was not distinctively Russian as in western Siberia. A large proportion, in spite of regulations and efforts to discourage it, was Chinese, Manchu, Korean, and Japanese. The disastrous result of the war with Japan had an effect upon Russian colonization in eastern Siberia the full significance of which was realized only after the revolution of 1917. When the imperial machine crumbled, it was seen that the Russians had little hold or influence east of Lake Baikal. Transbaikalia, Amur, and the Maritime Province have fallen into the hands of Japan. Only in the province of Yakutsk, which proclaimed its indepen-

dence in May, 1918, has the distinctively Russian character of the revolution been maintained.

On the other hand, western Siberia has remained in the orbit of Russian affairs. The Republic of Siberia, which was proclaimed at Tomsk in December, 1917, although it adopted a national flag, white and green, and asserted its independence from Russia, has shown from its incipiency its solidarity with the fortunes of the Russian Empire. A duma was opened on February 5, 1918, and a cabinet constituted. But instead of pursuing a policy of independent action, inspired by local interests, the Siberian Government received among its members political refugees from Petrograd, and joined other elements in Russia in the civil war against the Bolshevist Government.

Whatever may happen to other portions of Russia in Asia, there can be no doubt that western Siberia will remain Russian. The inhabitants are more than ninety per cent. Russian, and they feel rightly that their economic future is linked inseparably with the fortunes of European Russia. Wheat-growing, which they understand, is developing with immigration as rapidly and profitably in western Siberia as in western

Canada and the same phenomenon is apparent. The bulk of the new settlers come from an adjacent wheat-raising country. When order comes out of chaos and a strong Russia is again established, it is probable also that the Russians will find that they have not lost Yeniseisk and Irkutsk. The huge province of Yakutsk may remain Russian or return to Russia, even if temporarily detached. But the provinces north of Mongolia and Manchuria and bordering the Japan Sea and the sea of Okhotsk belong to the Far East. They have been lost to European eminent domain. However Europe and America may feel and whatever Europe and America may say, Russia's outlet to the Pacific is a vanished dream, and Japan will at last realize the fruits of the victory of fifteen years ago. Japan has never regarded the Treaty of Portsmouth as more than a temporary makeshift. Her chance to upset it came when the Entente Allies decided to intervene in Siberia against the Bolshevists.

Transcaucasia consists of six governments, three provinces, and two districts, between the Caucasus Mountains and Persia and Turkey. On the west is the Black Sea, and on the east the Caspian Sea. It is thickly populated, having

seven and a half million inhabitants for an area of less than one hundred thousand square miles, much of which is mountainous. Mountains, in fact, cover most of the territory except the region bordering on the Caspian Sea, which contains the famous oil-fields. At the point where Turkey, Persia, and Transcaucasia meet is Mount Ararat. In the cradle of the human race are found more racial and religious differences than anywhere else in the world. Transcaucasia boasts of sixty separate races, professing various brands of Mohammedanism and Christianity.[1] In almost every center is a large sprinkling of Jews.

Except on the Caspian Sea coast where the Russians control both banks, the frontier between Transcaucasia and Persia follows the Araxes River from Mount Ararat to the sea. It is an excellent natural frontier, and is an historical and racial frontier as well: for Georgia lies north of the Araxes. The frontier with Turkey, on the other hand, is a conventional line established

[1] There are fifty-eight in the province of Daghestan alone. In the summer of 1919, the tribes of Daghestan were asserting their right to complete independence according to the Wilsonian principles. They sought the aid of the British occupying army against one another, against the Bolshevists, against Denikine, and against the Georgians.

after the war of 1877. It is an artificial frontier which cut the Armenian race in half.

Extension of Russian sovereignty over Transcaucasia was a long and difficult process. After the country was wrested from Turkey in two wars, it had to be won over again from its own inhabitants. Russian penetration into Transcaucasia was the logical result of centuries of expansion at the expense of the Turks. Once the Black Sea, which had been a Turkish lake, was reached, the Russians wanted to make it a Russian lake. And from Transcaucasia Russian foreign policy saw two chances of an outlet to the sea—through Persia to the Persian Gulf, and through Asiatic Turkey to the Mediterranean. It was in the natural process of empire-building that Transcaucasia became Russian territory, and the vision of the conquerors was always beyond frontiers fixed by treaties. But Transcaucasia in itself turned out to be a rich possession. The Baku oil-fields became in the second decade of the twentieth century the most productive in the world, giving an annual yield larger than those of Rumania, Galicia, and Mexico combined, and reaching the astonishing total of one fourth of the yield of the United States. Cotton-

production had attained 1,750,000,000 pounds in the year before the revolution. There were twice as many horses and cattle, three times as many pigs, and twenty times as many sheep as in Poland. Nearly nine million acres of forest land were in exploitation. Enough coal for local consumption was found.

Justified by the economic value of the country fully as much as by political considerations, Russia was able to extend her railway system in Transcaucasia, develop the ports of Batum and Baku, and establish an excellent steamship service on the Caspian Sea. Batum and Baku were connected by a railway which crossed the isthmus. From Tiflis a line was run south through the mountains, which bifurcated to the Turkish and Persian frontiers. The western branch, running through Kars, ended at the frontier of Turkey. The southern branch had its terminus at Tabriz, capital of the Persian province of Azerbaijan.

During the first years of the recent war, the Russians maintained their hold in northern Persia, and succeeded in joining hands with the British north of Bagdad. Their Asiatic campaign against Turkey was crowned with success in 1916, after many vicissitudes. Trebizónd,

Erzerum, Van, and Bitlis were occupied, thus completing the conquest of Armenia begun in the war of 1877. But the revolution of March, 1917, demoralized the Russian army in Persia and Turkey. Azerbaijan and Armenia were abandoned. The situation grew worse after the Bolshevists came into power. By the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Russians abandoned not only their recent conquests, but also the Transcaucasian territories incorporated after the war of 1877. The Petrograd Soviet declared the disinterestedness of Russia in Persia. Disregarding the frontiers decided upon at Brest-Litovsk, the Turks, after the occupation of Batum, pushed across Transcaucasia to Baku, which was held by the Armenians, reinforced by a small British detachment that had come across the Caspian Sea from Persia. Against overwhelming numbers, the Armenians could not hold. The British evacuated Baku.

But the triumph of the Turks in Transcaucasia was short-lived. General Allenby's victories in Palestine and Syria led to the capitulation of Turkey. By the terms of the armistice, the Turks withdrew to the frontier of 1914. The British reoccupied Baku, and during the

Peace Conference established garrisons in different cities of Transcaucasia. In the last year of the war, however, two independent states arose in Transcaucasia: Armenia and Georgia. Both states declared their independence from Russia, were forced to treat with the Turks and the Germans before the armistices, and sent delegates to the Peace Conference in Paris.

A large portion of the Russian forces in the Asiatic campaign had been Armenians. To their ardor and courage, the Russians owed what success they had against the Turks. The Russian Armenians possessed an incentive. They marched to free their fellow-Armenians from massacre and deportation. They had been inflamed by the sight and pitiful stories of several hundred thousand refugees who had succeeded in reaching Transcaucasia, fleeing before the Turks. Consequently, when the Russian Army broke up, the Armenians preserved their discipline against all attempts of the Bolshevists, and were the only force upon which the Allies could count in southwestern Asia during the last year of the war. The two million Armenians of Transcaucasia, increased by several hundred thousand refugees from Turkey, persisted in their

loyalty to Russia until the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk delivered them to the Turks. Then they formed their own state, which succeeded in maintaining itself during the period of anarchy and famine that Bolshevism brought upon the Russian Empire. The Armenian Republic of the Caucasus comprises the government of Erivan, the southern part of the government of Tiflis, the southwestern part of the government of Yelisavetpol, and the province of Kars with the exception of the region situated in the north of Ardahan. At the Peace Conference, speaking before the Council of Ten, M. Aharonian, delegate of the Armenian Republic of the Caucasus, stated that the two and a half million Armenians in Transcaucasia wanted to cast in their fortunes with the Armenians of Turkey to form a Greater Armenia, stretching from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.

Prince Sumbatoff, delegate of the Georgian Government, told the Allied representatives that the Georgians, like the Armenians, had hoped that the Russian revolution would result in the transformation of Russia into a federal state, in which the allogeneous races would enjoy autonomy. The Georgians were not separatists. But

Bolshevism destroyed the hope of seeing the Russian people pass from czarism to self-government. The Georgians took the lead, assisted by the Armenians and the Tartars, in forming a provisional government for all Transcaucasia. But the union established at first between the different elements was broken up by Bolshevist and Turkish propaganda. The Tartars took sides with the Turks after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. When Georgians and Armenians refused to accept the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Turks captured Kars and Batum, and massacred and starved the Armenians and Georgians into treating with them. The Germans intervened in June, 1918, ostensibly to save the Christians of the Transcaucasia from the fanaticism and anarchy aroused by the propaganda and the invasion of their own allies. Realizing that coöperation with the Tartars was no longer possible, and not wanting to accept the alternative of becoming vassals of the Germans, Armenians and Georgians dissolved the common government they had established at Tiflis, agreed upon a division of territory, and each element proclaimed its independence. If Georgia is allowed to remain an independent government, it will cover the greater

part of Transcaucasia, and lie between Armenia and Russia. Many Armenians will remain under Georgian rule. But the Armenians are ready to accept this in reason of the great hopes awakened by reunion with the Armenians of Turkey. Similarly, the Georgians have consented to make the "sacrifice" of what were historically Georgian territories—portions of the Governments of Tiflis, Erivan, and Yelisavetpol.

United to Turkish Armenia and Cilicia, there is a future for the Armenians of Transcaucasia. But one wonders whether the Georgians will be able to control the territories they have taken in hand. Certainly their independence can be safeguarded only by accepting a mandatory of the great powers, as the Armenians are prepared to do. For while the population of the country claimed by the Georgians is considerably more than four millions, their number is 1,350,000. They are outnumbered by the Turco-Tartars, and have 300,000 Persians to contend with. As the Persians live in territories contiguous to Persia, the Persians have invoked the principle of nationalities at the Peace Conference to secure rectifications of frontier at the expense of both the Georgian and Armenian republics. Transcau-

casia is a country in which the various elements lived in comparative security and prosperity under the strong hand of the Russian Government. The Grand Duke Alexander told me recently that the races were so numerous and so divided by religion and traditional feuds that putting one over the other would never work. The grand duke was born in Transcaucasia, and lived in Tiflis, where his father was governor-general. He points out that no element in the Caucasus has a numerical or cultural preponderance. Christians belong to different churches: Mohammedans are Sunnites and Shiites. The impracticability of forming an independent government in Transcaucasia, along national lines such as the Georgians have proposed, is demonstrated by the hopeless mixture of races. The experiment of forming a government through union of Armenians, Georgians, and Tartars failed. Tiflis is a city of nearly 350,000 inhabitants. It has no marked racial character. Railway and oil-field development was due to the intervention and control of Russia.

Decisions taken by the Peace Conference concerning Transcaucasia or by the peoples of the country themselves are bound to be temporary.



THE RAILWAYS OF ASIA

MAIN LINES — LESSER LINES

	NUMBER of SQUARE MILES	POPULATION	RAILWAYS APPROXIMATE N°of MILES
ASIA INCLUDING MALAYSIA	17.300000	918324000	69000
AFRICA	11.800000	126734000	29000
AUSTRALASIA	3448000	5881000	23000
AMERICA	17.208000	149994000	375000
EUROPE	3.800000	405759000	217000

The Russian element in the Caucasus numbers more than three millions. Although mostly in and north of the mountains that divide Europe from Asia, it is still a formidable link to bind to Russia all of the lands between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Does not the definite political status of Transcaucasia depend upon the evolution of Russia? When the Russians form again a stable central government, there is little likelihood that the whole of Transcaucasia will remain outside. The Persians may get back the Araxes River boundary. The Armenians may find themselves happily settled in a durable relationship with the Armenians of Turkey. But from Batum to Baku, the territory on both sides of the railway and in the Kura River valley, including Yelisavetpol, will drift back to the political union of pre-Bolshevist days.

The British, however, failed to recognize this fact, and are playing a game in the Caucasus which would be roundly condemned by British public opinion, were the facts known in England. A few would protest because of their conviction that Russia will one day be strong again and will not forgive the disloyalty of her allies of 1914: many more would protest on the ground of hu-

manity and fair play. The British Foreign Office and War Office, working together, decided at the beginning of 1919 to use the military occupancy to detach definitely Transcaucasia from Russia. In this way, the Baku oil-fields could be controlled, and a barrier erected against a possible renewal of Russian penetration into Persia. The British did not hesitate to make friends with the Tartars at the expense of the Armenians. Under British guidance, the Tartars formed the Republic of Azerbaijan, comprising the eastern side of the Caucasus and including the oil-fields, and sent representatives to the Peace Conference. General Thompson appointed a Tartar, who had been a notorious Turkish agent, Governor-General of Karabagh, a province where the Armenians have preserved their independence for more than a thousand years. His successor, General Shuttleworth, employed force to aid the Tartars in disarming the Armenians. Then the Tartars in the neighborhood of Schuscha massacred the Armenians. The British had staff-officers with General Denikine, aiding in the offensive against the Bolshevists. But at the same time, other British staff officers were aiding Tartars and Georgians to prepare to resist an attempt of General Deni-

kine to reëstablish Russian authority in the Caucasus. This tortuous and double-faced policy, repugnant to English character, shows how men can be carried away by and sacrifice everything to the imperial idea. Whatever helps the empire is justifiable.

The Steppes and Turkestan are portions of Russia in Asia totally different from huge Siberia and tiny Transcaucasia. With a different background and presenting different features and problems, their future is much more a matter of speculation. Their political relationship with the Russian Empire and with the other countries of Asia may not be decided for years.

The four provinces of the Steppes—Uralsk, Turgai, Akmolinsk, and Semipalatinsk—form with Turkestan what is generally called central Asia. Uralsk and Turgai, lying between the European governments of Samara and Orenburg on the north and Turkestan on the south, are the home of the Little Horde. Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk, lying between the Siberian governments of Tobolsk and Tomsk on the north and Turkestan on the south, are the home of the Middle Horde. The railway from Samara to Turkestan crosses Turgai and a little corner of Uralsk.

From Novo Nikolaevsk on the Tomsk section of the Trans-Siberian Railway, a branch connects up Semipalatinsk.

The Steppes have a population of four millions, very clearly divided. In the western part of Uralsk, in the valley of the Ural River and on the shore of the Caspian Sea, live the Ural Cossacks. Their fisheries, run on a strictly communal basis, are the richest in the world, with the greatest fish-market in the world near at hand. Cossacks are found also in the corner of Turgai, where they engage in cattle-raising, and in Semipalatinsk, where they devote themselves to bee-culture. In northern and middle Akmolinsk, owing to the proximity of the Trans-Siberian Railway and to river transportation northward into the government of Tobolsk, several hundred thousand Russians have colonized the rich plains and are doing splendidly with grain. The mountains contain copper, coal, and gold, which attract Europeans. In the northern part of Semipalatinsk, Russian colonization has penetrated along the valley of the Irtish River during the past twenty years.

Eastern Uralsk, most of Turgai and Semipalatinsk, and the southern part of Akmolinsk are

inhabited by the Kirghiz, who are Mohammedan Turanians. Over ninety per cent. are nomads. They devote themselves to cattle-, horse-, and sheep-raising. The dry climate, hot in summer and cold in winter, makes water rare, and forestation dwarfed and scarce, even in the mountains. Long stretches of sandy deserts, and a rich growth of grass in the spring, complete the features of a country not unlike some of our best American cattle-range sections. As in our West, the possibilities of extensive agriculture depend upon irrigation, and those of profitable mining upon means of transportation. Owing to its geographical position, Uralsk may in time become Europeanized. The southern half of the other three provinces, however, belong racially and economically to Turkestan.

From the historical and geographical point of view, Turkestan is the country of deserts and plateaus and mountains stretching for a thousand miles east of the Caspian Sea. On the north are the Steppes; on the south, Persia and Afghanistan; on the east, China. Two great rivers, which have their source in the mountains of Central Asia, flow across Turkestan into the Aral Sea. The Oxus River (Amu Daria or

Jihun), after forming the boundary line from its source between Russia in Asia and Afghanistan, flows north through Bokhara and Khiva. The Jaxartes River (Syr Daria or Sihun) considerably farther to the east, has its source in the Thian Shan Mountains on the western frontier of China. From the administrative point of view, the Russian Government has narrowed down Turkestan to mean the four provinces of Syr Dariisk, Samarcand, Ferghana, and Semiretchinsk. West and south of official Turkestan are the protected states of Khiva and Bokhara, and the virtually uninhabited Pamir district. The enormous region between the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea, and between the protected states and the Persian and Afghan frontier, south of the Oxus, is called the Transcaspian Province.

The northern part of the Transcaspian Province is a plateau. The southern part is mostly the desert of Khiva. But during the last twenty-five years, the successful accomplishment of an ambitious railway building program has brought the Transcaspian Province into political and economic prominence. From Krasnovodsk, a port on the Caspian Sea opposite Baku, the Transcaspian Railway skirts the northern frontier of

Persia through the country of the Tekke Turkomans to Merv. From Merv, a railway runs northeast to Bokhara and Kokand. Between Bokhara and Kokand it is joined up with the Samara-Tashkent Railway. A branch runs south from Merv to the Afghan frontier. It would have been possible to connect Meshed in the Khorasan province of Persia and Herat in Afghanistan with the Russian Transcaspian Railway without much additional mileage. But the British feared Russia. In spite of the economic benefits to the countries concerned, they would tolerate railways, built by their rivals, neither in Persia nor Afghanistan!

Semiretchinsk, bordering China, is inhabited mostly by Kirghiz, who are engaged in cattle-raising. But since 1900, a hundred thousand Russians have settled there, attracted by agricultural possibilities. Cereals and fruits thrive. The Russians had planned before the war to extend the railway south from Semipalatinsk across the province to Tashkent. When this project is put through and when a railway is built into China, Semiretchinsk will become a thriving country capable of supporting a population of millions. In area, Syr Dariisk is the largest of the Turkes-

tan provinces. It contains, however, enormous stretches of desert. The railway from Samara runs through the province following the river from which it takes its name. Tashkent, in the southeastern corner, is the ninth largest city of the Russian Empire, and the largest city except Tiflis of Russia in Asia. Tashkent has become an important trading-center again, as it used to be in the days of caravans. With the development of cotton-production in central Asia, the Russians have had in mind making Tashkent a center for raw cotton and textiles for the Chinese, Afghanistan, Persian, and Russian markets. Samarcand and Ferghana, both linked up with the Central Asian and Transcaspian railways, are small mountainous provinces which represent the southern limit of direct Russian administrative control. They are conquests of the nineteenth century and are inhabited mostly by Kirghiz and Uzbegs. South of Ferghana is the mountainous and only partly explored region of Pamir, where the frontiers of Russia, Great Britain, and China have been agreed upon in uninhabited regions, snow-bound for the greater part of the year.

There remain in central Asia, under Russian

protection, the native states of Bokhara and Khiva, both inhabited by Uzbegs. They are all that is left of the great empire of Timur. The two countries have seen their boundaries gradually narrowed down to the valley of the Oxus River through Russian encroachments from the north, the west, and the south. A large part of the Transcaspian Province has been formed by annexations from Khiva and of the Turkestan provinces by annexations from Bokhara. After the Holy War of 1866, Bokhara lost Syr Dariisk and became a vassal state of Russia in 1873. The emir agreed to admit no foreigners without Russian passports. The Khan of Khiva acknowledged the supremacy of the czar in 1870. In 1872, the Russians invaded the khanate and exacted a heavy indemnity, which could not be paid. It was still being liquidated at the time of the Russian revolution in 1917. The extension of the Russian railways, while bringing economic prosperity to the protected states, completed their political dependence upon Russia. The forward march of the Russians into Khiva and Bokhara, occurring only a few years before the Turco-Russian War of 1877, made the British feel that the Crimean War might have to be

fought over again. The extension of Russian railways in central Asia and Russian intervention in Persia kept alive British apprehensions. At the beginning of the twentieth century a war between Great Britain and Russia seemed inevitable. It was avoided only by the Convention of 1907.

In April, 1917, the Emir of Bokhara and the Khan of Kniva threw off the Russian yoke and promised a democratic constitution to their people. The two rulers announced that they intended to take back the portions of Turkestan and the Transcaspian Province wrested from them by the Russians. Bolshevism made its appearance in central Asia at the end of 1917. A Soviet government was set up at Tashkent. Merv announced its adhesion to the Lenine régime. At the time of the last Turkish advance, it was reported that the Turks were forming a pan-Turanian league, to which the central Asiatic emirates and Afghanistan were ready to adhere. But after the collapse of Turkey, the British were able to send a force to Merv. Through Habibullah Khan, Emir of Afghanistan, the British tried to capture the league of the emirs, and bring cen-

tral Asia under the political influence of the Government of India. But in February, 1919, Habibullah Khan was assassinated. His successor, Amanullah Khan, although he rigorously punished the murderers, soon showed anti-British tendencies. The British were compelled to evacuate Merv, and seem to have lost their temporary influence over the khanates.

As in the Caucasus, the dreams of British imperialists are doomed to disappointment. Bolshevism is a passing symptom. But the forces of order in Russia, when the empire is reconstituted, will never consent to the *fait accompli* of the extension of British influence through the temporary misfortunes of Russia. On the other hand, if Russian imperialism does not revive, another danger confronts the British. The nationalist movements in Turkestan are bound to have a repercussion among the other Turanian and Iranian Moslems and among the Moslems of India. It will then be realized by the Russophobes among the British imperialists that the maintenance of European control in western and central Asia depended upon a strong Russian imperialism successful in extinguishing foyers of

nationalist agitation. The day may come when Indians, Afghans, and Persians will join Uzbegs and Kirghiz in challenging European eminent domain.

CHAPTER XVI

THE ISLAND EXTENSION OF JAPAN

FROM Singapore to Kamchatka, the eastern coast of Asia is guarded by a succession of islands. They shut off the Pacific Ocean and form stepping-stones between Asia and Australia. The Dutch East Indies extend over most of these islands. Great Britain, however, holds the northern coast of Borneo, Portugal, the eastern end of Timor, and (up to the recent war) Germany had the eastern part of New Guinea and small groups of islands east of the Philippines. The Philippine Islands, the link between the Dutch East Indies and the coast of China, changed from Spanish to American sovereignty at the end of the nineteenth century.

An island empire takes to islands. But when Japan became a world power, Great Britain was in full possession of Australia and New Zealand, and the other islands over which Japan might have extended her economic and political control

were already within the colonial spheres of European powers. The opportunity of Japan for island expansion, even in her own waters, seemed scant. On the south, between Formosa and Kiusiu, administrative control was asserted of the Luchu group and the Saki Sima group during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Out in the Pacific, southwest of Japan, sovereignty was proclaimed also over the Bonin Islands. On the north, the Kurile Islands, the link between Japan and the southern tip of Kamchatka, were ceded to Japan by Russia, but at the expense of waiving the rights of Japan in Saghalien Island, historically and geographically one of the Japanese group.

By the wars with China and Russia, Japan secured Formosa and took back the southern half of Saghalien. The annexation of Korea gave her complete mastery of all the islands in the channel between Japan and the mainland, and removed anxiety over European efforts to find naval bases and coaling-stations. During the recent world war, Japan conquered from Germany the Mariana, the Marshall, the Caroline, and the Pelew Islands.

Formosa has an area of nearly fourteen thou-

sand square miles and a population of three and three quarter millions. Between Formosa and the mainland of China, the Pescadores group of twelve islands has been attached to Formosa. In twenty years, the Japanese built three hundred and fifty miles of railways, and constructed good roads everywhere. Tea is a flourishing industry, and cane sugar has prospered. Refineries have been developed on the island. Although trade with Japan has been profitable and mining a source of great wealth, military expenditures are so heavy that the island has never paid its way.

Japan has had a bitter experience with the white man's burden in Formosa. The Chinese never attempted to extend administrative control over portions of the island inhabitated by the aborigines. The effort of the Japanese to do so cost them dearly. In the old days, the aborigines, savage head-hunting Malays, were left undisturbed. The Formosans put up with raids as a part of the natural order of things, just as they suffered incursions from wild animals. The Chinese had a system of frontier guards which used to try to prevent the savages from coming down on the plains. For fifteen years, the Japanese were content with this system, but they worked it

more scientifically. They placed two hundred and fifty miles of charged barbed wire along the frontier, and put batteries in strategic positions.

In 1910, however, the government decided to do away with the constant menace from the aboriginal districts by subjugating the Malay tribes. A sum of seven and a half million dollars was voted for this purpose and a plan of campaign sketched out to extend over five years. In 1914, it was reported that five hundred and fifty out of six hundred and seventy tribes had made their submission, and that twenty-five hundred students were in the schools for aborigines. This courageous undertaking has opened up rich forests and mining areas, and has increased greatly the value of plantation lands near the old frontiers. It is a striking fact that the Japanese, owing to the willingness of soldiers and police to risk their lives, have accomplished far more in Formosa than the Dutch in Sumatra and Borneo.

The Japanese have had trouble also with the Formosans, who have risen in insurrection nine times since the Chinese Republic was first declared at Canton. It is difficult to secure accurate information about the revolutionary

movements in Formosa. The insurrections of 1913 and 1915 were exceedingly serious. Japanese were assassinated and public buildings burned. In 1913, the ringleaders were arrested before the troubles had spread far. In 1915, nearly fifteen hundred natives were brought before the military courts, of whom eight hundred and sixty-six were sentenced to capital punishment. Upon the occasion of his coronation, the present emperor commuted all except ninety-five of these sentences. From the way the insurrections spread, it is evident that the Japanese are no more popular in Formosa than in Korea, in spite of the security and prosperity and good administration they have brought to the island.

In 1909, an official effort was started to promote Japanese colonization in Formosa. It has hardly been more successful than that in Korea. There are only a hundred and fifty thousand Japanese in Formosa—four per cent. of the population. Nor has Formosa developed into an important rice-producing country for Japan. The surplus of rice-production over the needs of the population is only fifteen per cent.!

Saghalien is an enormous island, narrow and mountainous. The southern half of it, ceded

back to Japan by the Treaty of Portsmouth, contains a dwindling native population. The plantations abandoned by the Russians have been taken up only partially by Japanese settlers who, after fifteen years, number seventeen thousand. The Japanese Government estimates that while four hundred and thirty thousand *cho* (a *cho* is little less than two and a half acres) are available for agriculture and pasturage, the Japanese settlers are cultivating five thousand five hundred *cho*. Stock-breeding, forest exploitation, coal, mineral oil, iron, and gold are all possibilities in Saghalien. But they need capitalists and laborers rather than settlers. In the summer, some seventy thousand Japanese go over to Saghalien to work. The winters are too cold. It is doubtful if Saghalien will ever attract Japanese immigrants. At the Conference of Paris, I spoke to the Japanese delegates about the possibility of getting a complete title to the whole of Saghalien and to the Maritime Province of Siberia as well. "Too cold," was their laconic reply.

The colonial possessions of Germany in the Pacific lay north of Australia and east of the Philippines. Kaiser Wilhelm's Land, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Solomon Islands, directly


HOIRYUNG
CHUNGCHIN
WEIJU
HAMHENG
WONSAN
PYNGYANG
KESUNG
SEOUL
CHEMULPO
TEKU
KUNSAN
FUSAN
MOKPO
MASAMPO
CHEJU

north of Australia, were conquered by the French and Australians. The New Zealanders occupied the German possessions in Samoa. The other groups of islands—Pelew, Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall—were occupied by the Japanese Navy. The Marshall Islands belonged to Germany since 1885, and were administered originally by a private company. The other three groups were bought after the Spanish-American War, with the exception of the largest of the Mariana Islands, Guam, which the United States kept for a naval station. These islands are not rich nor extensive in area. There is no chance for Japanese emigration to them. But their strategic position in the Pacific is unrivaled. During the war and at the Conference at Paris, Australia bitterly opposed the cession of former German islands to Japan. In order to avoid unpleasantness, Japan handed over to Australia, after the capture, Yap Island, which lies between the Pelews and Marianas. The Australians regarded this as essential to them from the fact that it is the relay station for the Hongkong-Sydney cable and steamship lines. By the Treaty of Versailles, however, Germany ceded the islands to the Allies. A compromise between Great Britain and Japan

left to Japan all the German islands north of the equator.

The island extension of Japan has done virtually nothing to provide for her surplus population, and little for her trade. And if there is to be a real society of nations, the preventive and positive strategic advantage of Japanese expansion in the Pacific since 1895 will count for nothing. Australians and New Zealanders are anxious, all the same. They do not care to have stepping-stones from Asia in the hands of those who might be tempted to use them. But if Australia and New Zealand, like the rest of the world that is not thickly populated, are to remain the white man's preserves, where will the Japanese go?

CHAPTER XVII

KOREA LOSES HER INDEPENDENCE

THE peninsula of Korea juts out from the mainland of Asia toward Japan between the Japan Sea and the Yellow Sea. The Japan Sea is as important to Japan as is the North Sea to Great Britain. The Yellow Sea is as important to China as is the stretch of the Atlantic between Boston and Newport News to the United States. Korea has been called a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan. This expression is no exaggeration. Were Korea in the hands of any European power, the menace to Japan would be as the menace to Great Britain of Belgium in the hands of Germany. A European power ensconced in Korea could separate Japan from China and control the outlet of northern China to the Pacific.

For many centuries, Korea, like Japan, was a closed country. Attempts of missionaries and traders to penetrate Korea ended in disaster.

KOREA LOSES HER INDEPENDENCE

The capital fact of contemporary history in the Far East is that Japan was open to foreign influence several decades before the Koreans were forced to allow foreigners to settle in their country. This fact alone frustrated the complete triumph of European eminent domain in Asia. For when the Koreans were called upon to incur the fate of other weak and backward Asiatic nations, the Japanese had become strong enough to have a foreign policy of their own and to anticipate the insatiable ambitions of European imperialism. The fear that Russia or Great Britain would get control of Korea led Japan to interfere in the internal affairs of the Hermit Kingdom, to fight two costly wars, and finally to annex the whole peninsula.

Between 1876 and 1892, the ports and interior of Korea were opened to foreign settlement and trade and missionary effort by treaties with Japan, the United States, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Russia, France, and Austria-Hungary. Immediately, diplomatic agents of the powers began the traditional game of intriguing for exclusive concessions and political influence. As elsewhere in Asia, their efforts were powerfully helped by civil war and administrative anarchy,

which they encouraged as much as they possibly could. Plots were hatched in foreign legations and unsuccessful revolutionaries found refuge in the legations. Under cover of the confusion—altogether natural—of the first decade of Korea's entrance into the family of nations, the European powers tried to secure concessions for naval stations and to block the efforts of others in this direction. Thoroughly alarmed, Japan championed the complete independence of Korea and opposed every scheme of Europeans to instal themselves in the peninsula. When they saw that they could accomplish nothing against Japanese influence at Seoul, the powers decided to work through Peking. Was not China the suzerain of Korea? Chinese statesmen were susceptible to suggestions from all sides that they assert the rights of China in Korea. Through fear and distrust of Japan, the Koreans were betrayed into the fatal mistake of playing up to China against Japan.

A situation that had been developing for years came to a crisis in May, 1894. The Korean Government appealed to China for aid in putting down a serious insurrection. Observing the terms of her agreement with Japan, China notified Japan that two thousand soldiers were being

sent into Korea. China did not ask the coöperation of Japan, however, and did not wait before sending the troops to see what attitude Japan would take. Japan retaliated by landing an army of twelve thousand in Korea to occupy the capital and the ports.

A new era began in the history of the Far East. In their relations with each other, Japan and China had come to a point where they would have to adopt a common foreign policy in regard to European influences or become enemies. Japan had long been uneasy and resentful over the failure of China to resist encroachments upon Chinese sovereignty. Against the protests of Japan, China had been granting concessions to the great powers that threatened to put the Far East under European control. Chinese statesmen refused to see how their weakness and corruption were compromising the interests of Japan and the entire Far East at the same time as the interests of China. The worst fault of China had been to allow Russia to get a strong foothold on the coast of the Japan Sea north of Korea. Korea became the test case. The Japanese did not propose to permit Chinese suzerainty in Korea to be the means of balking the efforts of Japan to prevent

the granting of concessions to European powers in the peninsula between the Yellow Sea and the Japan Sea. Consequently, Japan invited China to join in formulating and carrying out a program of reforms in Korea. The program was reasonable and practicable. The Chinese could find no objection to it. But they raised the point of sovereignty. What right had Japan to ask to participate in the execution of reforms in a country where she was a stranger? Peking answered that before discussion of any such program could be entertained, the Japanese would have to withdraw the army that had been sent into Korea, without justification or permission of the Koreans or the Chinese. Coupled with this demand was the declaration that Korea must be left to reform herself.

Thereupon, Japan declared war against China. This first manifestation to the world of Japanese military and naval power, in the summer of 1894, ended in the decisive defeat of China. The powers intervened to revise the treaty imposed by Japan upon China. But in Korea, Japanese was substituted for Chinese influence, and the King of Korea renounced Chinese suzerainty. So far as the initial cause of conflict was concerned,

Japan was not robbed of the fruits of her victory. The Japanese went ahead with the execution of the program of reforms originally proposed to be undertaken jointly with China. Korea began to adapt herself to the necessary conditions of existence of a modern state. If the use of an army and a fleet by the Japanese was a revelation to Europe, the work of Japanese counselors in Korea during the months following the war gave also the spectacle of a new unwelcome and disquieting stumbling-block in the path of European Far Eastern ambitions. The Japanese demonstrated that they had been studying the constructive side of European civilization as carefuly as military and naval matters.

Excellent and wise in conception as was the Japanese program of reforms, the methods of application were resented by a high-spirited people. The Koreans felt that they were being made to bear the burden of the disappointment and bitterness of the Japanese, who had built high hopes upon the victory over China. Russia had not withdrawn from the struggle for the control of Korea. She was quick to take advantage of the growing hatred against Japan, which culminated in the storming of the palace and the assassina-

tion of the queen by Japanese troops in 1895. When the king, who had been made prisoner by the Japanese, escaped, he was received at the Russian legation. Encouraged and aided powerfully by the Russians, the king reëstablished the absolutist régime and abolished the reforms. He assumed the title of Emperor. At the end of the nineteenth century, international intrigue in Seoul was worse than before the Sino-Japanese War. All the powers vied with one another for concessions and privileges. But during the first years of the twentieth century, the competition for the control of Korea narrowed down to a duel between Russia and Japan.

In March, 1900, occurred the first of the events that led to the Russo-Japanese War. It was announced that Russia had secured a concession for exclusive settlement at Masanpo, the finest harbor of Korea, and the promise of the Korean Government not to cede the island of Ko-Je to any foreign country. Russia declared her intention of making Masanpo a winter harbor for war-ships. If Masanpo had become a Russian naval station, Russia would have dominated the passage from the Japan Sea to the Yellow Sea and have been a constant menace to Japan. War was averted

only by the action of the Korean Government, which repudiated the concession. After a year of bickering, the matter was temporarily settled by awarding concessions at Masanpo to both Russia and Japan. At the same time, a joint Korean-Japanese company secured the concession for a railway from Seoul to the port of Fusan, which is near Masanpo and which the Japanese knew they could develop in such a way as to control Masanpo.

The second encroachment of Russia upon Korea occurred in 1903. Inspired by the example of France in Siam, where the French were successfully following up a lumber concession in the Mekong Valley by administrative control of both banks of the river, Russia established a settlement at Phyong-an Do on the Korean side of the Yalu River. The Korean Government protested. The Russian minister replied that a settlement at Phyong-an Do was necessary for developing a timber concession granted in 1896. The Koreans rejected this interpretation. There was nothing in the terms of the concession about a settlement. The Russian minister then tried to force Korea to sign supplementary clauses to the original concession, legalizing the occupation of

land at Phyong-an Do. Seconded by Great Britain and the United States, Japan backed up the Korean protest. Here the fatal weakness of the Korean Government became evident. It was the same kind of weakness that was leading to the partition of China. Afraid of provoking resentment and unwilling to take either side, Korea sought a solution in inaction. She neither insisted upon the Russians leaving, nor did she sign the supplementary clauses. To get even with Japan, Russia instigated the Korean Government to protest against the issue of notes by the Japanese bank at Seoul, the first and only banking enterprise in Korea. The Japanese bank-notes were declared illegal. No steps were taken, however, to prevent their circulation. None could accuse the Koreans of partiality! Unable to defend their own interests, and unwilling to take sides, the Koreans put up their country as a prize to be fought for and to be won by the strongest.

When the Russo-Japanese War broke out, the impotence of Russia on sea made the military occupation of Korea easy for Japan. There was no opposition from the Koreans themselves. On February 22, 1904, the Korean Emperor was compelled to accept a treaty, adopting Japanese sug-

gestions as to the administration of the country, and allowing Japan to occupy strategical positions in case of invasion or internal disturbance. In return, Japan guaranteed the independence and integrity of the country.

Japan did not wait for victory over Russia to assume control of Korea. The geographical situation of Korea made the country an admirable base—in fact, a necessary base—of military operations against the Russians in Manchuria. A Japanese Resident and Japanese gendarmes were sent to Seoul. The construction of the railway through the peninsula from Fusan was rapidly pushed on to the Yalu River frontier. Korean ports were used for revictualment and naval bases. The Japanese Government constructed lighthouses all along the coast and on the islands. Japanese civilians followed the armies into Korea. It was a bloodless conquest, accomplished in wartime. The fighting was on Chinese territory. Korea lost only her navy, which was sunk by the Vladivostok Russian squadron. The Korean navy consisted of one little steamer that had justified the creation of many admirals!

The Treaty of Portsmouth imposed upon Russia the recognition of Japan's "paramount inter-

ests in Korea." Several weeks before this treaty was signed, the alliance between Great Britain and Japan was renewed, which also recognized Japan's paramount interests in Korea and her right to take special measures to protect them in view of "the consolidation and maintenance of general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia." Japan had already anticipated these agreements with the two powers against whose influence in Korea she had been contending for more than ten years. The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed on August 12, 1905, and the Treaty of Portsmouth on September 5. But earlier in the year, the Korean military establishment had been reduced to ten battalions, and the civil administration of the country placed entirely in Japanese hands. Korean currency had been changed to a gold standard, and new coinage issued on the Japanese model. The notes of the Japanese National Bank were made legal tender, and on June 1, the bank itself became the government's central treasury.

After the war, the Japanese moved with great haste to convert Korea into a province of Japan. The remnant of the army was disbanded. Only fifteen hundred men were allowed to remain un-

der arms as the emperor's palace guard. Japan took over the railways and telegraphs and post-offices, and discontinued the issue of Korean stamps. In November, Marquis Ito forced the emperor to sign a treaty that put the control of the foreign affairs of Korea in the hands of Japan, and the administration of the country under the supervision of a resident-general in Seoul. Japanese advisers were placed in all the departments of the government and in the imperial household.

The Korean Government had neither been notified of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance nor consulted in the Treaty of Portsmouth. The emperor declared that his signature to the treaty dictated by Marquis Ito was a case of *force majeure*. A telegram of protest was sent to the United States. Two cabinet ministers committed suicide. But the powers paid no attention to Korean protests. The United States was the first to withdraw its minister from Seoul. Others followed suit. The legations were closed and Korean matters treated through Tokio.

During 1906, revolts against the Japanese in the southern and eastern parts of the peninsula had to be suppressed by troops. Koreans abroad fomented insurrections. Marquis Ito arrested

the leaders of the conservative parties and prominent officials, and made the emperor virtually a prisoner in the palace. In the spring of 1907, a plot to assassinate the ministers who had signed the treaty of 1905 led to the execution of thirty-three leaders of rank and position. The next move of the Koreans was the appearance of a mission at The Hague Conference in June, 1907, to protest against the violation of Korean sovereignty by Japan. No attention was paid by The Hague Conference to the protest. But newspaper comment was wide-spread and favorable to the Koreans. The resentment of the Japanese was aroused. The emperor was compelled to disown the mission, to condemn its members to death, and then to abdicate. This caused an uprising in Seoul. Japanese were killed in the streets. The army of occupation retaliated by shooting down hundreds of Koreans. After a month of fighting in the provinces, organized resistance ended. But individual murders continued. The hatred of everything Japanese was so strong that Marquis Ito had to advise against immigration from Japan. During the next year, twelve thousand insurgents were killed by the Japanese with a loss of less than two hundred

men. From a military standpoint, the situation of the Koreans was hopeless. But they continued their agitation. The remarkable increase in converts to Christianity led the Japanese Government to suspect that the revolutionaries were using the new religion as a cloak for conspiracy.

Korean secret societies, composed of political refugees, kept up the spirit of protest abroad and did not hesitate to use violent means to prevent their cause from being forgotten. In 1908, Mr. Stevens, an adviser of the Japanese Government, was murdered by two Koreans at San Francisco because he gave out an interview commending the work of Japan in Korea. In 1909, when Prince (formerly Marquis) Ito left Korea, he was murdered at Harbin. In December of the same year, an attempt was made to assassinate the Korean Premier, who had declared that Japanese domination was "inevitable." Although they suppressed every movement ruthlessly, the Japanese had a large insurrection on their hands in the summer of 1909. Before the end of 1909, Japan abandoned as hopeless the policy of reconciliation and decided that the only means of keeping control of Korea was annexation pure and simple.

In May, 1910, General Terauchi was appointed

Resident-General at Seoul. He went to Korea with the mandate to annex the country. Japan had promised to maintain the independence and integrity of Korea. But she knew there would be no opposition from the European powers if she could come to an agreement with Russia. For all the powers were in possession of colonial titles acquired by disregard of treaty obligations. No time would be wasted by the pot calling the kettle black. Japan was aware of the terms of the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian conventions. She had studied British policy in Egypt. She was conscious of her growing power. She was able to reap the fruits of her forbearance and sagacity at Portsmouth and come to an understanding with Russia about Manchuria. This enabled the withdrawal from Manchuria for use in Korea of most of her army on the continent of Asia. On August 22, 1910, the Emperor of Korea signed a new treaty recognizing the sovereignty of Japan over Korea.

The Korean minister at Petrograd, who had been unable to keep Russia from agreeing to the annexation, committed suicide. There was no organized protest in Korea. Four years of suppression had cowed the Koreans into submission.

Without arms and without friends, they could do nothing. In notifying the powers of the annexation, Japan assured them that the tariffs in force would be maintained for ten years and the international regulations for coast trade and treaty ports respected. The only exception was Masanpo, which Japan decided to close in order to make it a naval base.

The former Emperor of Korea was promised maintenance of his title and rank and continuance of the grants heretofore allowed him and his father. The two ex-emperors were to receive seven hundred and fifty thousand dollars per annum. At the same time, in order to forestall opposition and intrigue and to make it worth while for the Korean nobility to accept the new order of things, seventy-five Koreans, including five members of the former imperial family, were created peers. They received sums of money running from ten thousand dollars to a hundred thousand dollars—four to five times the amount usually granted new peers in Japan.

For ten years, Korea has been the Japanese province of Chosen. The visitor to Chosen, who knew the Korea of ante-Japanese days, is struck by the contrast. There can be no doubt about the

material evolution of Korea under the Japanese occupation. I have on my desk a copy of the last "Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen, compiled by the Government-General." It is presented "with the compliments of Field-Marshal Count Hasegawa," who succeeded Field-Marshal Count Terauchi in October, 1916. Illustrated with photographs to show the remarkable work of the Japanese administration and filled with imposing tables of statistics, the book indicates that nothing in the way of enlightened colonial administration has been neglected by the Japanese. They have built railways which represent an investment of eighty million dollars, and have constructed good roads and bridges in every province. They have established a financial system and reformed the currency, introduced schools and law-courts, and developed agriculture and forestry and trade. The section on sanitation is the most remarkable part of the report. Only in regard to education and police and criminal courts and legislation has one reason for qualifying his admiration of what Japan has accomplished.

The survey of the peninsula—an enormous task—was completed in 1918. Ports have been

modernized and railway construction pushed with astonishing rapidity. The great natural wealth of fisheries and forests is being exploited. In nine years, although the budget has been doubled, Korea stands on her own feet, independent of imperial grants. And there is something tangible and permanent to show for the money spent in the peninsula. Where irrigation difficulties have been overcome, all cleared land is under intensive cultivation. Cotton and fruit culture and stock-raising are being increased by scientific methods. Gold, iron, graphite, coal, and other mining enterprises are adding to the wealth of Korea and furnishing new opportunities for labor. The problem of rice yield has not yet been solved, but it is estimated that Korea will provide before the end of 1920 for her total salt consumption: and soya beans are being exported to Japan.

The population of Korea is about sixteen millions. The Japanese represent a little less than two per cent. Although the three hundred thousand Japanese in Korea are six times as many as when the Russo-Japanese War broke out, the hope of providing opportunities for Japanese agricultural settlement in Korea has not been

realized. In spite of extensive propaganda and the organization and subsidizing of the Oriental Development Company to encourage the emigration of farmers to Korea, most of the Japanese settle in cities and engage in trade. The failure of the emigration policy is partly due to the frequent insurrections that keep alive the intense hatred of Koreans for Japanese. The principal reason, however, is that the peninsula does not afford the attractions and advantages to new settlers expected at the time of the occupation.

Both of the deposed emperors have died. Prince Li, who succeeded to the ex-throne at the beginning of 1919, was educated in Japan and is married to a Japanese princess of the blood. In common with most of the nobility, who have been made to feel a financial and social interest in the *status quo,* he seems to have accepted the definite incorporation of his country with Japan. But the intellectual class and the masses have not become resigned to the loss of independence. A conspiracy brought to light in 1911 proved to have extensive ramifications, especially in Christian communities. The notorious trial of 1912, which resulted in the sentence of more than a hundred "rebels" to penal servitude of from five

to ten years, brought an outcry from missionary circles, given wide publicity in Europe and America. The missionaries—and other foreigners—declared that the prisoners had been tortured in preliminary examination, and remonstrated against the unfairness of the trial. In the autumn of 1914, a Korean secret society at Shanghai endeavored to foment a new revolution. The plan was discovered by the police before it had grown to serious proportions.

During the world war, the Koreans kept quiet. Like the Egyptians, they refused to lend themselves to German intrigues, but looked forward to the Peace Conference for the remedying of the injustice done to them. They were inspired by the promises of Entente statesmen that the war against Germany was being fought to liberate all small nations from foreign masters and they were encouraged by the idealism of President Wilson. When the United States, followed by China and Siam, entered the war, the Koreans began to feel that they would not be forgotten in the formation of the society of nations.

After the armistice, the new movement for independence manifested itself at first in simple demonstrations, as in Egypt. But repression at

Seoul was as ruthless as at Cairo. The Koreans answered by formally declaring their independence at Seoul on March 1, 1919. A delegation was appointed to the Peace Conference. Koreans in America held meetings in Independence Hall, passed resolutions, and sent cablegrams to the Peace Conference.

Telegrams from Shanghai and letters from missionaries gave graphic details concerning conditions of terror in Korea in April. The reports read very much like those put out by the Egyptians—burning of villages, looting, refined cruelties, violation of women and girls, shooting down unarmed demonstrators with machine-guns. According to Japanese journals, more than eight hundred Korean students abandoned their courses at the University of Tokio in protest against the massacres. On April 14, five thousand Koreans attacked the gendarmery building at Seoul. They were literally mowed down, but kept coming in waves, driven to sacrifice themselves in a mad frenzy. The Japanese arrested Son Peuing Hui, who was head of the politico-religious association that had fomented the insurrection. On April 23, representatives from thirteen Korean provinces met at Seoul and

elected Dr. Synghman Rhee to take his place. Dr. Rhee has been a leader of Young Korea since 1894. A graduate of Harvard and Princeton, he is well known in America, where he has many warm friends.

The Koreans had no more success in gaining a hearing for their cause at Paris than at The Hague twelve years before. It became perfectly clear during the course of the Peace Conference that the Entente powers intended to apply the principles they had proclaimed only in the case of nationalities subject to their enemies, and that President Wilson had not the courage to practise what he preached.

The hope for Korea is not in the society of nations and in the enlightened conscience of the civilized world, but in the growth of democratic feeling in Japan. There is a spirit of liberalism in present-day Japan that frightens the imperialists. Viscount Kato, leader of the Kenseikai, has become an *enfant terrible,* as Gladstone was in England. In the height of the Korean agitation, he did not hesitate to say:

> The act of union between Japan and Korea cannot be set aside: but it would be dangerous for the Government to think that the Japanese people are satisfied with

things as they are. Many of our leading men have long known that reforms were necessary. The defects of Marshal Terauchi's administration have long been recognized, also the desirability of substituting a civil for a military governor. While the material prosperity of the Koreans, compared with a generation ago, is unquestioned, we must pay attention to the spiritual and intellectual needs.

The agitation in Japan forced the government to direct Governor-General Hasewega to institute on April 20 courts martial for the trial of officers and soldiers guilty of outrages against the Koreans. On May 15, the emperor presided at a meeting of the Privy Council in Tokio, which decided to revise the organic system of the Korean Government. It is declared that military rule will be abolished and a large measure of self-government granted the Koreans as soon as they abandon their agitation for complete independence. Although the official bulletin given to the press after this important meeting explained that the independence of Korea is impossible because it is "incompatible with the military defense of the Empire as well as with Japan's paramount industrial and commercial interests," Japan may in the end find that the friendship of an independent neighbor is more valuable than the hatred

of an alien race in a subjugated province. But that will not be until the Japanese are sure that no other power cherishes any longer the hope of economic and political domination in Korea. Korea lost her independence through the imperialistic ambitions of European powers in the Far East. She will regain her independence only through the definite renunciation of those ambitions.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

THE intervention of the powers to rob Japan of the fruits of her victory over China was believed by the Japanese to be due to Russia. When this belief was confirmed by the Russian penetration into Manchuria and the Liaotung peninsula, the Japanese knew they would either have to measure arms with Russia or become—together with China and Korea—vassals of Russia. The fortification of Port Arthur was a direct challenge to Japan. And the Japanese saw that the European powers, who had united to prevent the Japanese from getting a foothold in China, did not oppose effectively the ambitions of Russia. When Russia, after completing the Trans-Siberian Railway, made a settlement on the left bank of the Yalu River, in Korean territory, and secured a concession from Korea for a naval base at Masanpo, a port opposite Japan, the Japanese had to choose between fighting Russia

or allowing Russia to become the dominant power in the Far East.

The second alternative was never entertained for a moment. During the decade that followed the war with China, the Japanese strained every nerve to prepare to expel Russia from China, Manchuria, and Korea. They consented to stupendous financial sacrifices for building up their army and navy. They followed the example of Germany in realizing that military strength could not be developed apart from industrial and commercial growth. Energy, discipline, and complete sacrifice of self were the qualities needed to prepare for the great struggle. The Japanese were not found wanting.

The evolution of Japanese foreign policy in regard to China and the great powers after the Sino-Japanese War, and the attitude of Japan toward Korea, are discussed in other chapters. The scope of this chapter is limited to the direct relations between Japan and Russia.

In June, 1903, General Kuropatkin, Russian Minister of War, visited Tokio as the guest of the emperor. He was given a friendly reception. Japanese statesmen insisted strongly upon the desire of Japan to prevent war. The tone of the

Russian press, also, was moderate and friendly. But while the Russians were prodigal with assurances of admiration and friendship for Japan, words were not translated into actions. Russia continued to occupy Phyong-an Do on the Korean side of the Yalu River, to fortify Port Arthur, and to build up a Pacific fleet. The encroachments upon Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria and the provinces north of Peking were more alarming than ever.

On August 12, 1903, the Japanese ambassador at Petrograd presented a proposal for arranging the mutual interests of Russia and Japan in Manchuria and Korea. The Japanese demanded the fulfilment of the agreement Russia had signed with Japan in 1898, by which both powers recognized Korea's independence. But at the same time, Japan desired Russia to recognize the Japanese agreement with Korea of the same year, which granted Japan preferential rights for railway construction. For several months there was a deadlock in the negotiations. A conference was held in Tokio in October between the members of the Japanese cabinet and the Elder Statesmen. The latter urged the cabinet to make all possible concessions to Russia.

But public opinion in Japan was thoroughly aroused. It was felt that a continuation of negotiations indefinitely would simply mean allowing Russia more time to strengthen her naval and military position in Liao-tung and Manchuria. The proposal of the Elder Statesmen that Japan limit her demands to a pledge from Russia to respect Chinese and Korean integrity and sovereignty was considered as a makeshift to put off the evil day. The Japanese cabinet summoned Russia to recognize the independence and integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires; to admit Japan's special interests in Korea in return for Japan's admission of Russia's special interests in Manchuria; and the mutual declaration of equality of opportunity for Russia and Japan in concessions and trade in both Manchuria and Korea. November passed without an answer from Russia. On December 5, the Japanese Diet met and voted confidence in the cabinet only with the stipulation that immediate action be taken. The emperor addressed the Diet in person on December 10, declaring that his ministers had shown prudence and circumspection in the negotiations to protect the rights and interests of Japan. The Diet unanimously replied that the cabinet

was temporizing at home and neglecting opportunities abroad. The emperor immediately dissolved the Diet. It could not be concealed, however, that Russia had sent an unsatisfactory reply and that the Russian military authorities were pouring troops into Manchuria. The Japanese press called upon the government to declare war against Russia.

On December 21, Russia was asked to reconsider her reply. The answer, received on January 6, demanded recognition by Japan of Manchuria and the Liao-tung peninsula as outside the Japanese sphere of interest, and consented not to interfere with the enjoyment by Japan and other powers of treaty rights acquired within Manchuria. The establishment of foreign settlements in the province was, however, excepted: and Japan was informed that if a neutral zone were established, it must be on the Korean side of the Yalu River alone, and that Japan must promise to refrain from using any part of Korea for strategic purposes. With the single modification that she was willing to pledge herself not to act in advance of any other power in regard to settlements in Manchuria, Japan rejected the Russian proposals. Japanese statesmen may have hoped

for a further reply and new proposals from Russia. If they did, they were disappointed. On the other hand, Russian statesmen did not seem to regard their silence as making war inevitable. They affected astonishment in Petrograd when the Japanese minister demanded his passports on February 6, 1904.

A Russian official *communiqué,* given to the press on February 9, asserted the surprise of the Russian Government at the events immediately following the breaking off of diplomatic relations by Japan. The Russians tried to make it seem that they had no intention of entering into war with Japan: and that Japan was the clear aggressor. The Russian note said that the army in Manchuria numbered barely one hundred thousand. But is the man who strikes the first blow necessarily the aggressor? Should a nation, any more than an individual, be bound to wait until the enemy is ready to strike? Must aggression be limited to the use of armed force? A nation pursuing an imperialistic policy should never be surprised if another nation prefers to declare war rather than to accept a change of the economic and political *status quo* in territories where that change affects security and economic prosperity.

The day after the Japanese minister left Petrograd, Admiral Uriu appeared before the port of Chemulpo and ordered a Russian cruiser and a Russian gunboat to leave the harbor within twenty-four hours. The commanders of French, British, American, and Italian war-ships in the port protested to Admiral Uriu. By refusing to receive the protest, Admiral Uriu signified to the powers the disappearance of the last vestige of their tutelage over Japan. A new "great power" had been born in the decade following the Sino-Japanese War. If Europe and America needed a demonstration of this unpalatable fact, they were not to wait long. The two Russian war-ships made an attempt to escape. Not succeeding, they returned toward the port and sank themselves in shallow water. On the same day, the main Japanese fleet attacked the Russian fleet outside the harbor of Port Arthur, inflicted considerable damage, and forced the Russians to withdraw under the protection of the guns of the fortress. For two months, Admiral Togo kept the Russian fleet busy by repeated and daring torpedo-boat attacks. He was unsuccessful, as the Americans had been at Santiago, in trying to bottle up Port Arthur by sinking ships at the mouth of the chan-

nel. But he kept firing into the harbor and prevented the Russians from coming out. On April 13, the Russians lost two battle-ships by running into a mine field. The Russian Vladivostok squadron had succeeded in making a few raids in the Japan Sea, but could not interrupt the transport of the Japanese army into Korea.

Secure in their control of the sea by these brilliant naval operations, the Japanese occupied Korea and made the peninsula their base for attacking the Russians in Manchuria. At the end of April, the Japanese won the first victory of the war on land by crossing the Yalu River and establishing bridge-heads in Manchuria. General Kuroki ordered an immediate advance to cut off the Russians, who retreated to avoid being surrounded. Large stores fell into the hands of the Japanese. At the same time, a second Japanese army, under General Oku, landed on the Liaotung peninsula at two points on the east coast. Using his right wing as a protection, the Japanese general pushed his left wing across the peninsula to Port Adams. The railway to Port Arthur was cut. Then the Japanese marched south and occupied Dalny, on May 30, which was converted into a naval base. By this time, a third army was

formed, which, under command of General Nogi, invested Port Arthur. General Oku followed the line of the railway northward to connect his operations with those of General Kuroki, who was now firmly established west of the Yalu.

In August, as General Nogi was approaching Port Arthur by land, the Russian fleet put to sea. This movement had been intended to coincide with a sortie of the Vladivostok fleet. There was a mistake somewhere, and the Japanese were able to gain a decisive victory. Some of the Russian ships were sunk. Others fled to refuge in Chinese treaty ports, and the remnant managed to get back to Port Arthur. Three days later, the Vladivostok fleet was beaten by the Japanese in the Tsushima Straits. One cruiser was sunk, and the other two succeeded in returning to Vladivostok, but wholly disabled for further fighting. The value of these victories was incalculable. They left the Japanese admirals free to prepare for the coming of the Russian fleet from Europe. The morale of the Japanese people was strengthened. It had been a hazardous undertaking to send a large army to the mainland of Asia; and the Russians were concentrating imposing forces in Manchuria, the main theater of military opera-

tions. In number of vessels and in armament, the Russian fleets in the Far East had been superior to those of Japan. Coupled with the ships Russia was planning to send from Europe, the menace to Japan would have been exceedingly serious. But in measuring themselves on sea with the Russians, the Japanese found that they were superior in skill and courage.

Fighting from August to October was in favor of the Japanese. But they were unable to take Port Arthur, and the Russians in Manchuria, constantly reinforced, were resisting stubbornly. Although General Kuropatkin had to retreat on Mukden, he prevented attempts to surround him and retired his guns and supplies without loss.

The Japanese redoubled their efforts against Port Arthur, whose conquest was essential to them before the Russian fleet from European waters could reach the Pacific. By consenting to stupendous sacrifices, the Japanese convinced the defenders of Port Arthur that further resistance was useless. On New Year's Day, 1905, Port Arthur surrendered.

The Liao-tung peninsula and a small portion of Manchuria were now in the hands of Japan. But at the beginning of 1905, Russia had more

men and artillery and supplies in Manchuria than when the war broke out. In the early part of March, the Japanese gained a great victory over the Russians at Mukden. Had they been able to follow it up immediately, they might have brought about the surrender of the Russian armies. But they themselves had suffered heavily and were exhausted by three weeks of continuous fighting. The inability of a modern army to win a decisive victory in a pitched battle, so unmistakably demonstrated in the recent European war, was the lesson of the Battle of Mukden. Since 1914, the world has had so many similar experiences that the criticisms of Japanese failure to follow up their success, made by military writers who have commented on the Battle of Mukden, now seem unjustified. In movements affecting hundreds of thousands of men, the question of transportation alone robs the twentieth-century general of the possibility of repeating Sedan.

On October 15, 1904, Russia sent the Baltic fleet from Libau to the Pacific. After interminable delays, thirty-six Russian vessels, which had reached eastern waters in several sections, arrived off the coast of Korea on May 27, 1905. In an

action that lasted only an hour, the issue of the battle was decided. The Russian fleet scattered and tried to escape in every direction. Twenty-two of the thirty-six vessels were sunk, six were captured, six took refuge in neutral ports where they were interned, and only two reached Vladivostok. The price of the victory was three Japanese torpedo boats.

But the Japanese were not in an enviable position for forcing the end of the war on land. They captured the island of Saghalien in July and sent two armies to invest Vladivostok. Further military operations against the Russians might have led to another Mukden. But would it have been worth while to make a new effort in Manchuria without the certainty of winning a decision? On the other hand, the Russians saw that a continuation of the war might lead to the loss of Vladivostok and the entire Maritime Province without any hope of turning the fortune of arms in Manchuria. Russia was also troubled by the fear of an internal revolution. As both sides were in the mood for peace, an overture of mediation from President Roosevelt met with success. The proposal of the American Presi-

dent was made and accepted shortly after the destruction of the Russian fleet. Fighting in Manchuria ceased at the beginning of summer.

On August 9, the Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries met at Portmouth, New Hampshire. Among their stipulations, the Japanese demanded a pecuniary indemnity and the cession of Saghalien—two points on which the Russian plenipotentaries did not have power to yield. After a fortnight of debate, during which all the other conditions were agreed upon, Russia consented to compromise by ceding the southern half of Saghalien, while Japan waived her claim to an indemnity. The Treaty of Portsmouth, signed on September 5, was ratified in October by both countries.

By the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia recognized Japan's paramount interests in Korea; transferred to Japan her lease of Port Arthur and all concessions, establishments, and railway and mining rights in the Liao-tung peninsula and southern Manchuria; ceded the southern half of Saghalien; and granted fishing rights to the Japanese in the Pacific waters of Russia. There was a reciprocal undertaking to evacuate Manchuria and restore to China sovereign rights

throughout the province; to give up prisoners and pay the expenses of their maintenance during the war. An additional provision regulated the strength of the military forces Russia and Japan were to keep in Manchuria to protect the railways and other concessions.

The Japanese people, who believed themselves the unquestioned victors in the war, were deeply disappointed. Riots broke out in Tokio and elsewhere when the terms of the treaty were made public. The Japanese felt especially that the waiving of an indemnity was putting upon them the financial burden of a war they had not sought. They did not see why Russia should be allowed to retain any interests in Manchuria and be left in undisturbed possession, without restrictions, of Vladivostok.

It soon came to be admitted, however, that the prolongation of the war for the sake of an indemnity might have meant throwing good money after bad. As for Saghalien, Vladivostok, and northern Manchuria, the compromise might lead to the establishment of friendly relations with Russia. In the minds of Japanese statesmen, there was no longer reason for fearing Russia or considering Russia an enemy after Russia

had been expelled from Korea and the Liaotung peninsula, and had agreed to divide Manchuria. Japan did not covet any other Asiatic territory over which the Russian flag waved. The Maritime Province and Siberia were too cold for Japanese settlement, and could not produce rice. With fishing rights secured, what more did Japan want from Russia in Siberia?

The moderation shown by the Japanese at Portsmouth was as good politics as their remarkable forbearance during the negotiations preceding the war. In the fulfilment of the aspiration of Japan to be the dominant power in the Far East, the expulsion of Russia from Korea and the sea-coast of China was the first point gained. None could deny the legitimacy of the aspiration—if Japan were going to use her power to protect other Asiatic nations against Europe as the United States was doing in maintaining the Monroe Doctrine on behalf of other American nations. When the opportunity presented itself and when Japan, having recovered from the strain of 1904 and 1905, felt herself strong enough to hold her own once more against Europe, the turn would come of the other European powers to be ousted from China.

CHAPTER XIX

CHINA THE VICTIM OF EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM

IN the discussion and solution of no problem before the Conference of Paris were the insincerity and bad faith of the great powers more apparent than in the disposition of the Shangtung question. The facts of history were distorted. The principles for which the Entente powers and the United States declared they had fought were ignored. The powers showed their inability to rise to the high level of international morality essential for the creation of a society of nations. Instead of trying to lay the foundations of a durable peace in the Far East, the statesmen of the Entente powers and the United States decided for the continuation of a policy that has provoked several wars and given rise to injustice and oppression. For the European powers and Japan, the solution proposed for the Shangtung question was the holding fast to tradi-

tions and practices of the past. For the United States, it was the abandonment by our Government of the idealism and disinterestedness that for more than half a century have characterized American diplomacy in the Far East.

The solution of the Shangtung question incorporated in the treaty dictated to Germany is the triumph of the policy of economic exploitation through political blackmail against which John Hay and his predecessors in the American State Department struggled with skill and a large measure of success. By simply telling the story of the attitude of the powers toward China since the Sino-Japanese War, the truth of this assertion can be established.

On April 17, 1895, the Treaty of Shimonoseki ended the war between China and Japan, which was undertaken by Japan to prevent China from becoming the victim of European imperialism. China ceded the Liao-tung peninsula and the island of Formosa to Japan, agreed to pay an indemnity of a hundred and fifty million dollars and to accord commercial privileges to Japan in China. Russia thereupon induced France and Germany to join her in forbidding the execution of the treaty in so far as the Liao-tung peninsula

was concerned. Li Hung Chang, the leading statesman of China, who had been compelled to accept the responsibilities and disgrace of having signed the treaty with Japan, showed his gratitude to Russia and France by sacrificing the interests of China to a much greater extent than would have been the case had the Treaty of Shimonoseki been allowed to stand in its original form. Russia obtained the right to construct the Siberian Railway across northern Manchuria, and France a rectification of frontier in the Mekong Valley and railway and mining concessions in the Kiangsi and Yunnan provinces. Both powers were given permission to make settlements at Hangkow. Then Li Hung Chang negotiated a secret treaty at Moscow which put Russia in the place Japan hoped to have in the Liaotung peninsula, with the right to fortify Port Arthur. In return for this sacrifice, China received from Russia a loan that would pay less than half the indemnity exacted by Japan!

Great Britain protested that the territorial extension granted to France was a violation of an agreement entered into between China and Great Britain several years earlier. But instead of insisting that France should give up what

she had received from China, Great Britain forced China to make compensation by agreeing to a further extension of the frontiers of Burma.

It was after these encroachments upon Chinese sovereignty were made that Germany decided to have a finger in the pie. Using the pretext of getting satisfaction from China for the murder of two missionaries, Germany seized the Bay of Kiao-chau on the Yellow Sea side of the Shangtung peninsula. China was bullied into leasing Kiao-chau to Germany for ninety-nine years, with liberty to erect fortifications, build docks, and exercise all the rights of sovereignty. Then Germany, invoking precedents established by other powers elsewhere in China, began an economic penetration into the province of Shangtung by the usual game of railway and mining concessions. Russia and Great Britain retaliated, not by opposing Germany, but by pressing further claims at Peking. Russia secured a lease of Port Arthur, of which she was already in full occupation, and a concession for a railway from Port Arthur north through the Liao-tung peninsula to connect up with the Manchurian section of the Siberian Railway. Great Britain demanded and obtained a similar lease for Wei-hai-wei, on the north coast

of Shangtung opposite Port Arthur. When Germany penetrated Shangtung, Russia declared that she must have exclusive privileges in Manchuria, and Great Britain chose the Yangtse Valley as her preserve. France already had her concessions in the two southernmost provinces bordering Indo-China. Japan demanded exclusive privileges in the province of Fuhkien. Italy asked for a lease of a coaling-station at Sanmun, on the coast of Chekiang, together with a grant of railway and mining rights in that province. But by this time the limit of endurance was reached at Peking. Italy was bluntly refused and decided not to press the matter by force. All the other powers, already in possession of their "bits," frowned on Italy.

Space is lacking to go into the details of the scramble for concessions in China from 1896 to 1899. Peking was the center of international rivalry, where each power struggled against the others. The greed and brutality and hypocrisy of concession-hunters, officially backed by their respective governments, was an exhibition of European diplomacy that aroused the resentment of the peace-loving Chinese and contaminated the Japanese. To assert that the Germans were

alone to blame or even the first to blame, as has been so frequently done during the recent war, is to deny the facts. This statement must be made, and impartial readers referred to the history of these years, in order that the present attitude of Japanese and Chinese toward Europeans may be clear. The Japanese have no more contempt and the Chinese no more dislike for Germans than for other Europeans. All are tarred with the same brush. All have set the same example to Japan. All have acted in the same way toward China. It just happened to be Germany's turn in 1914. Let us not deceive ourselves! As for American concession-hunting in China, the difference is that the American Government never officially supported any demands and did not use economic concessions as a cloak for the extension of political influence. All the others did.

At this juncture, two forces arose to prevent the partition of China or at least the further impairment of Chinese sovereignty and economic exploitation of the country by foreigners. The first of these was the ferment of dissatisfaction among the Young Chinese of official classes and of commercial classes in the ports, who had come

under the influence of Western education and who realized the strength of Japan as opposed to the weakness of China because of Japan's admirable and successful adaptation of Western civilization. The Young Chinese believed that their country could be saved from humiliation and slavery only by the diffusion of Western education and more intimate contact with Occidentals and Occidental methods. They opposed neither missionaries nor concession-developers, and regarded treaty ports and foreign settlements and foreign-built and foreign-run railways as necessary evils—to be endured until the nation was transformed. To get rid of foreign influence—which meant virtually foreign domination—the Young Chinese realized that reforms must be introduced into the administration, an army and navy built up, a national spirit created through schools and newspapers, and eventually the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty with its military and civilian officialdom.

The other force was the reactionary element which wanted to see China undisturbed by Occidental influences. The reactionaries were not interested, as were the Young Chinese, in a strong and united China that could hold her own

with the great powers by adopting and developing the sources of strength of the modern state. They hated the foreigners because they felt instinctively that foreign control not only would limit and destroy their power and privileges, but would also provoke a movement of regeneration within China. The effort for reform, inaugurated by the Young Chinese in 1898, caused them as much alarm as the encroachments of the European powers and Japan. Unfortunately, the reactionaries made use of a powerful agency, which was successful in arousing the hatred of the common people through stirring up the fanaticism of ignorance and superstition.

The disastrous war with Japan led to the organization in 1895 of a secret anti-foreign society, I-Ho-Chuan (the righteous harmony fists). The members of this society, called Boxers by missionaries and newspapers, were deceived by the ritual of initiation to believe that they were made invulnerable to bullets or swords. Gathering in Taotist and Buddhist temples, they swore to drive the foreigner and his religion out of China. The movement spread rapidly in the northern provinces, and was helped by the affairs of Kiao-chau, Wei-hai-wei and Port Ar-

thur. The building of railways and development of mines by foreigners, and the creation of concession settlements in ports and railway centers, fanned the flame of hatred.

In 1899, Yu-Hsien, founder of the I-Ho-Chuan, became Governor of the Province of Shangtung. Almost immediately, attacks upon foreigners began. The murder of English missionaries in Shangtung brought forth a strong protest from the British, French, German, and American ministers. In spite of promises from the empress-dowager, who was all-powerful, that the guilty parties would be punished, outrages and murders became more frequent in Shangtung and in Chi-li, the province in which Peking is located. In March, 1900, another protest of the ministers, this time with the addition of the Italian minister, resulted in the appointment of Yuan-Shih-Kai as Governor of Shangtung, with orders to suppress the Boxers, and an imperial rescript to the Governor of Chi-li, denouncing by name the Boxer Society.

The empress-dowager soon showed that she was hand in glove with the Boxers. She secured from the emperor a decree stating that his health was so bad that he could not have a son, and ask-

ing the empress-dowager to select a successor to the throne. The empress-dowager named Pu Chung, son of Prince Tuan, who was a patron of the Boxer Society. The headquarters of the movement was established in May in the palace of Pu Chung.

A Boxer proclamation was issued denouncing the emperor and the mandarins as incompetent and corrupt, and declaring:

> Foreign devils have come with their doctrine of Christianity. Converts to their own Catholic and Protestant faiths have become numerous. These churches are devoid of human principles and full of cunning. They have attracted the greedy and avaricious as converts to an unlimited degree. They practice oppression and corruption until even the good officials have become covetous of foreign wealth, and are servants to the foreigners. Telegraphs and railways have been established; foreign cannon and rifles manufactured; railway engines and electric lamps the foreign devils delight in. . . . The foreigners shall be exterminated; their houses and temples shall be burned; foreign goods and property of every description shall be destroyed. The foreigners shall be extirpated, for the purpose of Heaven is determined. A clean sweep shall be made. All this shall be accomplished within three years. The wicked cannot escape the net of destruction.

Prince Tuan used very cleverly the discussion in European parliaments and press, which spoke

openly of the partition of China. He had proofs of European intentions in the successful encroachments of France, Russia, Germany, and Great Britain, and in the demand of Italy which had been put forward at Peking in a brutal and undiplomatic manner. Circulars were sent to the provincial governors of the approaching massacre of foreigners. Prince Tuan did not conceal his intention of seizing the foreign ministers at Peking and holding them as hostages until Europe consented, in his own words, to treat China "as a sealed book."

The Boxer uprising, the seriousness and imminence of which the powers had failed to appreciate, broke out in Peking on June 13, 1900. The railway connecting Peking with Tientsin was literally torn up and the telegraph poles sawed off close to the ground. All foreign property in Peking was looted. Bodies were taken out of the graves in the foreign cemeteries and burned. For several days, a massacre raged in which thousands of native Christians were slain and which ended in a fire that burned the principal shops of Peking. Prince Tuan and other members of the imperial family directed the massacre.

Rescue parties sent out by the legations saved several hundred women and children who had escaped death by hiding. All the foreigners in the city and refugees from the surrounding country were received in the legations. On June 19, the foreign ministers were informed that the powers were at war with China, and that they must leave within twenty-four hours or the government could not be responsible for their safety. As it was impossible to start out not knowing what means of transport were available and what measures had been taken to escort the foreigners to the coast, the ministers asked to be received by Prince Tuan to arrange for the departure. No reply came. The next morning, after a meeting at the French legation, the ministers decided to go in a body to make representations to the government. On the way, the German minister, Baron von Kettler, was murdered by a Manchu official in full uniform. The Chinese authorities told the ministers that they could give no guarantee of escort to Tientsin.

For two months, about six thousand foreigners and Christian refugees, of whom more than half were in the grounds of the British legation, defended themselves against the mob and against

government troops. When it was seen that the inter-allied relief column was approaching Peking, a decree was issued ordering the foreign ministers to be conducted safely to the coast "in order once more to show the tenderness of the Throne for the men from afar." But the foreigners preferred to trust to their own resources. On August 11, government troops began to bombard the British legation. The relief column reached Peking on the afternoon of August 13, just two months after the uprising was started. It was none too soon.

The relief of Peking was an international operation. The first attempt to reach Peking was made on June 10, before the troubles had broken out. But the force of bluejackets of the different navies, under Admiral Seymour, was totally inadequate. As the railways were destroyed, progress was slow, and Admiral Seymour could not break through the Chinese army. In fact, his men would have been annihilated had he not been relieved by reinforcements. An uprising broke out in Tientsin in the relief column's rear. On June 17, the ships of the great powers had to fire on and capture the Taku forts. Then Tientsin was occupied. When Admiral Sey-

mour returned to Tientsin, it was realized that an army would have to be sent to Peking. There was no news from Peking, and it was feared that all the Europeans had been massacred. The Russians had only four thousand troops within reach, and the British three thousand. Two thousand Americans were despatched from the Philippines and eight hundred French from Indo-China. The Germans, Austrians, and Italians had virtually no free effectives. Japan was called upon to save the day. She contributed ten thousand troops, half of the force which finally set out from Tientsin on August 4. It took nine days to reach Peking, and the losses of the international army were severe.

On the morning after the entry into Peking, the empress-dowager and the imperial court fled to the interior to the province of Sanshi. But the Chinese continued to resist. The Imperial City was not surrendered until August 26.

After the relief of Peking, the international troops continued to increase in number. Under the command of Count von Waldersee, the military occupation of the province of Chili was organized. But there had been a divergency of views among the powers as to the attitude to

adopt after the relief of Peking. The Russian Government, which considered that all of China north of Peking was within its sphere of influence and which had agreed to the expedition only as a measure for the relief of the legations, proposed the immediate evacuation of Peking. Japan, hostile to the principle of European intervention, insisted that the Chinese Government be invited to return to Peking immediately. The Japanese were wild with apprehension over the news that had come from Manchuria, where the Russians had taken advantage of the Boxer troubles to throw large forces into the province, attack the Chinese troops, and occupy strongly Mukden. The Russians looted the palace at Mukden and were massacring civilian Chinese. All the powers were afraid that Germany might seize the opportunity of extending her influence from Shangtung into Chi-li.

These jealousies made very acceptable the proposal of the empress-dowager, through Li Hung Chang, to conclude peace on the basis of an indemnity and reaffirmation or modification of old commercial treaties in return for the cessation of military operations and the withdrawal of foreign troops. In spite of the insistence of Russia and

Japan, the other powers participating in the international occupation refused to agree to evacuate Peking and Tientsin until peace was signed. On the contrary, they reinforced their contingents so that all the cards should not be in the hands of the Russians and Japanese.

Several months were spent in debate. On December 19, a joint note was sent to the Chinese Government, formulating the demands of the powers. The stipulations were: apology at Berlin by an imperial prince for the murder of the German minister; reparation to Japan for the murder of the chancellor of her legation; punishment of Princes Tuan and Chuang, and other instigators and leaders of the Boxers; erection of expiatory monuments in foreign cemeteries where tombs had been desecrated; permission to maintain permanent legation guards at Peking; razing of forts at Taku and between Peking and the sea, and military occupation by international troops of the Tientsin-Peking railway line; assurance that provincial governors would be held personally responsible for violation of the treaty or future anti-foreign outbreaks; revision of commercial treaties; reform of the palace system of govern-

ment at Peking, and modification of court ceremonial for the reception of foreign Ministers; any payment of indemnities to governments, corporations and missionary bodies, and individuals.

The peace protocol was signed at Peking on January 14, 1901. But when the conference began between the foreign ministers and the government to arrange for carrying into effect the terms of peace, Li Hung Chang realized the lack of agreement among the powers. There was no solidarity in negotiations. In private interviews, Li Hung Chang was able to secure a betrayal of the general interest of all by making an appeal to the special interests of each. Russia was willing to encourage Chinese resistance to the punishment clause in return for additional advantages in the Manchurian treaty she was negotiating with China. Other powers, also, gave secret instructions to their ministers not to press claims for punishment too vigorously. Sordid political and commercial considerations prevented insistence upon measures that would have been contructively helpful to China and that would have aided China to learn and profit by the lesson of the Boxer revolution.

On the other hand, all the powers with the ex-

ception of the United States were united in demanding exaggerated indemnities. By becoming creditors of the Chinese government, the powers hoped to gain further economic advantages and to have means of pressure to keep China in tutelage. In May, China was saddled with an enormous debt, to be paid off at four per cent. interest within forty years. The total interest and principal amounted to nearly a billion and a half dollars. The legation compounds in Peking were united and surrounded by a loop-holed wall. China had to agree to the permanent maintenance of this fortress by legation guards. On September 17, 1901, Peking was evacuated. The court returned on January 7, 1902.

In the meantime, the powers negotiated secretly with China and with one another to preserve advantages already acquired to advance their own schemes, and to block the schemes of others for further impairment of Chinese sovereignty and further exploitation of Chinese territory.

While the Peking negotiations were in progress, Great Britain and Germany signed an agreement to observe a common policy in China. They promised mutually to sustain the open door in

every part of Chinese territory where they could exercise their power, and not "make use of the present complication" to obtain for themselves any territorial advantages. But in case another power should obtain territorial advantages as a result of the Boxer rebellion, they agree "to come to a preliminary understanding as to steps which may have to be taken for the protection of their own interests in China." When Russia secured exclusive rights in Manchuria, Germany did not support Great Britain in her protest at Peking. On the other hand, when Germany asked China to promise not to grant any power special advantages in the Yangtse Valley, Lord Lansdowne telegraphed that Great Britain would pay no attention to any pledge of the Chinese Government by which freedom of action in the protection of British interests in the Yangtse region would be limited. A copy of this telegram was shown to the German Ambassador at London, who answered that Germany's policy was to support China in a firm refusal to part with sovereign rights in any part of the empire. And France, while refusing, as Germany had done, to join Great Britain in a protest against special privileges to Russia in Manchuria, announced that the

withdrawal of her troops from China was undertaken with the express stipulation of reserving the right to intervene militarily in China "in case the integrity of China was threatened by the aggressive action of any other power or by internal Chinese troubles."

The participation of Germany in suppressing the Boxers received more attention from the world than its importance warranted. The murder of Baron von Kettler was ample justification for Germany's particular interest in the expedition to Peking. But Germany had only a handful of soldiers available, and the appointment of Field Marshal Count von Waldersee to command the international army was due, not to German pressure or intrigue, but to the hopeless jealousy between British and Russians and Japanese. Japanese and Russians vetoed each other, and the British were heavily involved in the Boer War. The British Government, unable to send many troops and fearful of a Russian or Japanese occupation of Peking, suggested the appointment of a German in the hope that the kaiser would send a large force. He did. By the end of November, Germany had twenty thousand men in China. The official statement issued by the

German Government was dignified and reserved. It was declared that the army to be sent to China would be composed entirely of volunteers, that the purpose was to rescue Europeans in Peking and exact retribution for the murder of Baron von Kettler and other atrocities, but that the partition of China was against German policy. It was the kaiser whose theatrical pronouncements discredited the German effort. He has never lived down the speech in which he expatiated upon Attila and the Huns. The protest against the brutality of the kaiser's speech was as strong in Germany as in other countries. When German soldiers acted on the advice of the kaiser, there was sharp criticism in the Reichstag and in the press of the whole idea of the expedition and the way it had been carried out. The Germans in 1900 were ashamed of their kaiser, and did not hesitate to ridicule what they called "the Waldersee theatricals." Only the British accepted loyally the command of Field Marshal Count von Waldersee. French and Russians treated him with scant courtesy. The confiscation by German troops of astronomical instruments in the imperial palace and their conveyance to Germany did not receive the approval of the German peo-

ple. The "Norddeutscher Zeitung" declared that the German Government offered to return them, but that China declined to take them back. However that may be, the instruments remained in Germany—until the Treaty of Versailles![1]

On March 15, 1901, Chancellor von Buelow told the Reichstag that some powers pursued commercial interests and other powers played politics in China. Germany was in the first category, and for this reason the Anglo-German agreement had been signed with the hope of maintaining the integrity of China as long as possible.

[1] First at Tientsin and later at Peking, the soldiers of the international army, and their officers as well, vied with one another in looting. The stealing of the astronomical instruments stood out from other acts of brigandage because it was done officially, and the Imperial German Government was not ashamed to receive the loot. To the eternal disgrace of our Occidental civilization, however, looting was one of the features of the international intervention. American officers returning from the expedition, brought back to the United States all sorts of objects they had either themselves stolen or had purchased knowing they were loot. I once saw in the home of an American general some wonderful teak furniture concerning the origin of which the owner was reluctant to speak. In Volume II, p. 288, of Professor Johnson's "America's Foreign Relations," we read, however, that "the American troops distinguished themselves both by their efficiency and by their orderly and humane conduct, presenting a fine contrast to some of the others, who disgraced themselves by committing outrages as vile as those of the Chinese mob itself." Testimony is concordant that the American troops respected the lives and honor, if not the property, of the Chinese.

The wording of the agreement showed that it had no reference to Manchuria, where there were no German interests worth mentioning. "As regards the future of Manchuria, really, gentlemen, I can imagine nothing which we regard with more indifference. But it is our interest to see, in close coöperation with other powers, that China does not unduly diminish her resources until her debts are paid." The words of the German chancellor sum up tersely the cynical attitude of European statesmen toward China. The independence of Korea? Attacks upon Chinese rights in Manchuria? Shangtung? Wei-hai-wei? Shanghai? Hongkong? From the beginning of European encroachment in China, changed in later days largely to Japanese encroachment, European diplomacy has acted on the von Buelow principle. The other fellow's rights? Never! Our interests? Always!

Liberal circles in Great Britain felt during the siege of the legations that the delay in going to the relief of Europeans in Peking was due to the unwillingness of the other powers to allow the Japanese or the Russians to save the day. Thus the risk was run of sacrificing helpless women and children to diplomatic considerations. The full

extent of the immorality and lack of chivalry of international diplomacy was demonstrated when Indian troops, who had been despatched to protect foreigners in Shanghai, had to stay on their ships until a certain proportion of French and German troops landed.

Speaking in parliament on August 2, Sir Edward Grey declared that "the idea that China was ripe for partition and that any liberty could be taken with her was the main fault of the present trouble." The tendency to lay the blame for the Boxer uprising at the door of Germany because she had seized Kiao-chau, and thus exculpating the imperialism of the other powers, did not enter into the minds of the statesmen of the day. Sir Edward Grey did not take Germany to task when the Boxer troubles were reviewed in the House of Commons. Speaking for the British Government, Mr. Broderick paid Count von Waldersee a high tribute. He said that England's interests were often found to be running side by side with those of Germany, that the government welcomed German intervention, and he hoped that "as good comrades, Germany and England might advance together again, certainly to victory, and, let us all trust, also toward the strengthening of

the ties between that great nation and ourselves."

In the year following the Boxer uprising, Russia completed her hold on the Liao-tung peninsula and Manchuria. France and Germany refused to protest or to join with the other powers in preventing Russia from doing exactly what they themselves had several years before united with Russia in preventing Japan from accomplishing. The opposition to Russia came from Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. It led to an alliance between Great Britain and Japan that has lasted to this day. It stimulated the American Government to take the initiative in championing the integrity of China and formulating the policy of the open door, a diplomatic effort that won for the United States the affection of the Chinese nation. But neither Anglo-Japanese combined effort nor American diplomatic activity prevented Russia from accomplishing her purpose. Russian imperialism, at the expense of China and Korea, developed uninterruptedly until the menace became too great for Japan. It was checked by force of arms.

Not content with permission to construct the Trans-Siberian Railroad across Manchuria, or even to get economic and political control of the

portion of Manchuria through which the railway ran, Russia wanted all of Manchuria and the Korean and Liao-tung peninsulas. In secret negotiations with Li Hung Chang, in addition to the railway from Mukden to the point of the Liao-tung peninsula and the Port Arthur and Dalny concessions, Russia secured land for a settlement at Tientsin, on the left bank of the river Pei-ho opposite the British concession. This led to similar demands from the other powers, and Tientsin, the port at Peking, became a center of international rivalry, with the powers fighting for lands and wharves with complete disregard of Chinese sovereignty. In 1901, instead of withdrawing her troops from southern Manchuria and the province of Chili, Russia, through Li Hung Chang, tried to negotiate a separate treaty with China. Some of the powerful mandarins and public opinion in Peking, encouraged more or less openly by Great Britain and Japan, opposed the Russian demand. Then Russia presented the proposed treaty to China as an ultimatum, with a date fixed before which the terms must be accepted. The Manchurian demands were as follows: civil administration to be restored to China, but China to accept the assistance

of Russia in keeping order and Russia to maintain a military force for the protection of the Manchurian Railway; no munitions of war to be imported and no military force to be kept in Manchuria without Russia's consent; no foreigners except Russians to be employed in organizing land and sea forces in north China; Chinese officials in Manchuria and Liao-tung who prove themselves obnoxious to Russia to be dismissed; district of Kin-chau, at the northern end of the Liao-tung Gulf, to pass under Russian administration; no mining or railway concessions to be granted to foreigners in Manchuria, Mongolia, or Turkestan; indemnity for injury to Russian interests and for Russian expenses in Manchuria arising from the Boxer troubles; the damage caused to the Manchurian Railway to be compensated by granting a new concession or modifying the old one; and the concession for a new railway connecting the Manchurian Railway with the Great Wall. These demands meant virtually Russian control from Petrograd to Peking.

China resisted at first. After the protocol to settle the Boxer affair had been signed, Russia presented a new project of treaty very similar to the ultimatum. At this juncture, Li Hung

Chang died. But the Russian troops remained in Manchuria, and Russia was in a position to exercise the rights China refused to grant. The Trans-Siberian Railway was completed in November, and the Russians prepared Dalny as terminus of the Liao-tung branch. In defiance of China and the powers and in violation of their rights, the Russians remained in occupation of the treaty port of Niuchuang.

In January, 1902, Great Britain and Japan informed China that they would not assent to the concession of exclusive rights to Russians in Manchuria. Next month, the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were published, in which the integrity and independence of China and equal trade opportunities for all were assured. The United States protested vigorously at Petrograd and Peking. Russia assured the United States that equal commercial rights would be maintained within "the Russian zone." This same assurance was given to Great Britain and Japan. France did not ask for it: nor did Germany. It was no secret that French capitalists expected to draw the biggest portion of the profit from Russian exploitations in Manchuria. And Germany intended to watch closely every step in

Russian encroachment. Any additional privilege granted to Russia in Manchuria would be regarded as a precedent for demanding the same privilege in Shangtung!

A Russo-Chinese agreement was signed on April 8, 1902. Russia promised to withdraw her troops from Manchuria within eighteen months, to restore the entire Manchurian Railway to China, to entrust the guarding of the railway to Chinese troops, and to consider Manchuria as "an integral portion of the Chinese Empire." On the other hand, China was to put the executive control of the railway into Russian hands, and to grant no concessions for other railway construction in Manchuria without the consent of Russia. This was what the world knew. Russia asked for secret clauses, accompanying the agreement, by which China would grant exclusive railway and mining exploitation in Manchuria to the Russo-Chinese Bank. But the secret clauses were discovered by the other powers. The convention was signed without the secret clauses.

The railway to the tip of the Liao-tung peninsula was completed at the end of July, 1903. Russia showed the intention of not fulfilling her obligations to China. New stipulations were

made for withdrawing troops from Manchuria, which amounted to renewing the secret clauses of 1902 and to closing Manchuria, including Liaotung, to foreign trade other than Russian. The Russian ambassadors in London and Washington denied that any such negotiations were taking place. But the American minister at Peking had been able to secure proofs of Russia's bad faith. Instead of evacuating Manchuria on October 8, Russia held military and naval manœuvers at Port Arthur and reoccupied Mukden with strong forces on October 28. Admiral Alexieff gave the excuse that Russia had found it impossible to "extend civilization in Manchuria" without administering the country. At the same time, reports reached the outside world that the Russians had erected forts in northern Mongolia and were sending their agents, commercial and political, into that province. Russian engineers were surveying a railroad route in Mongolia.

Once more, as at the time of the Russian menace to Korea, China was at the parting of the ways. Yuan-Shih-Kai, who came to the front as new commander-in-chief of the Chinese Army, declared for a policy of rapprochement with Japan. He tried to get Peking to see that Russia

might fight for Manchuria. By declaring war against Russia and inviting the coöperation of Japan, China could anticipate Japanese action against Russia and save Manchuria and the Liao-tung peninsula. Yuan-Shih-Kai was not listened to. European representatives at Peking, while opposing Russia and each other, worked against any agreement between China and Japan.

The result of failure to follow Yuan-Shih-Kai's advice has been constant antagonism between China and Japan, whose real interests on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War were identical. How different might have been the history of the past fifteen years for China had she sided with Japan in the defense of her territorial integrity against *all* European encroachment! While Japan engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Russia, China remained neutral. The Chinese suffered the ignominy of neutrality with all the inconveniences of belligerency. In Manchuria, they saw their homes destroyed, their possessions subjected to requisition, and Chinese civilians forced to work for both armies. Japanese and Russians lived on the country, and finally made a peace with each other, disregarding China, and agreeing upon the division of Manchuria.

During the period between the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the Treaty of Portsmouth, the only power that sided with China was the United States. Our attitude was one of consistent idealism and disinterestedness. We opposed the disgraceful scramble for "leases" and "zones." American public opinion did not regard the encroachment of one power upon the sovereignty of China as a justification for other powers, including ourselves, following the policy we were denouncing. Is any more striking proof needed that the world is not ready for a society of nations than the unwillingness or the inability of the nations to set forth and live up to a high standard of international morality? In international relations, the powers seem determined to accept as standards of conduct the actions and policies of one another, no matter how base. One power commits an injustice against China. An outcry is raised. Then the other powers do exactly the same thing! The excuse is always either: "X did it first," or "If we did n't do it, X would."

The war with Spain, ending in the acquisition of the Philippines by the United States, brought America into the company of the Asiatic colonial powers. Our position in the Far East was

materially strengthened. The American Government felt this and determined to make its voice heard to save China from partition. When Great Britain and Russia agreed to divide China into "spheres of influence," Secretary John Hay formulated his "open-door" policy. On September 6, 1899, he invited the great powers, including Japan, to adhere to an international convention that would supersede the system of spheres of influence. No power was to have exclusive rights in any treaty port or zone; the Chinese tariff was to be administered by Chinese officials at the same rates throughout China; and there was to be no discrimination against any nation or in favor of any nation in port dues or railway rates. Only Great Britain, whose supremacy in Chinese trade had long been secured, accepted and approved the scheme. Mr. Hay insisted upon definite replies. Then came the Boxer rebellion, which not only saved the powers from taking a definite stand for or against "the open door," but enabled them to defeat Mr. Hay's initiative. The United States declined to participate in the shelling of the Taku forts, and showed reluctance in the famous Peking relief expedition. There is no doubt that the action of the

international squadron did much to aggravate the Boxer troubles. All the powers showed too great alacrity to take advantage of the situation created by the anti-foreign outbreak. Instead of making an honest effort to establish the causes of the uprising and to allay the agitation by assuring the Chinese of their good-will and good intentions politically toward China, the powers acted as if they wanted the disorder to increase to the point where intervention would be justified. The propaganda in the European press was very much like that which later appeared in regard to Fez when the French were seeking for a means to circumvent the Act of Algeciras, and the reports circulated about Cairo when Great Britain wanted to hasten the acknowledgment by her allies of the protectorate over Egypt before a peace treaty was presented to Germany. When the United States finally decided to participate in the expedition, Secretary Hay declared, on July 3, 1900: "The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly Powers by treaty and international law,

and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

After the Boxer uprising, the United States dissented from the exaggerated indemnity demands put forth by Germany, France, and Russia. Secretary Hay saw clearly that the object of these demands was to make China bankrupt and to give a pretext for seizing territory in the place of money. Great Britain, who already had her well-developed ports in China, had every reason for supporting the American position. Japan, whose interest was to prevent one and all of the European powers from getting a hold on China, sided also with the United States. The final amount of indemnity agreed upon, however, was so far in excess of the losses incurred that the United States refused to accept more than half of the amount allotted to her.

But Secretary Hay failed in preventing Russia from closing the door in Manchuria, and after the Russo-Japanese War, when Russia was limited to northern Manchuria, Mr. Hay's successor, Secretary Root, protested in vain against the surrender by China of her right of control over the municipalities of northern Manchuria.

In December, 1909, a third American Secretary of State tried by diplomatic means to restore Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria and thus secure equal privileges for the trade of other powers in Liao-tung and Manchuria. Mr. Knox proposed that the railways be turned back to the Chinese Government, and that their management be freed from Russian and Japanese influences, which were discriminating against American trade. The Japanese and Russian Governments rejected this proposal and compelled China to cancel a concession for a railway in northern Manchuria that had been granted to a British-American syndicate. This latter act especially was a failure for American prestige, because Secretary Knox had asserted that the syndicate would have the complete diplomatic backing of the American Government as a test to establish the open door once more in Manchuria.

Several Chinese statesmen, who had an active part in the affairs of their country during the years between the Boxer uprising and the Revolution of 1911, have described to me graphically the growing feeling of despair and resentment among educated Chinese over the exploitation of their country by the European powers and Japan,

They have confessed to me also their lack of faith in the promises of the United States to give effective aid to China. "You talk much: you do nothing," was the laconic way in which a Chinese delegate to the Conference of Paris expressed his opinion of American diplomacy. To prove his statement, he gave me an illuminating review of the notes of Secretaries Hay and Root, and explained how the Chinese felt about our supineness after Secretary Knox had openly announced "the determination of the American Government" to secure the neutralization of the Manchurian Railway. During the recent war, the United States promised to loan China money to send troops to Europe. After having given the promise, the American Government yielded to the pressure of the diplomacy of our allies, who did not want active Chinese participation on the field of battle, and broke faith with China. During the Peace Conference, the Chinese delegates say they received the solemn assurance from President Wilson that he would not consent to yield "one iota" in the application of the principle that no territories should change political sovereignty without the manifest will of their inhabitants. After the Shangtung decision, which violated this state-

ment, had already been made, Secretary Lansing (who was of course unaware of the President's surrender) told one of the Chinese delegates that the Japanese demand in regard to Shangtung would not be agreed to by the United States.

Threatened by the European powers and Japan, seeing the resources of their country pass into the hands of foreigners, realizing that their future was being mortgaged, patriotic Chinese at home and abroad decided that the only way to save China was the complete reform of the country along the lines that Japan had accomplished. The movement for reform and change gained ground rapidly after the Russo-Japanese War. An imperial commission, sent to study the representative systems of government in foreign countries, made a report that led to the edict of September 1, 1906. The edict promised a constitution with universal suffrage, but wisely declared the necessity of first reforming the administrative system, revising the laws and court procedure, encouraging education, regulating finances and reorganizing the army and gendarmery. Great progress was made in the autumn of 1906. Fifteen universities were established and public schools opened for girls. Thirteen thou-

sand students went to Japan and several thousand more to Europe and to the United States. Two important facts mark the seriousness of the change that was taking place. The first was the promulgation of the edict gradually abolishing the production and sale of opium in ten years. The second was the beginning of xenophobia among the intellectual classes—a symptom invariably accompanying national movements. After several years of agitation, China launched upon the supreme effort to save her unity. Old institutions were swept away. China astonished the world by becoming a republic.

CHAPTER XX

CHINA BECOMES A REPUBLIC

UNTIL our traders began to exploit China and sought the support of statesmen and diplomatists, the Chinese Empire, as a political organism in the sense we Occidentals understand a state, did not exist. We had to have a central authority from which we could wring concessions and which we could hold responsible for protecting those of us who penetrated the seclusion of China for the purpose of filling our pockets. At the time of the opium war and of the Anglo-French Expedition to Peking, the Manchu Dynasty had moral and cultural rather than political authority. In a vast country where communications were slow and difficult administrative authority was in the hands of provincial viceroys. The viceroys in turn were limited in the exercise of power. They were strong or weak according to their personal ability and the

physical features of the provinces they governed. Local autonomy was due to circumstances that never changed, not to pressure of peoples upon rulers.

Absence of caste spirit, feudal privileges, political prerogatives based on heredity, and conditions analagous to those of European and American economic and political evolution, have made it difficult for us to comprehend Chinese history and institutions. Communities did not have to come together for the purpose of defending their lives and homes and economic interests against invaders of another race. Nor did the Chinese awaken to national feeling and political solidarity under the pressure of seeking markets abroad for what they produced. China was a civilization, not a nation. Until European imperialism troubled China and inspired and contaminated Japan, the Chinese needed no army and navy to defend common interests. The imperial throne was a symbol. Statesmen and diplomats were non-existent.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the intervention of European powers in China led to a counter-intervention of Japan. The Manchu Government at Peking was forced

to speak for the Chinese people. The Chinese woke up from the seclusion of centuries to find themselves involved in debts and concessions and foreign wars—all within the space of a few decades. Great Britain, Russia, and France, installed in neighboring countries, began to encroach upon Chinese provinces. Followed by Portugal, Germany, and Italy, they seized ports, bombarded undefended cities, landed troops, and mapped out spheres of influence. They imposed the principle of extra-territoriality in half a hundred places, the term "treaty port" meaning often an inland city. Then Japan entered the game. By looking to Peking to represent and bind and be responsible for all China, the great powers at first acted in ignorance. Later, when they realized the nature of the imperial institution, they still refused to accept the difference between the Chinese and the European conception of statehood. They insisted upon the authority and responsibility of the imperial throne. In order to clothe their predatory schemes with a semblance of legality, they regarded China as a united and cohesive state at the very moment they were conspiring against Chinese unity.

The story of the dealings of Europe and Japan

with China is told in other chapters, where foreign aggression is set forth to explain the political evolution of Japan, the policies of Russia and Germany and France and Great Britain in the Far East, and the international aspects of the Boxer uprising. But we cannot understand the phenomenon of the birth of the Chinese Republic, involving the disappearance of the Manchus and the confusing years of *coups d'état* and civil war, without emphasizing again the successive attacks of the great powers upon Chinese territorial and political integrity and their attempt to enslave China economically by loans and concessions. If the Manchu Dynasty had profited by its opportunity to make the throne the rallying-point of successful resistance against all the powers, there would have been no Republican movement of irresistible appeal. But the weak and corrupt officials at Peking, tolerated in the old days, came to be regarded as the instruments of the "foreign devils." And they were. So the Manchu Dynasty was doomed. What we have witnessed during the last decade is the transformation of a civilization into a nation. China—the state—was born. It was not political evolution from imperial to republican institutions.

It was the awakening to national consciousness of the most numerous race in the world.

The revolution of 1911 was preceded by unmistakable symptoms of the new spirit in China. Through the concessions and the opening of more "treaty ports" and the increase of taxation, the Chinese of the provinces began to realize willy-nilly that the foreigners were insisting that Peking exercise the prerogative of speaking for China—but in a sense inimical to the interests of China. The great powers were demanding that the central government assume all the rights of sovereignty and exercise direct administrative control over the provinces in order that the rights of sovereignty and administrative control be transferred to them! This was the lesson of the diplomatic activity of Great Britain and Russia and France, of Germany's entrance into Far Eastern affairs, of Japan's "defense of China," of the settlement after the Boxer uprising. If the Peking Government was to be able to pledge the resources of China for the payment of interest on loans and indemnities, to cede ports and whole provinces to foreigners, to open the door wide to foreign exploitation, it was high time that the Chinese race became the Chinese nation

and banded together to defend its economic interests by asserting its political sovereignty. The great powers wanted to regard China as a state in order to mulct China. China decided to become a state to frustrate the schemes of the conspirators. Hence the symptoms that foreshadowed the transformation of China from an Oriental civilization into an Occidental state.

The first symptom was interest in military training. In spite of increased taxation, public opinion supported the raising of armies. Force must be met with force. Imperceptibly the Chinese began to learn how to fight as the "foreign devils" fought, and to gather the means of fighting. Long ago, General Gordon had declared his admiration of the fighting qualities of the Chinese, and their amenability to discipline. But the profession of arms, because it was superfluous, had not appealed to the people. And there was no necessity of training fighting-men in the Occidental fashion, and to use Occidental weapons. But at the end of the nineteenth century, provincial viceroys discovered that it was easy to get recruits—recruits enthusiastic about drilling, recruits who could learn in a short time the infantry and artillery tricks of the foreigners.

After the Boxer uprising, military preparation was intensified. Military drill was introduced into the curriculum of schools. Sons of princes and nobles were encouraged to enter the army. In Shanghai and other centers, where the people had come into actual contact with foreigners and where they had seen—and sometimes suffered from—foreign troops, recruiting for the army brought marvelous results. In the autumn of 1906, after the reform edicts had been promulgated, in one month more young men offered themselves for military service than had been the previous existing strength of the Chinese Army. The manufacture of munitions of war became an industry in almost every provincial capital. Small arms and ammunition took a prominent place in imports—to the delight of European traders. An illustration of the military potentiality of China was afforded by the effort of Yuan-Shih-Kai during the five years he was Minister of the Army Reorganization Council, a position he filled simultaneously with that of metropolitan viceroy. Yuan-Shih-Kai succeeded in raising and equipping six infantry divisions in North China, the leadership of which made him a powerful factor in the empire. At

the same time, he put through a plan of army reorganization in the provinces that unfortunately awakened the jealousy of rivals, who conspired for his dismissal. But the ball had been started rolling.

The second symptom was interest in administrative, financial, educational, and social reforms. The edict of September 1, 1906, followed by changes in the administration in November, marked the beginning of the effort to convert China into a state along Occidental lines. China had never before been faced with the necessity of raising enormous sums of money for a central government to pay out. The Chinese had never before seen foreigners appear in the ports, on river banks, and in the provinces with authority from Peking to seize land and take over its administration. Just as in military affairs the Chinese woke up to the imperative necessity of having to meet force with force, so in administrative and financial affairs they began to realize that the millenia of *laisser-faire* were over. The struggle for existence against the foreigner, including the Japanese neighbor, called for learning how to do things as they were done elsewhere in the world. Cutting off pig-tails, abandoning

baby shoes for women, revising the examination system for civil service, going abroad or to foreign institutions to study, founding newspapers by the thousand, exhibiting sudden jealousy over the maintenance of Chinese sovereignty in Tibet and Mongolia, clamoring for universal suffrage and representative government, recognizing the equality of womanhood—all these miracles are commented upon in books on twentieth-century China as evidences of the religious and cultural influence of Occidental civilization upon the Chinese. Nonsense! The influence has been political and economic. The Chinese, like the Japanese, have imitated us and adopted our institutions because we forced them to do so. Far from believing in the superiority of the new ways, they are filled with misgivings. Witness the edict of December 31, 1906, which raised Confucius to the same rank as Heaven and Earth.

The third symptom was the determination to get rid of opium. This was a feature of the September, 1906, reforms, and the opium dens of Peking were closed on the day of the elevation of Confucius. The edict concerning opium provided for the abolition of its use in ten years. All officials, except those of the palace and the very

old, were commanded to abandon the habit. For several years Chinese showed continued interest and energy in suppressing the growth of the poppy and the use of opium. But the action of provincial authorities differed widely. Some were thorough, others supine. The Chinese crusade was greatly helped by the generous attitude of the Government of India and by the closing of opium dens in Hongkong and in foreign settlements. China had the loyal coöperation of the European powers and the United States. When one considers that opium furnished nearly a quarter of the revenues of Hongkong and more than half of those of Singapore and the Straits Settlements, and six per cent. of the entire revenues of India, the attitude of the British authorities—who had to contend with powerful local opposition in the colonies—is worthy of the highest praise. Great Britain, in answer to the request of China, agreed to suppress the importation of opium into China one tenth each year, beginning in 1908, until the complete extinction of the trade in 1917. There was to be an experimental period of three years, and the British promise was contingent upon the success of China in curtailing the culture of opium one tenth each

year. In 1911, Great Britain offered to shorten the period of ten years by stopping importation entirely as soon as China stopped production entirely, and by tripling the import tax against China's tripling the production tax. Following this new agreement, other powers agreed to refuse the right to their subjects to deal in opium in the treaty ports, to receive other opium than the certified Indian product, and to suppress rigorously contraband for transit across their territories. An opium convention was signed by twelve powers on January 23, 1912, at The Hague. A second Hague Convention met in the summer of 1913. As far as importation into China goes, the Chinese have nothing to complain of in the attitude of the powers. The opium question has become an internal Chinese problem. Owing to the civil war, it is not yet solved. But the Chinese have rid themselves of one of the most baneful and corrupting aspects of European trade through treaty ports.

The fourth symptom was the growing manifestation of hostility to foreigners. This was no longer confined to reactionaries and the ignorant. It could no longer be explained by imputing anti-foreign agitation to officials who resented the di-

minishing of their ability to graft, to villagers who did not like missionaries for various reasons, and to peasants the graves of whose ancestors were being disturbed by railway construction. The Chinese educated abroad were returning in great numbers to point out to their fellow-countrymen the shame of being exploited economically and of not being masters in their own house. Why should foreigners be given exceptional privileges in China when humiliating restrictions were laid down for the entry of Chinamen into the United States and many parts of the British Empire? Why should coolies, hired like cattle and transported like cattle, be shut up like slaves or criminals in South African mining-camps? Anti-American feeling began to spread in South China. American goods were boycotted. The Chinese Government made representations at Washington, similar to those of the Japanese Government, regarding our immigration laws, and to Great Britain concerning the treatment of Chinese in South Africa. For the first time in history, China threatened reprisals if Chinese subjects and Chinese interests were not given full and courteous attention by governments that had always demanded in China scrupulous re-

spect for treaty rights, privileges, and concessions acquired by violence or dubious diplomatic means. It was impossible for an intelligent Chinaman to travel abroad or study in a foreign institution in China without becoming a hater of foreigners. How could it be otherwise? It used to be that we did not treat the Chinese badly and try to exploit them and apply to them the principle of might makes right, or at least that the Chinese, not having traveled or not having found out by reading our conception—*for ourselves*—of what constitute inalienable individual and national human rights, did not realize how badly we were treating them.

Xenophobia, instead of being condemned and denounced, ought to be regarded as an encouraging sign in China of the twentieth century. For xenophobia in the Chinese means self-respect and an intelligent conception of the obligations and privileges of nationhood. Xenophobia will grow in China as rapidly as education spreads and intercourse increases with the outside world. And it will not die out until we are ready to apply the Golden Rule in our dealings with China and the Chinese.

Concentration of power in the hands of the

imperial government, which began in 1907, led immediately to a movement for democratic control, and the primary reason given by leaders in the agitation in all the provinces for the overthrow of autocracy was that the establishment of representative government at Peking was the only means to resist the development of concessions and the encroachment of European powers and Japan upon Chinese sovereignty. Throughout China, temples were converted into schools. At every meeting to support the program of reforms and to advocate a constitutional system of government, women participated, and the resolutions voted contained a paragraph calling upon Peking to resist the demands for favors of all foreign governments. At a great public meeting in Canton, there was a protest against British vessels of war doing police work in Chinese waters. In 1908, the leaders of the constitutional movement promised that success would result in the control of all railways and mines by Chinese, and the abolition of Russian and Japanese right to administration and jurisdiction in Manchuria. The empress and the old empress dowager both died in November. The new emperor was only five years old. His father, Prince Chun, himself a

very young and inexperienced man, was named regent. Yuan-Shih-Kai, who had reorganized the army and was in charge of the drafting of a constitution, succumbed to the intrigues of the old nobility.

The first step toward constitutional government was the convening of an imperial assembly on October 3, 1910. Of the two hundred members, one half were Manchus—imperial princes or dukes, clansmen, hereditary nobles, high functionaries, and great landowners. The other half were members of provincial assemblies chosen by the viceroys. The imperial assembly, under the influence of the demand of the provincial assemblies for parliamentary government, urged the regent to convene a national parliament at an early date. The government, which had at first decided upon 1917 as the earliest possible date for putting into effect constitutional changes, compromised. On November 4, 1910, an edict appeared promising the inauguration of the parliament after three years. The edict contained provisions for the constitution of the cabinet and parliament and regulations for election. The assembly, not satisfied, insisted on a much earlier date. At the same time, the government was

warned against sanctioning a foreign loan and against granting further concessions to foreigners.

Under pressure of foreign diplomats and foreign financiers, the imperial government did not listen to the warning. This was the direct cause of the revolution that led to China becoming a constitutional state as a republic rather than as an empire. An epidemic of bubonic plague was taken advantage of by Russia and Japan to get a Chinese and an international acknowledgment of their sovereignty and spheres of influence in Manchuria. The Chinese became thoroughly alarmed when Russia established consulates in towns where importance of trade was no excuse, when Mongol princes visited Petrograd, and when Peking refused to allow the viceroy of Yunnan to take measures to prevent the British from extending the frontier of Burma The last straw was the signing of railway agreements with foreign financiers, and the borrowing of money from a foreign group for currency reform and industrial enterprises in Manchuria. The revolution broke out in South China. Manchu garrisons were massacred.

Yuan-Shih-Kai, who was leading successfully

an army against the revolutionaries, had to be recalled to Peking to assume the premiership. But neither his military nor political ability could save the Manchu Dynasty. Province after province went over to the revolution. The admiral of the Yangtse fleet adhered to the revolution. Yuan-Shih-Kai failed in his attempt to form a coalition cabinet. Some of those whom he asked to join him, such as Wu Ting Fang, former Minister to the United States, responded by becoming members of the Republican government that had been proclaimed at Shanghai. At the beginning of December, the regent resigned. Yuan-Shih-Kai agreed to an armistice and proposed federal government for China. The revolutionaries, however, insisted that the Manchu Dynasty abdicate and the republic be proclaimed. On the last day of the year, Dr. Sun Yat Sen, organizer of the revolution, who had lived for fourteen years in exile and had just returned, was unanimously elected president at Shanghai. On January 5, 1912, a manifesto to the foreign powers proclaimed the establishment of the republic. Two weeks later, the success of the movement was assured by the splendid spirit of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, who offered to resign the presi-

dency in favor of Yuan-Shih-Kai, if the emperor abdicated and all the provinces agreed.

With the diplomats looking on bewildered, the revolution marched apace. On February 12, the emperor signed three edicts, abdicating, creating a constitutional republic, and granting full power to Yuan-Shih-Kai to establish a provisional government in conjunction with the revolutionaries. On February 17, Yuan-Shih-Kai was elected provisional president by the representatives of seventeen provinces, and the Western calendar adopted. On March 16, Yuan-Shih-Kai was inaugurated. He promised to develop a republic and create the nation from the five races—Chinese, Manchu, Mongol, Mohammedan, and Tibetan—symbolized in the stripes of the Republican flag. On April 1, Sun Yat Sen and the members of his cabinet gave up their seals of office, and agreed to Peking instead of Nanking as seat of government. Parliament was to be summoned within six months.

Public opinion in America and Europe and in Japan was far from being hostile to the Chinese Republic. As in the case of the establishment of a constitutional régime in Turkey three years earlier, press comment was universally sympa-

thetic. But foreigners who were in business in China and the European diplomats in the Far East had a totally different attitude. They influenced their governments not to recognize the republic and frustrated the effort of Yuan-Shih-Kai to float a foreign loan in any other way than through legation channels. The formation of an army was not looked upon with favor by Russia and Japan. When these two nations joined the six-power group, they stipulated that China should not spend more than one twentieth of the money she borrowed for military purposes. The Republican government gave European diplomacy a terrible jolt by negotiating a loan of ten million pounds with a private British firm on easier terms than those laid down by the six-power group. The foreign ministers at Peking protested. Owing to the Boxer indemnity, they held the whip hand over China. At the same time, the Russian and British Foreign Offices were highly indignant because the new government refused to admit the thesis that Mongolia and Tibet were "practically independent"—which meant that these two provinces were sufficiently detached from China to be attached to the Russian and British empires.

Elections were held in January, 1913. The parliament was inaugurated on April 8 at Peking. Five hundred out of five hundred and ninety-six representatives, and one hundred and seventy-seven out of two hundred and seventy-four senators, were present. Never in history had such a large body of delegates of the Chinese provinces met together. It would have been surprising had difficulties not arisen. From the beginning, Yuan-Shih-Kai met with opposition from his old enemies, the original revolutionaries, and it was not long before a revolt broke out in the Yangtse Valley which spread in the South, and at the head of which were Dr. Sun Yat Sen and others of the first Canton government. Perhaps this was in the nature of things. But much of Yuan-Shih-Kai's trouble would have been averted had not European intrigues continued at Peking.

The powers backed their financiers in imposing a large loan from a consortium of banks, which was secured by mortgaging the salt revenues and the future surplus of maritime customs. It was stipulated that the foreign interests should have inspectors and advisers in various departments of the Ministry of Finance. The

United States was the only government to recognize officially Yuan-Shih-Kai.

The new revolt was put down before the end of summer. In the presidential election, held in October, Yuan was overwhelmingly chosen president for five years. In November, when Parliament was considering limiting the power of the president, Yuan-Shih-Kai dissolved the Southern Party, most of whom were his bitter opponents, and declared their seats vacant. The members excluded were nearly half of the senators and little more than half of the representatives. On January 11, 1914, Yuan-Shih-Kai dissolved the parliament. A committee appointed by him to draft a constitution proposed a one-chamber parliament, the abolition of the cabinet, and the substitution of the premier by a Secretary of State, who would act under the direct orders of the president. The new assembly was not to be strictly representative nor to have full powers.

When the European War broke out, Yuan-Shih-Kai was the dictator of China, although his authority was by no means recognized everywhere. He had against him the exiled revolutionaries and the Manchu conspirators—the two extremes. He was facing the serious uprising

of the mysterious leader who was known as the White Wolf. He had been struggling against the intrigues of Russia in Mongolia, of Great Britain in Tibet and Yunnan, and of Japan in southern Manchuria. He had to accept the unpopularity of increasing taxation to meet obligations to foreign powers, and of enforcing respect for concessions. After Japan entered the war, Yuan-Shih-Kai was confronted with a new situation due to the substitution of Japan for Germany in the Shangtung peninsula.

In June, 1915, President Yuan-Shih-Kai issued a manifesto on his negotiations with Japan. He admitted that China had suffered by the concessions in Manchuria and Mongolia, and was called upon to suffer a more serious menace than Germany had been from the fact that Japan was now installed on both sides of the capital. He expressed sorrow and shame for the humiliation the country had been forced to bear. But in view of the political weakness of the Chinese people, none of these abdications of sovereignty and impairment of national interests had been possible to avoid. A spirit of solidarity must be created. The people must work together for reforms. When China became a strong nation, wrongs

would be righted. In the last months of 1915, in spite of the virtual veto of the Entente powers, the Council of State, after a dubious referendum to the provinces, formally asked Yuan-Shih-Kai to become Emperor of China. The president consented. This led to a new revolt. On December 26, 1915, the province of Yunnan declared its independence from China. The coronation was fixed for February 9, 1916, but at the end of January, Yuan-Shih-Kai announced the indefinite postponement of the inauguration of the monarchy. This did not calm the rebels. By the end of April, nearly all of South China—seven provinces—had separated from Peking. The movement kept spreading in spite of Yuan-Shih-Kai's declaration that the scheme to re-establish the monarchy was totally abandoned.

Yuan-Shih-Kai conveniently died on June 6. The vice-president, Li Yuan Hung, who succeeded according to the provisions of the constitution, convened the old parliament on August 2 and declared adherence to the constitution. As General Li was acceptable to the South, unity was restored.

But traces of trouble remained; for the North and the South were not harmonious on questions

of policy. Southern leaders were more liberal and radical than those of the North, as the Northern Party was recruited from military men, who had been under the training of Yuan-Shih-Kai and who believed that the first two things China had to do were to build up a large army and to organize a centralized administrative system like that of France.

Most Chinese were profoundly indifferent to the war in Europe. They had been treated so abominably by all the European powers that they could not see any great moral issue. Undoubtedly, Chinese reactionaries and military men had a certain amount of sympathy and admiration for Germany, but not any more than the similar class in Japan and Russia, both of which countries were at war with Germany. It is equally true that Chinese liberals believed in the principles proclaimed by the Entente leaders, and held imperial Germany in abhorrence. But faith in the sincerity of the Entente powers was lacking, especially in view of the fact that two members of the Entente Alliance, Russia and Japan, had been and were still doing in China exactly what they were fighting to prevent Germany from accomplishing in Europe. Without exception, an

educated Chinaman would tell you that Great Britain had one morality for Europe and another for Asia. Chinese neutrality was primarily due to skepticism, born of experience, concerning the sincerity of Entente statesmen's belief in the ideals they so loudly proclaimed.

The break between the United States and Germany changed the situation completely. The Chinese had been following closely President Wilson's speeches. The analogy between their own wrongs and those bitterly denounced by the American President, and the wonderful vista of independence that would come to China in the world-wide application of the Wilsonian principles, inspired the Chinese with the deep longing to see the triumph of the Wilsonian philosophy in international relations. It was not to be wondered at that when the United States sent a note to China advising her to take sides with the Entente powers, diplomatic relations were broken with Germany on the ground of Germany's intention to prosecute unlimited submarine warfare. That China did not follow also America's example by declaring war against Germany immediately after America had done so was due to internal considerations. The Chinese of the

South, liberals and Americanophiles as they were, did not want to strengthen the hands of the Northern Party by giving the government the opportunity of proclaiming a state of siege, which would follow the declaration of war. The Southerners, fearing the use the premier—a Northern military man—might make of his powers in war-time, asked that a new cabinet be formed, with larger representation for the South, before war was declared. The premier refused. This explains why an anti-German and pro-American parliamentary majority refused to pass the bill declaring war against Germany.

President Li dismissed the premier, believing that only by taking this step could China be brought into line with the United States and enter the European War. The Northern leaders then revolted against the president. The Southern provinces separated once more. Civil war broke out in August, 1917. After President Li restored the premier, the North declared war against Germany, although most of the Northern leaders were at heart friendly to Germany—or at least no more inimical to Germany than to Germany's enemies.

The declaration of war was illegal, as there

was no parliament in session and the whole country had not passed upon it. The Southern leaders, who were quite willing to confirm the declaration of war (they had been willing from the beginning), demanded that the old parliament should be convened once more. But the North said that this was impossible because the Southerners were opposed to the war policy. In order to legalize the declaration of war, the Peking cabinet passed a new electoral law and convoked a new parliament.

The Southern Party summoned the old parliament to meet at Canton. This action resulted in a division of China that continued throughout the war and the peace negotiations in Paris. The Southerners controlled completely the three provinces of Kwang-tung, Kwang-si, and Yunnan. These provinces acknowledged the authority of the Canton parliament alone. It has been civil war, however, in theory rather than in fact; for neither faction, as during the earlier period of conflict between North and South, has tried to conquer the other by force of arms in a serious and persistent military campaign. During the Paris Peace Conference, the two parties came together at Shanghai. They were united as far

as foreign policy is concerned. The Southerners did not weary of declaring their approval of the war against Germany; but they would not accept the illegal declaration of war, which would have meant the acknowledgment of the authority of the new Peking parliament. The Southerners have regarded the allied and associated powers as allies, and have treated the Germans in the same way as the rest of China. In order that China might appear united before Europe and America at the Peace Conference, the Peking Government gave representation to the Southerners on the delegation sent to Paris.

The success of Japan in prosecuting her claims to Shangtung at the Conference of Paris, and the disregard of the rights of China by the victorious powers, including the United States, helped greatly in bringing Northern and Southern leaders together. Peking and Canton were in harmony in the decision not to sign the Treaty of Versailles.

The fitness of the Chinese for self-government and the possibility of China becoming a united and constitutional state should not be questioned because eight years of confusion and lack of harmony have followed the proclamation of the re-

public. What government in Europe or America has not passed through initial stages of internal discord, marked by revolution, bitter parliamentary dissension, attempted secession of provinces, and civil war? The assumption of superiority by the white man in creating and maintaining the machinery of government is unfair. If we compel non-European races to erect governments patterned after our own in order to escape from our political and economic yoke, should we not give them a little time before hailing with delight their "incapacity for self-government"? Rome was not built in a day. Why China?

CHAPTER XXI

THE CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF JAPAN

THE eagerness of Orientals to learn our ways flatters the superficial Occidental observer. He misinterprets the motive. He thinks that Orientals imitate us—our institutions, our methods—because they believe in the superiority of our civilization. None makes this mistake who realizes that necessity is the mother of imitation as well as of invention. The most stupendous and admirable efforts made by humankind, collectively and individually, are subjecting the heart to the head, the instinct to the will, the innate conviction to the outward adaptation, the theory to the fact. If conformity were an act of conscience, the problems of society would disappear. We should cast off the cloak of hypocrisy.

No Oriental nation is comparable with Japan in the rapidity and success of the process of Oc-

cidentalization. We forced ourselves upon Japan less than seventy years ago. Because of their insularity, the Japanese had been able to keep secluded. Submitting to the menace of our cannon, Japan entered the family of nations. But the Japanese did not propose to have their islands become a happy hunting-ground for European and American commercial imperialism. From the day we pointed our cannon at Japan, the Japanese realized what they would have to do to save themselves from slavery. If Japan became Europeanized in two generations, it was solely to remain Japanese. This statement is not paradoxical. The Japanese followed the wise course. The possibility of resisting an enemy of superior force depends upon becoming his equal. The history of contemporary Japan—domestic and international—is the story of a nation, conscious of its material inferiority, imitating Europe and America to attain material equality in order to resist the application in Japan of the principle of European eminent domain. Never have the Japanese admitted the moral superiority of our civilization or shown any inclination to adopt our religion and our ideals. Consequently, the transformation of Japan, under European and Ameri-

can influence, is a transformation in the realm of the practical and material, and not in the realm of the moral.

The constitutional evolution of Japan is inextricably bound up with the evolution of the foreign policy of Japan. The repercussion of one upon the other has been continuous. This is not surprising when we consider that constitutionalism was born of the necessity of adopting a foreign policy, and that the miraculous economic and political changes of the past seventy years have been effected by the relations of Japan with the outside world.

The political life of Japan demonstrates that there has been no slavish imitation of Western institutions and Western practices. What has been borrowed from Europe and America has been adapted, not adopted. Two hereditary clans which survived the pressure of the shoguns began and carried through the revolutionary movement of the middle of the nineteenth century. Membership in the Shoshu and the Satsuma is a family matter. If one is not born in a clan, entrance is possible only by formal adoption or by marriage. This is the essential difference between clans and political parties. A party is a free-well associa-

tion to which one belongs by inclination or conviction or interest.

The Japanese constitution, like that of Germany, does not admit the principle of governmental responsibility. The emperor names and dismisses cabinets at will. If parliament refuses to support the government, the emperor has the right to dissolve the Chambers. Up to the present time, the general election after dissolution of parliament has invariably given a majority to the cabinet chosen by the emperor.

Until the year of the European War, the Shoshu and the Satsuma controlled cabinets. But opposition to the clans had gradually developed in parliament and press. When public opinion, formed by universal education, wider circulation of newspapers, participation in two wars and extension of suffrage, began to make itself felt in Japan, parliamentarians and publicists outside of the clans were able to form political parties along the lines of Europe and America. About 1890, parties—as distinct from and opposed to clans—came into prominence. The original political parties had decided opinions concerning the goal of constitutional life. The liberal Diyuto demanded universal suffrage and a

single Chamber. The Kaisinto, conservative and aristocratic, stood for two Chambers and limited suffrage. Both parties advocated the change in the constitution essential to their success, i.e., the establishment of the responsibility of the cabinet to parliament.

In the decade following the war with China the development of a national consciousness and a spirit of patriotism, which accepted the burden of military service and heavy taxation for the modernization and increase of armaments, made the political parties a factor to be reckoned with by the government. They could no longer be ignored, not that they had power to overthrow the clans, but that the clans needed their coöperation in rallying the nation to the support of a vigorous and prudently aggressive foreign policy. When they thus received recognition and were joined by the younger element, now fully educated, the party leaders became gradually less radical and outspoken. The basis of party life was unfortunately changed from principles to personalities. After 1900, when the qualification for voting was reduced from fifteen yen ($7.50) to ten yen ($5.00) personal direct tax per annum, resulting in tripling the electorate, this evolution

was accentuated. The Diyuto has become the Seiukai (Society of Political Friends). The Kaisinto gradually changed into the Doshikai (Society of People having the same Ideas). Recently, a fraction of the Seiukai joined the Doshikai to form the Kensenkai. There is a third party, a little more chauvinistic than the other two, known as the Kokuminto (National Party). The earlier extremists in liberalism and the theoretical socialists of the end of the nineteenth century lost their faith and abandoned politics or became conservative.

Up to the outbreak of the war with Russia, the Genro—a group of Elder Statesmen belonging to the clans—were the real rulers of Japan. They advised the emperor, and no parliament dared oppose their will. The first sign of public opinion influencing politics came during the stirring months before the declaration of war against Russia. Feeling ran high in Japan. There was a conviction that the Genro were too long-suffering, and that China was taking advantage of the forbearance of Japanese diplomacy to strengthen her navy in Asiatic waters and her army in Manchuria. The pressure of public opinion was so strong that parliament did not accept the explana-

tion in the speech from the throne. A virtual reprimand of governmental policy, as dictated by the Genro, was passed. The emperor immediately dissolved parliament. Eighteen months later, after the terrible struggle was over, the same recalcitrant spirit was manifested when the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth were published. There was serious rioting in Tokio. Parliament, press, and people united in denouncing the failure to insist upon an indemnity and the complete cession of Saghalien.

In the decade between the Russo-Japanese and European wars, the democratic evolution of Japan was greatly helped by discontent over taxation. Japan had peculiarly heavy burdens to bear as a result of the war. Added to this, statesmen were unanimous in their belief in the necessity of a substantial increase of the navy and in the maintenance of a larger army. Every year more people were reading. The influence of newspapers could not be disregarded. The first triumph of the advocates of constitutionalism came at the beginning of 1914. The clans, hitherto impeccable in financial matters, were involved in a disgraceful naval scandal. The Yamamoto ministry had to resign. A distinct break with prece-

dent was caused by the call of Marquis Okuma, who belonged to no clan, to the premiership. Marquis Okuma constituted a party cabinet. This was tolerated by the Genro, who had every interest in wishing the scandal to die down for the sake of the prestige of the clans, and who realized that a sop had to be thrown to public opinion in order to get the people to accept the program of increasing the standing army by two divisions. Although Marquis Okuma was the founder of the Kaisinto, of which the Doshikai was the successor, he did not have the whole-hearted backing of the Constitutional Party. Leaders of the Doshikai disliked the new premier because they knew he had little faith in their liberalism. However, by appointing Viscount Kato, leader of the Doshikai, as Foreign Minister, Marquis Okuma was able to form a party cabinet and carry on the government with the support of a parliamentary majority.

The test of the sincerity of Marquis Okuma came in December, 1914, when his cabinet was defeated over the army estimates. Had the premier consented to disregard parliament, the emperor and the Genro would have sustained him. But Marquis Okuma insisted on the dissolution of

parliament. In spite of the fact of his seventy-five years and a wooden leg, Marquis Okuma made speeches all over the country in support of the larger army program. He sent phonograph records to places he could not visit personally. The general election, on March 25, 1915, was a triumph for the government. In minority before the dissolution, the Ministerialists returned to Tokio with a clear majority of over forty seats.

Marquis Okuma resigned on October 3, 1916. The reason he gave was his extreme age. But it was popularly supposed that the Genro, who had tolerated the policy of party government in order to let the naval scandal blow over and win the people to the increased military and naval estimates, forced Marquis Okuma out of office. This suspicion was confirmed when the emperor refused to accept the retiring premier's suggestion that Viscount Kato succeed to the premiership. The Doshikai, Kato's party, had been returned with so substantial an increase at the last general election that the suggestion was logical if party government were to continue in Japan. The Genro went to the emperor of their own initiative and advised that Count Terauchi, Governor-General of Korea, be made premier. The appoint-

ment would be popular with the people. It would be a victory for the clans.

Count Terauchi, raised to the rank of field marshal, had military and administrative reputation. But he belonged to no party and had no parliamentary support. He chose a cabinet composed entirely of clansmen. It was a return to the old state of affairs. As soon as the new cabinet presented itself before parliament, Mr. Inukai, the veteran leader of the National Party (Kokuminto), moved a vote of lack of confidence. In combination with the Kensenkai, the motion would undoubtedly have passed. Premier Terauchi dissolved the House. In order to return to power, the Seiukai became governmental in the elections. The Okuma-Kato party was defeated. Although the Nationalists gained a few seats, the change from Kensenkai to Seiukai was sufficient to give Count Terauchi a majority. Mr. Inukai then made his peace with Count Terauchi.

The details I have given are necessary to show that the bitterness of Japanese party politics is not due to radical differences in the convictions of the leaders of the rank and file of parliament. The clans continue to control the government. The Genro have not lost their power. They took

in their sails for a couple of years because of the storm of indignation over scandals and increased taxation. But sailing became smooth again at the end of 1916. The trouble is that neither the clans nor the parties represent the great mass of the people, which has not yet made its voice heard in public affairs. Even among the educated, the democratic spirit has not permeated. Poor men, having secured a university education, are dependent upon government jobs. Merchants and manufacturers stick to traditions. No party calls forth idealism and enthusiasm and devotion by the proclamation of principles or the defense of particular interests. A keen Frenchman, M. Felicien Challaye, who went to Japan during the war to study the political situation, told me on his return that the bourgeoisie had no political convictions. A large manufacturer of Osaka said to M. Challaye: "I do not belong to any clearly defined party. I am of the party of the nation, that is to say, of the party of the Emperor. Therefore, always of the party of the Government, since it is the Emperor who chooses the Government, I naturally support the Government in power."

But a new factor has appeared in recent years,

whose influence in Japan as in China cannot be overestimated. Everybody reads the newspapers. And the newspapers, almost all of them anti-governmental, are far more radical than the parliamentarians. Two radical newspapers, the "Asahi" and the "Nishi Nishi," both with simultaneous editions at Tokio and Osaka, have each reached a daily circulation of over half a million.

A constitutional régime was established in Japan as a means of enabling the country to resist the menace of European and American encroachment. The motive of its birth has remained the keynote throughout its evolution. Japan was modernized, not to become an Occidental country or similar to an Occidental country, but to become as strong as an Occidental country. The Japanese have built upon their own foundation and have clung to their own ideas and their own civilization. As Japan emerged from her shell and became strong, she insisted with quiet dignity upon respect for her rights at home and abroad. Critics of the Japanese denounce their jingoism and imperialism. The Japanese are the Prussians of the Orient! They are imbued with militarism! They think only of conquests and world power! If we do not take our precautions in

time, they will menace us! Look at what they have done in Korea and are doing in China!

If one believes in the divine right of the white race—or a certain branch of the white race—to rule the whole world, he has reason to feel annoyed and alarmed over Japan's stupefying response to our ultimatum: "Be neighborly or be bombarded!" Did we intend to add Japan to our Asiatic trading and concession preserves? Or did we sincerely want Japan to wake up for her own sake, and for what the world could give her in exchange for what she could give the world? I fear that most of the animosity and resentment against Japan is due to the fact that the Japanese refuse to allow themselves to be exploited by us, as the other Asiatic countries have been. Instead, they have had the presumption to assume that what was happening on the mainland of Asia opposite them interested them more than it did Europe and America.

When Commodore Perry "knocked at the rusty doors of Japan and opened her to the Society of Nations," the Japanese had not forgotten their last contact with Occidental civilization three hundred years before. Jesuit missionaries, who had been hospitably received, were followed by

traders. It became evident that the Westerners were preparing to take possession of Japan. So the Jesuits were expelled by force of arms. Three hundred years of profound and uninterrupted peace had intervened between the Spanish and Dutch intrigues and the visit of Commodore Perry. All European countries were looked upon by the Japanese as predatory and unscrupulous in their dealings with Eastern races. The experience the Japanese had had with Spaniards and Dutch was being repeated in China, this time with British, French, and Russians as aggressors, at the moment Japan opened her doors to foreign trade. It is impossible to overestimate the influence upon the modern history of Japan of the opium war of 1840 and the war of 1857–1860. In the opium war, the British prevented the Chinese from curtailing the opium trade, and took Hongkong from China, thus establishing the precedent of preying upon China's weakness for territorial and economic advantages. In the war of 1857–1860, France joined Great Britain in the capture of Peking. Large indemnities were extorted from the Chinese after both wars. Japan started her modern life with the consciousness that she must strain every effort to avoid the fate

of the rest of Asia. We have seen Japan develop into a militaristic state. We have watched the anomaly of a people becoming educated and establishing institutions similar to our own, and at the same time acquiescing in a despotic form of government. The explanation is the instinct of self-preservation. For half a century, Japan lived for the day her army stormed the forts of Port Arthur and her navy swept the Russians from the Pacific.

Great Britain and Russia did not stop at Hongkong and Vladivostok. The British had designs on the Chusan Archipelago, near Shanghai. They even went to Moose Island and Port Hamilton in the channel between Korea and Japan. Russia planned to occupy Tsuhima, which commands the Korean channel. British and Russians blocked each other. But there was always the nervous feeling that the two European powers would come to an understanding or would fight for the spoils of the Pacific. No European power had any regard for the rights of Asiatics. If an Asiatic nation was helped by one power against another, it was always for a price. The most striking instance of this policy—fraught with menace for Japan—occurred when

Japan was painfully emerging from her seclusion and adjusting herself to the international morality of the world in which she was called to live. When the British and French occupied Peking in 1860, Russia helped China. But she demanded the cession of the Maritime Province. China consented. This brought the Russians to Vladivostok, and gave them the Asiatic mainland opposite Japan. Russia immediately claimed the lower half of Saghalien Island, which was historically part of Japan. Japan, still too weak to oppose Russia, waived her rights over Saghalien in exchange for the Kurile Islands.

For thirty years, Japanese statesmen devoted their energies to the material and moral development of the country. But all the time they were getting ready to contest any further effort to extend European eminent domain in eastern Asia. To prevent Korea from falling into the hands of Russia, Japan wanted China to unite with her in developing and protecting Korea as an independent nation. Unfortunately, Chinese statesmen did not realize that the interests of China were identical with those of Japan in regard to Korea and in regard to Europe. China refused Japanese coöperation in Korea on the

ground that Korea was a vassal state. Japan fought China in 1894 to prevent Korea from falling into the hands of Russia.

The terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki caused an outcry in Europe. Russia, France, and Germany united to compel Japan to reduce the indemnity and to renounce the annexation of the Liao-tung peninsula and littoral. Had this intervention been inspired by the desire to protect China, it would have been justified. It would have promoted peace in the Far East, and the intervening powers would have shown themselves the real friends of Japan. But it soon appeared that the motives that impelled the three powers to "curb Japanese imperialism" were of the basest. Russia proceeded to instal herself in Liao-tung. Germany did what she refused to allow Japan to do on the opposite peninsula of Shangtung. France negotiated with China for exclusive privileges in two southern provinces. As an eminent Japanese put it to me: "The disgusting hypocrisy of the European intervention to save China destroyed what little faith some of us had in the friendship of Europe and in European sense of justice and decency. Having completed the partition of Africa, the European

powers turned their attention toward the East. They intended to take advantage of the impotence of China, as revealed in our war, to cut up China like a watermelon."

The Japanese do not regard the war with China as a victory. They did not at the time. General Kawakami, Chief of the General Staff, called the Japanese Moltke, was guest of honor at a dinner given to celebrate the victory. Some one suggested the erection of a triumphal arch to commemorate the war. General Kawakami responded in a voice trembling with indignation: "There is no reason for that! There is no reason for that! We fought the war simply to convince China that we must go hand in hand. We have failed. In fact, our success has only helped to bring about the partitioning of China by the European thieves."

The diplomacy of the European powers in China at the end of the nineteenth century made the Japanese feel that salvation lay in the development of force to oppose force. China was unable or unwilling to resist European aggression. The European powers refused to subscribe to the American policy of open door and equal opportunity. The national safety of Japan and of the

Far East depended upon the Japanese Army and Navy. The Japanese believed that everything had to be subordinated to the responsibility they must assume of opposing the further extension of European eminent domain.[1] Japan would gladly have united with Europe and America in following the easier and more sensible path of mutual renunciation of exclusive political and commercial advantages in China and Korea. America was willing. Europe was not. If Japan has had to play Europe's game in Europe's way during the first two decades of the twentieth century, who is to blame?

As a result of her successful war with Russia, Japan became a great power. Japan owed her victory entirely to her own efforts. The United States was in sympathy with Japan in the diplomatic position Japan took at Peking before the war. But the United States exercised no strong pressure either upon Russia or Japan.

[1] The greater part of the taxation in Japan is for the interest and the amortization of war debts and especially for the maintenance of the army and the navy. Before the recent war, the Japanese were shouldering by far the heaviest tax burden in the world, one fifth of the income of the working classes going for taxes. If the League of Nations succeeds in reducing armaments, Japan will be able to divert an important part of her national income to constructive expenditures and reduce taxes substantially.

In spite of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Great Britain helped Japan only morally and financially. Japan paid a big price for her victory. And the victory was not complete. Russia remained in Manchuria: and there was no reconciliation between China and Japan. Has Japan been given full credit by the Chinese and other Asiatics for the influence of her victory over Russia upon the internal life of nations suffering from European over-lordship? Especially in China have the sacrifices of Japan borne fruit. After the Russo-Japanèse War, the Chinese began the movement to redeem their national rights which had been mortgaged to foreign powers. The example of Japan triumphing over a great European power inspired the Young Chinese to start the movement for reform that led to the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and the establishment of the republic.

While Japan was preparing to oppose the extension of European sovereignty in China and Korea, she worked quietly to rid herself of the derogations of her own sovereignty admitted in the treaties signed after the opening up of Japan. The first effort was the mission of Prince Iwakura, who went to Europe and America in 1871

to ask for a revision of the treaties. Japan demanded the recovery of complete judicial and tariff autonomy. But it was not until the year of the Sino-Japanese War that the first step in accomplishing this legitimate aspiration of a self-respecting nation was concluded. In 1894, Great Britain agreed to waive her special rights in Japan. From 1895 to 1897, the United States, Italy, Russia, Germany, France, and Austria-Hungary made similar concessions. The abandonment by the powers of what was virtually a capitulatory régime was eloquent testimony not only to the success of Japan in adapting her judicial and economic standards and methods to conform with those of European and American nations, but also to the realization of the powers that Japan had become a diplomatic force to reckon with. Less than ten years after Great Britain agreed to treat Japan as an equal, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was signed. This "agreement for guaranteeing peace in the Far East," made in 1902, was replaced by a treaty of alliance in 1905. The rapproachement proved popular in both countries and worked out to the advantage of both; for it was revised and renewed for ten years in 1911. The influence of

the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian treaties was felt almost immediately in the Far East. Japan entered into agreements with France in 1907 and with Russia in 1907 and 1910. Germany was diplomatically isolated in Asia as in Africa. When Japan entered the European war, she became an integral member of the Entente Alliance and signed the Pact of London. A closely knit convention with Russia in 1916 completed the prestige of Japan as a great power.

The diplomatic triumphs of Japan, fully as much as the wars that made them possible, encouraged Japanese imperialism. Some writers have found the source and inspiration of Japanese imperialism in the Shinto religion, and have pointed out the religious significance of the expansionist movement. The Japanese consider themselves, we are told, the chosen people, destined to enlighten, modernize, unify, protect, and liberate the other Asiatic races. In support of the thesis of the religious and mystical and racial basis of Japanese imperialism, the writings of Baron Tokutomi, editor and proprietor of the great newspaper "Kokumin," are cited. There is remarkable resemblance between his point of view and that of German imperialists.

But if Japanese imperialism has much in common with the imperialism of Germany and Italy, especially as manifested in the recent war, is it not because of similar international conditions confronting the three countries? Japan, like Germany and Italy, became a strong nation—economically and politically—after most of the world had been preëmpted by other nations. Like Germany and Italy, her population has grown by leaps and bounds. Like Germany and Italy, she needs raw materials and world markets to keep the mouths of her increasing population fed, and she needs lands for settling her overflow. Instead of being grieved and shocked that Japan should want to expand, as other nations have done, we should view with the deepest sympathy the problems confronting Japan. The causes of German imperialism have been aggravated rather than mitigated by the solution we have given to the world war. This lesson ought to teach us something in our dealings with Japan. Not until nations learn that live-and-let-live is a better policy than being a dog in the manger will there be any chance of a society of nations and a durable peace.

The menace of Japanese imperialism is a fav-

orite theme in the American press and in club conversations where an American naval officer happens to be present. The American naval officer—and the journalist as well—may be able to cite numerous facts from personal observation of the chauvinistic spirit of Japan. His warning that the Japanese are advocates of Asia for the Asiatics—meaning by that formula the hegemony of Asia for Japan—is probably true. But when the Japanophobes go to the extent of talking about a landing in California or an alliance between Japan and Mexico, the *reductio ad absurdum* has been reached. Japan has no aggressive intentions against America or Europe. The ideas of Japan about the future of Asia and the islands of the Pacific form a different problem—a totally different problem. If we expect that we Americans and Europeans are going to continue indefinitely to keep Asiatics out of our continents and out of Africa as well and at the same time pretend in most places to superior and in many places to equal rights, politically and commercially, in Asia, we shall precipitate a great struggle that may have its repercussions in our own hemisphere. The "Yellow Peril" is far from imaginary so long as Europe asserts the

right to dominate and exploit Asia. But if we reconcile ourselves to treating Asiatics equitably *in their own continent* (they do not ask more than that!), we shall not need to prepare for "the next war" with Japan. Japanese imperialism will have no longer a *raison d'être*. There never would have been any Japanese imperialism had European powers not been conscienceless hogs.

Internal signs of strong democratic evolution in Japan are encouraging. If America and Europe make a sincere effort to form a society of nations on the basis of equality, the growth of democratic feeling and liberalism in Japan will undoubtedly lead to anti-militarism. A new era will open for the Far East—an era of Korean autonomy, if not independence, and of rapproachement between Japan and China. It behooves us to study carefully recent events in Japan. We shall find in them—always provided we are willing to do our share!—the solid hope of the pacific intentions of Japan toward America and Europe.

Anti-militarism in Europe, and to a certain extent in America, finds its greatest support among the Socialists. In spite of the growth of industry and the remarkable radicalism of newspaper

thought in Japan, socialism as a party and as a creed is forbidden. To understand the rigorous taboo put upon socialist teaching, we must realize the universally respected theory of the sacrosanct character of the imperial institution. However enlightened they have become, however advanced in their thinking, the Japanese are not yet ready to give up the mikado and what he stands for. Socialist teaching, from the political point of view, cannot be other than subversive of the public order. No socialist journals or other publications are allowed in Japan. Since the hanging of Kotoku (a disciple of Krapotkin), his wife, and ten of his followers, in 1910, open and avowed socialism had not reappeared.

At the end of 1916, the democratic movement began to make rapid progress throughout Japan. Europe and America, engrossed in the struggle with Germany, have given little attention to recent changes in Japan that may affect profoundly the relations of Japan with China and with the world in general. When the expulsion of the Germans from Shangtung was followed by disasters to the Russians, Japan began to breathe more freely than at any time since she became a mod-

ern state. The collapse of Russia changed the political situation of the Far East to the advantage of Japan much more than the expulsion of German influence from China and the islands of the Pacific. Then, too, the European war was dragging on. The Japanese watched with satisfaction and delight the increasing exhaustion of Europe. All the European states were losing the flower of their manhood and piling up huge war debts. Their energies were turned from productive industries. Their shipping was being sunk by submarines or requisitioned for war purposes. This was the opportunity for Japanese commerce and shipping. It was also the first assurance Japan had ever been able to count upon that European aggression in the Far East need no longer cause fear. The people of Japan, prosperous and feeling secure, were able to begin to take internal politics seriously.

The action of the Genro in upsetting the precedent of 1914 by forcing the Terauchi cabinet from parliament gave rise to profound resentment. The general election that seemingly confirmed the return to clan supremacy in the government did not interpret public opinion. The action of the Seiukai in supporting Count Terau-

chi accounts for the failure of the election to pronounce a verdict upon the reversion to the old order. In the late summer of 1918, the Terauchi cabinet resigned in the face of the national demand for a party government. This time, unlike the Okuma experiment of 1914, all the members of the cabinet, except the Ministers of War and Marine, were party men. The new premier was leader of the majority party. Mr. Hara was the first commoner to preside over the destinies of Japan. His cabinet was certainly much less of a compromise with reactionary and imperialistic forces than its predecessors. Raised to the peerage, Viscount Hara kept his promises in regard to greater freedom of speech and of the press. In March, 1919, a new electoral law lowered the financial qualification of electors to three yen ($1.50) direct tax per annum. This has brought the number of electors to nearly three millions. If Japan is not threatened with international complications, the progressive tendencies will continue. Universal suffrage is bound to come. The aristocracy and bureaucracy, grouped around and supporting itself upon the imperial institution, will disappear. The ideal of the Japanese

is to have their emperor occupy a position similar to that of the King of England.

The possibility of rapid success is great. Once freed from the anxiety caused by European imperialism, the Japanese will be able to democratize their institutions with little difficulty. Their aristocracy is indigenous. As there were no invasions for nearly three thousand years, a conquering race or caste (like the Manchus in China) does not exist.

The military caste, Germanophile throughout the war, and the noisy imperialists have been given serious food for thought by the complete collapse of Germany. There is more inclination to put faith in the admirable Japanese characteristics of moderation and patience that have always been shown by the leaders of the nation in moments of crisis. The growth of democracy does not imply the danger of extreme nationalism. The ultras, violent in their criticism of the cautiousness of the Genro, of the persistent determination of liberals not to antagonize the European powers and America, and of the Ito-Kato policy of conciliation with Korea and China, are coming around to the idea that Japan may arrive

at her dream of the emancipation and regeneration of Asia without rattling the saber. Is another principle than that of force to rule international relations? If so, the Japanese will be the first to welcome the change. They long to devote their energies to the peaceful constitutional evolution and to the peaceful extension of their culture and commerce in the part of the world where it is natural that they should be the dominant power.

How Japan acts in the next decade depends upon the reasonableness and the good faith of the Occidental powers.

CHAPTER XXII

GERMANY IS EXPELLED FROM ASIA

IN the second decade of the German Empire, after Prince Bismarck had piloted Germany successfully through the difficult period of political and economic readjustment, the question of a place in the sun was posed. The two American continents were protected by the Monroe Doctrine. The Ottoman Empire had been granted a new lease of life by the Congress of Berlin. Australia and New Zealand and most of the islands of the world were British. Great Britain and France and Russia were in possession of every bit of land on the Continent of Asia over which European eminent domain could be extended. France had just seized Tunis and Great Britain was installing herself in Egypt. Both Occidental powers were penetrating Africa. Although Germany came in for a share in the final partition of Africa, the best parts were already preëmpted. It was the same with the is-

lands of the Pacific. In 1883 and 1884, Germany planted her flag in Togoland, Kamerun, and Southwest and East Africa. In the Pacific she gained footholds in New Guinea and an adjacent archipelago. In 1886, some of the Solomon and the Marshall Islands were occupied. The Spanish-American War, which drove Spain from the Pacific, gave Germany the opportunity of buying in 1899 the Caroline, Pelew, and Mariana Islands. An agreement was made between Great Britain and Germany (to which the United States adhered) on November 14, 1899, to establish the title of the islands of the Pacific. By this agreement Germany ceded some of the islands of the Solomon group and received a clear title to Savaii and Upolu, the largest of the Samoan Islands. The total area of these possessions was less than a hundred thousand miles, nearly three quarters of which was on the island of New Guinea. Outside of New Guinea, the population of the German possessions was scarcely fifty thousand.

The Pacific islands cost more than they brought in, afforded no opportunity for settlement and very little for trade, and interested chiefly missionaries. Their only value was for naval pur-

poses. They gave Germany places she could call her own on the path from America to Australia and from Asia to Australia. They afforded an opportunity for coaling-stations, for cable landings, and for wireless telegraphy. And that was all. But to Germany they looked important because they were all that Germany had.

As Germany was not mistress of the sea, she had no means of defending these possessions when the European war broke out. Kaiser Wilhelm's Land, on the mainland of New Guinea, was seized by the Australians at the beginning of September, 1914. New Zealand sent an expeditionary force to Samoa. The Japanese gathered in the other groups of islands. Before the end of 1914, Great Britain and Japan agreed upon the division of the booty. Samoa went to New Zealand, the German islands south of the equator to Australia, and those north of the equator to Japan. The Treaty of Versailles imposed upon the Germans the cession of all her possessions in the Pacific, which were divided among the victors in accordance with the Anglo-Japanese arrangement.

The one possession of Germany in Asia that

had intrinsic economic value was on the Shangtung peninsula in China. The story of the acquisition, development, and loss of Kiao-chau requires telling in more or less detail. For the disposition of the Shangtung lease and concessions has become a powerful bone of contention in the final settlement of the European war.

When Russia, France, and Germany intervened in 1895 to prevent the execution of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, it was agreed among them that each should be paid by China for protecting China from Japanese imperialism. Russia stepped right into the places from which Japan had been expelled. France, as she held the outlet to the sea of one whole Chinese province and a portion of another, was able to get concessions in Yunnan and Kwangsi, and intrigue peacefully for the lease of Kwang-chau-Wan, a good and convenient port. The German Asiatic squadron searched the coast of China for a naval base and harbor. An official German commission recommended the Bay of Kiao-chau on the ocean side of the Shangtung peninsula.

A most fortunate occurrence in the right place gave the excuse. In November, 1897, two German missionaries were killed in the interior of

Shangtung province. Four German men-of-war landed marines on the coast of Kiao-chau Bay and raised the German flag. After several months of negotiation, "His Majesty the Emperor of China, guided by the intention to strengthen the friendly relations between China and Germany and at the same time to increase the military readiness of the Chinese Empire" (as the first article puts it), signed a convention on March 6, 1898, leasing to Germany for ninety-nine years a zone of fifty kilometers surrounding the Bay of Kiao-chau. The lease read "that Germany, like other Powers, should hold a place on the Chinese coast for the repair and equipment of her ships, for the storage of materials and provisions for the same, and for other arrangements connected therewith." A second section of the convention gave the Germans the concession for constructing two railway lines in Shangtung Province, with mining-provisions. A third section extorted a promise from China that "if within the Province of Shangtung any matters are undertaken for which foreign assistance, whether in personnel or in capital or in material, is invited, China agrees that the German merchants shall first be asked whether they wish to

undertake the works and provide the materials." A supplementary agreement was signed on March 21, 1900, specifying the terms under which the Kiao-chau-Chinan Railway was to be built.

The idea in the minds of many Europeans and Americans that the entrance of Germany into Kiao-chau, the wringing of a lease from China, and the subsequent economic penetration of the province was a unique act, peculiarly resented by the Chinese, is far from the truth. During the past five years writers have been losing their sense of fairness, and have become special pleaders. The German leases and concessions in Shangtung are modeled upon and are not different from leases and concessions exacted by other foreign powers elsewhere in China. I have talked with numerous Chinese, including members of the government, about the way Germany entered into Shangtung and her actions in the peninsula. They are unanimous in assuring me that there is no greater resentment against the Germans than against other foreigners, and that to the Chinese, leases and concessions held by European states and European companies are regarded as having been acquired and worked in the same way. In fact, an open-minded examination of the docu-

ments submitted by the Chinese delegation to the Peace Conference leads one to believe that the Chinese had much less to complain of in regard to the Germans in Shangtung than in regard to the Russians and Japanese in Manchuria and Liao-tung.

The Germans were not oppressive masters of the natives within the leased territory. Their control led to improved sanitary conditions and to economic prosperity.[1] One of the most remarkable successes of their administration was the method they devised of collecting land-taxes through the Elders of the villages. Germany did not follow the tactics of Russia and Japan in using the railway concession as a means of permanent military control. When the railway was completed, the German troops were withdrawn. Even within the fifty-kilometer zone, Germany agreed to confine her troops, reduced to less than a thousand, to the port of Tsingtao by a definite

[1] Chinese delegates to the Peace Conference lay emphasis upon the fact that Japanese impairments of Chinese sovereignty are much more serious for the Chinese to contend with than European leaseholds and economic penetration. The standard of living of the Japanese is sufficiently like that of the Chinese to make Japanese trading and labor competition inimical to the interests of the inhabitants. Protected by their government, Japanese traders and coolies compete with Chinese. The Chinese do not have this to fear from Europeans or Americans.

agreement signed in 1905. In 1911, by the Mining Area Delimitation Agreement, Germany renounced privileges accorded in the convention of 1898. The Shangtung Mining Company relinquished all the mining-rights with the exception of two collieries and one mine.

The military efforts of the German Government were concentrated in making at Tsingtao, on the tip of the northern promontory of Kiao-chau Bay, a powerful fortress. But the idea of creating a naval base was linked from the beginning with the plan of developing a port as a commercial outlet for the whole province of Shangtung. In the fifteen years from 1899 to 1914, Tsingtao was transformed from a fishing-village into a railway terminus and port, equipped with every modern improvement and representing an investment of hundreds of millions of marks. In government buildings, warehouses, and dock facilities, Tsingtao became a model of European enterprise in the Far East.

The Pacific islands of Germany were of slight importance commercially. German colonial experiments in Africa brought forth meager fruit in proportion to the energy and money expended. It was not the same with the Kiao-chau colony.

Here Germany had one opportunity to show what she could accomplish under favorable conditions. The result was to the credit of her officials and engineers and capitalists.

In 1899 two companies were formed to finance and develop the Shangtung concessions. The Schangtung Eisenbahn Gesellschaft built and ran the Tsingtao-Chinan Railway. This line, with two small branches, is 434 kilometers long. It was completed in June, 1904. The Schangtung Bergbau Gesellschaft held the mining-concessions which consisted of the development of the Fantse and Hungshan collieries and the iron mines near Kinglinschen. This latter company was merged into the railway company in 1913. Six months before Germany lost Kiao-chau, she secured the option to finance and construct and supply materials for two lines of railway, west from Tsinan and south into Kiangsu province. In June, 1914, Germany was assured of a loan option in financing other lines in Shangtung.

Early in August, 1914, the British Government asked Japan to intervene in the war under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It was pointed out to Japan that German cruisers and armed vessels were a menace to commerce,

and that therefore it was question of "the peace of the Far East and the immediate interests of the Japanese as well as of the British Empire." Great Britain wanted German influence destroyed in China. The reward for Japan was permission to take over the German lease of Kiao-chau and the German concessions of Shangtung. Baron Kato said to parliament:

> Japan has no desire or inclination to become involved in the present conflict. But she believes she owes it to herself to be faithful to the Alliance with Great Britain and to strengthen its foundation by ensuring permanent peace in the East, and protecting the special interests of the two Allied Powers. Desiring, however, to solve the situation by pacific means, the Imperial Government has given the following advice to the German Government.

The advice was an ultimatum to Germany on August 15, 1914, asking for the immediate withdrawal of German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds from Chinese and Japanese waters, and the delivery at a date not later than September 15 of the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau to the Japanese authorities, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China. An unconditional acceptance of the "advice" was asked by noon on August 23. Germany ignored the ultimatum. What answer

could she have given? Japan had couched the ultimatum, even to the use of the word "advice," on the terms of the Russo-Franco-German ultimatum concerning the restoration of Liao-tung to China, when the three powers combined to prevent the execution of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. It took ten years for Japan to get even with Russia. After twenty years, the opportunity came to punish Germany.

On August 23, 1914, Japan declared war on Germany. The Japanese fleet blockaded Kiaochau. The Germans had only four thousand soldiers and sailors in the fortress of Tsingtao. There was no hope of relief by land or sea. The Chinese Government, although not previously consulted, saw through the Japanese game. China offered to join the Entente powers, and could very easily have undertaken the investment of Tsingtao by land. Japan did not need to send a single soldier. But the offer of China was rejected. Instead of investing the German fortress, Japan landed twenty thousand troops at Lungkow, on the northern coast of Shangtung a hundred and fifty miles away from the Germans. They were in no hurry to attack the fortress. During the month of September, the Japanese

took possession of the railway line all the way from Kiao-chau Bay to Chinan, and the German mining-properties. They occupied the principal cities of the peninsula—places that the Germans had never gone to—seized the Chinese postal and telegraph offices, and expelled the Chinese employees from the railway. The investment and capture of Tsingtao was the matter of a few days. But the bombardment and assault of the forts, in which fifteen hundred British soldiers coöperated, did not occur until the end of October. In the meantime, the Japanese were thoroughly installed in one of the richest provinces of China in a way the Germans had never dreamed of.

The garrison of Tsingtao capitulated on November 7, 1914. The Japanese permitted the governor and officers to retain their swords, and when the vanquished arrived at Tokio, they were met by Japanese women who offered them flowers.

Thousands of Germans remained, however, in other parts of China. China declared war upon Germany in August, 1917. At first, the Germans were not molested. But gradually French and British diplomacy at Peking secured the in-

ternment of German subjects, the cancellation of German concessions, and the closing up of German educational and missionary establishments. After the final defeat of Germany, measures were taken to expel, by repatriation to Germany, all German subjects in China. The same disaster met German enterprises in Siam. From other parts of Asia, including the Ottoman Empire, Germans and everything German gradually disappeared.

By the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany formally renounced, not only her territorial possessions, but also her shipping and trade and missionary work in every part of Asia.

CHAPTER XXIII

JAPAN AND CHINA IN THE WORLD WAR

WHEN Japan declared war upon Russia, the United States insisted upon "the maintenance of the neutrality and integrity of China during and after the war." The Chinese were very grateful for this disinterested intervention. But, as usual, the action of the United States was limited to sending a note. We were not willing to use the only argument worth while, a show of force, to protect Chinese neutrality. The very nature of the struggle made it impossible for the belligerents to accede to the polite American request. Russia, ensconced in Manchuria, was quite ready to promise not to fight there if Japan did not attack her. But Russia was using Manchuria as a military base against Korea, and the Liao-tung peninsula as a naval base. Since the object of Japan in the war was to expel Russia from these

very places, Japan told the powers that she would have to conduct military operations in the portions of Chinese territory held by Russia. Japan pointed out to the United States that the reason she was fighting was to compel a respect of Chinese neutrality. She had always been willing to respect Chinese neutrality if Russia would do the same. She had to fight for China simply because China could not protect her own neutrality.

When Japan declared war against Germany ten years later, the same situation arose. Germany protested at Peking against the landing of troops outside the leased zone, and also against the seizure by the Japanese Army of the German railways in the Shangtung province. President Yuan sent a note to Japan and Great Britain in regard to the violation of Chinese neutrality: but he told Germany that it was impossible to prevent or oppose the action of the Japanese and the British. The Entente powers backed the Japanese contention that Japan was acting once more as the friend of China. If operations had not been undertaken against Kiao-chau, Germany would have used Kiao-chau as a naval base. The impotence of China to compel respect for her neutrality led to utter disregard of her neutrality.

After the expulsion of the Germans from the Shangtung peninsula, the Japanese installed themselves in the place of the Germans as they had done ten years before in the place of the Russians in the Liao-tung peninsula and southern Manchuria. They reopened Kiao-chau for trade on December 28, 1914. No Germans were left in the interior of the peninsula. But the Japanese continued to occupy militarily the entire German railway- and mining-concessions. China reminded Japan of the promise to restore Kiao-chau to its rightful owner. Had not the Japanese fought the Germans for that purpose? Japan answered that no promise of any kind had been given to China in this matter, but that the restoration of Chinese sovereignty was contemplated after the war. In the ultimatum to Germany, it was true that Japan had called upon Germany to evacuate the lease in order that China might enter into possession of her sovereign rights. But had Germany yielded to the ultimatum? Not at all! Japan had to fight to expel the Germans. The indirect promise in the ultimatum would have bound Japan only if Germany had turned over the lease as a result of the ultimatum.

Japan was not disposed to waste time in long diplomatic negotiations with China. The European powers were at war. The United States, from the unbroken experience of the past, could be relied upon to limit interference to an academic protest. On December 3, 1914, the Japanese minister at Peking was given the text of twenty-one demands for presentation to the Chinese Government. They were divided into five groups. Minister Hioki was told that there was to be no compromise in regard to the demands of the first four groups. He was assured, to quote his instructions, that "believing it absolutely essential for strengthening Japan's position in eastern Asia as well as for the preservation of the general interests of that region to secure China's adherence to the foregoing proposals, the Imperial Government are determined to attain this end by all means within their power." The articles of the fifth group were also to be presented as demands, but could be modified. The Japanese minister held the twenty-one demands up his sleeve for six weeks, during which the Chinese Foreign Minister kept protesting against the decision of Japan to maintain a special military zone in Shangtung and the

seizure and holding of the railway traversing the province. On January 16, 1915, the Chinese Government gave the Japanese minister a note pointing out that "two months have elapsed since the capture of Tsingtao; the basis of German military preparations has been destroyed; the troops of Great Britain have already been and those of your country are being gradually withdrawn. This shows clearly that there is no more military action in the special area. That the said area ought to be cancelled admits of no doubt. . . . As efforts have always been made to effect an amicable settlement of affairs between your country and ours, it is our earnest hope that your Government will act upon the principle of preserving peace in the Far East and maintaining international confidence and friendship."

In response, the Japanese minister presented the twenty-one demands. The first group dealt with the province of Shangtung. China was asked to agree in advance upon whatever arrangements would be made between Germany and Japan concerning "the disposition of all rights, interests, and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, pos-

sesses in relation to the province of Shangtung." Japan claimed recognition of her inheritance of German rights to finance, construct, and supply materials for railways running from Shangtung into Chili and Kiang-su, the two neighboring provinces to north and south. Group Two demanded preferential rights, interests, and privileges for Japan and Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia, most important of which was the extension to ninety-nine years of the old Russian port and railway leases. In Group Three, China was asked to agree to the exclusive exploitation by Japanese capitalists of the Han-Yeh-Ping Company, an important iron-works in the Yangtse Valley. Group Four contained the single demand of a formal declaration by China that "no bay, harbor or island along the coast of China be ceded or leased to any Power." The Fifth Group related to the employment of Japanese advisers in political and financial and military affairs; the purchase from Japan of fifty per cent. or more of her munitions of war; railway rights; Japanese missionary propaganda; and a veto power against any foreign concessions being granted in the province of Fukien.

China made a great outcry. She called the world to witness that Japan was trying to accomplish against her the very things the Entente powers, of whose alliance Japan was a member, claimed they were fighting to prevent Germany from doing to European neighbors. There was the usual mild protest from America. But the European powers, while demurring for form's sake, gave Japan secret assurance that they would not interfere with her ambitions in China. She could go ahead and treat China as she pleased, subject only to the caution of not harming French and British interests in China. Japan was urged also to come to an agreement with Russia about the spoils.

With the knowledge that the Entente powers were behind her—or that they would not oppose her—Japan cut short China's protests by an ultimatum delivered on May 7, 1915. It was modeled on the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia of the previous year. If China did not yield to all the demands of the first four groups and the Fukien demand of the fifth group in forty-eight hours, Japan would use force. The other demands of the fifth group were not insisted upon solely because some of them infringed

upon the real or fancied privileges of Japan's allies in other parts of China. Before these screws were tightened, further negotiation was required with Great Britain and France and Russia. Again the United States sent a note. China, with no backing anywhere in the world, had to accept the demands of Japan or enter into war. On May 25, a series of notes dictated by the Japanese minister at Peking and signed by the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave Japan control of Shangtung and put China in the hands of her island neighbor.

To show the danger of secret diplomacy to the maintenance of good faith in international relations, we have no more convincing example than the negotiations between Japan and Russia in the summer of 1916. At the suggestion of the French and the British, who were nervous about the pro-German influence at Petrograd and wanted to do everything they could to propitiate the Russian Foreign Office, Japan came to an understanding with Russia. A treaty was signed at the beginning of July, 1916, which was given out to the press. It read as follows:

The Imperial Government of Japan and the Imperial Government of Russia, resolved to unite their efforts to

the maintenance of lasting peace in the Far East, have agreed upon the following:—

ARTICLE ONE: Japan will not be a party to any political arrangement or combination directed against Russia. Russia will not be a party to any political arrangement or combination directed against Japan.

ARTICLE TWO: Should the territorial rights or the special interests in the Far East of one of the contracting parties recognized by the other contracting party be threatened, Japan and Russia will take counsel of each other as to the measures to be taken in view of the support or the help to be given in order to safeguard and defend those rights and interests.

The British press hailed this agreement as highly satisfactory: and it was pointed out by the government in parliament that Japan was not only acting fairly toward China and living up to the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, but was also doing all she could to knit more closely the bonds uniting the powers at war with Germany.

But after the Russian revolution, the archives of the Russian Foreign Office were published. A secret treaty, signed on July 3, 1916, was discovered. By its terms, Russia and Japan bound themselves mutually to safeguard China "against the political domination of any third Power entertaining hostile designs against Russia or Japan." It was an offensive and defensive alliance, operating from the moment "any

third Power" should attack either Russia or Japan in their vested positions on Chinese territory. The signing of this treaty was a violation of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and of Article Three of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance of July 13, 1911. As both contracting parties agreed that "the present convention shall be kept in complete secrecy from everybody," this evidence of bad faith might never have come to light had it not been for the publication of the Russian archives. But did not Great Britain in the following year make a secret treaty with the King of the Hedjaz, promising Damascus to the Arabs in violation of a previous agreement with France about the disposition of Syria? And what European government has the courage to publish its documents of the last quarter century? Let him who is without sin cast the first stone! Those who believe in the necessity of a complete change in diplomatic methods, if we are to have a durable peace, are encouraged by the determination of the Entente powers to bring Ex-Kaiser Wilhelm II to trial as responsible for the outbreak of war in 1914. For this trial will naturally lead to the publication of all the documents in the Foreign Offices

of the belligerent powers. In this way, and in this way alone, will the responsibility of secret diplomacy in causing—or at least in not preventing—wars, be established.

Without the knowledge of China, the Entente powers gave secret assurances (written except in the case of Italy) that when it came to signing peace with Germany, Japan should have the Shangtung peninsula and the German islands north of the equator. These negotiations, sanctioning a violation of the principles the Entente powers assured the world they were fighting for, were carried on and terminated at the very moment the United States was getting ready to enter the world war and to bring China with her to the aid of the Allies. The dates of these secret agreements are sadly significant. They are all in the early part of 1917, between the time America broke diplomatic relations and declared war. There was need for haste. When the Peace Conference assembled, the Entente powers wanted to be able to show the United States arrangements concluded before America became a belligerent. The Russian promise to Japan was given on February 20, following the British promise of February 16. France's obligation to

support Japan against China was signed on March 1. On March 28, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated orally that "the Italian Government had no objection regarding the matter."

In the autumn of 1917, Viscount Ishii visited the United States. After his negotiations with President Wilson and Secretary Lansing, the Department of State gave out for publication an exchange of notes between Secretary Lansing and Viscount Ishii, in which the two governments acknowledged complete agreement in regard to the intention not to "infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China" and the adherence "to the principle of the so-called 'open door' or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China." But the United States recognized "that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." The notes were accompanied by a curious statement of Secretary Lansing, which destroyed the impression of sincerity the simple publication of the notes might have made. It was evident from Mr. Lansing's verbose accompanying statement that the agreement with Viscount Ishii was a war

measure inspired by the need of more effective Japanese coöperation against Germany. The possibilities of the effects of the Russian revolution in Siberia were beginning to be envisaged. The Russian archives have given us the opinion of M. Krupensky, Russian minister at Peking at the time of the twenty-one demands, and ambassador at Tokio when Japan was negotiating with the United States. While Viscount Ishii was in Washington, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs told M. Krupensky that "the Japanese Government does not attach much importance to its recognition of the principle of the open door and the integrity of China," and that "in the negotiations by Viscount Ishii at Washington, the question at issue is not some special concession to Japan in any part of China, but Japan's special position in China as a whole." When M. Krupensky asked Viscount Motono "whether he did not fear that in the future, misunderstandings might arise from the different interpretations by Japan and the United States of the terms 'special position' and 'special interests' of Japan in China," the Russian ambassador gained the impression "that Viscount Motono is conscious of the possibility of misunderstandings in

the future, but believes that in such a case Japan would have better means at her disposal for carrying into effect her interpretation than the United States"!

The Chinese, when the Lansing-Ishii notes were published, could not help feeling that the United States was beginning to act like a European power. It was the first time in the history of American diplomacy that our government had been guilty of negotiating a diplomatic understanding regarding a great friendly nation without consulting that nation. Consequently, the Chinese Government protested against the Lansing-Ishii agreement, and declared that China could not permit herself to be bound by any agreement made between other nations. The suspicion that the United States had been "let in" was strengthened by the publication at Petrograd of Ambassador Krupensky's telegrams, which were never intended to see the light. But when President Wilson became a party to the Entente secret agreement concerning Shangtung and accepted the Japanese contention, without consulting the Chinese delegation at the Peace Conference, the Chinese concluded that American diplomacy had become contaminated, to the

point of losing all moral sense, by close contact with European methods and the European point of view.

In other chapters have been set forth the reasons for the entry of Japan into the world war, the military operations in the Shangtung peninsula, and the conquest of the German islands in the Pacific. The direct coöperation of Japan with the Entente powers was limited to the Kiaochau expedition, and in a naval way to patrolling the Pacific and Indian oceans, with the exception of a few destroyers sent into the Mediterranean.[1] From 1915 to 1917, there was frequent agitation in the Entente press for the participation of Japanese armies in Europe and western Asia. For a long time, French public opinion believed that Germany and her allies could not be conquered on land without the aid of more effectives than France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia could put into the field. Those who held this view certainly had reason on their side. For,

[1] At the Paris Peace Conference, Baron Makino told the press correspondents that the Japanese fleets in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and in the Meriterranean traversed over one million, two hundred thousand miles in the work of protecting transports and merchant vessels from the submarines. Three quarters of a million men, "rushing to the aid of France and Britain," were escorted by the Japanese.

while Germany grew constantly weaker internally, owing to the blockade, her armies seemed able to go from victory to victory. Not only did they hold in check the Entente armies, but each year they gained more ground. The intervention of the United States turned the tide in favor of the Entente. Japanese troops were no longer needed. But would not the victory have come sooner had Japan helped in Europe and in Mesopotamia? This question cannot be definitely answered. It raises another question: how many troops could Japan have sent to Europe? Transportation was lacking. What the United States accomplished later is no criterion. The distance across the Atlantic was much shorter. America was able to use more than half a million tons of German ships seized in her ports. She built herself an enormous tonnage with miraculous rapidity.

Whether the practical difficulties of transport of troops could have been solved or not, it is doubtful that Japan would have consented to succor her allies in this way. There was a large pro-German party in Japan, and in military circles the Japanese thought, up to the last few months of the war, Germany was going to win

out on land. Japan had plenty of available troops. Her standing army was over two hundred thousand. More than half a million men per year were eligible to military service. It would have been possible to mobilize a million and a half trained men without difficulty.

But Japan had other fish to fry. It was not to her interest to see the war end quickly or to have Germany crushed by her enemies. The longer the war lasted in Europe, the weaker the white race would become. And Japan, like the United States, was making money! She was left undisputed mistress of many markets. The manufacturing disorganization of Europe opened new vistas for Japan, of which she was quick to take advantage. I remember seeing in the summer of 1916 in the private office of a New York merchant a collection of articles Japan was offering. They covered almost everything Europe had produced before the war. In addition to this permanent manufacturing and trade development, which meant so much to the prosperity of Japan, Japanese houses had all the war orders they could fill. In this field, Japan rendered real services to her allies. Russia was cut off in western

Europe, and relied upon Japan for cannon and ammunition and war material of all sorts. Why should Japan fight in a war that did not involve her direct interests? None had rendered her practical aid during the life-and-death struggle with Russia. In 1914 and 1915, Japan returned to Europe the "watching with sympathetic interest" she had received from Europe ten years earlier!

Politically as well as economically, Japan made hay while the sun shone. She worked feverishly to strengthen her position in southern Manchuria, Liao-tung and Shangtung. As military measures were over in Shangtung, the Chinese tried to persuade the Japanese to terminate their military occupation of the province. We have already told the story of the twenty-one demands, and how Japan bullied China into accepting them. Japan was anxious above all things that China should not become a belligerent. A second Chinese proposal to enter the war, made in November, 1915, was bitterly opposed by the Japanese. When the intervention of the United States became inevitable, we have seen how Japan took her precautions, by means of secret

agreements with her allies, to discount any effort of China at the Peace Conference to secure a fair hearing of the Shangtung question.

China severed diplomatic relations with Germany on March 14, 1917, after sending a note of warning against the consequences of the submarine warfare. The declaration of war against Germany and Austria, for reasons of internal politics that are explained elsewhere, was not made until August 14, 1917. During these months, Japanese diplomacy worked hard to keep China out of the war.

When China became a belligerent, she encouraged the sending of laborers to work behind the battle lines in northern France. They were a great help to the British and French, and numbered before the armistice over one hundred and thirty thousand. In addition to these workers in France, a large number of Chinese were employed by the British in Mesopotamia and German East Africa. Chinese seamen were a precious aid on ships that might otherwise have been held up for lack of crews. China seized the German ships in her ports, and placed nine steamers at the disposal of the Allied governments. But when Peking offered to despatch an

army of one hundred thousand to France, there was immediate opposition. France and Great Britain had by this time fully rallied to the Japanese point of view that accepting armed aid from China would undoubtedly create "an embarrassing situation" at the Peace Conference. The Chinese proposal to send troops was enthusiastically received by the Inter-Allied Council in Paris, and accepted *en principe*. Later, the Chinese Government was told that the necessary tonnage for transport could not be assured. America promised ships: and then went back on her promise. Bad faith in dealing with this proposal of China is evident when we consider that there was always shiproom for the transport of many more than a hundred thousand Chinese coolies. France, also, was able to find accommodation for Chinese who were willing to work in munition factories.

The collapse of Russia turned the attention of the world to the war in the Far East after three years of quiet. A new situation was created for both China and Japan. Before China entered the war, the Bolshevist government began to negotiate with China. The Bolshevists declared that Russia renounced all treaty rights in Mon-

golia and Manchuria and in regard to the Boxer indemnity. Upon becoming a belligerent, China had to fall in with the Entente policy of refusing to recognize the Bolshevists. A commission of Entente powers was formed at Harbin, upon which America and China had representatives, to manage the North Manchurian Railway. The Chinese Government was called upon to police northern Manchuria, and this led to fighting with the Bolshevists, who had confiscated the railway and the properties of the administration. Although Russia dropped out of the war, the Russian Asiatic Bank at Peking took control of the North Manchurian Railway in the interest of the shareholders, most of whom were French. But China is determined to prevent a return to the old order of things. Most of the treaties between China and Russia were of a political nature, and were imposed upon China. In 1913, Russia compelled China to recognize the autonomy of Mongolia. The Manchurian agreements are a clear violation of Chinese sovereignty. China has notified the powers that she will never again recognize the Russian treaties. Czarist Russia is to have no heir in so far as privileges in China are concerned.

In the early part of 1918, the powers requested the coöperation of Japan in an international expedition against the Bolshevists in Siberia. The reason for Allied intervention was three-fold: to aid the Czecho-Slovak Army; to save the vast international stores in Vladivostok and elsewhere along the Siberian Railway from falling into the hands of the Bolshevists and German escaped prisoners; and to prevent the formation of a Bolshevist government in Siberia, which might become an ally of Germany. Although Japan was called upon to furnish the major portion of the expeditionary force, she was asked to give a pledge that she had no territorial designs in Siberia. In the United States and Japan, and in some circles in Europe, the idea of this expedition was bitterly opposed. It was a violation of the sovereignty of Russia, and the aims of Japan were suspected. Common agreement was finally reached. Japan did her part well. Her expeditionary force coöperated in the occupation of Vladivostok, and seized considerable supplies of arms as well as a number of small vessels that had been armed by the Germans on the Amur River. The Japanese penetrated as far as Irkutsk. Baron Makino said in Paris that the ma-

jor portion of Japanese troops had already been withdrawn and that Japan "will be glad when the day arrives on which, under the terms of the agreement, all foreign troops may be withdrawn from Siberia or from Russian territory, and an orderly government set up in those countries." The Chinese are afraid, however, that some secret agreement has been entered into by which Japan will eventually receive northern Manchuria and Vladivostok.

A prominent Chinaman, who had exceptional opportunities of knowing the inside of European diplomacy, told me shortly after the United States and China entered the war: "I am collecting carefully the speeches and newspaper comments in Great Britain and France on the proposals of Germany to the Pope concerning Belgium. The arguments of British and French statesmen and publicists are logical and just. Belgium has a right to the restoration of her entire and unrestricted independence. The pretensions of Germany to a special economic position in Antwerp are preposterous. Geographical propinquity and economic necessity are no longer acceptable arguments for violating the inherent rights of a nation to her own sovereignty. We

Chinese believe in President Wilson. We are encouraged by the speech of Mr. Asquith, who has said that the new era the Peace Conference will initiate is one in which the nations of the world, banded together in a league, are going to insist upon each nation being master of its own destinies, when historic wrongs will be righted, and when great powers who, by sheer military superiority, by bullying or by fraud, have taken another's property, will be compelled to disgorge. At the Peace Conference, we shall confront Japan, Great Britain, and other European natons with the deadly parallel. No special pleading, no sophistry, will be able to turn aside our just demands. We have our Antwerps in the hands of the foreigner. The title to them is no better than Germany's title to the great Belgian seaport."

This was the attitude of the Chinese when the Peace Conference assembled. The Chinese delegates felt that the Treaty of Versailles would be drafted on the basis of President Wilson's "fourteen points and subsequent discourses." Had not this solemn assurance been given to the world by the Supreme War Council at Versailles in regard to the treatment of Germany before the

armistice was signed? If enemies were to be treated on the basis of justice, how much more had allies the right to just treatment! Consequently, the Chinese delegation formulated demands for the return of the Shangtung peninsula to China, and expressed the hope of a readjustment in the Far East that would make possible the formation of a society of nations, working in common for the establishment and maintenance of a durable peace.

The European statesmen received enthusiastically every demand of China that was against the interests of Germany. Of course Germany should give up all the privileges and concessions she had wrested from China! Of course Germany should waive for her subjects rights of extraterritoriality and special trading-privileges! Of course Germany should restore to China the astronomical instruments stolen from Peking! Of course Germany should receive no more Boxer indemnity! The French and the British went farther. They pointed out that this was a golden opportunity for China to expel all Germans and Austrians, business men and missionaries and educators alike, from her territory. But when it came to giving up any

of their own privileges, similarly wrested from China, to waiving their own Boxer indemnities, the victorious powers could not see it that way. And President Wilson was confronted with secret treaties between Japan and the other Entente powers by which Japan was given Germany's place in Kiao-chau and the Shangtung peninsula. President Wilson denied his own principles. He betrayed the faith the Chinese had put in him. In vain the Chinese delegates reminded the American President that he had formally invited them to enter the world war, pledging the United States to fight for and secure the triumph of the principles that were now being violated.

A new era of unrest, leading inevitably to war and wrecking the conception of the society of nations, was inaugurated in the Far East by the insertion in the Treaty of Versailles of Articles 156, 157, and 158. Germany renounces in favor of Japan "all her rights, titles and privileges which she acquired in virtue of the treaty by her with China on March 6, 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the Province of Shangtung." Instead of the Shangtung settlement being an "open covenant, openly arrived at," the

Chinese Government had no say in it. The Chinese delegates did not know about it until several days after it had been agreed upon. When they presented a memorial to the "Principal Allied and Associated Powers," pointing out that a population of Chinese as large as the total population of France was being turned over to an hereditary enemy without being consulted or even notified, President Wilson and his associates did not deem it necessary to answer the Chinese protest. What could they have said?

One of the most remarkable documents the Peace Conference has given birth to is the statement issued by the Chinese Peace Delegation. Dignified and restrained, but remorselessly logical, it is a scathing indictment of the Treaty of Versailles in its effect upon the Far East. I cannot close this chapter better than by quoting its salient points:

China came to the Conference with strong faith in the lofty principles adopted by the Allied and Associated Powers as the basis of a just and permanent world peace. Great, therefore, will be the disappointment and disillusionment of the Chinese people over the proposed settlement. If there was reason for the Council to stand firm on the question of Fiume, there would seem all the more reason to uphold China's claim relating to Shangtung, which involves the future welfare of thirty-six million

souls and the highest interests of peace in the Far East. . . .

The German rights in Shangtung originated in an act of wanton aggression in 1897, characteristic of Prussian militarism. To transfer these rights to Japan is therefore to perpetuate an act of aggression which has been resented by the Chinese people ever since its perpetration.

Moreover, owing to China's declaration of war against the Teutonic Powers, and the abrogation of all treaties and agreements between China and these Powers, the German rights automatically reverted to China. This declaration was officially notified to and taken cognizance of by the Allied and Associated Governments. . . . The Council has bestowed on Japan rights not of Germany but of China, not of the enemy but of an ally. Such virtual substitution of Japan for Germany in Shangtung, serious enough in itself, becomes grave when the position of Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia is read in connection with it. Firmly entrenched on both sides of the Gulf of Peichili—the water outlet of Peking—with a hold on three trunk lines issuing from Peking and connecting it with the rest of China, the capital becomes but an enclave in the midst of Japanese influence. Besides, Shangtung is China's Holy Land, packed with memories of Confucius and Mencius and hallowed as the cradle of Chinese civilization. . . .

The Chinese Delegation understands that the decision of the Council has been prompted by the fact that Great Britain and France had undertaken in February and March, 1917, to support at the Peace Conference the claims of Japan to German rights in Shangtung. To none of these secret agreements, however, was China a party, nor was she informed of their contents when she was

invited to join the war against the Central Powers. The fortunes of China appear thus to have been made an object of negotiation and compensation after she had already definitely aligned herself with the Allied cause.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN EMINENT DOMAIN

THE most important events in the contemporary history of Asia are the Russo-Japanese War and the participation of Japan in the war of 1914. Together they constituted a challenge to the doctrine of European eminent domain. The immediate objectives of Japan were the elimination of Russia and Germany as colonial factors in Eastern Asia. The ultimate objective was the elimination of all European powers as the masters of Asiatic races. The imperialists in Europe who rejoiced over the discomfiture of Russia and Germany saw no farther than the end of their noses. They welcomed the aid of Japan in destroying the aspirations of rivals, thinking that what Japan was doing would contribute to their own security in Asia. Fear of Russian aggression had haunted the British. The schemes of Germany were a

menace to the British and the French. What a foolish delusion!

In the eyes of Asiatics, the victories of the Japanese over the Russians on the battle-fields of Manchuria were the victories of Asiatics over Europeans. They were the beginning of the great struggle for emancipation. Europeans were no longer invincible. They no longer enjoyed the monopoly of ability to handle armies and navies. The doctrine of European eminent domain had been imposed upon Asiatics by force. An Asiatic race had given proof of superior force. The repercussion of the Russo-Japanese War was felt throughout Asia. Nationalist movements, which had long been in the embryo, came to light from Cairo and Constantinople to Batavia and Peking. The European powers had to deal with Young Egyptians, Young Turks, Young Persians, Young Hindus, Young Siamese, Young Chinese—all claiming the same thing, the right of Asiatics to govern Asia. In the midst of this ferment came the war of 1914. Japan did not hesitate. She summoned Germany to get out of China. When Germany refused, Japan forced her out. A triumph for the Entente powers? The answer depends upon whether we

believe that the action of Japan in the Shangtung peninsula was inspired by enmity to Germany or by the splendid opportunity to eliminate easily another European intruder.

In this book we have seen how Japan followed up her victory over Russia and her victory over Germany. In 1915 as in 1906 Japan demonstrated clearly that her challenge was to the doctrine of *European* eminent domain and not to the doctrine of eminent domain. She had studied European models in creating an army and a navy. She used European models also in establishing a foreign policy. Her attitude toward Korea, Manchuria, and China was inspired by long and careful observation of the diplomacy of London, Paris, and Berlin. Instead of promulgating, as they could have done, a Monroe Doctrine for Asia, the Japanese became a great power with imperialistic ambitions. Japan accepted and started to put into force the doctrine of eminent domain. If the war of 1914 had remained throughout a struggle between two groups of belligerents, its only result in Asia would have been the addition of Japan to the European powers as a factor not to be ignored in the future division and readjustment of colonial spoils.

Great Britain would have had to make sacrifices to appease Japan and keep her friendly, as she had done with France in 1904 and with Russia in 1907.

But the war did not end as it had begun. The United States entered in 1917, followed by China and Siam. When the time for making peace arrived, the prophetic words of an English writer were realized. In "The Problem of the Commonwealth," Mr. L. Curtis had written:

> If it is true in America that people must be left to govern themselves irrespective of their capacity for the task, then it is also true in Europe, Asia and Africa. The world is not large enough to contain two moralities on a subject like this.

During the war the public pronouncements of premiers and cabinet ministers of the belligerent powers were wholly academic. Secret diplomacy, far from being abandoned, was more pernicious than ever in its activities. In anticipation of victory, statesmen carved up empires and allotted territories and peoples with no thought of seeking the consent of those whose destinies were being bartered. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, although pressed by radical deputies and newspapers to state frankly Germany's gen-

eral conception of what the peace terms should be, consistently refused. He was unmoved by the argument that such a statement was needed to prove to the enemies of Germany—and to the German people as well—that Germany was not pursuing a war of conquest. In spite of the formal resolution voted by the Reichstag in July, 1917, Doctor Michaelis continued his predecessor's policy of silence. The German answer to the Pope's peace overture was as vague as all other official statements of Germany's war aims. The treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest were "old-fashioned" in every particular. Up to the moment of collapse, when all was lost, no German statesman had expressed the intention of making any other than a purely imperialistic peace.

Unfortunately, there was the same reluctance on the other side. Until the United States entered the war we knew nothing definite and concrete about the ideas of Entente statesmen concerning peace. They were unresponsive to the argument that a general statement of peace terms, in detailed and explicit form, would have convinced the German people that their kaiser and leaders had lied to them in declaring that Ger-

many was fighting a defensive war. If a decisive military victory had come to either side, there would have been no statement of the bases of peace before the armistice was signed. Statesmen had no other thought than to put down cards that spelled *vae victis*. This is what President Wilson had in mind and feared when he told European statesmen that a just and durable peace must be a "peace without victory."

In the heat of the struggle, independent thinkers in the belligerent countries had the courage to protest in press and parliament against secret diplomacy. They pointed out that if the diplomatic arrangements of the war were envisaged in the same spirit and concluded in accordance with the same principles that have prevailed in Europe up to this time, there would be a shipwreck of hopes of general disarmament and formation of the society of nations. But even in Great Britain and France, where public opinion is most enlightened and best informed, protests against secret diplomacy were greeted with suspicion, and the setting forth of constructive programs met with ridicule and opprobrium. Because they condemned Prussian ideas of diplomacy, critics of "diplomatic agreements" were

denounced as Prussian sympathizers—and then persecuted in the Prussian way! The old baneful secrecy was maintained against leading questions in parliaments. Inquisitive articles were suppressed by the censorship. The great mass of intelligent men feared having their patriotism questioned when they tried to express their thoughts logically and constructively. It is a sad commentary on democracy that, although M. Sazonoff in Russia, M. Delcassé in France, and Lord Grey in England were dismissed from office, the public who dismissed them blindly continued to support and fight for the accomplishment of territorial and political changes arranged by these Foreign Ministers, although still in ignorance of the nature and extent of the changes. How strong is the force of tradition! How pervasive is the unwillingness to resist the current of national passion!

President Wilson's suggestion of a Monroe Doctrine for the world did not have a good press among the belligerents. There were two reasons for this, resentment of the intrusion of an outsider and the determination that no neutral should be allowed to have any say or part in the reconstruction of the world after the war. To

old-fashioned diplomatists and to Tories and Junkers and Imperialists, President Wilson's ideas were subversive. There had been a lot of talk on both sides about fighting for freedom of small nationalities and about a new era in international relations. But that was to create and maintain fighting-spirit and to gain the support of neutral sentiment. Even if, in order to win, there would have to be a limited application of the principle of freedom for small nationalities in Europe, the proclamation of the principle was never, come what may, intended for extra-European consumption. The inner circles in Europe were planning another Congress of Vienna, and they had been successful for two and a half years in keeping the management of the war and international negotiations in their own hands. Socialists and Radicals made a big noise but had slight influence. Then came the events of the early spring of 1917 which removed from the power of the diplomats the shaping of the destinies of Europe and the world, and brought into question the secret treaties that had been concluded among belligerents.

The Russian revolution soon got into the hands of the extremists. Moderate liberal elements

had not shown themselves fearless enough and powerful enough to overthrow czarism. This told against them when they tried to get control of the new régime. Because they had made the revolution, the Socialists became masters of Russia. While assuring their allies that they would continue the war, they stated clearly what M. Miliukoff had tried to administer in the form of a sugar-coated pill, with more sugar than pill. The new Russia did not feel herself bound in the slightest way by secret diplomatic agreements entered into without the knowledge and consent of the Russian people. Since fighting for conquest and for the domination and enslavement of nations was contrary to the very nature of the Russian revolution, the other Entente powers were asked to revise the existing diplomatic agreements and to put the common cause openly and frankly upon the high plane of a battle of democracy against autocracy. When Russia came under the control of the Bolshevists, she could no longer be considered as a colonial power. Disorder and anarchy led to a voluntary renunciation of interest, not only in new colonial projects, but in the future of Russia's Asiatic possessions.

A few weeks after the deposition of the czar, the refusal of Germany to withdraw her declaration of unlimited submarine warfare brought the United States into the conflict. Immediately President Wilson's speech before the American Senate, which had aroused the bitter resentment of European diplomatists in January, became vitally significant. President Wilson said that the United States had entered the war with the sole view of securing peace to the world by overthrowing German militarism and autocracy. He solemnly repeated his previous declaration that the United States committed herself to the establishment of a new era in world history and international relations by the application of the principle of "the consent of the governed." In the first enthusiasm over American intervention, M. Ribot said to the French Chamber of Deputies: "The only peace that can be entertained by Europe is a peace based upon the right of every nation to decide its own destiny."

I have quoted M. Ribot's exact words. But he would be the first to protest with vehemence if they were taken to mean *every nation in the world.* He would probably reply without hesita-

tion: "Why, of course it is understood that I was speaking of European nations!" Is it understood? If understood by Europeans, is it understood by extra-Europeans, Americans as well as Africans and Asiatics? Here comes the challenge to European eminent domain. What started as a European war became a world war, the first real world war of history. During four centuries, European nations fought one another in Europe and outside of Europe for the control of other continents. "Natives" of the other continents were enlisted by Europeans to kill other Europeans—but on extra-European soil. From its incipiency the recent war was different. To meet the first shock of the German invasion Great Britain and France introduced into Europe as many Asiatics and Africans as they had available, called them their "brothers in arms fighting in the common cause of the defense of civilization against the barbarians" and invited them to die *for their liberties* on the battle-fields of Flanders and eastern France. "Native" troops were used prodigally in Egypt and Mesopotamia, at Gallipoli and Saloniki. To stimulate their fighting ardor and reconcile them to hardships and sacri-

fices, Asiatics and Africans were told that the war was their war, fought for the establishment of world-wide justice and freedom.

One could not go into a factory town of France without meeting at every turn laborers from the French African and Asiatic colonies, brought to Europe (in some cases forcibly) to work in munition plants. Africans and Asiatics unloaded ships at French ports, and took up the garbage and swept the streets of Paris. Japan patrolled the Pacific waters, escorted troop-ships from India, New Zealand, and Australia, helped put down the Singapore mutiny, and coöperated against submarines in the Mediterranean. French editors invited Japan to send armies to Europe, believing that it was the only way to secure victory. Japan did coöperate in the expedition into Siberia against the Bolshevists. China sent several hundred thousand laborers to France, tens of thousands of whom were used by the British at the front and were subjected to the dangers of combatant troops. Siam actually sent troops to France. Great Britain accepted millions of pounds as war gifts from Indian princes. Most of the states of the two Americas became belligerents. Lastly—and this is by no

means the least significant of the facts I have enumerated—Russia, in victorious offensives as well as in hours of bitter defeat, leaned heavily upon Asiatic contingents. Have we not always heard that the best Russian troops were Asiatics —Cossacks and Tartars? The hold of Bolshevism upon Russia was gained and has been maintained by Kirghiz and Chinese mercenaries. When the two Americas were called upon for help in winning a peace based upon the principle of the freedom of nations to decide their own destinies, the Entente powers had in mind only Belgium and Serbia and Poland and Bohemia and Rumania. But they set in motion forces which, in their own population and in the self-governing dominions of Great Britain as well as in the United States and the other American republics, are going to insist upon a wider application of the principle. Asiatics and Africans, who contributed to the blocking of German schemes to world empire and whose aid is still being relied upon in enforcing the decisions of the Peace Conference, have plenty of backing in America—and also in Europe—when they insist that the principle of freeing subject nationalities from the yoke of the foreigner be applied to them

also, and that they sit as equals in the new society of nations.

A dilemma confronted the peacemakers at Paris: their formula had to be either the reëstablishment of the *status quo ante-bellum* or a world-wide territorial and political readjustment. Once the *status quo* of 1914 was upset and questions raised of how titles were acquired and what "the consent of the governed" meant, the doctrine of European eminent domain was challenged. Quite unconsciously, I think, Mr. Lloyd George was betrayed into making the challenge himself, when he told the House of Commons that Germany's African colonies could not in justice be returned to Germany "without the consent of the natives"! If the natives of Germany's African colonies are intelligent and advanced enough to have an opinion as to whom they prefer for masters, is it not equally true of the African colonies of other European powers? Unless the same principle be applied everywhere, outside of Europe as well as in Europe, we either acknowledge the fallacy of declaring that we are acting in accordance with the idea that right makes might or we are self-convicted hypocrites. I am not sentimental and impractical, nor am I

trying to confuse the issues of the war by fishing in troubled waters. I am setting forth here other issues of the war that have not occurred to those whose vision goes no farther than the defeat of Germany. The challenge to European eminent domain is the inevitable result of attempting to change the *status quo* in Europe by the application of another principle than the law of force. We cannot get away from the truth tersely expressed by Mr. Curtis: "The world is not large enough to contain two moralities on a subject like this."

The weakest point of the project for the society of nations presented by President Wilson to the Peace Conference was Article X, which provided for the guarantee by all the members of the society of each member's territorial integrity. I believe that it was the sponsorship of this article which caused President Wilson to lose the support of many thoughtful men who had up to that moment stood behind him. In all the course of history no political combination was ever devised to consecrate the infallibility of the decisions of a peace conference. The Conference of Paris became a more secret and closer corporation than its predecessors of the nineteenth cen-

tury. Uncontrolled either by public opinion or an intimate and comprehensive knowledge of many of the matters they were deciding upon, four men tried to make a treaty of peace, by bargaining and compromising, which they expected the enemy to accept without discussion and the League of Nations to guarantee for all time!

President Wilson's society of nations proposal, as he presented it to the Peace Conference, was a document intended to secure the guarantee of the world for the new territorial and political order in Europe and for the continuance of the old order outside of Europe.

The political organisms of Europe, as they existed in 1914, were determined partly by a succession of wars through centuries and partly by the working out of economic laws. The title to virtually all of the colonial possessions of Europe overseas rests on superior force. European colonial possessions were gained by the waging of wars. Titles passed from European states who could not defend their colonies to more aggressive European states who ousted the former possessors by fighting. A study of the evolution of Europe into states and of the expansion of Europe outside of Europe is a necessary antidote to

the plausibly expressed and glibly repeated programs of politicians and partisan writers for remaking the map of Europe and the rest of the world. When one comes to appreciate the influence of economic factors in determining political boundaries and colonial expansion, wars appear most often as results rather than causes, and conflicting national propagandas are seen to be the efforts of rival traders to extend market areas. Condemning pan-Germanism, we must remember that in statements of aspiration and underlying motives, there is a striking similarity between German irredentism and the irredentism of other nations, and that in longing for her "place in the sun," Germany is acting just as other European nations acted in the century following the achievement of their national unity. Past history is not needed to corroborate this statement. We have a contemporary example. Italy, who achieved her political unity at the same time as Germany, exhibits to-day exactly the same irredentist and colonial empire symptoms.

If we approve and are willing to give our sons' blood for the maintenance of the changes in the *status quo* of Europe, on the ground that the old *status quo* was the result of the working of the

law of force and violated the principle of self-government, are we logical in our position unless we reject equally the extra-European *status quo* on the same ground?

For many years before the outbreak of the war, I supplemented reading polemical and propagandist literature by personal investigation in most of the parts of Europe where a change in the *status quo ante-bellum* has been made by the Treaty of Versailles. I have also studied the polemical and propagandist literature of African and Asiatic movements, and have visited in their homes many leaders in the effort to rid these countries of their European masters. The similarity between the arguments against the maintenance of the *status quo* advanced by European and extra-European subject races is remarkable, and the arguments used by the possessors, in one case and the other, to justify their titles are identical. Even the blindest of partisans can hardly refuse to see and admit the parallels.

1. *Present rulers:* "We have won this country (colony, protectorate) by the expenditure of blood and treasure." *Subject race:* "We do not recognize your title acquired by force."

2. *Present rulers:* "This country (colony,

protectorate) came to us by a treaty made with its former possessor and which all Europe ratified, if not specifically, at least tacitly." *Subject race:* "We had no say in the treaty of which you speak, so it does not bind us; and as you mean by 'all Europe' the statesmen of the great powers, we answer that they did not consult us, that their approval was based upon a real or fancied advantage to themselves and was influenced neither by our desires nor by our welfare. Your title, then, based on such consent and ratification, is null and void."

3. *Present rulers:* "Your king (chief) gave us this country (colony, protectorate)." *Subject race:* "But times are changed, and you fought the recent war because you denied the right of a ruler to decide the destinies of his people."

4. *Present rulers:* "We have been here a long time, and the time is past when our title can be challenged. You have become an integral part of our empire." *Subject race:* "The French have always maintained in regard to Alsace and Lorraine that title based on right cannot be outlawed. If this be true in that case, it is equally true in our case."

5. *Present rulers:* "We are in possession, and in peaceful possession. We maintain order here. No other states, and not even you yourselves, oppose us." *Subject race:* "You are in possession, and in peaceful possession, because you have quartered upon us an armed force, for which you make us pay. Other states do not dispute your title, solely because they know you would fight them to maintain it, and they are either not strong enough or do not want us badly enough to challenge your title."

6. *Present rulers:* "If we leave you, you cannot defend yourselves against an aggressor." *Subject race:* "What happens if you get out concerns us and not you. If you think it does concern you and that it would be a calamity to your interests to have another nation installed here in your place, you would fight to defend us anyway. But have you not created a society of nations to protect the *status quo* established by the Peace Conference? If you realize that ideal, this argument of yours for staying here will no longer have value."

7. *Present rulers:* "But we cannot leave you because of our enormous investments in this country (colony, protectorate). Not only have

we put, as individuals and as a government, enormous sums in the development of your country (colony, protectorate), but you owe a large part of your national debt to us." *Subject race:* "We waive the observations we could justly make, namely, that your investments were at your own risk and for your own profit, and that you have loaned us as a nation money which you have spent for us without our consent or advice, and a large part of it to strengthen your hold over us. We point simply to the fact that you would never accept this argument, if it were directed against you. Nor do you accept it when directed against Belgium and other small states. You have larger private investments and larger interest in the national debt in very many independent states than you have in ours."

8. *Present rulers:* "But we are here for your benefit and your interest." *Subject race:* "Only secondarily. Whenever our benefit and our interest happen to be contrary to yours, your officials here act against us and for the interest of the country from which they came."

9. *Present rulers:* "Our rule has given you material prosperity beyond anything you ever had or ever dreamed of before, and which you would

no longer enjoy if left to yourselves." *Subject race:* "Material prosperity does not compensate for the lack of the right of self-government, which you hold to be your most precious possession and the cause of your high degree of civilization, but which you deny to us."

10. *Present rulers:* "You are not ready for self-government." *Subject race:* "A race that does not have the chance to guide its own destinies, no matter how well off it may be in subjection, can never advance morally and become highly civilized and self-respecting."

11. *Present rulers:* "Officials of your own race, and your substantial land-owning and industrial classes, do not want us to get out. They would consider it a calamity if we did get out." *Subject race:* "You have bribed our official classes by paying them large sums out of our pockets, and they are your creatures because they are dependent on you and not on us for their jobs. As for our substantial land-owning and industrial classes, you keep them favorable to your rule by favoring their privileged position in a way that you do not favor similar classes in your own country. You are advocates of universal suffrage, equality before the law, and other demo-

cratic principles in your own country. Here you deliberately protect feudalism and irresponsible bureaucracy because you know that in no other way would you have indigenous partisans of your rule."

12. *Present rulers:* "If we withdrew, anarchy would follow. We repeat what we have said above, that we have put a lot of money into this country (colony, protectorate) and have guaranteed your debts. Not only our own citizens but those of other nations have settled and invested money in this country (colony, protectorate) because they had confidence in us as your rulers. So we do not intend to get out or let the reins of government pass from our control." *Subject race:* "What nation has evolved to self-government except by passing through anarchy, civil wars, and revolutions, during which property was destroyed and lives were lost? We are not foolish enough to believe that we shall attain your civilization without passing through such periods ourselves. But we ask you in the name of fairness, do you think that you could have been prepared for self-government by an alien race, different in background, in religion, in language, and which considered itself superior to

your race? Had some outside nation prevented your evolution, where would you be to-day? As for the financial argument, since you bring it up again, do you intend to interfere in the evolution of Russia on the ground of unwillingness to see your investments and trade and the lives of people jeopardized?"

In these twelve pros and contras, I have tried to cover the ground of contention between subject races and their masters. If we are honestly working for constructive world peace, it is of prime importance to consider the arguments of dominant races and subject races wholly aside from the heat and passion that remains from the conflict between the two groups of European powers. The reason for doing this *sautent aux yeux,* as the French say.

Nationalist movements interested the world at large very little before the recent war. The general public was unacquainted with the existence of most of them, let alone with their merits and demerits. Aside from students and travelers and those who were directly affected, none took the trouble to familiarize himself with those movements. Consequently, when the war broke

out, public opinion all over the world, lacking ante-bellum knowledge of the aspirations and claims of subject races, accepted at face-value statements of partisan writers who did not hesitate to denature the truth for the sake of propaganda. We were asked to believe, for example, that the Ukrainian and Finnish movements were the work of German agents and not at all on the same footing as the Czech and Yugo-Slavic movements; that Turkey was responsible for anti-British feeling in Egypt and India; and that only the natives of the *German* colonies in Africa were eager to get rid of their white masters. Hostility in Albania to the Serbians during the retreat of 1915 and to the Italians afterward was represented as the result of Austrian intrigue. Similarly, German newspapers told their readers that the troubles of Austria-Hungary with her Slavic elements and the revolt of the Arabs against Turkey were due to the machinations of the Entente.

Woefully misled were statesmen, publicists, college professors, and lecturers who believed that during the war and the Peace Conference patriotism demanded of them, if not actual *suggestio falsi,* at least *suppressio veri.* When

Ex-President Taft was speaking at a great meeting in championship of the League of Nations and mentioned the necessity of establishing the principle of self-determination for the former Baltic provinces of Russia, some one interrupted: "How about Ireland?" Mr. Taft answered: "Let us be practical. Ireland is an internal question of the British Empire, and it is not our business to mix up in it." If the League of Nations is conceived as a combination of victorious powers to enforce principles only to the detriment of conquered enemies, the answer was logical. But unless we are pro-human instead of anti-German, unless we are universal in our consideration of the aspirations and claims of weak nations and subject races, we are using our influence against the triumph of the conception of a genuine society of nations. The war has awakened in all humanity a demand for a new international and colonial morality.

The proposition to establish a society of nations is before the world. Its corollary is the challenge to European eminent domain from four sources: the nations, big and small, who are not rich in colonies and protectorates; the self-governing dominions of the British Empire; the "na-

tives" who are the political and social, and in many cases economic, victims of the doctrine of European eminent domain; and the democrats of all countries, including those who hold colonies and protectorates. The challenge from the first and second of these sources is motived by interest, from the third by the very logic of the new order proposed in the society of nations, and from the fourth by hatred of hypocrisy and by the conviction that imperialism is the deadly foe of democracy.

Those who demand the open door to trade in Africa and Asia, on the basis of absolute equality with the owners of colonies, cannot accept the doctrine of European eminent domain, incorporated in a charter of a new-world order of which they are to be co-guarantors. Overseas Britons, having helped to defend old colonies and win new ones, want a share in the ownership and management of them. Those who are denied the right of self-government simply because they are not Europeans or Americans protest against the approval of their tutelage by the society of nations. The questions opened and the problems posed by these three groups of challengers are too numerous and complicated to be discussed here. By

far the most important challenge is that of the fourth group, which believes that the peace of the world is dependent upon the triumph of democracy.

Putting idealism aside and basing our argument on recent European history, we have the most practical grounds for asserting that European eminent domain can be considered a permanent danger to the world's peace. In the prosecution of the recent war and in drawing up the terms of peace, we adopted toward Germany Cato's attitude toward Carthage. But we must not allow ourselves to forget that at the beginning of the twentieth century, British statesmen and British newspapers regarded France, and not Germany, as the "disturber of the world's peace." After France, Russia was considered Britain's potential enemy. On the other hand, in the minds of British imperialists, Germany was a friend to be cultivated. Easily accessible proofs of these statements are not lacking. We have the testament of Cecil Rhodes as well as the letters of his later years; the correspondence between the Foreign Office and the British Minister in Morocco where the British were coöperating whole-heartedly with the Ger-

mans in opposing France; and the files of London newspapers, particularly the "Daily Mail," in which the present Lord Northcliffe's aversion for France was as marked as his admiration for Germany. Events since 1914 prove that there was no natural antipathy between French and British. But war was averted fifteen years earlier only because France was not strong enough to back by force her own colonial ambitions in Africa against Great Britain's. War between Great Britain and Russia was averted only because Japan attacked Russia first. Is it possible to study the history of India and Egypt during the past generation without seeing that the seeds of trouble for Great Britain in these countries were sowed not by Germany but by Russia and France?

Speaking at Leeds on September 26, 1917, Mr. Asquith formulated the aspiration of democracy the world over. He said:

> Prussian militarism has been and is our objective, since it chose to force matters to an issue. But the peace for which we are fighting is not the restoration of the *status quo,* not the revival in some revised shape of what used to be called the balance of power. It is the substitution for one and the other of an international system, in which there will be a place for great and for

small states and under which both alike can be ensured a stable foundation and an independent development. For the first time in history, we may make an advance to the realization of an ideal. It is the creation no longer of a merely European policy, but since our kinsmen across the Atlantic have joined hands with us, of a world-wide polity, uniting the peoples in a confederation of which justice will be the base and liberty the corner-stone.

Mr. Asquith is right. He has voiced a truth which will prevail against the irresolution and expediency of the Conference of Paris. The moment has passed when peace could be patched up, to use Mr. Asquith's own words, on the basis of "nebulous and unctuous generalities." The leader of British liberalism held up to us the "newer and truer perspective."

When we examine analytically and weigh dispassionately arguments advanced for the maintenance of European eminent domain, we realize that they are based upon principles we have proscribed. They are the principles of Prussian militarists and of the German Imperial Government. For European eminent domain is the doctrine of the *Uebermensch* put into practice. Races, believing in their superiority, imposed by force their rule and *Kultur* upon inferior races. European eminent domain has no justification,

unless one believes either (*a*) that our particular idea of civilization is so essential to the world's happiness and well-being that it must be built up and spread and maintained by force; or (*b*) that "superior races" have the right to exploit, or at least to direct the destinies of, "inferior races"; or (*c*) that the bestowal of material blessings upon people is adequate compensation for denying them the right of governing themselves.

Can a man believe in "the white man's burden" —with all that this phrase implies—and at the same time condemn what we fought Germany to destroy?

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on 31 October, 2019